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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the pattern of transition from the 
precapitalist to the capitalist mode of production in Iran, 
and the specific character of capitalist development within 
the period of 1800-1978.
The general theoretical framework around which the empirical 
and historical evidence from Iran is organized is based on 
three main theses. The first thesis is that, through the 
approach of the internationalization of capital, it is 
possible to cut across the formal distinction between 
'circulationism' and 'productionism' and to bring elements 
of the two perspectives together. The approach of the 
internationalization of capital is based on the historic 
periodization of the development of the world market, 
distinguishing between the three circuits of capital 
(merchant, money and productive capitals), and specifying 
the dynamics of the successive internationalization of each 
circuit. Emphasis is placed on the forms of subsumption of 
labour by capital (formal and real subsumption of labour) 
and modes of surplus labour extraction (absolute and 
relative surplus-value appropriation) in identifying the 
dynamics of the internationalization of each circuit of 
capital. This approach allows us to take into account both 
exchange and production relations. While the sphere of 
production always plays a determinant role in shaping the 
centre/periphery relationship, the sphere of exchange is 
dominant in certain historical cojunctures. This is the 
second thesis of this study.
The third thesis of this study is that the mechanisms of 
transition to capitalism in the periphery are fundamentally 
different from those in the centre. The endogenous model of 
transition in the centre cannot be transposed to peripheral 
formations where the transformation of production relations 
has occurred in the context of incorporation into a world 
market in which capitalism had already asserted itself. The 
approach of the internationalization of capital specifies 
the different trajectory taken in the transition to
iv
capitalism in the periphery.
Two structural features of the process of transition to 
capitalism in the periphery are focused upon in order to 
highlight the specificity of this process. First, drawing 
upon Marx's distinction between the 'first path' of 
transition, direct-producer/capitalist, and the 'second 
path', merchant/capitalist, it is argued that the 
internationalization of the circuit of merchant capital has 
blocked the 'first path' of transition to capitalism in the 
periphery, and has imposed the 'second path'. Second, 
internationalization of the circuits of money and productive 
capital in the periphery has not led to the generalization 
of capitalist wage-labour and the real subsumption of labour 
by capital. Despite the destruction of precapitalist modes 
of production in the periphery, non-capitalist 'forms' of 
production are seen to have survived and are restructured as 
integral components of the dominant capitalist mode of 
production.
In relating this approach to the historical experience of 
capitalist development in Iran, the period under 
consideration is divided into two main phases. The first 
phase (1800-1950) is characterized by the 
internationalization of the circuit of merchant capital, 
which not only blocked an organic transition to capitalism 
but also consolidated the precapitalist mode of production 
and intensified production of commodities for the world 
market on that basis. At this phase labour processes were 
formally subsumed by capital, and the sphere of exchange was 
dominant in establishing the relationship of the Iranian 
economy with the world market. The second phase (1950-1978) 
is distinguished by the internationalization of money 
capital, which led to the capitalist transformation of the 
economy and real subsumption of labour processes by capital. 
At this phase, the sphere of production was both dominant 
and determinant in shaping the relationship of the Iranian 
economy with the world market. However, the evidence drawn 
from the Iranian case-study shows that, although capitalism 
became the dominant mode of production in the 1970s, and
Vdespite the movement towards the internationalization of 
productive capital, proletarianization and real subsumption 
of labour by capital were accompanied by the survival and 
re-structuration of non-capitalist 'forms' of production as 
integral components of the expanded reproduction of capital 
in both urban and rural areas. The imposition of the 'second 
path' of transition by merchant capital, and the survival of 
non-capitalist 'forms' of production in the present phase of 
productive capital are seen as the defining features of the 
peripheral character of capitalism in Iran.
The Iranian case, as an example of peripheral capital 
accumulation, shows that: (i) the dynamics of transition to
capitalism in the periphery are fundamentally different from 
those of the centre, and there is no justification for 
extending the 'classical' model of transition into a general 
theory of capitalist developemnt; and (ii) the 
centre/periphery relationship cannot be characterized either 
in terms of perpetual stagnation and underdevelopment or in 
terms of the development and eventual homogenization of 
relations of production. A diversified treatment of both 
capital and precapitalist modes of production, and of the 
historical periodization of world capital accumulation, 
provides a synthesis which cuts across these overly simple 
classifications.
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EXPLANATORY NOTES
CITATIONS: The bibliography of works cited, at the end of 
the text, indicates the editions used; page references are 
to these editions.
Notes will be found at the end of each Chapter.
CURRENCY: The following exchange rates, being roughly the
market rate, will be used for all market transactions;
1956-1970, U.S. $1.00 equals 76.5 rials (R76.5)
1971-1972, U.S. $1.00 equals R75.7 
1973-1975, U.S. $1.00 equals R67.5 
1976-1978, U.S. $1.00 equals R70.5
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1INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to analyze the specific pattern 
of transition from the precapitalist to the capitalist mode 
of production (CMP) in Iran, and the character of capitalist 
development, following the incorporation of the Iranian 
economy into the world market in the period from 1800 to 
1978. The first two chapters of this study establish a 
theoretical context for the subsequent discussion of the 
Iranian case-study. A number of conceptual propositions are 
advanced in these chapters, which, it is argued, provide an 
alternative approach to the study of transition and 
capitalist development in the periphery. The last four 
chapters of this study constitute an analysis of the Iranian 
case-study in the context of this theoretical framework.
The first chapter provides a general background to the 
approach adopted in this study through an examination of the 
fields of both development and Middle Eastern studies. This 
chapter outlines the political and economic context in which 
the competing paradigms of 'developmentalism' and 
'neo-Marxism' were formed. The conceptual procedures of 
these paradigms, and the major critiques developed against 
them, are also outlined. A critical discussion of these 
paradigms demonstrates the major problems which the field of 
development studies, in both its Marxist and non-Marxist 
approaches, presents in the study of Middle Eastern 
societies in general and of Iran in particular. It is shown 
that the intellectual traditions which have dominated the 
study of the Middle East and Iran share certain
2methodological assumptions with the field of development 
studies. The identification of these traditions also 
demonstrates both the specificities of the field of Middle 
Eastern studies and the alternative interpretation of 
Iranian history and society presented here.
As part of this alternative interpretation, a distinction is 
made between two broad currents within the neo-Marxist 
paradigm. One is the trade-centred 'circulationism' which 
defines capitalism in terms of production of commodities for 
market and perceives (peripheral) underdevelopment as rooted 
in the system of international trade and specialization in 
primary-export products. According to this approach, the 
initial incorporation of peripheral areas into the world 
market through trade has led to their rapid and almost 
immediate capitalist transformation. The second 
interpretation, 'productionism', focuses on the sphere of 
production and considers wage-labour as the defining feature 
of capitalism. It sees capitalist transformation of 
peripheral areas to be incomplete, as evidenced by the 
survival of precaptialist modes of production (PCMsP) in the 
periphery. Both approaches are found to provide a limited 
and partial interpretation of the development of the world 
market and the process of peripheralization.
In Chapter Two the major theses of this study are advanced. 
My first thesis is that, through the approach of the 
internationalization of capital it is possible to cut across 
the formal methodological distinction between 
'circulationism7 and 'productionism' and bring elements of 
the two approaches together.
3The approach of the internationalization of capital is based 
on the historical periodization of the world market in terms 
of the distinction between the three circuits of merchant, 
money and productive capital. It is argued that the 
internationalization of each circuit of capital encompasses 
a specific historical stage in the development of the 
international division of labour, involves a certain mode of 
integration of peripheral economies into the world market, a 
specific form of subsumption of labour by capital, and a 
certain mode of extraction of surplus labour.
The position of the periphery within the world market is 
initially determined by the requirements of merchant capital 
as an 'agent' of expanding competitive capitalism in the 
centre. Merchant capital acts as an intermediary between 
systems because, being restricted to the sphere of exchange, 
it can function in both capitalist and precapitalist 
environments. Internationalization of merchant capital 
consolidates PCMsP in the periphery and commoditizes their 
economies on that basis. In other words, merchant capital 
initially accommodates itself to the 'natural economies' and 
redirects the laws of motion of PCMsP on terms favourable to 
the requirements of central economies. Gradually the 
expanding sphere of commodity production comes under the 
dominance of merchant capital and the peripheral structures 
begin to be established. Merchant capital imposes 
specialization in the production of agricultural raw 
materials for export on peripheral economies, and introduces 
a local market for consumption of manufactured goods. This 
is the main requirement of competitive capitalism in the 
centre at this stage. As this mode of integration into the
4world market does not necessitate capitalist transformation 
of the periphery, labour processes are formally subsumed by 
metropolitan capital.
In the phase of the internationalization of the circuit of 
money capital, the transition from competitive to monopoly 
capitalism in the centre makes export of capital to the 
periphery an imperative of metropolitan capitalism. At this 
stage direct capital investment in the productive processes 
breaks down PCMsP and deposes precapitalist ruling classes 
from power. Following capitalist transformation of 
peripheral economies, labour processes begin to be subsumed 
by capital in real terms. Finally, the internationalization 
of the circuit of productive capital leads to the 
internationalization of production itself, that is, 
universalization of the law of value and a world-wide 
expansion of capitalist production relations. At this phase, 
the dynamics of commodity and money capital are intensified 
and subordinated to the requirements of productive capital.
The historic periodization of the formation of the world 
market, on the basis of the internationalization of the 
three circuits of capital, shows that the centre/periphery 
relationship is subject to changes depending on the dynamics 
of each circuit of capital. Each stage imparts certain 
significance to both the sphere of exchange and the sphere 
of production. Rather than suggesting the theoretical 
primacy of the sphere of production over that of the 
exchange, or vice-versa, it is argued that while the sphere 
of production is always determinant, in certain historical 
conjunctures the sphere of circulation is dominant. It is in
5the phase of the internationalization of the circuit of 
merchant capital that international terms of trade and 
exchange relations become dominant factors in the process of 
peripheralization and influence the mode of incorporation of 
peripheral economies into the world market. However, in the 
phase of the internationalization of the circuits of money 
and productive capital, the sphere of production becomes 
both dominant and determinant. At this stage the sphere of 
exchange can no longer adequately explain the structure of 
peripheralization and the centre/periphery relationship.
This is the second thesis of this study.
My third thesis is that the mechanisms of transition to 
capitalism in the periphery are fundamentally different from 
those in the centre. The approach of the
internationalization of capital enables us to distinguish 
clearly between the endogenous model of capitalist 
transition in the centre and that in the periphery, where 
transformation of production relations have occurred in the 
context of incorporation into a world market in which 
capitalism had already asserted itself.
In order to substantiate this thesis, two features of the 
historical process of peripheralization are emphasized. 
Firstly, drawing on Marx's distinction between the 'first 
path' of transition to capitalism (direct-producer/ 
capitalist), and the 'second path' (merchant/capitalist), it 
is argued that the initial incorporation of peripheral 
formations into the circuit of merchant capital has blocked 
the 'first path' of transition to capitalism in the 
periphery and has imposed the 'second path'. Secondly,
6incorporation into the circuits of money and productive 
capital has not led to the generalization of capitalist 
wage-labour and the real subsumption of labour by capital. 
Rather, non-capitalist labour processes are maintained and 
restructured as integral components of the expanded 
reproduction of capital.
In developing the latter argument, much of my effort has 
gone into a conceptual clarification of the character of 
noncapitalist structures and their relationship with the 
dominant CMP. I have characterized these labour processes as 
'forms' rather than 'modes' of production, following the 
conceptualization of the mode of production advanced in this 
study. Mode of production is here defined as a broad, 
epochal category encompassing both the immediate production 
processes and the mechanisms of the reproduction of 
production relations. The theory of 'articulation of modes 
of production', developed within the 'productionist' 
approach, is inconsistent with the approach adopted in this 
study. 'Natural economies' are destroyed at the present 
phase of the internationalization of productive capital, and 
their dissolution has followed the process of 
commoditization under the domination of merchant capital. 
Non-capitalist labour processes are considered as 'forms' of 
production in that their reproduction cycles, and thus their 
integrity as a separate, distinct mode of production, are 
broken and replaced by the production of exchange-values and 
the consumption of commodities, although direct producers 
retain ownership in the means of production and control of 
the immediate production process. The distinction between 
formal and real subsumption of labour by capital provides
7the theoretical tool of understanding the mechanisms of the 
appropriation of noncapitalist producers' surplus labour by 
the circuit of productive capital. These producers, formally 
subsumed by capital, are exploited by the dominant CMP 
through production of absolute surplus value which involves 
devalorization of their labour time.
Within the theoretical framework outlined above, the last 
four chapters of this study examine a particular example of 
peripheral capital accumulation: Iranian social formation 
between 1800 and 1978. It is necessary at this point to make 
a few remarks on the choice of the period examined in this 
study.
Iran has been inside the penumbra of European trade since at 
least the 1600s. It is suggested here, however, that it was 
not until the early decades of the 19th century when 
commodity production for external markets began to assume a 
peripheral character. The slow, difficult and protracted 
character of the process of commodity production for the 
world market was determined by both the dynamics of European 
capitalism and the internal economic trends of the Iranian 
formation.
The rise and consolidation of the world market in the 16th 
century brought about increasing commodity production in 
Iran. All the historical sources show that Iran during the 
Safavid Empire (1501-1722) witnessed a substantial 
appropriation of surplus product in the form of raw 
materials and petty-commodity craft production for export to 
both European and Far Eastern markets. It was particularly
8during the reign of Shah Abbas I (1587-1629) when 
mercantilist policies in foreign trade were encouraged and a 
network of state-controlled commerce and petty-commodity 
production was established. Trade relations with Europe 
expanded and commercial envoys were sent to Britain,
Denmark, France and the Netherlands. Silk was the major 
export item, and its production and marketing was 
monopolized by the state. On the whole, trade and craft 
production was subject to vigorous state control. Merchants 
and artisan producers, although controlled by and 
subordinated to the state, prospered and advanced their 
commercial activities and wealth.
It is open to interpretation as to whether the absolutist, 
mercantilist Safavid state, with its expanding foreign 
trade, agrarian surplus and petty-commodity craft 
production, was evolving towards an indigenous capitalism. 
However, it is certain that its fall in 1722, primarily due 
to internal reasons, can be considered as a watershed in 
Iranian economic history. Following the fall of the 
Safavids, the Iranian formation descended into eight decades 
of chaos and civil wars between various nomadic tribes. In 
the tumultuous decades of the 18th century, particularly the 
1720s, 1750s and 1790s, tribal nomadism and the absence of a 
strong central government revived the 16th century 
tendencies towards socio-economic fragmentation. Until the 
rise of the Qajar dynasty just before 1800, the conditions 
of socio-economic fragmentation and civil wars ensured that 
surplus product was no longer appropriated and concentrated 
by a centralized ruling class. The silk trade of the 
Safavids dried up and artisan production of handicrafts for
9export declined. The internal conditions proved difficult 
and resistant to European capital penetration throughout the 
18th century.
With the establishment of the Qajar dynasty in 1792 and the 
restoration of 'order' in the mid-1800s, commodity 
production and foreign trade expanded once again. However, 
the expansion of foreign trade, particularly during the 
second half of the 19th century, assumed a character 
different from that of the Safavid Empire when the movement 
of commodities could be controlled by a strong centralized 
state and a favourable balance of trade could generally be 
maintained. Moreover, European capitalism was experiencing 
its expansionary industrial phase in the 19th century, and 
was increasingly in search of raw materials and market 
potentialities. Under the Qajar dynasty, the first patterns 
of the peripheralization of the Iranian economy were 
established. Economically backward and relatively isolated, 
the internationalization of merchant capital brought Iran 
into the orbit of 19th century European colonial expansion. 
The military defeats from Russia and Britain, and the 
imposition of capitulatory treaties by these two competing 
imperialist powers in the first half of the 19th century, 
laid the foundation of the peripheralization process. By the 
second half of the 19th century, Iran had definitely moved 
into a semi-colonial and peripheral position in the world 
market.
The Iranian case study is divided into two major historical 
phases. The period of 1800s-1950s, encompasses the phase of 
the internationalization of merchant capital, and the period
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of 1950-1978 is the phase of the internationalization of 
money and productive capitals. The beginning of the 
internationalization of productive capital can be traced 
back to the mid-1970s. This process, however, remained 
embryonic and stopped short of completion due to the 1979 
Iranian Revolution. An analysis of the economic trends which 
the Iranian Revolution has established during the past 
decade, and whether they represent a break with the 
capitalist world market, is beyond the scope, concern and 
objective of this study. The Revolution, however, is seen as 
a turning point in Iranian history, which explains the 
choice of the period under consideration.
The period of 1800-1950, identified with the 
internationalization of merchant capital, is considered to 
constitute a more or less consistent economic trend as the 
Iranian formation, under the domination of merchant capital, 
remained basically precapitalist and the mode of its 
incorporation into the world market was not altered. Chapter 
Three examines the period of 1800-1911, when the penetration 
of foreign merchant capital laid the foundation of the 
peripheralization process. Merchant capital in Iran, 
characteristically, did not dissolve the PCMP. Rather, by 
subordinating the laws of motion of the precapitalist 
economy to the requirements of industrial capitalism in the 
centre, and through import of manufactured goods to Iran and 
export of raw materials to the centre, it restructured and 
consolidated the PCMP and instigated production of 
commodities on that basis. In contrast to the 
'circulationist' proposition, it is shown that the initial 
incorporation into the world market through trade did not
11
lead to a capitalist transformation of the Iranian economy. 
However, the sphere of exchange assumed a particular 
significance in that it affected the internal structures of 
production. Merchant capital restructured precapitalist 
production relations through mechanisms such as the 
concentration of the means of production (land), 
introduction and relative consolidation of private property 
in land, the production of cash crops for the world market, 
and a limited degree of monetization. It is also shown that 
the internationalization of merchant capital led to the 
decline of petty commodity production and, by blocking an 
organic transformation of petty-commodity to capitalist 
production, imposed the 'second path' of transition on Iran.
The Constitutional Movement of 1905-11, the hallmark of this 
period, is examined in relation to economic changes brought 
about by the internationalization of merchant capital. The 
Constitutional Movement is seen as the long-run political 
consequence of precapitalist commoditization of the Iranian 
economy. It marked the rise of a relatively powerful 
merchant class which came into contradiction with the 
indigenous landowning class and the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie. The attempt of this class to capture state 
apparatuses and to establish an independent bourgeois state, 
and the reasons of the failure of the Movement, are examined 
in Chapter Three.
Chapter Four examines the period of 1911-1941, considered as 
the phase of the maturation of the internationalization of 
merchant capital. My interpretation of the period of the 
1920s and 1930s constitutes a revision of the dominant view
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on this relatively little-studied period. Despite the 
constitution of a centralized 'nationalist' state, Reza 
Shah's period is not seen to represent either a break with 
the precapitalist past, or a period of 'modernization' and 
capitalist transformation of the economy. Rather, the 
'statist' period of the 1930s exhibited an almost exemplary 
structure of precapitalist commoditization and full 
integration with the world market. During the depression of 
the 1930s, political authority found itself in a relatively 
autonomous position and began to implement its 'statist' 
policies. Reza Shah's infrastructural investments and 
administrative reforms aimed at expanding the sphere of 
commodity production in order to allow merchant capital a 
greater domain of activity. In contrast to the post-II World 
War period, it was not money capital whose
internationalization constituted a world-wide division of 
labour. Merchant capital continued to be the dominant 
circuit of capital which performed this function. Reza 
Shah's state is also seen as the conjuncture at which the 
rudimentary separation between political and economic power 
laid the foundation for the future capitalist transformation 
of the country.
In the post-II World War period, Iran was no longer tied to 
the world market through the export of agricultural raw 
materials and import of manufactured goods. The increasing 
concentration and centralization of capital in the centre, 
and the booming world economy, made possible export of 
capital to Iran, and its investment at the point of 
production. Capital export from the centre led to the 
gradual ascendence of capitalist production relations, and
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to the emergence of a capitalist home market and a 
capitalist state. The import-substitution policy that was 
adopted in the 1960s was similar to the post-1945 
experiences of many other peripheral economies. In Chapters 
Five and Six, these structural changes are analyzed through 
an examination of the role, functions and policies of the 
state in both urban and rural areas. The nature and outcome 
of state policy measures is seen as indicative of the 
capitalist transformation of the economy as well as of the 
state representation of class interests. In discussing the 
post-war industrialization model, traces of the theoretical 
framework of the 'regulation school' will be discernible.
The move from the 'sub-Fordism' of the 1960s to the 
'peripheral Fordism' of the 1970s represented the beginning 
of the internationalization of productive capital. Emphasis 
is also placed on the role of the oil sector in the capital 
accumulation process, and the distinct structural attributes 
which it has imparted to the character of the state and the 
pattern of class formation.
Important objectives of the last two chapters are to 
question the assumption that subsistence production is 
likely to disappear with the development of capitalist 
production relations in the periphery; and to assess the 
evidence drawn from the Iranian case for the hypothesis that 
peripheral capitalism, rather than dissolving non-capitalist 
forms of production, restructures and perpetuates them. It 
is shown that although capitalism became the dominant mode 
of production in Iran by the 1970s, in both rural and urban 
areas noncapitalist structures survived and were 
subordinated to the dictates of capitalism. Following the
14
theoretical proposition advanced earlier, it is argued that 
these labour processes do not constitute a distinct, 
separate mode of production. Rather, they are noncapitalist 
forms of production characterized by formal/partial 
possession of the means of production, by combined 
production of exchange-values and use-values, and by the 
formal subsumption by capital.
I have tried to draw the historical picture in broad 
outline, while concentrating at some length on theoretical 
interpretation. It is believed that the history of Iran 
provides substance to many theoretical issues in the field 
of development studies. My purpose in this study of a 
particular case is to contribute to the elaboration of 
theory in the field of development studies, as well as to 
present an interpretation of Iranian history which would 
challenge many assumptions made in the field of Middle 
Eastern studies. It is necessary at this point to make a few 
general remarks on the methodology adopted here.
Given the complex and multi-faceted nature of development 
processes, and the relatively long period of the Iranian 
history covered by this study, the approach adopted here is 
necessarily selective. Throughout the following chapters, 
emphasis has been placed on the identification of economic 
trends in three major areas of economic activity in the 
peripheral economy: agriculture, industry and trade. These 
areas are then investigated to reveal the basic and changing 
patterns of integration with the world economy. This focus 
on the determinations acting upon the economic structure has 
necessarily led to a number of omissions. The character of
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the state, formation of classes, the major class struggles 
of Iranian history and internal and inter-state political 
relations do not receive a systematic theoretical treatment, 
and are discussed insofar as they help establish the broader 
economic trends which are taken to constitute the process of 
peripheralization. The state, in particular, is dealt with 
only in that its policies and interventions have influenced 
the establishment of these economic patterns. The 
discussions on the peripheral state, at the beginning of 
Chapters Four and Five, therefore, should not be taken as a 
systematic theoretical analysis of the evolution of the 
peripheral state. Rather, they are intended to clarify the 
underlying themes of these chapters: state policies and the 
mode of state intervention vary according to the particular 
phase of capital accumulation. A given level of 
incorporation into the world market, and the imposition of a 
certain type of specialization on the peripheral economy, 
have imposed certain structural limitations on the 
peripheral state. As will be demonstrated, the mode of 
intervention of the Iranian state shifted from that of 
intensifying commodity production on a precapitalist basis 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries, to active intervention 
at the point of production from the 1960s onwards. The 
central theoretical tool for defining the character of state 
intervention is the nature of the dominant circuit of 
capital in each phase of capital accumulation. The function 
of state intervention at each phase is to redefine the 
relations under which labour is subsumed by capital, and 
thus to secure the conditions for the reproduction of 
production relations.
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The Iranian case study provides abundant evidence of the 
role of the state as an agent of structural change, but a 
lengthier and systematic treatment of the state would 
reguire a different theoretical approach necessitating the 
determination of the political instance in the periphery. By 
focusing on the appearing patterns of economic activity, I 
have hoped to avoid falling into the politicist-voluntarist 
perspectives which largely characterize studies on the 
periphery.
The historical and economic trends identified here are taken 
to constitute the basic turning points in the process of 
peripheralization, not only of Iran, but also of other 
peripheral areas of the world economy. Within peripheral 
economies this process has varied considerably as each 
individual country has accommodated capital penetration in 
specific ways, depending on its precapitalist mode of 
production and precapitalist structures. I believe, however, 
that despite these 'specificities', there are certain 
regularities in patterns of development to which all 
contemporary peripheral societies have been and still are 
subjected. The theoretical framework basic to this thesis 
could also assist the analysis of other peripheral 
formations. However, I must emphasize that it is beyond the 
scope and purpose of this study to make comparisons with 
other cases of peripheral accumulation; a comparative study 
of peripheralization would have reguired a different type of 
project and it would have been naive to make generalizations 
at this level of analysis. For example, studies by Clawson 
(1977-1978-1979) on Egypt and Irag, Berberoglu (1980) and 
Keyder (1981-1987) on Turkey, Richards (1977-1982) on Egypt,
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Seddon (1982) on Morocco and Stork (1979) on Iraq show both 
striking similarities and major differences with the case of 
Iran.
I should also comment on the nature of the sources used in 
this work. Because of the circumstances of this study, the 
statistical and historical data employed here are largely 
drawn from secondary sources. These data, produced by 
conventional economic and historical studies on Iran, have 
been reinterpreted in terms of changes in the mode of 
integration with the world market and in the production 
relations in order to present an alternative view of Iranian 
history. Without a prior theoretical framework, this 
reinterpretation of empirical data would have been 
impossible.
One final note on key theoretical contributions which 
enabled the development of the theoretical framework of this 
study: Christian Palloix (1975-1977) has established the 
preliminary bases of a theory of the internationalization of 
capital in terms of the distinction between the circuits of 
capital and historical periodization of the development of 
the world market. Patrick Clawson (1979), in a lucid and 
insightful work, has applied this historical periodization 
to the case of Iran. In this study, however, through a more 
detailed investigation of the capital accumulation process 
in Iran, and a focus on the surviving non-capitalist forms 
of production, I have tried to challenge the view of the 
homogenized world market advanced by the approach of the 
internationalization of capital.
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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY
The field of development studies, as it developed in the 
post-World War II period, constitutes a large, diverse and 
interdisciplinary area of academic research. Concerned with 
development processes in all the comparatively 'poor' 
countries known as the 'Third World', it covers an enormous 
geographical area and a large part of the modern history of 
the world.
The large, diverse and rapidly changing literature of 
development studies poses problems in situating this field 
of study within a specific 'discipline'. Given the complex 
and multi-faceted nature of development processes, it is now 
conventional wisdom that the study of development does not 
constitute, and cannot be usefully pursued, within a single 
'discipline'. The particular complexity of the subject 
matter means that the study of development is inevitably 
interdisciplinary, transcending the boundaries of 
disciplines such as economics, history, sociology, political 
economy and human geography.
The field of development studies is not only 
multidisciplinary, but also, in the sense used by Kuhn 
(1962), is in a 'pre-paradigm' stage. The concept of 
paradigm refers to a pre-theoretical entity, a set of 
assumptions which serves to define the framework of study.
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Rather than a 'scientific paradigm', development studies is 
constituted by a multitude of partial and unsynthesized 
models and theories. Only in the sense that the existing 
schools, at the most general level, share certain basic 
methodological assumptions is it possible to speak loosely 
of the existence of competing paradigms.1
The framework and limitations of these paradigms are too 
numerous to consider in detail, and are fully discussed in 
the literature on development. This Chapter therefore aims 
to broadly outline the concepts and conceptual procedures of 
the competing paradigms, their main methodological 
assumptions, and the context of their development. The major 
criticisms of these prevalent paradigms, both in general 
terms and in relation to the study of the Middle East and 
Iran, will also be outlined. This discussion should help 
define and differentiate the materialist approach adopted by 
this study from conventional approaches to the fields of 
both development and Middle Eastern studies.
A. The Paradigm of Developmentalism
As a field of academic research, development studies has to 
be placed in the context of the changing nature of 
international relations and economic and political realities 
of the post-World War II period. The post-1945 era was 
characterized by the political bipolarity of the cold war 
and the advent of national liberation movements in the Third 
World. The success of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, and of 
the Cuban Revolution in 1960, as well as the spread of 
Soviet influence in Eastern Europe were seen as challenges
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to the 'stability' of the 'free world'. Development studies 
became the focus of concern in Western social sciences, 
particularly in North America, seeking to exclude 
'communism' from the 'free world' and to formulate a path of 
development for Third World countries which would provide an 
alternative to the 'totalitarian' and 'forced labour' 
economies of the socialist bloc. Ultimately, development 
studies aimed to provide an ideological cover and framework 
for continuous capitalist expansion in the Third World.
The paradigm of developmentalism, whose best-known and most 
influential school is 'modernization theory', is the 
particular product of this socio-political order. It is 
constituted around the central theme of continuum theory, 
i.e., the idea that development is a continuous, universal 
and irreversible progress towards some determinate 
end-points. The evolutionary concepts of development, social 
change and progress are adopted from the writings of the 
founders of sociology: Dürkheim, Spencer, Tonnies and Weber. 
Indeed, modernization theory and various models of 
modernization constituted the unity of what is also known as 
the 'sociology of development'.
Talcott Parsons' structuralist/functionalist discourse best 
represented the approach of the sociology of development. 2  
Parsons' theoretical framework is centred around the 
traditional/modern dichotomy, derived from the key concept 
of pattern-variable. One side of the pattern-variable shows 
the 'original state' of 'traditionality', while the other 
side characterizes the 'end-state' of 'modernity'. The 
end-point of this dichotomy assumes the methodological
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Status of 'ideal-type'. Traditionality is characterized by 
the absence of certain typical characteristics of modern 
society. Western model of development provides the 
ideal-type of modernity against which traditional societies 
are juxtaposed as infant models. 'Modernization' involves a 
piecemeal and orderly process in which modern elements 
accumulate and displace traditional ones; it designates a 
cumulative movement from one state of equilibrium to 
another. Another example of this evolutionary/functionalist 
approach is the 'stages of growth' model, as represented by 
the work of W.W.Rostow.3 This model depicts traditional 
societies at a 'lower' stage of the process of development, 
already completed by Western industrialized societies.
The cumulative concept of development is predicated upon the 
notion of 'diffusion'. Diffusion occurs through the spread 
of certain material, technological and cultural patterns 
from modern to traditional societies. Within each backward 
nation itself diffusion occurs from modern to traditional 
sector. This theory thus presupposes a notion of 'dual 
society', which sees backward countries in terms of the 
co-existence of two separate sectors of 'modern' 
(industrial/advanced), and 'traditional' (feudal/archaic), 
each with its own history, dynamics, labour organization and 
corresponding 'elites'.
Modernization theory further identifies several levels at 
which this diffusion occurs. One is the level of social 
structure, which, following the evolutionary theories of 
Dürkheim and Spencer, conceives of the process of change in 
terms of increasing societal differentiation. Modernization
22
at this level is indicated by the emergence of markets, 
division of labour, bureaucratic rationality, modern state 
structures and so on. At the cultural level, modernization 
theory is concerned with the sphere of norms, values and 
attitudes. Rationalization, a concept derived from Weber, 
refers to a process whereby an increase in the normative 
patterns of rationality at the cultural level produces a 
prerequisite for the attainment of modernity.
An influential variant of cultural diffusionism is 
psychological or personality theory, whose extreme example 
is the work of David McClelland.4 The psychological approach 
identified certain personality traits as central to economic 
development. These included the 'need to achieve', 
'entrepreneurship', and innovative, market-oriented and 
acquisitive personality. Economic development is therefore 
causally linked to the psychological attributes of 
individuals.
The major events of the 'development decades' of the 1950s 
and 1960s, however, proved exceedingly anomalous for the 
paradigm of developmentalism. The main anomaly was 
constituted by the continuing lack of development in the 
Third World. Indeed, by the early 1960s the crisis of 
non-development was acute, indicating that the very 
discourse of developmentalism had prevented it from 
explaining, or even recognizing, this crisis.
Despite the professed universality of its claims to a body 
of neutral, value-free and scientific knowledge, 
developmentalism came to be increasingly identified with an
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ethnocentric and interest-based ideology whose ultimate aim 
was preservation of economic and foreign policy interests of 
Western capitalism. To the extent that North American and 
Western European values and norms in the political and 
economic spheres were abstracted and projected, without any 
qualifications, into those of Third World countries, 
developmentalism reflected Western cultural prejudices and 
aimed to preserve a given social and political order.
Nothing reveals the ideological character of the sociology 
of development more than the obsession of cultural diffusion 
theorists with pluralism, non-disruptive change and 
conflict-free politics. The best-known proponent of this 
view was Daniel Bell.^ In the consensus model of politics 
which he advanced, societies were depicted as comprising of 
pressure groups whose respective interests could be 
accommodated by bargaining and compromise rather than 
conflict and violence. The fact that the 'end of ideology' 
thesis was rooted in an anti-Marxist philosophy and the 
politics of the cold war has been discussed at length 
elsewhere and does not need to be repeated here. 6
More fundamentally, modernization theory came under attack 
for its functionalist and evolutionary concepts of change 
and structure, and its failure to specify the mechanisms of 
change from one 'stage' of development to another. In 
Parsons' model, for instance, functionality is 
conceptualized in terms of systems of maintenance and 
adaptation. Adaptation itself is the process which makes 
transition from one state of eguilibrium to another 
possible. Real change can be explained only in terms of
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events exogenous to the model: the emphasis is on 
development which maintains the system in equilibrium and 
promotes social integration. This functionalist model 
explains the preoccupation with stable and non-disruptive 
change mentioned above, and a corresponding fixation upon 
instability as the main obstacle to development. By 
translating functions into values, this model implies that 
the destruction of the existing institutions is 
'dysfunctional' to the system. Evolution is a progressive 
process of differentiation and a parallel process of 
reintegration of increasingly more complex structures. 
Reintegration occurs through teleological necessity, while 
failure to achieve 'development' is envisaged in terms of 
'breakdown of modernization'. The system experiences a 
'breakdown of modernization' when there is a lag in the 
development of agencies of integration relative to those of 
differentiation. In this Durkheimian view of social 
disorder, therefore, all types of socio-political upheavals 
are seen as pathological deviations from the orderly and 
cumulative process of development.
Modernization theory was also ahistorical in that it failed 
to problematize the central object of its analysis: 
'development'. 'Development' was seen as non-problematic as 
it has already been realized in the West. This conception of 
development failed to recognize that the historical 
experience of Western Europe was only one variant of the 
process of transition to 'modernity'. Neither did it see as 
problematic the application of this model to an extremely 
heterogenous geographical area, lumped together under the 
guise of 'traditional societies'. The ahistorical and
25
evolutionary character of this discourse prevented it from 
recognizing the fact that the origins and nature of European 
capitalism were different from those of the countries of 
Latin America, Asia and Africa which, for centuries, have 
been subordinate components of a structured whole: the 
capitalist world market. Reliance on abstract and ideal-type 
models led modernization theorists to neglect this crucial 
historical relationship.
Personality theory and other variants of cultural diffusion 
thesis were the crudest examples of the ahistoricity of the 
sociology of development. Based on the 19th century liberal 
economic model of free enterprise, this particular approach 
divorced social institutions and psychological attributes of 
individuals from their historical and structural roots. No 
link was established between the emergence of economic 
individuality and changes within economic structures such as 
the formation of a capitalist market which provides a basis 
for the conditions of rationality and entrepreneurship. This 
approach conflated different types of economic 
transformation and resorted to a psychological reductionism 
which explained structural change in terms of psychological 
variables.7
Although developmentalism remains in a pre-paradigm stage, 
it is possible, on the basis of the broad outline presented 
above, to identify its basic methodological assumptions: 
that development is a unilinear, cumulative and universal 
process; that it does not involve irreconcilable conflicts 
of interests between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies, 
but rather an orderly, non-ideological, non-violent process
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of 'diffusion' and 'differentiation'; that there is no 
historical and structural connection between the ideal-types 
of 'traditionality' and 'modernity'; and that transition 
from the former to the latter state means 'traditional' 
societies becoming a mirror image of already 'modern' ones.
These methodological assumptions formed the site of the main 
critique of modernization theory. Known in broad terms as 
'neo-Marxist', this alternative perspective developed as an 
extended critique of the paradigm of developmentalism and 
was concerned with the continuing massive discrepancy of 
accumulated capital and power between advanced and backward 
parts of the world. In discussing the neo-Marxist literature 
on development, two broad approaches can be identified. The 
first is the various formulations of dependency theory; and 
the second approach is that of the 'modes of production'.
The former approach is usually identified with 
'circulationism', following its concentration on exchange 
relations and international terms of trade in analyzing the 
processes of transition and underdevelopment; while the 
latter approach, known as 'productionism', focuses on 
production relations and various forms of labour 
exploitation. 8 This distinction is over-simplified, yet it 
highlights, in broad terms, how different methodologies have 
led to different readings of the history of the world 
market.
B. Neo-Marxism and Two Readings of History
As an extended critique of the paradigm of developmentalism, 
theories of dependency developed in, and contributed to, the
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milieu of what may be termed Third Worldist Marxism of the 
1960s and 1970s.
The formation of Third Worldism, both in theory and 
practice, was promoted not only by the crisis of 
non-development in the Third World, but also by a series of 
events which characterized the decade of the 1960s.
Countries which had been classified as 'stable' and 
'democratic', and placed in leadership roles for the 
'modernization' efforts of their 'elites', experienced 
breakdowns of governments, populist upheavals, revolutions 
and violent coups. Third Worldism was particularly 
associated with the success of the Cuban Revolution in Latin 
America, which was followed by a series of guerrilla 
movements in Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and 
Argentina. In Asia, Third Worldism was associated with the 
Vietnam war, especially after direct US military 
intervention in South Vietnam in 1965. There the defeat of 
the most technologically and militarily advanced country by 
an army of peasant guerrillas embodied the very model of 
Third World revolutions and proved the limits of American 
hegemony. In Africa, Third Worldism was associated with the 
triumph of the Algerian war of independence in 1962, armed 
struggle in Angola in 1961, in Guinea Bissau in 1963, and in 
Mozambigue in 1964. The emergence of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization brought Third Worldist politics to 
the Middle East in a major way, particularly after the 
defeat of its military wing by the Hashemite monarchy in 
Jordan in 1970.9
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In North America, the citadel of developmentalist ideology, 
these events, particularly the Cuban Revolution and the war 
in Vietnam, had far-reaching repercussions for the 
established orthodoxy. Developmentalism as a mode of 
analysis had retained credibility because it had 
rationalized and justified the status-quo in the post-war 
period. But, in the face of these events, it seemed 
difficult to salvage the paradigm.10 It was against this 
background that develomentalism suffered a major setback, 
and the Third World emerged, in Foster-Carter's words, as 
'an actor in its own right' (1974:85). The 'New Left' in 
Western Europe and North America came to identify itself 
with the national liberation movements and anti-imperialist 
wars in the Third World. Theories of dependency were both a 
response to, and a product of, this milieu. They turned many 
of the concepts and conclusions of developmentalism on their 
head and replaced them with the concepts of 'exploitation' 
and 'repression'. The language, assumptions and conclusions 
of dependency theory played, and continue to play, an 
influential role in the politics of the left in the Third 
World. However, as we shall see, its radicalism advanced 
little our understanding of the history and contradictions 
of Third World societies.
Dependency theory is particularly associated with the 
writings of Andre Gunder Frank. Though rooted in the 
structuralism of the economists of the United Nations' 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ELCA), Frank's early 
writings (1967-1969) represented an attack on the concept of 
dualism predominant both in bourgeois development theory and 
in the programmes of orthodox Latin American communist
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parties.11 Against the dualist theories Frank argued that 
Latin America is wholly capitalist because it has been 
involved in the production of commodities for the world 
market since the 16th century colonial conquest. This 
argument was further developed through a rejection of the 
linear evolutionism of bourgeois models. Frank argued that 
backwardness is not a residual or original state, but a 
phenomenon resulting from a particular historical 
experience. Contemporary Third World societies were never 
undeveloped, but actively underdeveloped in the process of 
emergence and consolidation of capitalism as a world system. 
Capitalist penetration from the 'metropoles' has promoted, 
and continues to promote, the process of underdevelopment in 
the 'satellites' through the 'drain' of 
indigenously-produced 'economic surplus'. Bourgeois 
development theory, therefore, has failed to recognize that 
Third World countries have been underdeveloped in order to 
develop capitalism in the metropolitan countries, and that 
their position is in no way comparable to that of 
precapitalist Europe. Given that subordination to, and 
dependence on, the capitalist world market has universally 
pre-empted and 'blocked' development in the Third World, the 
only way of achieving development is to 'disengage' from the 
system, through a socialist transformation.12
Theories of dependency, in broad terms, were a response to 
the ethnocentrism of bourgeois development models. They 
showed that the process of socio-economic change is not 
essentially indigenous, and that the 'classical' model of 
capitalist transformation derived from the experience of 
Western Europe was clearly inadmissible for Third World
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countries where incorporation into the world market occurred 
through direct and indirect European colonial rule. 
Dependency perspective, therefore, rightly placed the 
guestion of development in its international context and 
shifted the emphasis from the normative sphere to the 
structural and external determinants of development. 
Dependency school, however, was submitted to severe 
criticisms for its failure to break with the underlying 
epistemological assumptions of orthodox bourgeois models: 
the failure to problematize and theorize its central 
concepts (development, underdevelopment, capitalism), an 
ahistorical, circular and teleological mode of reasoning 
which neglected national histories in favour of global 
explanations, and a nationalist and utopian critique of 
capitalism which simply replicated the basic categories of 
developmentalism. Underdevelopment, i.e., the state of a 
'disarticulated', 'dependent' and externally-oriented 
economy is juxtaposed against the 'ideal-type' and 'normal' 
model of self-centred and autarchic capitalism of W. Europe. 
To its critics, dependency theory's idealist and 
teleological reasoning was simply a mirror image of 
bourgeois development theory.13
For the purposes of this study, the most significant 
critique of theories of dependency is their conception of 
capitalism. Capitalism is conceived as a basically static 
system of exploitation in existence since the 16th century 
and characterised not by specific class relations but by 
production of commodities for profits on the world market. 
Production relations are not specific to a certain mode of 
production, and various forms of labour organization, such
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as sharecropping and slavery are, therefore, compatible with 
capitalism. If the world economy is basically capitalist, 
then the incorporation of peripheral export economies into 
the world market means that the relations of production in 
these economies are also capitalist.
This interpretation is derived from defining a mode of 
production at the level of exchange and adopting the world 
economy as the unit of analysis. Within the capitalist world 
market, peripheral societies are seen as exploited by the 
'drain' of 'economic surplus' through 'unequal exchange' or 
through monopolistic control over trade. Underdevelopment is 
primarily externally determined, resulting from the 
imposition of a particular pattern of specialization on the 
periphery. By giving an almost total external determination 
to the history of peripheral formations, 'circulationism' 
fails to employ a historically-specific notion of 
capitalism, to analyze the development of classes, and to 
identify the roots of class struggle. The contradictions of 
the development of capitalism are located in the 
international system of exchange rather than in the 
production systems of different social formations. By 
locating class struggle in the exploitation of the periphery 
by the centre, the antagonistic contradiction between labour 
and capital is transferred to a contradiction between 
'proletarian' and 'bourgeois' nations. 1 4
The attempt to counteract circulationist tendencies of 
theories of dependency has led to a 'return to Marx', as 
represented by the modes of production approach. Under the 
considerable influence of structuralist Marxism of Louis
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Althusser and the attendant school of 'Marxist economic 
anthropology', this approach was consolidated by the 
1970s.15
Althusser's Marxism was principally concerned with issues of 
epistemoloy and methodology, and advanced a view of 
historical materialism as a general science of all social 
formations. This general science was based on the hypothesis 
of determination in the last instance by the economy, and 
the distinction between dominance and determination.16 
Influenced by Althusser's specific reading of Capital. 
'Marxist economic anthropology' expressed the conviction 
that the encounter between Marxism and anthropology was 
necessary and useful both theoretically and politically. The 
school was unified on the assumption that a Marxist 
anthropology is one which applies Marx's insights into 
capitalism to other (precapitalist) modes of production.
This position followed Althusser's reading of Capital which 
contends that it is possible to deduce a theory of 
precapitalist societies from Marx's analysis. In other 
words, although Capital is about the CMP it also contains 
the science of historical materialism whose concepts and 
categories can be used as a basis for a general theory of 
all modes of production, all historical epochs, including 
contemporary Third World societies and the present 
international division of labour.
In the general field of development studies, the influence 
of Althusser's structuralist Marxism, and of 'Marxist 
economic anthropology', was most clearly represented by the 
'productionist' approach which became a serious contender
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for hegemony in a period when no single paradigm in the 
field has been able to become dominant. In general terms, 
productionism should be seen as a reaction to the 
theoretical and methodological assumptions of the dependency 
school; and as a rejection of the conceptualization of 
history as a universal process. In contrast to the 
exchange-oriented theories, productionism has placed major 
emphasis on the concept of the mode of production, the form 
of surplus extraction and internal structures of peripheral 
formations. These issues, as well as the process of 
transition, the destruction of 'natural economies', and the 
development of capitalism in agriculture are ignored in the 
trade-centred theories of dependency. For the critics of 
circulationism, notably Brenner (1977) and Laclau (1971), 
capitalism can be conceptualized at the level of production 
relations only; and its defining feature is commodity labour 
power.
Within this perspective, various formulations have sought to 
explain backwardness of Third World societies in terms of 
the persistence and articulation of PCMsP with capitalism. 
According to these formulations, the incomplete transition 
in the periphery takes the form of the co-existence of two 
or more modes of production, one of which is capitalist, 
dominant, and expanding, while the other (or others) is 
precapitalist and subordinate. In this context, 
'articulation' has become the key concept because it is used 
to identify different forms of co-existence between 
precapitalist and CMP. In contrast to the circulationist 
approach, the blocked transition and underdevelopment are 
explained in terms of factors primarily 'internal' to social
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formations, i.e., the persistence of PCMsP, precapitalist 
class structure and precapitalist modes of exploitation. The 
development of each country is determined by its dominant 
mode of production. Capitalism generates economic 
development while other modes of production do not. 
Capitalism is seen in dynamic terms, and the class relations 
and particular forms of labour organization are determinant 
factors in a successful or failed transition to capitalism. 
Underdevelopment is caused by a certain class structure and 
organization of production.
The approach of modes of production does represent an 
advance on theories of dependency. In contrast to the 
trade-centred theories of dependency, the emphasis on the 
concept of the mode of production points to where the main 
dimension of development and underdevelopment lies: forces 
and relations of production, and the economy in general. The 
mode of production concept also leads to a considerable 
narrowing of analytical focus, given the high level of 
generality of the theories of dependency. Rather than 
explaining everything by reference to the imperatives of the 
system as a whole, productionism brings internal structures 
of production into focus. For example, the emphasis on the 
production sphere has enabled Marxist economic 
anthropologists to deconstruct the evolutionist categories 
of the 'liberal' tradition of Anglo-American anthropology, 
and to show that 'primitive societies' are not homogeneous 
but there exists in these societies a variety of economic 
systems.
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Despite its contributions, productionism, like 
circulationism, has raised as many problems as it has 
solved. Structural determinism of the mode of production 
approach has been submitted to criticisms which, 
paradoxically, are reminiscent of the earlier arguments 
against the dependency perspective. It is argued that 
Althusser's structuralism has denied the possibility of any 
autonomous collective action and has therefore led the 
school to an ahistorical analysis. In an almost Durkheimian 
fashion, the analysis begins from structures or systems to 
practices. Classes as relatively autonomous agents of social 
transformation disappear from the scene and become the mere 
'bearers' of structures. This static conception of class 
brought Althusser's Marxism perilously close to Parsonian 
functionalism, rendering it incapable of dealing with the 
question of social change. Moreover, the disturbing tendency 
to see capitalist development in the core countries as 
homogeneous compared to that in the Third World reappears in 
this approach, implying that the process of transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe will be replicated 
in the Third World. 1 7  This assumption is reminiscent of the 
universal stages of national development, as postulated by 
modernization theory.
The prevailing and competing paradigms of development in the 
Third World, as represented by poles of bourgeois 
developmentalism and neo-Marxist approach, have been 
submitted to substantial empirical and theoretical critique. 
Although it can be said that in no other area of social 
sciences Marxism has been more influential than in the field 
of development studies, and that various Marxist approaches
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have substantially challenged conventional development 
theory, the field of development studies remains in a state 
of impasse. This situation is partly understandable: no 
paradigm completely replaces another, and the evidence for 
paradigm change is never conclusive. However, there does not 
seem to be a professional consensus even on the most central 
question of this field, i.e., why has there existed, 
historically, and continues to exist, such asymmetries of 
accumulated capital and power in the contemporary world?
Despite the present state of disarray in the theoretical 
field of development, it is certain that, within a Marxist 
tradition, the concept of the mode of production remains 
indispensable to the analysis of any concrete situation; it 
is not possible to proceed without it. In the following 
section I shall specify the concept of the mode of 
production employed in this study in the context of a brief 
critique of productionism, and then consider its 
implications for the analysis of a concrete historical 
situation.
C. Mode of Production and Social Formation: Delineation of 
the Basic Concepts
It may be an obvious point that a great deal of confusion 
and disagreement over the concept of the mode of production 
stems from the fact that it has been conceptualized at 
various levels of theoretical abstraction. Specifically, 
there are two points of divergence in defining the concept 
of the mode of production. First is the question of the 
links between the economic 'base' of a mode of production
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and the class structure and the corresponding political 
institutions; second is the question of the unit of analysis 
at which the reproduction of this social totality should be 
analyzed (Goodman and Redclift, 1981).
Depending on the level of theoretical abstraction, for some 
writers the definition of a mode of production is exhausted 
by concentrating at the regional level or the level of 
individual enterprises. This level of abstraction results in 
the conceptualization of several modes of production within 
a social formation. For others, a mode of production is what 
might be called a 'social totality', or a 'structured 
whole', which embodies the class structure and political 
institutions. Here mode of production is conceptualized at 
the level of social formation and constitutes a unit with 
it.18
Within the productionist approach, much of the debate on the 
concept of the mode of production has focused on the 
distinction between production and reproduction spheres 
(Friedmann 1976; Hindess and Hirst 1977; Meillassoux 1972- 
1981; Terray 1972; Wolpe 1972-1980). This distinction has 
enabled articulation theorists to argue that determinate 
combination of forces and relations of production do 
constitute distinct, separate modes of production, though 
they are subordinated to capitalism. In other words, 
precapitalist modes of production are not necessarily and 
inevitably destroyed by capitalism and cannot be simply 
reduced to the status of different forms of capitalism.19
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The question of the theoretical status of the existing PCMsP 
constitutes the site of the main critique developed against 
the articulation approach. The critics of this approach, 
notably, Alavi (1983), Banaji (1977) and Bernstein 
(1977-1979a), have argued that the concept of articulation 
is the outcome of a functionalist logic and an empiricist 
reading of relations of production. For this group of 
writers, generally concerned with the development of 
capitalism in agriculture and the subsumption of peasant 
production under capital, the control of capital over the 
production and exchange of subsistence producers means that 
these producers, although not fully dispossessed, are not 
located within a distinct mode of production and are best 
seen within the sphere of capitalist production relations. 
Central to an understanding of this approach is the level of 
theoretical abstraction employed in defining the concept of 
the mode of production, which necessarily leads to a 
rejection of the concept of articulation.
The question of the level of abstraction is most clearly 
discussed by Banaji (1977), who argues that a low and formal 
level of abstraction has led articulation theorists to 
confuse 'forms of exploitation' with 'relations of 
production'. Wage-labour, defined as dispossessed labour, is 
only one 'form' of subjugation of labour by capital, and, 
like market and commodity production, is only a 'simple 
category' common to several 'epochs of production'. On its 
own, it cannot define the CMP.
In defining modes of production, Banaji argues, the laws 
regulating the movements of different epochs of history, or
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the 'historically-determinate laws specific to each epoch', 
should first be identified. In the case of capitalism, 
although emergence of commodity labour power is the 
necessary basis, in specifically bourgeois relations of 
production, wage-labour is 'capital-positing, 
capital-creating labour'. Capitalist relations of production 
are value-producing relations and should not be confused 
with modes of surplus extraction. Banaji therefore defines a 
mode of production in broad epochal terms, as a 'definite 
totality of historical laws of motion'.
It then follows that all other elements of an epoch are 
subordinated to the laws of motion of a single mode of 
production; they are nothing other than forms of existence 
of that single mode. Therefore, the concepts of mode of 
production and social formation, although of quite different 
levels of theoretical abstraction, coincide, and exclude the 
possibility of articulation of modes of production except in 
a transitional, antagonistic manner.
Alavi (1983) employs the same level of theoretical 
abstraction in defining and distinguishing his concepts, and 
therefore draws rather similar conclusions. According to 
him:
A mode of production defines the structure of 
social relations of production; it is an 
analytical concept. The concept of social 
formation, on the other hand, is a descriptive 
term. It denotes an actual and specific societal 
entity, with all its peculiarities, products of 
past developments, and structuration and 
restructuration, results of accident and design, 
and all historical legacies of the past and 
potentialities for the future. As such it refers 
to a particular geographically bounded and 
historically given societal entity with given 
resources and given forms of economic and
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political organization and cultural features 
(Alavi, 1983:178, emphasis in original).
A version of the formulation developed by Banaji (1977) and 
Alavi (1983), and as we shall see by Bernstein (1977-1979a), 
has been adopted in this study. In order to explain why this 
'epochal' concept of the mode of production has been 
employed, it is necessary to specify it in more detail.
In Capital. Marx employed the concept of the mode of 
production as an idealized and hence formal-abstract object 
which can be used to analyze a concrete reality. Mode of 
production refers to the economic level of society, not 
'economic' in the narrow sense but in the sense of the 
production of material values and the set of social 
relations. It is a theoretical construct which defines a set 
of historically determined relations of production and 
appropriation in a concrete social formation. While forces 
and relations of production are considered to be the two 
essential aspects of every mode of production20, the 
production process cannot be understood simply in terms of 
the techniques of production and the organization and 
ownership of the means of production. Production must be 
considered within the social totality, which also includes 
legal and state structures, the dominant ideology and the 
political structure. To be more precise, a mode of 
production specifies what has variously been described as a 
'social totality' or a 'structured whole'. This is to argue 
that in conceptualizing a mode of production it is essential 
to define the conditions of reproduction, and this requires 
that the class and political structures instrumental in 
maintaining the relations of production be specified.
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The concept of the mode of production as a 'social totality'
adopted in this study emphasizes the analytical unity of
production and reproduction spheres. Though never
specifically defined in Capital. Marx's concept of the mode
of production was by no means restricted to the definition
of forces and relations of production, given that production
and reproduction constitute a unitary social process:
whatever the form of the process of production in a society, it must be a continuous process, must continue to go periodically through the same phases. A society can no more cease to produce than it can cease to consume. When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, as flowing with incessant renewal, every social process of production is, at the same time, a process of 
reproduction (Marx, Capital. Vol.I:566).
The analytical unity of production and reproduction spheres 
is indicative of the methodological errors of the 
articulation theory: an empiricist interpretation of 
production relations and a functionalist mode of 
argumentation. The empiricist reading of relations of 
production does not grasp the methodological distinction 
between empirical and analytical space and, therefore, 
identifies the immediate sphere of production with 
capitalism. All non-wage forms of labour are located within 
PCMsP and articulation with them is seen as 'necessary' for 
capitalism. This 'necessity' is then explained either in 
terms of some notion of profitability or as an effect of the 
'needs' of the expended reproduction of capital. Bradby 
(1975) has argued that articulation to secure external 
markets, raw materials, and labour supplies is not a 
permanent or universal condition for the reproduction of 
capital. The 'needs' of capital are not related to capital
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as a homogeneous whole "but to individual capitals or 
branches of capital at a particular time" (Bradby,
1975:149). Moreover, as Clarke (1977) has persuasively 
argued, a notion of capitalism which embodies the existence 
or bringing into existence of its own conditions of 
reproduction, or which states that something is necessary 
and assumes that the conditions of its existence also exist, 
involves an 'essentialist' and 'voluntarist' conception of 
capitalism.
These criticisms do not imply that noncapitalist producers 
do not exist, but that the 'uncomfortable notion of 
existential necessity' can hardly account for the reasons of 
their existence. Rather than developing arguments based on 
the concepts of 'existential necessity', we should look at 
the particular conditions within certain industries or 
sections of capitalist production which depend on the output 
of noncapitalist producers. This is to say, the absorption, 
preservation or even creation of noncapitalist structures 
depend on conditions which can not be identified in advance. 
Each case of capitalist/noncapitalist relationship has to be 
theorized separately and should not be related to some 
'needs' of the expanded reproduction of capital.
To reiterate, a mode of production cannot be identified by 
observing immediate production processes; rather, it should 
be defined in broad epochal terms, by incorporating into 
this concept the mechanisms of reproduction, the state, and 
political and ideological institutions. Production and 
reproduction constitute a unitary process rather than 
functionally distinct spheres. This epochal concept of the
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mode of production excludes the possibility of the existence 
of more than one mode of production in a social formation.
It however leaves unanswered the important question of the 
characterization of production processes organized on a 
non-capitalist basis in the periphery.
Before addressing this question, it is necessary at this 
point to establish the relevance of the concept of the mode 
of production specified here to the study of Iranian social 
formation. For this purpose, the following discussion first 
identifies the conventional approaches to the study of the 
Middle East and outlines the problems they present. This 
discussion would establish how and why a materialist 
approach based on the concept of the mode of production is 
both necessary and useful for the study of Iran. Throughout 
the discussion I have found it necessary to refer to the 
study of the Middle East and Iran interchangeably, as almost 
all problems presented in the study of Iran are derived from 
the larger field of Middle Eastern studies.
D. Social Sciences and the Study of the Middle East
Most studies on the Middle East are descriptive and 
characterized by a relative absence of the contemporary 
debates found in the study of other regions of the Third 
World. This is primarily due to the fact that the tradition 
of Western scholarship on the study of the Middle East is 
constituted by three closely intertwined approaches: 
sociology of development, functional anthropology and 
Orientalism (Seddon, 1986). Despite their different 
historical and intellectual roots, these three traditions
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share certain basic epistemological assumptions and concerns 
which have largely formed the framework for the study of the 
Middle East.
Both functional anthropological ethnography, as exemplified 
in British and North American anthropology of the first half 
of the 20th century, and the post-war sociology of 
development characterized Middle Eastern societies as 
self-contained organisms maintaining an internal equilibrium 
and lacking historical dimension. These approaches shared 
the assumption that in the Middle East economic and social 
prerequisites for dynamic change were absent, and focused on 
the normative and cultural spheres, particularly the 
institutions of religion and family, to explain resistance 
to change and the persistence of backwardness. As discussed 
above, these intellectual traditions systematically ignored 
the internal dynamics of change and failed to confront the 
determinants of externally-introduced change, namely, the 
relations of exploitation and domination that characterized 
the colonial and imperialist structures within which the 
Middle East was incorporated. Neither the 'external' nor the 
'internal' determinants of structural transformations were 
identified as appropriate problems for analysis.21
While the traditions of the sociology of development and 
functional anthropology also dominate the study of other 
regions of the Third World, in the case of the Middle East 
the problem is compounded by the tradition of Orientalism. 
Since the publication of Edward Said's Orientalism in 1978, 
a large corpus of literature has arisen in response to this 
tradition, either in an attempt to salvage it, or to further
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deconstruct its main categories.22 However, despite the 
extensive critique it has been subjected to, the tradition 
of Orientalism continues to dominate the study of the Middle 
East.
Classical Orientalism can be traced back to the first 
historic Christian experience of Islam, beginning in the 
Middle Ages until the 18th century. During this period, 
capitalist Europe gradually emerged out of feudal 
Christendom, the last of the Arabs were expelled from Spain, 
and aggressive Ottoman Empire helped much to fashion the 
image of the 'cruel' Islamic polity. Classical Orientalists 
were mainly the medieval Christian polemicists who sought to 
defend the values of Christendom against the threat of 
aggressive Islam (Asad, 1973a).
Modern Orientalism is historically distinct; it is rooted in 
the rise of European colonial empires and the imperial 
expansion of Europe in the Middle East in the 19th century. 
Its method, assumptions and preoccupations articulate the 
deep contradictions of that 'unequal historic encounter'. In 
Said's view (1978) modern Orientalism is more than a field 
of study; it forms a discourse constituted by a set of 
generalizations, abstractions, relationships, structures and 
texts which define the Orient and the Orientals for the 
West. Through this discourse the West has sought to find 
clues to its own rationality and humanity, as compared with 
the alleged irrationality and repressiveness of Islamic 
polity and society. Orientalism is therefore constituted 
around the central assumption that there is an ontological 
distinction between the 'Orient' and the 'Occident'; an
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absolute and systematic difference separates the rational, 
developed and humane West from the abbarent, decadent and 
inferior East. This alleged ontological difference also 
entails an epistemological one which holds that the 
conceptual instruments, scientific categories and political 
descriptions employed to understand Western societies are, 
in principle, irrelevant and inapplicable to the Eastern 
ones.
Central to an understanding of the ontological distinction 
between the 'Orient' and the 'Occident' is the 
characterization of the former in terms of a 'series of 
absences' (Turner, 1984:158). The most significant 'absence' 
in the Orient is that of private property rights in land, 
which has resulted in the institutionalization of a 
particular form of political rule: 'Oriental despotism'.
The absence of private property rights gave the Orient its 
stagnatory and despotic conditions. In a situation where the 
state, instead of individual citizens, was the real landlord 
and property could be confiscated arbitrarily by the ruler, 
autonomous cities with a legal character and internal 
coherence never fully developed; no urban bourgeoisie could 
prosper; and no autonomous institutions which could 
intervene between the whimsical and illegitimate demands of 
the despot and the mass of the population could come into 
existence. Consequently, social classes, and a clearly 
defined class structure, did not develop in the Orient, 
which therefore lacks the dynamism of class struggle.
Instead of classes, Oriental society was constituted by a 
complex mosaic of 'tribes', ethnic groups, communities and
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religious sects. The mosaic diversity of the social 
structure enabled the despotic overlord to divide and rule, 
and to own and confiscate landed property without fear of 
coherent and organized opposition.23
Despotism and the absence of private property rights are 
therefore the key features of Islamic polity and society. In 
this connection, Asad (1973a) makes the interesting point 
that while the tradition of functional anthropology, which 
largely dominated the study of African societies, stressed 
consent and legitimacy as the central elements in the 
integrated political systems of African countries, the 
Orientalist image of Islamic society was very different.
Here the defining feature was force; the Islamic society was 
viewed as fragmented and the Orientalist focused on the 
element of repression in the institutionalized relationship 
between rulers and ruled.
Orientalist scholarship also emphasized the attitude of 
resignation and submission to the ruler on the part of the 
ruled. This attitude was explained in terms of the religious 
essence of 'Islam'. Islam was portrayed as a monolithic, 
unchanging worldview outside history, yet one which 
paradoxically determines all other aspects of Oriental 
society. The whole 1,300 years of Islamic history and its 
various epochs, the 'Golden Age of Islam' (9th to 12th 
centuries), the 'Islamic Dark Ages' (13th to 18th centuries) 
and European colonial expansion in the Middle East (19th 
century), were subsumed under the general rubric of 
'stagnation', 'decay' and 'continuity' (Hammami et al., 
1988). Islamic history was seen as free from conflict and
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turmoil, and Islam as fostering fatalism and resignation, 
which in turn characterized 'Muslim psychology'. Islamic 
counter-cultures such as Sufism, which provided critigues of 
hierarchy and exploitation, and the populist tradition in 
Muslim societies as expressed in the repeated popular 
revolts, never formed the object of Orientalist's 
analysis.24 An essentialist conception of Islam as a 
totalizing force and consciousness, together with the 
absence of private property rights and the predominance of 
despotism, defined the ethos of the Orient: fatalistic, 
guiescent and stagnant. The progressive, rational and 
democratic values of the West could not develop in the 
Orient.
Based on an essentialist and idealistic epistemology, and 
through a series of stereotypes and abstractions,
Orientalism transformed the Orient into an image, and 
represented it as an eternal and uniform entity incapable of 
defining itself. Perhaps Iran more than any other Middle 
Eastern country has conformed to the Orientalist image of an 
unchanging, stagnant and remote land. With the increasing 
incorporation of the Iranian economy into the world market 
and its rapid peripheralization in the 19th century, the 
first Orientalist images of 'Persia' and 'Persians' began to 
take shape.25 These images first appeared in the popular 
genre of the 19th century: 'books of travel'.26 The 
travelogue descriptions of Iran presented the image of an 
exotic, remote and tranquil land inhabited by backward, 
childlike people and despotic, capricious kings, where, for 
thousands of years, nothing had happened and nothing had 
changed. Backwardness was explained by reference to the
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despotic and corrupt court of the Qajars, forces of Islam, 
general ignorance and the particular character and 
temperament of the 'Persians'. These early Orientalist 
images of Iran clearly conveyed the disparagement and 
disdain of the West of 'other' cultures. For these Western 
'observers', Persia typified the backward, idle, exotic and 
sensual Orient, and, yet, a curiously attractive land which 
provided them with an outlet for their escapist fantasies 
and romantic nostalgia.
Although Orientalism was initially a European phenomenon, 
particularly as it was institutionalized in 19th century 
Britain and France, with the decline of European formal 
empires, the advent of decolonization movements and the rise 
of informal American empire in the post-1945 period, the 
'old world' scholarship on the Middle East shifted to the 
new terrain of American 'area studies'. As discussed 
earlier, 'political modernization', 'economic development' 
and 'national character' studies proliferated rapidly in 
post-war America in order to rationalize the new imperial 
order and to enable the US to compete favourably with the 
Soviet Union in the cold war. In the field of Middle Eastern 
studies, however, developmentalism incorporated, adopted and 
echoed the Orientalist discourse, albeit modifying it to 
accommodate the new American hegemony over the Middle East. 
For instance, in the case of Iran, although modernization 
theory transformed the 'despotic king' into a 'modernizing 
monarch', the basic characteristics of Iranian society and 
economy were depicted as essentially the same. Iranian 
society continued to be seen as an inherently disintegrated 
and fragmentated entity, with all groups and institutions
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dissolved in order for the monarch to achieve and maintain 
the absolute subordination of his subjects.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Iran provided an ideal-type 
for modernization theory in North America. The 
psychological/personality approach of modernization theory 
was particularly influential in the study of Iran. Generally 
speaking, the inherently unchanging social structure and the 
particular form of political rule were seen as impeding 
socio-economic development in Iran. Insecurity, fatalism, 
individualism, cynicism, aloofness, irrationality, and 
subjectivity characterized Iranian 'psyche' and formed 
'obstacles to modernization'. The two most prominent 
advocates of psychologism and cultural diffusion model, 
Lerner (1958) and McClelland (1963) studied 'political 
attitudes' and 'psychological orientations' of Iranians.27 
While Lerner discovered that 'extremism' characterized 
Iranian 'national character', and established a direct link 
between this psychological attribute and the particular 
ecology of the country, McClelland explained the low rates 
of economic development in the 1920-1950 period in terms of 
the weakness or lack of 'achievement orientation' among 
Iranians, as evidenced by the insufficient occurrence of 
achievement-related themes in Iranian children's stories.
But it was the works of Zonis (1971) and Bill (1972a) on 
Iran which typified the broader trends of Middle Eastern 
studies in North America, and provided a vivid example of 
the fusion of developmentalism and Orientalist discourse. 
Zonis' work is an examination of political conflict and 
political development in Iran through the psychological and
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biographical study of three hundred individuals he calls the 
'political elite'. Based on 'scientific' methods such as 
questionnaires, computer-based data and psychological tests, 
he arrives at the conclusion that the 'insecurity' of the 
'political elite' provides a valid guide to understanding 
political processes of Iran. Bill, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the rise of the 'new middle class', which he 
terms 'professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia', and seeks 
to explain the 'alienation' experienced by this class in the 
face of the 'challenge of modernization'.
It goes without saying that these works reflect, in 
characteristic ways, the fundamental assumptions of the 
sociology of development. Lack of adequate conceptual basis, 
mechanical scientism, abstracted empiricism, confused 
positivistic notions and an anti-historical and 
anti-materialist approach characterize these studies. The 
past, a frozen, undifferentiated and static entity, is 
conceptually separated from the present, and the phenomenon 
under study bears no relationship with its social and 
material context (de Groot, 1978).28 Thus Zonis (1971:127) 
contends that for the past 2,000 years the patterns of 
political mobility in Iran have remained basically the same; 
and Bill (1972a:2) argues that class relations in Iran have 
persisted unchanged for nearly 1,400 years. It is therefore 
not surprising that relevant analysis of the historical and 
structural determinants of 'insecurity' and 'alienation' 
allegedly experienced by the members of the 'political 
elite' and the 'intelligentsia' in Iran is never produced. 
The sweeping generalisations, the vacuous attitude to time,- 
and the total denial of internal dynamics of change, all
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characteristics of modernization theory, are reinforced in 
these studies by the tradition of Orientalism and its image 
of the timeless Orient.29
However, despite the psychological and normative obstacles 
to 'development', Iran was also depicted as the arch-model 
of modernization. Iran's rates of economic growth, 
urbanization, development of infrastructure and 
industrialization were cited as evidence of a successful 
'take-off' to 'modernity' and a promising model of growth. 
The context of this generally positive and progressive image 
of Iran under the Shah, as propagated by cold war scholars 
such as Bill (1972a), Binder (1962), Lerner (1958), 
McClelland (1963), Savory (1973) and Zonis (1971), was 
obviously US-Iranian relationship in the three post-war 
decades and the pressing need to discredit and dismiss its 
critics. Edward Said (1978) has shown us how 19th century 
Orientalists served the interests of the formal empire. The 
blunt ideological character of post-war US-Middle Eastern 
studies, compared to the tradition of Orientalism, reflects 
the informal structures of American empire, its declining 
tendencies, its insecure foundations and the challenges it 
faces today almost everywhere - least of all in the Middle 
East.
In the late 1960s and 1970s a different interpretation of 
Iranian history and society came to the fore. Influenced by 
theories of dependency, the Cuban Revolution and Maoist 
teachings, the alternative interpretation saw Iran as an 
arch-model of dependent capitalist development, and the 
American support for the Shah as an evidence of the
53
existence of a neo-colonial 'puppet' regime promoting a 
'lumpendevelopment' through the agency of a corrupt and 
'comprador' bourgeoisie. Much of the writings of this period 
reflects the particular orthodoxy of the left which has 
earlier been described as Third Worldist Marxism.30 
Characteristically, the major constituent elements of this 
orthodoxy were radical nationalism, populism, economism, 
lack of concern with theory and a narrow conception of 
political practice (Arman, 1986). The Third Worldist 
interpretation saw the major contradiction of Iranian 
society as an external one and argued that the main task of 
progressive forces was an anti-imperialist struggle. A 
populist and romantic conception of revolution defined it as 
a broad-based, anti-imperialist struggle whose aim was to 
overthrow a 'puppet' regime and change the direction of 
development from a 'dependent' to an 'autarchic' one. For 
the Iranian Third Worldist writers, dependency theory 
provided a moral critique of capitalism by reference to a 
utopia free from exploitation and inequality. The Marxist 
concern with the totality of social relations of production 
and the internal contradictions of Iranian society were 
reduced to a struggle between the oppressor (US imperialism) 
and the victim (Iranian masses). Therefore, while class 
analysis in the orthodox Orientalist and developmentalist 
traditions were either wholly absent or based on confused 
sub-Weberian categories, in the Third Worldist literature it 
appears, only to be reduced to a subjectivist sociological 
problematic of inequality, injustice and deprivation.
Although Third Worldist interpretation subjected the central 
assumptions of orthodox approaches to Iran to extensive
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critique, it proved to have almost equally oppressive 
implications for both theory and practice. By iqnorinq the 
Marxist concepts of class and contradiction in favour of a 
popular struqgle against foreign dominance, by emphasizing a 
return to 'national values' and 'native culture', and by an 
equally essentialist distinction between the 'West' and the 
'East', the left's Third Worldism predictably played into 
the hand of its enemy.31 Hammami and Rieker (1988) have 
described Third Worldist analysis as reflecting the 
'epistemological privilege of the oppressed'; and al-Azm 
(1984) has called it 'Orientalism in reverse', having in 
mind Arab nationalism and Islamic revival movements. It is 
this type of Third Worldist analysis which has reproduced 
the ethnocentrism of conventional approaches to the Middle 
East.
Despite the general deconstruction of categories derived 
from Orientalism, functional anthropology and sociology of 
development, the field of Middle Eastern studies has hardly 
progressed beyond its colonial heritage. It seems that even 
radical and Marxist scholars on Iran find it difficult to 
break completely from the Orientalist categories of Middle 
Eastern 'despotism', 'timelessness' and 'continuity', which 
have plagued this field of study for so long.32 More 
fundamentally, these problems are rooted in the theoretical 
weaknesses of these works, itself derived from the overall 
lack of concern with social theory and the assumption that 
'Western' concepts of class and politics are inapplicable to 
the study of the Middle East. These assumptions remain 
enduring and resilient, despite works produced by scholars 
such as Asad, Clawson, Glavanis, Halliday, Keyder, Owen,
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Richards, Said, Seddon and Turner, which have done much to 
'decolonize' the field. 3 3
However, to challenge the established intellectual 
traditions also involves suggesting an alternative approach. 
It is suggested here that the starting point for the 
analysis of Iranian society and history begins with the 
deconstruction of the analytical categories of the fields of 
both Middle Eastern and development studies at large. Static 
and essentialist categories such as 'Islam' and 'Orient', 
ideal-types such as 'traditional' and 'modern', and 
reductionist constructs such as 'dependent development' are 
dismissed as obscuring contradictions internal and external 
to Iranian society. Although dismissing the assumptions of 
these intellectual traditions, this study emphasizes the 
significance of 'Western' concepts of class and politics, 
and argues that they should establish the point of reference 
of the analysis of Iran. The Chapters on Iran challenge the 
persistent idea of 'Middle Eastern exceptionalism' and show 
that basic Marxist concepts such as mode of production, 
property relations, class and exploitation are as relevant 
to the study of the Middle East as they are to the rest of 
the world.
The approach adopted here is based on historical and 
materialist concept of Iranian society and economy. It 
emphasizes the dynamics of the changing involvement of the 
Iranian economy in the world market during the past two 
centuries and the impact of this involvement on property 
relations, class configuration and the structure of the 
state. Only within this framework is it possible to
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deconstruct categories derived from both Orientalism/ 
developmentalism and the more recent Third Worldism.
It has not been possible for me here to unfold all the basic 
ontological, epistemological and other underlying 
assumptions constituting the Marxist paradigm. I have, 
however, highlighted those essential aspects of the Marxist 
method which are relevant for explaining the type of 
transformations this study proposes to analyze. It is my 
conviction that historical materialism is distinguished by 
its emphasis on the most basic and primary human activity: 
social production and reproduction. This emphasis reveals 
how human beings, in developing a way of producing, alter 
the material conditions of their existence as well as their 
way of thinking and ideas. In the final analysis, for 
Marxism, what defines and determines the specificity of any 
society and any historical epoch is the property system and 
production relations. All the crucial characteristics of 
human society, means of production, techno-economic division 
of labour, social relations of production, etc. are analyzed 
through the general, abstract concept of the mode of 
production discussed in this Chapter.
This work should be seen as part of a broader 
reconceptualization in the fields of both development and 
Middle Eastern studies, and as an attempt to establish that 
a Marxist study of Iran is both relevant and necessary.
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9. For a general discussion of Third Worldist ideology and the context of its formation, see: G.Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World. Penguin, New York, 1978.
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10. For an attempt to salvage the paradigm of developmentalism, see: S.Huntington, 'The Change to Change', Comparative Politics. April 1971, and Colin Leys' (1983) interesting discussion of it.
11. Frank's early writings and their relationship with both 
ELCA's structuralism and the position of Latin American communist parties are fully discussed by Booth (1975), O'Brien (1975) and Roxborough (1979).
12. Due to the lack of space, I have only outlined the main constituent elements of dependency perspective. The ideas outlined here are shared by a number of writers, amongst whom Frank is perhaps the most well-known one. Baran's (1957) pioneering work has been the major source of inspiration for dependency writers, who have drawn heavily on the notions of 'economic surplus' and 'surplus drain'. Wallerstein's 'world system' analysis is a logical extension of Frank's thesis; its distinguishing features being the choice of the unit of analysis, i.e., the world level; and his concern with the genesis, growth and functioning of the world system since the 16th century. Amin also shares the same concerns in his attempts at writing the whole history of the capitalist world market and formulating a 'general model' of underdevelopment. Amin is particularly known for his idea of 'delinking', a persistent and major theme of Third Worldism since Baran. Emmanuel's (1972) 'unequal exchange' is the clearest example of circulationism; it is the main source of the proposition that core regions 'exploit' peripheral areas through exchange relations, and has been used extensively by both Amin and Wallerstein as the basis of their theories of imperialism. According to this theory, 'poor' countries are exploited by 'rich' countries because the labour content of their commodities exceeds that of commodities produced in the 'rich' countries. Exploitation is conceptualized in terms of the surplus value produced in the periphery because of its lower organic composition of capital which is then expropriated by the capitalists in the centre through international exchange relations. This thesis has been extensively criticised for its Ricardian rather than Marxist notion of value. For a critique of Frank's early writings, see references in note number 11; for a detailed criticism of 'world system' analysis, see: Brewer (1980). Unequal exchange has been criticised by Bettleheim (1972), Kay (1975) and Pilling (1973). For discussions of Amin's work, see: Barone (1980), Brewer (1980), Schiffer (1981) and Smith (1980-1982-1983). References to a general critique of Third Worldism are listed in note 13.
13. Works produced along this line of critique are numerous. See, for example, Angotti (1982), Bernstein(1979b-1983), Brenner (1977), Brewer (1980), Culley (1977), Johnson (1982), Kitching (1982), Laclau (1971), Leys (1977), 
Petras (1982) and Phillips (1977).
14. Emmanuel (1972) is the main adherent of the view that 
the division between centre and periphery should be assimilated to a division between 'bourgeois' and 'proletarian' nations; and that class struggle now takes
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place in the form of nation against nation. The crudest version of this view is put forward by Wallerstein (1974- 1979-1980) , who argues that while in the core areas 
national, class conscious struggles do occur, in peripheral areas class struggle takes the form of national liberation movements in which the local bourgeoisie will always be allied with international capital. This view, as we shall see, makes it quite impossible to understand recent Iranian history: the immense struggles within the power bloc in the 1905-11 Constitutional Movement, and outside the power bloc in 1979 Revolution, as well as the class conflicts of the late 1940s and early 1950s.
15. For detailed discussions of Marxist economic anthropology, see: Kahn and Llobera (1980) and Clammer (1975).
16. For discussions and critique of Althusser's Marxism, see: A.Callinicos, Althusser's Marxism. Plutto Press, London:1978; S.Clarke (ed), One Dimensional Marxism. Allison and Busby, London:1980; and A.Levine, 'Althusser's Marxism', Economy and Society. Vol.10, No.3, 1981.
17. The best example is the work of Rey (1982). See also Dupre and Rey (1973) and Meillassoux (1972-1981).
18. Two extreme examples would be the formulations of Roxborough (1979) and of Wallerstein (1974). For the former, a mode of production should be defined at the regional level, within a social formation. Modes of production can, therefore, exist in various parts of a social formation. For Wallerstein, on the other hand, there is one single mode of production, the CMP, and that must be conceptualized at the world level. There are only 'economies'. Finally, in another approach, the concepts of mode of production and social formation are considered as redundant, and abandoned in favour of a theory of reproduction (Friedman 1976), or the concept of the mode of production is replaced by a social formation which is an indeterminate or plural structure constituted by a variety of relations of production and their conditions of existence (Hindess and Hirst 1977).
19. See, for example, Bettleheim (1972), Dupre and Rey (1973), Meillassoux (1972-1981), Poulantzas (1973) and Wolpe 
(1980) for various formulations of this thesis in terms of 'dominant' and 'subordinate' modes of production co-existing 
in a paradoxical relationship of 'conservation/dissolution'.
20. The elements of a mode of production - labour power, the non-labourer, and the means of production - are constituted through the material appropriation and property relations. Material appropriation refers to the organization of the production process and focuses on the relationship between the division of labour and the means (e.g. tools) and the object (e.g. land) of labour. The property relation
('property' here is not used in the juridical sense of 'private property' but as a more abstract concept whose nature can be understood only within the social relations of production in which it is produced) describes the way in which surplus labour is appropriated from the direct
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producer by non-producers. Relations of production are the relations between producers and non-producers. This relationship constitutes the basis of class differentiation 
in a mode of production. The relationship between relationships, that is, the relationship between forces and relations of production, together with the conditions of their reproduction, determine the nature of a mode of production.
21. The limitations of these traditional approaches to the Middle East are fully discussed by Asad (1973a-1973b-1976, 1986), Asad and Owen (1984), Eickleman (1981), Glavanis et al. (1983), Rosenfeld (1972) and Turner (1978-1984). For a discussion of functional anthropology, see Peter Forster, 'A Review of the New Left Critique of Social Anthropology', in Asad (1973b).
22. See, for example, the following major discussions ofOrientalism: Talal Asad, 'Review of Orientalism'. English Historical Review. No.95, July 1980; James Clifford, 'Review of Orientalism'. History and Theory. No.19, Vol.2, 1980; Robert Kapp, 'Introduction to the Review Symposium on Orientalism'. Journal of Asian Studies. Vol.XXXIX, No.3, May 1980; Victor Kiernan, 'Review of Orientalism'. Journal of Contemporary Asia. No.9, Vol.3, 1979; Bernard Lewis, 'Review of Orientalism'. New York Review of Books. No.29, June 1982; L.Marni and R.Frankenberg, 'The Challenge of Orientalism'. Economy and Society. Vol.14, No.2, 1985; Stuart Shaar, 'Orientalism at the Service of Imperialism', Race and Class. No.21, Vol.l, 1979. See also Said's response to these reviews: 'Orientalism Reconsidered', Race and Class. No.27,
Vol.12, 1985.
23. A detailed discussion and critique of Orientalism can be found in references cited in note number 21. Said (1978) remains the most comprehensive source on Orientalism although the distinction between classical and modern Orientalism is at times blurred in his work. Marxism shares most of the assumptions of Orientalism, as the notion of the Asiatic mode of production clearly indicates. The relationship between Marxism and Orientalism is a complex and controversial issue which cannot be discussed here. Marx's Orientalism has more to do with his relationship with Hegel than with the 19th century colonial discipline of Orientalism. Turner (1978-1984) has interesting discussions of the relationship between the two discourses.
24. For a different interpretation of Islamic history, 
which contradicts the ideas of 'continuity' and 'timelessness', and establishes the compatibility of Islamic history with both class analysis and the development of capitalism, see: Rodinson (1979) and Gran (1975-1979). 'The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam' represents an excellent attempt by Asad (1986) to provide a Marxist analysis of 
Islamic history and practices.
25. The first Orientalist images of Iran, of course, predate the 19th century. For a broad review of the ways in which Iran has been portrayed in the West from the 5th to the middle of the 18th centuries, see: L.Lockhart, 'Persia
61
as Seen by the West', in A.J.Aberry (ed), The Legacy of Persia. Oxford University Press, London:1953. Banuazizi (1977) and Benard and Khalilzad (1984) discuss 19th century travel diaries and works of fiction on Iran in detail.
26. See, for instance, the following works which indicate the immense popularity of travel diaries on Iran in the 19th and early 20th centuries in Europe: J.B.Frazer, Narrative of Journey into Khorasan in the Years 1821 and 1822.London:1825; id., Travels and Adventures in the Persian Provinces on the Southern Banks of the Caspian Sea.London:1826; id., A Winter's Journey from Constantinople to 
Tehran, London:1838; Gertrude Bell, Persian Pictures.London:1894; P.N.Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Iran. London:1893; C.J.Wills, Persia as It Is - Brief Sketches of Modern Persian Life and Character.London:1880; C.E.Stewart, Through Persia in Disguise.London:1911; and Herman Norder, Under Persian Skies.London:1928.
27. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York:Free Press, 1958 (Iran is one of the six Middle Eastern case studies undertaken by the author); David McClelland, 'National Character and Economic Growth in Turkey and Iran', in L.W.Pye (ed), Communications and Political Development. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963.
28. Both Joanna de Groot (1978) and Stuart Schaar (1979) provide detailed critiques of Bill and Zonis, and the larger issues of post-war US/Middle-Eastern studies. See also Johnson and Tucker (1975) and Winder (1987) for the political and strategic context of US/Middle Eastern studies.
29. Other examples of works on Iran within the framework of modernization theory are: W.S.Hass, Iran. N.Y. Colombia University Press, 1946 (particularly the Chapter 'Persian Psychology'); H.V.Vreeland (ed), Iran, New Haven, Human Relations Area Files, 1957; R.Gable, 'Culture and Administration in Iran', Middle East Journal. Vol.23, No.3, Fall 1958; A.F.Westwood, 'Politics of Distrust in Iran', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol.358, March 1965; N.Jacobs, The Sociology of 
Development: Iran as an Asian Case Study. N.Y. Praeger,1966; L.Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society. Berkeley, 1962.
30. Most of the Third Worldist literature on Iran was produced by the activists of the major leftist groups and 
organizations in the 1960s and 1970s. Examples are:M.Ahmadzadeh, Armed Struggle: Both as Strategy and Tactic. Tehran:1979; M .Safaii-Farahani, What a Revolutionary Should Know. Tehran, 1979. See also Jazani (1980) and Nirumand 
(1964) for a similar type of analysis. In 'Iranian Intellectuals and Dependency Theory', Arman (1986) discusses the impact of Third Worldism on the political analyses and activities of the major leftist groups in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s.
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31. I am referring to 1979 Iranian Revolution and the defeat suffered by the left, partly due to its Third Worldist analyses and practices. This complex issue, however, should form the subject of a separate study.
32. More influential than developmentalism, Orientalist 
discourse continues to dominate the study of Iran. For example, Ervand Abrahamian (1974-1975-1982) and Ahmad Ashraf 
(1970-1980), despite their impressive and insightful historical and empirical works, continue to resort to formulations derived from Orientalism. Katouzian (1981), Mehrain (1979) and Moghadam (1986-1988a-1988b) also provide good examples of Orientalist interpretations of Iran. These works share the central assumptions of Orientalism: the 'absence' or 'insecurity' of landed private property, an emphasis on the element of repression as the defining feature of political domination, and on the fragmentary character of the social structure as exemplified by a fixation upon 'tribes'. The general trend, sometimes thinly disguised, is a refusal to accept that fundamental structural changes have occurred in Iran. See, for instance, the section 'The persistence of despotism'' in Moghadam (1988b) and her conclusion that '... private property continues to be weak and subject to arbitrariness. This suggests that once the process of historic transition is completed, the outcome is unlikely to be capitalist' (ibid., 
p .416) .
33. See the bibliography for the works of these authors.
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CHAPTER TWO
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE PERIPHERY
The distinction between 'circulationism' and 'productionism' 
is, at best, an oversimplified classification but it does 
express, in broad terms, two different readings of the 
history of the world market. In the previous Chapter, I have 
briefly discussed these two interpretations, and have argued 
that neither an exchange-oriented approach nor an exclusive 
emphasis on the production processes provides an adequate 
basis for a Marxist analysis of the development of the 
capitalist world market and the present international 
division of labour. As both approaches present a partial and 
misleading interpretation of the history of the formation of 
the world market, it is far from sufficient to replace one 
with another. A more promising theoretical starting point is 
to provide a synthesis which cuts across the formal 
distinction between the 'internalist' and 'externalist' 
readings of history. I believe that it is possible to 
develop this 'synthesis', and bring elements of the two 
interpretations together, through the approach of the 
internationalization of capital. As we shall see, the 
approach of the internationalization of capital also enables 
us to distinguish between the dynamics of transition to 
capitalism in the centre and in the periphery and therefore 
dismiss the unilinear sense in which the term transition is 
often employed.
64
A. Internationalization of Capital
The distinction between 'circulationists' and 
'productionists' is somewhat reminiscent of the distinction 
between 'neo-Ricardians' and 'Fundamentalists'. Fine and 
Harris (1976-1979) argue that there has been an 
irreconcilable split between 'neo-Ricardians', for whom all 
analysis of the capitalist economy takes place in the sphere 
of exchange and distribution, and the 'Fundamentalists', for 
whom the sphere of production is determinant.
'Neo-Ricardians' examine the spheres of exchange and 
distribution in isolation from the sphere of production, and 
they therefore draw their conclusion in terms of categories, 
such as prices of production and market prices, which exist 
at a relatively low level of abstraction. They conclude that 
economic crises are to be explained solely in terms of class 
struggle over distribution in the sphere of exchange. 
'Fundamentalists', on the other hand, emphasize the 
significance of the labour theory of value and locate the 
source of economic crises in the sphere of production; the 
fundamental contradiction of the system lies in the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall.1 Fine and Harris (1976-1979) 
argue that it would be erroneous to think that the two 
approaches, one operating on the surface of society and the 
other piercing that surface and reaching the hidden forces, 
can be reconciled or considered as complementary. They argue 
that a more promising theoretical starting point is to be 
found in Marx's own analysis of the circuits of capital 
which emphasizes the unity of production, distribution and 
exchange. In Capital, Volume II (Chapters 1, 2 and 3, and 
especially pp.103-118) Marx repeatedly uses the concept of
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the circuit of capital to characterize the structure of the 
capitalist economy. He divides the circuit of capital into 
three spheres of production, exchange, and distribution. The 
relation between these three spheres is complex; and Marx 
emphasizes that this relationship can only be understood as 
a unity. The specific feature of this unity is that surplus 
value is only produced in the sphere of production, while 
its distribution encompasses the two spheres of exchange and 
distribution. Marx states in the Gundrisse (1973) that the 
distinction between the three spheres should not lead to the 
conclusion that
production, distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality, distinctions within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself...but over the other moments as well .... That exchange and consumption cannot be predominant is self-evident.... A definite production thus determines a definite consumption, distribution and exchange, as well as definite relations between these different moments. Admittedly, however, in its one-sided form, production is itself determined by the other moments. For example, if the market, i.e.,the sphere of exchange, expands, then production grows in quantity and the divisions between its different branches become deeper. A change in distribution changes production, e.g., concentration of capital, different distribution of population between town and country, etc. Finally, the needs of consumption determine production. Mutual interaction takes place between the different moments. This is the case with every organic whole (Marx, 1973:99-100, emphasis in original).
Fine and Harris (1976) argue that rather than concentrating 
on one moment of the circuit of capital, a Marxist analysis 
must embrace all three moments, while always giving priority 
to the sphere of production. They conclude that "production 
is determinant in the last instance, but the other spheres 
have a relative autonomy and each sphere has an effect on 
each other" (ibid:142).
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While Fine and Harris adopt the approach of the circuits of
capital as a basis for the analysis of the theory of
capitalist crisis, this approach has also been used for the
analysis of the development of the world market. Christian
Palloix (1975-1977), whose work lays the basis of the
following three sections of this Chapter, is particularly
known for developing this approach. He bases his work on
Marx's specification (Capital. Vol.II) of the 'three
functional forms' which capital takes in the process of its
expanded reproduction: commodity capital. money capital and
productive capital. The capital which encompasses all these
three forms in their entirety is industrial capital:
The circuit of industrial capital in its continuity is therefore not alone the unity of the processes of circulation and production but also the unity of all its three circuits. But it can be such a unity if all the different parts of capital can go through the successive stages of the circuit, can pass from one phase, from one functional form to another, so that the industrial capital, being the whole of all these parts, exists simultaneously in its various phases and functions and thus describes all three circuits at the same time (Marx, Capital. Vol.11:106).
Only productive capital pertains at the level of production; 
the other two circuits exist in the sphere of exchange. Like 
the three spheres of production, circulation and 
distribution, the three circuits are dependent on each 
other. For a social formation to be dominated by the CMP, 
the interlocked existence of the three circuits of capital 
is a necessary condition.
Palloix (1975-1977) employs Marx's distinction between the 
circuits of capital to analyze the historical formation of 
the capitalist world market. The objective of Capital was
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not an analysis of the breakdown of PCMsP but the discovery 
of the laws of motion of capitalism as a closed and 
homogeneous system. The internationalization of capital 
perspective seeks to extend the method and categories of 
Capital to an analysis of how capital has been transformed 
into a world system, or to an analysis of capitalist 
expansion into precapitalist formations. Obviously, there is 
nothing novel about this objective. Most 'circulationist' 
writers, particularly Amin (1974-1976) and Wallerstein 
(1974-1979), have set themselves to the same task. The 
difference, however, is that the perspective of the 
internationalization of capital does not restrict itself to 
the extraction of 'economic surplus' from the periphery to 
the core via the sphere of circulation, but examines how 
labour is exploited on a world level in the process of 
production itself. Since the circuits of capital are 
different aspects of a single process of 
internationalization, it can be seen that both 
'circulationism' and 'productionism' focus on only one 
aspect of the internationalization of capital, and thus give 
a partial picture of the development of the international 
division of labour.
Palloix's analysis of the internationalization of capital is 
conducted at two levels: the successive internationalization 
of individual circuits of capital and the 
internationalization of social capital. The circuit of 
social capital is equivalent to the concept of industrial 
capital discussed by Marx in the previous quotation. It 
denotes the unity of the three specific circuits of capital 
and the expansion of capitalist social relations of
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production in the most abstract and general sense. The 
following diagram shows the circuit of social capital:
m
I is the circuit of money capital (M....M').
II is the circuit of productive capital (P'....P'). 
Ill is the circuit of commodity capital (C'....C'). 
The total circulation process (Tc) is expressed by C' - m ' - C', the starting point of the circuit of 
commodity capital
M = money capital; C = productive process; c = surplus 
value in commodity form; m = surplus value in money 
form; L = labour power; MP = means of production.
M' > M; C' > C; P' > P.
Source: Palloix, 1975:65
As can be seen from the above diagram, each of the circuits 
of social capital is successively internationalized. First 
is the internationalization of commodity capital 
(development of international trade); then of money capital 
(export of capital); and finally of productive capital (the 
'internationalization of production'). In the last stage the 
three circuits in their entirety enforce the laws of motion 
of capital at world level; which is thus the only adequate 
level of analysis.
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In the following three sections of this Chapter the various 
periods of the development of the capitalist world market 
are analyzed on the basis of the distinction between the 
three circuits of capital, and the changing patterns of 
centre/periphery relationship are examined in terms of the 
successive internationalization of each circuit. It is shown 
that the internationalization of each of the three circuits 
of capital has produced dynamics of its own, and has 
transformed precaptialist formations in specific ways. The 
purpose of the following sections is to pinpoint the 
dynamics specific to each circuit and the corresponding 
changes they have brought about in the precapitalist areas 
of the world economy. In Section B it is shown that under 
the 'imperialism of free trade', the circuit of commodity 
capital (trade) has become internationalized. At this stage, 
central formations dominated by the CMP are linked, via 
exchange on the world market, to the peripheral formations 
dominated by PCMsP. This link fails to dissolve PCMsP; 
indeed it perpetuates and strengthens them. Development of 
productive forces and transformation of production relations 
in the periphery are thwarted at this stage due to the 
specific character of merchant capital.
In Section C it will be argued that development of 
capitalist production relations does occur in the phase of 
the internationalization of money capital. This is the phase 
of classical imperialism in the Leninist sense, when export 
of capital from the centre leads to the disintegration of 
precapitalist production relations in the periphery. In 
Section D the internationalization of productive capital is 
examined following the increase in foreign capital
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investment in the production spheres of peripheral 
economies. At this stage, particularly under the domination 
of multinational corporations (MNCs), production itself 
becomes an international process, leading to the emergence 
of a number of industrial centres in the periphery and to 
the formation of the so-called 'new international division 
of labour'.
Following Fine and Harris (1976), I have argued that, while 
the sphere of production is always determinant in the course 
of the development of the world market, at certain 
conjunctures the sphere of circulation tends to be dominant. 
In the phase of the internationalization of merchant 
(commodity) capital, the dominance of the sphere of 
circulation acts as a barrier to an organic transformation 
of the periphery and leads to distortion and 
'underdevelopment'. But metropolitan capitalism is not 
always an agent of backwardness and anachronism, as the 
phase of the internationalization of money capital shows.
The approach of the internationalization of capital enables 
us to identify at what stage world capital accumulation 
tends to transform, and at what stage it preserves or 
consolidates PCMsP in the periphery. The central emphasis of 
this approach is on the gaps, lapses, pace and periods of 
capitalist transformation in the periphery. In this way, my 
approach seeks to transcend the level of descriptive 
generality and the stagnationist character generally 
associated with dependency and world system analyses on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the 'internal' determination of 
history in the mode of production discourse which almost 
dissociates itself from the phenomenon of imperialism.
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Here I should briefly explain the basis of the periodization 
of the development of the world market presented in this 
Chapter. It is argued that the internationalization of each 
circuit of capital covers a certain period of the 
development of the world market. This historical 
periodization is, at best, approximate. Internationalization 
of the circuits of capital does not manifest itself in all 
societies at the same time; the process is uneven across 
time and space, given the unevenness of capitalist 
development. Moreover, internationalization of each circuit 
does not replace the internationalization of the preceding 
one; rather, it reinforces and subordinates the dynamics of 
the previous phase. The periodization presented here is 
primarily in terms of theoretical time rather than 
historical time and therefore should not be read as an 
evolutionist interpretation of history. It is in this sense 
that it has been argued that internationalization of the 
three circuits of capital has proceeded in an ordered form.
One final question which arises in relation to the 
internationalization of capital approach is whether the 
successive stages of internationalization of capital lead to 
the homogenization of the world market, and, by implication, 
to the disappearance of the centre/periphery gap. This 
question is addressed in the last two Sections of this 
Chapter where the thesis of the 'new international division 
of labour' and the question of the persistence of 
precapitalist forms of production in the present stage of 
the internationalization of production are examined.
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B. The Circuit of Commodity Capital
The circuit of commodity capital is represented by the 
formula: C - M - C  ... P ... C' (Marx, Capital, Vol.II, 
Chapter III). This circuit presupposes the act of 
circulation (C-M-C'), the external existence of commodities, 
and the world market. It was therefore the first circuit to 
be internationalized through international exchange 
relations (Palloix, 1975).
From the outset it is essential to distinguish between 
pre-industrial and post-industrial trade. My concern here is 
with the latter category only. Pre-industrial trade is 
associated with the phase of mercantilism in Europe during 
the period between 1500 to 1800, and was ended by the rise 
of the CMP in the early 19th century. In terms of the 
historical periodization of the world market, this is the 
'prehistory' of capitalism or the phase of primitive 
accumulation. Almost all goods traded during these three 
centuries of mercantilism in Europe were slaves and 
'luxuries': sugar, spices, tobacco and precious metals. The 
composition of trade changed gradually within the decades 
around 1800 which marked a turning point in the history of 
the world market: mercantilism was separated from the epoch 
of classical capitalism. The domination of the periphery by 
merchant capital in the phase of competitive capitalism, 
therefore, covers the period between 1800 to the end of the 
19th century, terminated by the rise of monopoly capitalism 
at the centre. This period of nearly one century is the 
heyday of competitive capitalism, beginning with England's 
industrial revolution.
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Britain's laissez-faire and free trade policy ensured 
British capital's continued paramountcy which had been 
gained in the earlier phase over the old mercantilist powers 
of the Mediterranean and the Low Countries. Throughout this 
phase, Britain controlled the markets of the world; a vital 
advantage since the most important raw material, cotton, 
could not grow favourably in Britain and had to be imported. 
By the 1850s, production processes were subordinated to 
capital (although cottage industry, atomized work process 
and low division of labour survived well beyond the second 
half of the 19th century). The central reason for the push 
into precapitalist markets was competitive capitalism's need 
for raw materials, especially since certain raw materials 
could not be produced in the centre because of climatic and 
geological reasons (Clawson, 1979). Trade in luxuries and 
slaves was replaced by a new pattern of trade: export of 
manufactured goods from the centre and import of foodstuffs 
and raw materials from the periphery. The division of the 
world into 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' parts came into 
existence at this point and the basic patterns of the 
international division of labour were established.
The industrial revolution was merchant capital's 'historic 
defeat'. In an extended discussion of merchant capital, Kay 
(1975) argues that after the rise of competitive capitalism 
in the centre, merchant capital took 'two historical forms': 
one as an independent form of capital (pre-industrial 
merchant capital of the Middle Ages), the other as an 
'agent' of industrial capital. During the Middle Ages 
merchant capital existed throughout the world solely in its 
first form; hence the absence of any international division
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of labour. The industrial revolution marked the crisis and 
decline of merchant capital in the centre. In the rest of 
the world, however, merchant capital survived and continued 
to operate as an 'agent' of industrial capital. According to 
Kay, it is this form of merchant capital which penetrated 
precapitalist formations and is the principal cause of 
'underdevelopment' today. While industrial competitive 
capital came to dominate the centre, in the 'underdeveloped 
world' merchant capital became dominant in the form that had 
existed in medieval Europe. In other words, the initial 
penetration of capital into precapitalist formations began 
with the rise of competitive capitalism in the centre. 
Penetration of commodity capital in the periphery coincided 
with the phase of fully developed industrial capital in the 
centre, which drew peripheral formations into the world 
market in ways radically different from those of the centre: 
(i) merchant capital dominated peripheral economies from the 
outside; its rise was not the result of contradictions 
internal to these economies, nor did its decline leave these 
economies with the same impact and consequences; (ii) 
merchant capital dominated peripheral economies at a time 
when it had already exhausted itself in the centre (Kay 
1975). The difference in timing here is of fundamental 
importance.
What are the characteristic features of merchant capital? 
Merchant capital is involved in the simple act of buying 
commodities cheaply and selling them expensively. All that 
is necessary for its existence, therefore, is the external 
existence of commodities. Here money becomes the object of 
exchange and commodities are produced not for the purpose of
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consumption but for sale on the market. As production 
processes are left intact, no value is produced and no 
surplus value is extracted. Merchant capital's profits are 
derived from price differences in space.2 In a chapter 
entitled 'Historical Facts About Merchant's Capital', Marx 
(Capital. Vol.III) characterizes merchant capital as a 
conservative/revolutionary force. This contradictory 
character lies in the fact that merchant capital, by being 
restricted to the sphere of exchange and by accumulating at 
that level only, withdraws value from the sphere of 
production, yet it simultaneously tends to undermine the 
PCMsP by encouraging commoditization of the economy. 
Consequently, merchant capital is unable by itself to effect 
the transition to capitalist commodity production.
Interaction of merchant capital with precapitalist producers 
(the latter group is generally shown in the circuit of 
simple commodity production: C-M-C') involves a primary 
division of labour. In other words, simple commodity 
producers have to increasingly rely on merchant capital to 
handle market transactions for them. Merchant capital, 
therefore, plays an intermediary role and provides a link 
between C-M and M-C (Kay, 1975). By mediating between C-M 
and M-C, it is obvious that merchant capital's profits 
cannot arise from the extraction of surplus value, as 
mentioned above. Simple commodity production is a 
precaptialist 'form' of production and is not subordinated 
to the law of value.3
Domination of precapitalist producers by merchant capital 
means the domination of the economy by relations of
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circulation. The economy, in other words, is commoditized 
without labour processes being subsumed by capital in real 
terms.4 It is therefore incorrect to argue that simple 
commodity producers are exploited through 'unegual 
exchange', since the category of social costs of production 
which determines prices is absent in non-capitalist 
production.5 Merchant capital does make a profit through 
differences in prices of different commodities in different 
parts of the world, but these differences are not determined 
by the law of value, and the equality or inequality of 
exchange cannot be determined in this situation (Brewer, 
1980) .
Marx (Capital. Vol.III, Chapter 20) is emphatic that, since
merchant capital is capital in trade connected with
noncapitalist production, its profits come from circulation
alone. Merchant capital's profits come from 'cheating' and
'outbargaining' through monopolization of non-capitalist
markets. According to Marx:
So long as merchant's capital promotes the 
exchange of products between undeveloped 
societies, commercial profit not only appears as 
outbargaining and cheating, but also largely 
originates from them .... (Marx, Capital.
Vol.Ill:330).
And again:
Merchant capital, when it holds a position of 
dominance, stands everywhere for a system of 
robbery, so that development among the trading 
nations of old and modern times is always directly 
connected with plundering, piracy, kidnapping 
slaves, and colonial conquests .... (ibid.:331).
In the above passage, Marx seems to be discussing the 
merchant capital of the feudal empires of the 15th and 16th 
centuries (Portuguese and Spanish empires). Although
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pre-industrial merchant capital is distinguished from 
merchant capital as an 'agent' of industrial competitive 
capital, the origins of profits are basically the same. No 
other mechanisms of exploitation can be specified when 
capital operates in the sphere of exchange only, and when 
direct producers remain in full possession and control of 
the means of production.
The first contact with merchant capital, as the 'agent' of 
industrial capitalism from the centre, initiated the 
formation of the international division of labour in which 
advanced countries produced manufactured goods and the rest 
of the world produced raw materials and foodstuffs for 
export. Concomitantly, merchant capital's domination of the 
periphery blocked what Marx called the 'first path' of 
transformation to capitalism in these societies, and imposed 
the 'second path' of transition. Marx (Capital. Vol.III), in 
analysing the transition from precapitalist to the 
capitalist mode of production, distinguished 'two paths' of 
transformation:
The transition from feudal mode of production is 
twofold. The producer becomes merchant and 
capitalist, in contrast to the natural 
agricultural economy and the guild-bound 
handicrafts of medieval urban industries. This is 
the really revolutionary path. Or else, the 
merchant establishes direct sway over production. 
However much this serves as a stepping stone ... 
it cannot by itself contribute to the overthrow of 
the old mode of production, but tends to preserve 
and retain it as its precondition (Marx, Capital, 
Vol.Ill:334).
The first path, producer-capitalist, was the historical 
pattern of primitive accumulation in the West, primarily 
Britain. Here the industrial bourgeoisie emerged from the
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ranks of petty-commodity producers in urban and rural areas: 
"This is the really revolutionary path". In the 'second 
path', merchants became capitalists; this is the non­
revolutionary path of transformation which, by itself, 
cannot transform the PCMP and, indeed, tends to consolidate 
it. With regard to colonial and semi-colonial experience, 
the very dynamics of the first path of transformation at the 
centre laid the basis for the emergence of the second path 
in the periphery. In other words, the industrial revolution 
marked the beginning of a global commodity production based 
on an international division of labour. This process created 
barriers to an organic transition from PCMsP to capitalism 
in the periphery.
It is plausible to argue that most of today's Third World 
countries experienced the second path of capitalist 
transformation. Merchant capital dominated peripheral 
economies without any substantial need for reorganization of 
production and restructured them according to the 
requirements of external markets. While in some areas of the 
world market, wage-labour did appear, as in plantation and 
mine extraction economies, this should be differentiated 
from capitalist wage-labour. Obviously, the question as to 
how one interprets this phase of the development of the 
world market depends very much on one's methodological 
position. For Frank and Wallerstein this is 'capitalism': 
the initial incorporation of peripheral economies into the 
capitalist world market implies their rapid transition to 
capitalism. For articulation theorists, who err in reading 
the character of the dominant mode of production from the 
immediate labour processes, this would signify the
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articulation of precapitalist 'petty-commodity mode of 
production' with the dominant CMP.
To recall the definition of a mode of production developed 
in Chapter One, it is not only production processes but also 
reproduction sphere that define a mode of production. 
Therefore, in order for capitalism to become the dominant 
mode of production, in addition to wage-labour and commodity 
production, capital must be directed towards production of 
value; or the end and objective of production must be 
further accumulation of capital. This is to say, three 
conditions must be met in order for capitalism to become 
dominant: (i) commodity production; (ii) wage-labour; and
(iii) production for self-expansion of value and further 
accumulation.
It is, however, incorrect to argue that merchant capital has
no impact on the production processes. According to Marx:
The development of commerce and merchant's capital 
gives rise everywhere to the tendency towards 
production for exchange, increases its value, 
multiplies it, makes it cosmopolitan, and develops 
money into world-money. Commerce, therefore, has a 
more or less dissolving influence everywhere on 
the producing organization .... To what extent it 
brings about a dissolution of the mode of 
production depends on its solidity and internal 
structure. And whither this process of dissolution 
will lead, in other words, what new mode of 
production will replace the old, does not depend 
on commerce but on the old mode of production 
itself (Marx, Capital. Vol.Ill:331-2).
This in not to suggest that the level of circulation defines 
the production processes. Production, circulation and 
exchange form an organic unity, but, as I have argued above, 
it is possible for circulation to be dominant in certain
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conjunctures, while production is, in the last analysis, 
always determinant. This 'certain conjuncture' for us would 
be approximately the period of one and a half centuries when 
merchant capital, in its 'two historic forms', dominated 
peripheral economies and subordinated their production 
processes. The end result was certain changes in the 
structure of the economy and in class formation. These 
changes established the precondition for the CMP, while they 
simultaneously prolonged and consolidated the hold of 
precapitalist ruling classes (and exploitation). For Kay 
(1975), this is the heart of 'underdevelopment'; the 
historical interweaving of merchant capital and 
petty-commodity production subordinated the peripheral 
economies to the needs of industry in the centre for raw 
materials, and made transition from precapitalist to the CMP 
difficult and distorted.
By 'certain changes in the structure of the economy' I 
primarily mean commoditization of both means of production 
(land) and labour power [or what Marx (Capital. Vol.II:327) 
calls the increasing production of exchange value on the 
basis of the old mode of production]. The introduction of 
property rights, ground rent and sharecropping are all 
results of commoditization. Commoditization also introduces 
changes in the structure of the ruling class; it creates new 
fractions within the landowning class and consolidates the 
hold of the indigenous merchant class, both classes being 
subordinated to the metropolitan industrial capital. This 
process also creates a local market for the consumption of 
manufactured goods from the centre and accelerates the 
export of raw materials to external markets. It slows down
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the process of proletarianization and strengthens the hold 
of precapitalist methods of exploitation. No necessity 
exists for revolutionizing forces and relations of 
production, and nascent industry is stifled by the lower 
prices and higher qualities of imported manufactured goods. 
In short, merchant capital as an agent of industrial capital 
from the centre blocks an organic transition to capitalism, 
while it simultaneously spreads commodity production on the 
basis of the old mode of production. It is in this sense 
that merchant capital takes its 'two historic forms' in this 
phase: from the perspective of advanced capitalist countries 
it is subordinated to the needs of industrial capital; from 
the point of view of peripheral economies, it is merchant 
capital in its 'pure' form (Kay, 1975).
By the 1870s centralization and concentration of capital had 
increased considerably in the centre, marked by the rise of 
monopolies. The 'Age of Imperialism', in the Leninist sense, 
was well underway by 1890-1900.
C. The Circuit of Money Capital
The circuit of money capital is shown by the formula:
M - C ... P ... C' - M' (Marx, Capital, Vol.II, Chapter I). 
It corresponds with the stage of imperialism in the Leninist 
sense, and implies the shift from competitive to monopoly 
capitalism (Palloix, 1975). The decades between 1870 to 1900 
mark this shift, when finance capital became the dominant 
form of capital in the advanced capitalist countries.
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The notions of monopoly capitalism and finance capital 
require a close examination here. Within the tradition of 
'classical' Marxism, Hilferding (1981) is the most important 
writer to provide a comprehensive analysis of this phase. 
Hilferding singles out two major characteristics to define 
the structural changes of the capitalist system which gave 
rise to finance capital in the decades around the turn of 
the century: (i) suppression of free competition as a result
of the formation of cartels and trusts; and (ii) the 
development of a close relationship between financial (bank) 
and industrial capital. These trends are directly related 
to, and are the outcome of, the processes of concentration 
and centralization of capital. In Capital. Vol.II, Marx 
defines these processes as the inevitable outcome of 
competitive struggle; the former refers to a situation 
whereby each unit of capital accumulation grows larger and 
larger, following technical changes; and the latter is a 
process whereby smaller firms are swallowed by the larger 
companies in the course of competition.
Monopoly capitalism is the passage of capitalism from its 
earlier stage of free competition to one in which giant 
firms, trusts and cartels dominate the market. Competition 
is not eliminated but shifted to another terrain. The 
political developments of the turn of the century, 
inter-imperialist rivalries and re-division of the world 
market into colonial empires and spheres of influence, all 
reflected the contradictions of monopoly capital between the 
development of productive forces, private appropriation of 
surplus value and the nation-state.
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Finance capital denotes the fusion of industrial and 
financial capital which means that both joint-stock 
companies and banks can assemble large capitals from many 
sources, and that the banks are effectively involved in 
direct investment in production.
Central to an understanding of the circuit of finance 
capital is the form and function credit takes in this phase. 
According to Hussain (1976), it is not the size or the 
organizational form of the firm but the variations in credit 
forms, as the underlying basis of the relationship between 
financial and industrial capital, which constitute the 
criteria for understanding the shift from industrial to 
monopoly capitalism, and thus for periodizinq capitalism.6
In order to develop a theoretical criterion for delineating 
the shift from competitive to monopoly capitalism, the 
notion of credit should be clarified first. As opposed to 
the limited definition of finance capital as 'banking' 
capital, present in Bukharin (1973), Hilferding (1981),
Lenin (1978) and particularly in Sweezy (1942), finance 
capital is not limited to any particular organizational 
form, such as banks, but involves any financial transaction 
that follows the circuit of M - M'.7 Such a conception of 
finance capital, in terms of financial transactions, allows 
for the inclusion of the firm's profits, shares, etc. as a 
type of 'credit' form, where their changing roles in the 
determination of social capital are the product of the 
relationship between finance and industrial capital as well 
(Hussain, 1976).
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Credit simply involves the act of lending money to producers 
(capitalist or precapitalist) and earning interest on the 
money loaned. This is the circuit of usurer's capital which, 
like merchant's capital, acts independently of the relations 
of production and makes a profit by exploiting price 
differences in time. In this general sense, credit has 
always existed under both precapitalist and capitalist modes 
of production. Credit, however, takes different forms in 
different phases of capitalist development. Variations in 
the form of credit are determined by the temporality and the 
type of financial obligation they entail. The question of 
the temporality of credit is important because of the way in 
which it affects the relationship between finance and 
industrial capital. In the early (competitive) period of 
capitalism, credit was 'short-termed'. Its function was a 
simple one: it acted as interest-bearing capital and as an 
auxiliary to the circulation of commodities. It was strongly 
restricted to the distribution of social capital, and 
therefore, the constitution of firms. This required a large 
volume of capital, and entailed a long period of turnover 
and high ratios of fixed capital vs. circulating capital. 
Marx's analysis of credit (Capital. Vol.III) is largely 
connected with this type of commercial credit under 
competitive capitalism, demonstrating how the concentration 
and centralization of capital has led to the rise of money 
as credit. Formation of oligopolies and monopolies, which 
mobilized vast sums of money capital for investment, is 
related to the emergence of a different form of credit.
While under competitive capitalism there existed a necessary 
restriction on the term of credit, in that it was 
subordinated to the circulation of commodities and was
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therefore short-termed, with the rise of finance capital 
this restriction is lifted and credit takes an exhaustive or 
infinite form (redeemable credit or shares). It is this form 
of credit which signifies the generalization and domination 
of finance capital. Specialized financial institutions 
separated the two spheres of production and circulation; 
they undermined and eventually eradicated trade associated 
with merchant's and usurer's capital. Firms then developed 
in their present, large-scale, capital-intensive and 
monopolistic forms.
It is this phase of the domination of finance capital, when 
an enormous variety of credit forms arises, which 
qualitatively distinguishes monopoly capitalism from the 
earlier phase of capitalist development. Financial 
organizations, through the fusion of individual capitals and 
the mobilization of idle money, intensify concentration of 
money capital and further extend the network of credit. 
Increased concentration of capital through credit 
facilitates the export of money capital from the advanced 
capitalist countries to precapitalist markets. Monopoly 
capitalism is thus distinguished by the export of capital, 
that is, mobilization of capital both as sums of money and 
as capitalist production relations. Export of capital from 
the centre, augmenting rather than replacing trade in 
commodities, first takes the form of 'portfolio' investment 
in the periphery (grants, loans, infrastructural 
investment), and then it increasingly takes the form of 
direct investment in production processes.
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The crucial question in this context is why the export of 
capital is 'necessary' for, and associated with, the onset 
of monopoly capitalism. Almost all Marxist theories of 
imperialism are built upon either the tendency for the rate 
of profit to fall, or one of the variants of 
'underconsumption theory': 'surplus capital' and/or 
'realization crisis' theses. Both types of explanation have 
been criticised extensively and the criticisms need not be 
repeated here in detail.8 It has been argued that the 
falling rate of profit tendency does not explain the export 
of capital because monopolies disrupt the tendency for the 
equalization of the rate of profit (Sweezy, 1942). It is 
therefore untenable to speak of an 'average ' rate of profit 
in the era of monopolies; rather, it is the individual 
'marginal' rates of profit which should be compared. This is 
to say that the rate of profit in the periphery does not 
have to be higher than in the centre for capital investment 
to take place; investment decisions are based on 'marginal' 
profitability (Magdoff, 1972). It has also been argued, 
against various theories of underconsumption, that excess 
capacity to produce in relation to the purchasing power and 
the consequent failure to realise surplus value, or the 
over-production of capital due to the insufficient aggregate 
demand, are not the logical or absolute necessities of the 
system (Bleaney, 1976; Brewer, 1980).
No general explanation of capitalism's assault on 
precapitalist markets can be given. It is essential to 
distinguish the nature of the dominant circuit of capital, 
and the specific period under consideration, in order to 
identify the reasons why capitalism expands into
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precapitalist markets. Under monopoly capitalism, the 
requirements of markets and raw materials no longer govern 
capitalist expansionism. Rather than the falling rate of 
profit tendency or underconsumption, the export of capital 
must be explained in terms of the imperatives of monopoly 
capital, brought about by concentration and centralization 
of capital (Magdoff, 1972). By investing directly in 
industry, money capital seeks to maximize the rate of return 
on its investment. Whether profits were rising or declining 
at home, and whether there was a pressure of 'surplus 
capital', money capital, in the late 19th century, was 
exported to exploit profitable opportunities wherever they 
existed. The pressure to expand is built into the economics 
of imperialism: it is the dominant factor of capitalist 
accumulation.
A further point raised in this context concerns the concept 
of imperialism. Many Marxists, following Lenin, reserve the 
term 'imperialism' for the post 1870/90 period, when 
competitive capitalism was replaced by monopoly capital. 
Approximately within the period of 1790-1850 free trade was 
imposed on the underdeveloped world, and the policy of 
laissez-faire was adopted by the central states. During the 
free trade era, the central states pursued a policy of 
anti-imperialism' characterized by the absence of state 
intervention on behalf of their traders. The end of 
laissez-faire and the beginning of state protectionism, 
marked by the partition of the world into colonial and 
semi-colonial enclaves surrounded by high tariff walls, 
signaled the onset of the 'imperialist' era. For Marxists, 
therefore, the term 'imperialism' has a definite scientific
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meaning. It designates the phase of capital export and 
international capital investment; a specific stage in the 
historical development of capitalism.
It is not exactly clear to me why free trade and 
laissez-faire should be contrasted with 'imperialism'; and 
the latter restricted to the monopoly stage of capitalism. 
Imperialism cannot be defined simply by the absence or 
presence of state interventionism, protectionism, or formal 
colonization. 9 I have identified the phenomenon of 
imperialism analogous with the successive
internationalization of the circuits of capital in that each 
stage of the internationalization of capital is also a stage 
of the development of capitalism on the world level. The 
concept of imperialism employed in this study thus differs 
from the classical Leninist concept; it designates the whole 
history of the expansion of capitalism into precapitalist 
markets and the formation of the international division of 
labour, which predate the rise of finance capital. Monopoly 
capital did represent a structural change in the pattern of 
centre/periphery relationship, but it did not mark the 
beginning of imperialism. 1 0
Lenins' definition of imperialism as exclusively associated 
with moribund and decaying monopoly capitalism does not 
establish how the passage from competitive to monopoly 
capitalism has involved a qualitatively different 
relationship between metropolitan and peripheral areas of 
the world economy. 1 1  Lenin's purpose, of course, was to make 
the phenomenon of imperialism historically specific.
However, in my view, imperialism is rooted in capitalist
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expansionism in general. It might be contested that this 
definition is ahistorical in that it does not make a 
distinction between the way in which surplus is appropriated 
by merchant capital through trade and under the conditions 
of an imperfectly organized world market, and in the later 
phases of the development of the world market. I suggest 
that this problem can be surmounted by periodization of the 
history of the world market through identifying various 
circuits of capital, and specific ways in which each circuit 
has penetrated (and exploited) precapitalist economies. Each 
phase of the internationalization of capital is also a phase 
of imperialist domination in the general sense of the 
subordination of precapitalist economies to the requirements 
of centres of capital accumulation.
The structural changes in the nature of capitalism at the 
monopoly stage discussed so far have important consequences 
for the pattern of centre/periphery relationship. Finance 
capital, unlike merchant capital, is not restricted to the 
sphere of exchange and, by penetrating the level of 
production, it introduces capitalist production relations in 
the periphery. Export of capital is both export of money 
capital and export of capitalist production relations. The 
phase of the internationalization of money capital has aptly 
been called the 'Third World equivalent of primitive 
accumulation' (Munck, 1984).
The persistent theme of this study has been an emphasis on 
the differences between the process of capital accumulation 
in the centre and the periphery. These differences bear 
direct consequences for the structure of peripheral
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formations. Apart from the different timing and the 
imposition of a pattern of 'unequal specialization', 
persistent until today, another major area of difference is 
the role of the state. In the most general sense, the 
relationship between state and capital is defined in terms 
of the role which the state plays in the maintenance and 
reproduction of capital as a relation of class domination. 
Changes in the nature of the state and class structure are 
derived from the dynamics of the internationalization of the 
circuits of capital. Without a prior characterization of the 
relations of production and the dominant circuit of capital, 
the nature of the state cannot be determined.
The earlier precapitalist state reflected the dynamics and 
requirements of mercantilism in the periphery. Its function, 
in the phase of the internationalization of the circuit of 
merchant capital, was to facilitate the commoditization of 
agriculture, a process ultimately leading to expropriation 
of peasants, and to regulate commercial privileges and 
monopolies. Commoditization gave rise to a class of 
merchants and created fractions within the landowning class. 
The state at this stage is predominantly precapitalist in 
both function and form.
In the phase of the internationalization of the circuit of 
money capital, introduction of capitalist production 
relations necessitates a separation of the spheres of 
production and consumption, a process by with the cycle of 
use-value production of petty commodity producers begins to 
be broken and is replaced by exchange-value production. This 
is also the necessary precondition for the emergence of the
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capitalist state, that is, the establishment of a system of 
private property and the separation of the spheres of 
'politics' and 'economics' (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978).
In almost all cases of capitalist transformation in the 
periphery, this process has been promoted and sponsored by 
the state at this stage. State intervention takes the forms 
of tariff barriers, import-quotas, construction of 
infrastructure and the establishment of financial 
institutions (Clawson, 1979). Both 'land reform' and 
'import-substitution policy' are common measures adopted by 
the peripheral state to consolidate and expand 
capitalization of the economy and its integration into the 
world market. In the previous phase, the dividing line has 
been between processed and industrial products and 
unprocessed primary goods. With the adoption of 
'import-substitution policy' in the periphery, peripheral 
economies begin to move toward production of 'light' 
consumer goods and the import of capital goods from the 
centre. This is the phase of the triumph of capitalist 
production relations in the periphery.
D. The Circuit of Productive Capital
The circuit of productive capital is represented by the 
formula P ...C'...M'...C'...P' (Marx, Capital. Vol.II, 
Chapter I). The internationalization of the circuit of 
productive capital covers the latest phase of the 
development of the world market; it means that, following 
the internationalization of commodity capital and then money 
capital, production itself becomes an international process.
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The expression 'internationalization of production' 
indicates that the production and reproduction of capital 
are carried over an increasingly international arena, 
manifested by the tendency for the equalization of the 
conditions of production, exchange and distribution on the 
world level. At this phase, there are no longer commodity 
relations but relations between capitals.
The driving force behind the internationalization of 
productive capital is further concentration and 
centralization of capital, stimulated by capitalist 
competition. The intensification of these tendencies has led 
to a shift in the composition of the investment abroad 
carried out by the central economies in the post-Second 
World War era, a period corresponding to the 
internationalization of the circuit of productive capital. 
Prior to 1914, three-quarters of foreign capital investment 
was in portfolio terms (i.e., through financial investment) 
and only one quarter was direct investment in production. 
After 1945, these ratios were reversed (Munck, 1984:62).
Even in the case of the USA, one of the central economies 
'leaping' towards monopoly capitalism and overtaking others 
in the post-Second World War era, between 1914 and 1930 only 
one-quarter of capital export was in the form of direct 
investment, and almost three-quarters was in the form of 
foreign bonds (Frieden, 1983:6).
Therefore, during this phase, capital export increasingly 
takes the form of direct investment in productive processes 
instead of the portfolio investment of the earlier period. 
Capital investment in productive processes of the periphery
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by central capitalism further integrates peripheral 
countries into the capitalist world market and organizes 
capitalist production on a world-wide basis.
Internationalization of productive capital also necessitates 
a more direct economic intervention by the state in the 
centre. The state is now forced into the role of mobilizing 
capital and, in its attempt to protect its own capitalists, 
emerges as a major unit in the competition amongst capitals 
(Clawson, 1979).12
The internationalization of productive capital is manifested 
by two interrelated phenomena: the growth of multinational 
corporations (MNCs), which set up production sites wherever 
wages and other costs are lowest, and circulate products 
internally amongst their major subsidiaries in place of a 
circulation of commodities; and the emergence of the 
so-called 'newly industrializing countries' (NICs). The 
emergence of the NICs since the 1960s, signalling the 
formation of the 'new international division of labour'
(NIDL), is the direct outcome of the internationalization of 
production.
MNCs have become the 'bearers' of the new international 
relations of production. They intensify the degree of 
monopolization within each capitalist country, and the 
degree of competition on the world level. They are firms 
that channel the international flow of capital, credits, 
commodities, technology and managerial skills. International 
flow of capital, as mentioned above, occurs at this stage in 
the form of direct investment in overseas branches and 
subsidiaries for the production of manufactured goods
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instead of raw materials. The international flow of credit 
occurs in the form of bank deposits and investment in 
Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets (Murray, 1975). It is, 
therefore, important to note that the move towards worldwide 
production does not replace the internationalization of 
money capital or of commodity capital; rather, it reinforces 
the internationalization of the other two circuits of social 
capital. Internationalization of production leads to a vast 
expansion of world trade and money markets, both of them at 
this stage subordinated to the needs of capitalist industry 
(Clawson, 1979).
Palloix (1977) argues that it is not helpful to study the 
organizational forms or the size of the MNCs as an index to 
this phase of the development of the world market. MNCs 
designate only the forms the internationalization of 
productive capital assumes. Rather than focusing on these 
forms, one should examine the dynamics of capital 
accumulation at the centre, of which MNCs are only an 
expression or a response.
One important aspect of the internationalization of 
productive capital has been the 'crisis of Fordism'.13 The 
phenomenon of Fordism developed between 1918 and 1945, and 
dominated the central economies throughout the three 
post-war decades. Fordism denotes two relatively distinct 
features. First, it involves a new 'mode of capital 
accumulation' based on constant changes in the labour 
process so that workers' skill is incorporated into the 
automatic features of machinery. This mode of accumulation 
combines rises in labour productivity with increases in the
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volume of constant capital, which presupposes the 
systemization of the methods of scientific management called 
'Taylorism'. This 'Taylorist' stage widens the gap in the 
labour process between conception and performance, and 
between skilled and unskilled labour.
As a 'system of intensive accumulation', Fordism sharply 
differs from the 'system of extensive accumulation'. The 
latter system roughly corresponds to the competitive phase 
of capitalist development which involved increases in 
productivity without changes in the labour process and a 
mode of regulation in which firms could not really control 
the market and had to adjust to demand through competitive 
pricing. The crisis of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s 
were caused specifically by this competitive mode of 
regulation which had led to over-production and 
under-consumption in the centre. In the post-Second World 
War era, the development of Fordism solved the guestion of 
'markets' on an internal basis, through what is the second 
characteristic feature of Fordism: the 'monopolistic mode of 
regulation'. In this mode the nominal wage is linked to both 
the value of labour power and the productivity level, 
thereby ensuring that final demand keeps pace with supply. 
This was the great 'discovery' of the post-war years: 
adjustment of mass demand to the rate of growth in 
productivity by linking wages and productivity. As the 
'welfare state' of the post-war era stabilized increases in 
nominal wages, the major firms of leading sectors were able 
to control their prices more or less independently of the 
fluctuations in demand, through their monopoly over the 
productive structure.
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Fordism, as a 'system of intensive accumulation' and a 
'monopolistic mode of wage-regulation', corresponded to the 
post-war US hegemony over the world market and gave rise to 
new norms of (mass) consumption, production and wage 
regulation within the centre. The 'virtuous circles' of 
intensive accumulation which marked the three post-war 
decades were the result of the domination of Fordism: the 
rate of productivity in the centre rose by 6-7% per annum 
during the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, against 2% 
previously (Lipietz, 1984:98).
By the mid-1960s, the period of the climax of Fordism, the 
share of commodity export from the centre to the periphery 
was at its lowest level, indicating that under the 
domination of the circuit of productive capital the 
periphery had lost its importance as a market for 
manufactured commodities.14 During the same period, the 
diffusion of mass technologies had led to the expansion of 
trade between imperialist metropolises. The exchange of mass 
production consumer goods between blocs within the centre 
(EEC, USA, Canada) had generalized a high-productivity model 
of accumulation and created larger and more homogeneous 
economic spaces. Under the leading role of US capital, 
Fordism expanded markets through mass production and 
economies of scale, leading to the transcendence of national 
frontiers and the interdependence of the OECD (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. By the 
late 1960s, the stability of the system of intensive 
accumulation was undermined by its very success in 
generating a high-productivity model of mass consumption: 
Fordism has entered a phase of crisis in the imperialist
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metropolises which continues until today. The 
internationalization of the circuit of productive capital, 
and the formation of the NICs, has been particularly spurred 
by this 'crisis of Fordism'.15
There are various explanations as to why the 'virtuous 
circles' of post-war growth have turned into 'vicious 
circles' of stagnation and hyperinflation in the 1970s and 
1980s. Most analyses see the major cause of the present 
crisis the falling rate of profit in the centre (Aglietta, 
1982; Amin, 1982; Arrighi, 1982; Frank, 1981b-1982; Frobel, 
1982; Landsberg, 1979; Lipietz, 1982a-1984). According to 
this view, the formidable mechanization introduced by 
Fordism and the growing mass of invested capital have led to 
the rising organic composition of capital, combined with 
working class strength, have reduced the rate of 
exploitation in the centre. A declining or insufficient rate 
of surplus value has forced central capitalism to find new 
sources of surplus value in order to increase the rate of 
profitability or to offset the falling rate of profit. These 
new sources of surplus value were found in certain 
peripheral areas of the world market where industrial 
relocation by central capitalism has taken place. Wage 
differential between centre and periphery has made 
decentralization of accumulation to the periphery 
profitable. According to this view, therefore, wages are the 
crucial determinants in the internationalization of 
production in certain areas of the periphery.
Whatever the exact causes of the present crisis,16 the point 
is that it has led to an extension of Fordism in certain
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areas of the periphery which, indeed, have emerged as the 
centres of internationalization of production. The crisis of 
the world economy, which has manifested itself in the centre 
by high rates of unemployment, declining output and domestic 
investment, mass redundancies, increased rationalization of 
schemes, fiscal crisis of the state and relocation of 
production processes, has given rise to new centres of 
industrial production in the periphery and has led to the 
formation of the NIDL (Frobel et al., 1980). The new centres 
of capital accumulation in the periphery, or the so-called 
NICs, are principally constituted by four countries in Asia 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), and three 
counties in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina).
The internationalization of production has created a world 
market for labour, a worldwide industrial reserve army of 
labour, and a world market for production sites. Production 
is split into sub-processes and is then carried out wherever 
capital and labour can be put together most cheaply. Central 
economies export, usually via MNCs, semi-processed products 
for further manufacturing to a sub-contractor in these NICs, 
and the finished products are subsequently exported to 
another Third World country or to the centre. By the 1970s, 
this particular form of development had led to a growth of 
industrial export of the NICs to both the OECD countries and 
the 'low income countries' in the Third World.1V
At the same time, the internationalization of production has 
reinforced the internationalization of money capital and of 
commodity capital, both of them responding to the needs of 
productive capital. This is clearly reflected in the new 
pattern or model of growth in the periphery which Aglietta
99
(1982) calls 'international debt economy'. In the present 
phase of the immense expansion of world credit, peripheral 
countries buy capital goods with international credit, which 
increasingly comes from private money markets beyond the 
regulation of any nation-state. Private sources financed 21% 
of Third World credit in 1970 and 43% in 1980 (Munck, 
1984:68). By 1983, the foreign debt of the NICs stood at 
around $600 billion, and more than half of this ($350 
billion) was owned by private international banks (Frieden, 
1983:3). Indeed the dominant pattern is borrowing by Third 
World countries from private international money markets to 
finance the process of industrialization. Particularly in 
the past twenty years, credit has taken a form of foreign 
capital investment, and seems to have overtaken direct 
capital investment by MNCs.18 It is crucial to note, 
however, that the circuit of money capital at this stage is 
subordinated to the imperatives of the circuit of productive 
capital, although it is predominantly through credit rather 
than direct capital investment by MNCs that capital export 
from the centre takes place. The huge rise in the foreign 
debt of the NICs in the 1980s is exactly the outcome of the 
dynamics of the internationalization of productive capital 
which has spurred on (and subordinated) the 
internationalization of money capital.
The crucial question here is the implications of the 
internationalization of production for the centre/periphery 
gap. Has the global expansion of Fordism, or the extension 
of OECD models of wage-regulation and mass consumption to 
the periphery, leading to the formation of the NIDL, altered 
the fundamental structure of inequality between the centre
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and the periphery; or has it merely reinforced the dependent 
integration of the periphery into the world market?
There is a continuing debate on the nature of the present 
industrialization in the Third World. The terms of this 
debate basically come down to the question of whether the 
NIDL is a change in the form of subordinate integration of 
the Third World in the world economy, or rather, a major 
change of substance (Cypher, 1979). Without going into 
detail one view is that the internationalization of 
production has not fundamentally altered the 
centre/periphery relationship, and dependence and 
imperialist domination have simply taken on new forms. The 
NIDL, associated with the 'neo-imperialism' of the USA, has 
led to a phase of 'neo-dependency' in the Third World, 
characterized by dependence on technology and managerial 
expertise controlled by MNCs, and by the rising debt of the 
NICs (Amin, 1982-1983; Barratt-Brown, 1983; Bienfeld, 1988; 
Frank, 1981b-1982; Frobel et al. 1980). In contrast is the 
view of those who can, in broad terms, be associated with a 
production-oriented approach: the NIDL signifies a change in 
substance. Capitalism (and very often imperialism too) is a 
progressive force in the Third world because it develops 
forces and relations of production. Compared to the 'old' 
colonial division of labour, the NIDL signals that not only 
have the Third World countries shifted away from dependence 
on export of raw materials and import of manufactured goods, 
but they have also laid a basis for a broader process of 
industrialization with the development of intermediate and 
capital goods industries. Capitalism is therefore developing 
apace, on a national basis, and in an increasingly
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autonomous fashion. Insofar as there are obstacles to Third 
World industrialization, they are not the result of 
'external' domination but rather of 'internal' 
contradictions of these societies (Kitching, 1982; Marcussen 
and Torp, 1982; Schiffer, 1981; Smith, 1982; Warren, 
1973-1980).19
The internationalization of productive capital has 
definitely created new centres of industrialization in the 
periphery. However, it is fundamentally erroneous to take 
the formation of a handful of NICs as a sign of a general 
'maturation' of capitalism in the Third World and of the 
ability of Third world countries to compete on an egual 
basis with the centre. Only an empiricist, ahistorical and 
undifferentiated notion of 'development', unable to 
discriminate between developments fomented by imperialism 
and those of a different origin, could lead to such sweeping 
generalizations. The point is not to dispute the fact that 
industrialization has taken place in the periphery, and that 
the 'old' colonial international division of labour has 
undergone changes since the Second World War, but the exact 
nature and structure of this development has to be 
specified.
The Third World is not a homogeneous whole but an area of 
the world economy with widely different systems of 
accumulation, forms of surplus extraction and 
wage-regulation. There is no single pattern which 
characterizes the integration of Third World countries with 
the world market. Under the internationalization of the 
circuit of productive capital, some areas of the periphery
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have experienced an extension of Fordism, while others have 
undergone a process of 'development' which Lipietz 
(1982a-1984) calls 'bloody Taylorization'. Still others have 
hardly been affected by the internationalization of the 
circuit of productive capital and have not moved beyond the 
phase of 'import-substitution'.
In the model of 'bloody Taylorization' (or 
'export-substitution' in which manufactured goods are 
produced for export) a segment of capital in the centre 
countries has relocated part of Fordist industry in those 
areas with a very high rate of exploitation of labour (in 
terms of wages, pace of work, working class organization). 
Internationalization of production has taken place through a 
Taylorist mode of accumulation: the jobs are fragmented and 
repetitive and are not linked to any automated system of 
machinery. In short, these are labour-intensive industries 
with a low composition of capital. Capital goods, management 
and technology very often remain under the control of 
central capital. These Taylorist labour processes involve 
extraction of absolute surplus value. The most typical 
examples are textile and electronic industries in the Asian 
'free production zones' where women make up to 80% of the 
workforce, earning some $2 a day (Lipietz, 1982a:42).
Internationalization of production has also taken place in 
the form of the development of the system of intensive 
accumulation in the periphery, which has been termed 
'peripheral Fordism' (Lipietz, 1982a). This system has 
developed in countries in which an autonomous domestic 
capital, an embryonic working class and a relatively
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numerous middle class have developed (Brazil, Mexico, South 
Korea, Iran). In 'peripheral fordism' a local market for 
manufactured goods has developed and extraction of relative 
surplus-value has been sufficiently stabilized.
Other parts of the periphery, that is, the overwhelming 
majority of Third World countries, have scarcely been 
affected by the internationalization of production. These 
so-called 'low income countries' remain neo-colonial 
producers of raw materials, with no substantial industry, no 
significant domestic market and no proletariat and 
bourgeoisie to speak of. Finally, the major oil-exporting 
countries, some of which have also developed a system of 
intensive accumulation based on oil rent (Iran, Venezuela), 
contain contradictions and characteristics specific to 
themselves.
This overview of various models of accumulation shows the 
increasing fragmentation/differentiation of the periphery 
under the impact of the internationalization of the circuit 
of productive capital. At the world level, this process is 
still at an embryonic stage, making it impossible to 
generalize about its ultimate effects. However, neither the 
enclaves of 'Taylorization' nor the models of 'peripheral 
Fordism' represent a breakdown of the centre/periphery gap. 
In the case of the Asian 'free production zones', developed 
on the basis of the production of absolute surplus-value, 
all the limitations of this pattern of 'development' pointed 
out by those critical of the thesis of the NIDL are valid.
In countries where the system of accumulation does not 
involve the relocation of labour-intensive processes, and
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where production of relative surplus-value has been 
stabilized, an extension of the model of central Fordism has 
reproduced their subordinate position in the world market on 
a different level. Apart from the question of ownership of 
industry by foreign capital, the NICs remain dependent on 
the centre for modern technology, managerial expertise, 
industrial output and, above all, money capital. Today Third 
World countries are falling deeper and deeper into debt as 
they buy modern technology and industrial inputs. In the 
NICs the level of debt has risen so high (today Brazil's 
debt stands at over $70 billion) that most of them have to 
spend their export earnings to service their debt. In 1982, 
Argentina was using 98% of its export earnings as a debt 
service payment (Frieden, 1983:9). The total financial 
collapse of Mexico by the end of 1982 shows how vulnerable 
is the attempt of peripheral countries to hook on to the 
centre-based system of intensive accumulation.20
Apart from the fact that the thesis of the NIDL exaggerates 
the extent of the internationalization of production - all 
'facts' point to the limited extent of the de-centralization 
of accumulation to the periphery21 - even an examination of 
those areas/countries where the internationalization of the 
circuit of productive capital is most advanced shows that 
this process has actually intensified the contradictions of 
peripheral accumulation. One of these basic contradictions 
is the stable co-existence of absolute surplus-value and 
relative surplus-value extraction, or the persistence of 
precapitalist labour processes. If Brenner (1977) is correct 
that capitalism is a mode of production characterized by a 
generalization of relative surplus-value extraction, wiping
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out and replacing all other forms of labour exploitation, it 
is then surprising that neither he nor Warren (1973-1980) 
nor any of their 'productionist' disciples has paid any 
attention to this significant fact. Not only in the 'low 
income countries' but also in the more 'developed' models of 
'peripheral Fordism', relative surplus-value has not totally 
replaced absolute surplus-value extraction. Is this only a 
guestion of 'transition'? I do not think so; stabilization 
of relative surplus-value in the Fordist sectors of the 
economy has occurred side-by-side the persistence/ 
perpetuation of absolute surplus-value in other 
(non-capitalist) areas. Is this a question of contradictions 
primarily 'internal' to these formations? To ask such a 
question is simply to evade the issue.
Some of the critics of the NIDL (Amin, 1983; Emmanuel, 1974; 
Lipietz, 1982a) have pointed out the persistence of 
precapitalist forms of production in most of the peripheral 
formations today. These are forms of exploitation of labour 
which apparently exist outside the capitalist system but are 
nonetheless integrated into the system at both local and 
international levels and participate in the reproduction of 
labour. Now that the main dynamics of the
internationalization of the three circuits of capital have 
been specified, it is necessary to turn to the important 
question of how to characterize non-capitalist structures 
and the mechanisms of their subordination to the circuit of 
productive capital in the present phase of the world capital 
accumulation.
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E. The Circuit of Productive Capital and Non-capitalist 
Forms of Production in the Periphery
In characterizing the contemporary peripheral social 
formations, the main issue is whether surviving 
precapitalist structures should be regarded as 'modes of 
production', in articulation with the dominant CMP, or as 
'forms' of production subject to capitalist laws of motion. 
This difference, as I have previously argued, is the result 
of employing different levels of theoretical abstraction, 
leading to conflicting conceptualizations of the notion of 
the mode of production.
Given our periodization of the development of the world 
market on the basis of the successive internationalization 
of the three circuits of capital, the central emphasis in 
this Chapter has been on the different ways in which capital 
has penetrated peripheral economies. I have argued that each 
stage of the internationalization of capital has imparted 
specific structural characteristics to peripheral 
formations. The periphery's relations with metropolitan 
capitalism has variously involved plunder, trade, 
colonialism, capital export and, more recently, various 
system of 'enclave' development following the 
internationalization of productive capital.
It should therefore be clear that my concern here is neither 
with the ways in which PCMsP were penetrated in the epoch of 
primitive accumulation nor with the question of 
characterizing precapitalist production relations as a 
'general problem'. Rather, I am concerned with the nature of
107
noncapitalist structures in the present phase of the 
internationalization of productive capital. It should also 
be clear that these noncapitalist structures cannot be 
characterized as 'natural economies' or precapitalist modes 
of production which have survived intact and now exist in a 
relatively stable symbiotic relationship with capital. As 
has been suggested earlier, peripheral formations should be 
characterized as the articulation of non-capitalist forms of 
production with the dominant CMP.
The characterization of non-capitalist structures as forms 
of production poses three interrelated questions:
(1) What is the nature of these forms; how are they to be 
conceptualized and differentiated from modes of 
production in a Marxist fashion?
(2) What is the nature of the relations between these forms 
and dominant capitalism?
(3) What is the class character of non-capitalist producers 
in their relation with dominant capitalism?
Non-Capitalist structures generally denote the circuit of 
simple commodity production (SCP) which, as will be 
discussed below, is the earliest expression of production of 
commodity.22 While in the earlier phase of the 
internationalization of merchant capital it was possible to 
analyze the relationship between capital and SCP at the 
level of exchange, at the present phase of world 
accumulation this relationship has to be conceived at the 
level of production. This conceptualization involves an 
examination of the ways in which productive capital attempts 
to control and regulate the conditions of SCP (and exchange)
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without undertaking its direct organization.
The penetration of commodity relations of direct producers, 
and the incorporation of their direct reproduction cycles 
into capitalist commodity relations, is what Bernstein 
(1977) calls the process of 'commoditization'. In this 
situation, "the reproduction of these conditions becomes 
internalized in the simple reproduction cycle to the extent 
that it cannot take place outside commodity relations. In 
other words, commodity production becomes an economic 
necessity" (Bernstein, 1977:63). Unless a full 
specialization of commodity production has occurred, direct 
producers remain in control and possession of the means of 
production, but their labour processes are determined by the 
withdrawal of labour from use-value production. Production 
of exchange-value as an 'economic necessity' implies a 
rupture in the reproduction cycles of subsistence producers. 
The breakdown of the reproduction cycles is the main 
criterion which distinguishes a form of production from a 
mode of production. This is to suggest that once 
reproduction cycles are broken and incorporated into 
capitalist commodity production, the production relations, 
behind the 'appearances', are also altered: "Despite the 
limited technical changes in production, however, this 
process involves social changes in the conditions of 
production and exchange" (ibid.:61, emphasis in original).
Once the conditions of the reproduction are destroyed, even 
though production processes are not completely transformed, 
it would be misguided to depict non-capitalist structures as 
PCMsP 'conserved' or 'perpetuated' by the dominant capital.
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Characterizations of non-capitalist forms of production as 
'domestic mode of production', 'peasant mode of production', 
'lineage mode of production', etc. are also ahistorical and 
descriptive in the sense that they concentrate on relations 
within the unit of production (the household) and its mode 
of economic calculation, but do not address questions 
concerning the larger relations of production through which 
they are constituted. To understand the latter, it is 
essential to place the subsistence producers in their 
relation to capital and the state. In other words, they have 
to be located "within capitalist production relations 
mediated through forms of household production which are the 
site of a struggle for effective possession and control 
between the producers and capital/state" (ibid.:73, emphasis 
in original).
To establish the distinction between forms and modes of 
production in more precise terms, it is necessary to 
consider briefly the question of what distinguishes one mode 
of production from another.
Modes of production can generally be distinguished from each 
other by the particular way in which surplus is extracted. 
Surplus labour can be appropriated in different ways. For 
example, under slavery, the labour supplied to the master is 
uncompensated and the master is responsible for the 
reproduction of the slave. Under feudalism, labour supplied 
to the feudal lord is embodied in the ground rent. Under 
capitalism, the wage-worker gives a portion of his labour to 
the capitalist without receiving any value, in exchange. 
Capitalism is the first mode of production to extract
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surplus from the direct producer through purely economic 
relations. In PCMsP surplus is extracted by use of extra 
economic coercion, for example, sanctions of kinship, 
custom, law and politics. This leads to the general 
conclusion that to distinguish between different modes of 
production not only should the general way in which surplus 
is extracted be considered, but also the political, 
ideological and juridical structures which enable the 
reproduction of the relationship between producers and 
nonproducers.
This argument is obviously derived from the concepualization 
of the mode of production presented earlier; and may pose 
the theoretical problem that there are as many different 
modes of production as there are 'superstructures'. To 
resolve this problem, it has been argued that we should 
distinguish between a mode of production (in general 
abstract terms) and a specific form of a mode of production 
as it manifests itself in a social formation. That is to 
say, at the level of concrete analysis within the CMP, 
surplus value may be extracted through the payment of a wage 
or through the 'wage-equivalent' paid to non-capitalist 
producers. What is important in distinguishing different 
forms of a mode of production is both the form of surplus 
labour appropriation and the process by which it is 
extracted.
This is to reiterate Banaji's (1977) distinction between 
'relations of exploitation' which occur in different modes 
of production and 'relations of production' which are the 
specific historically-determined laws of motion of an
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'epoch' of production. The former denotes specific forms of 
labour organization when their reproduction cycles are 
broken and are subsumed by capital. Despite the usefulness 
of his distinction, however, we differ from Banaji in that, 
for him, non-capitalist productive units, in the epoch of 
capitalist production, are non-capitalist merely in 
appearance but are capitalist in essence. Non-capitalist 
enterprises can be characterized as forms of the CMP in so 
far as they are subsumed by capital and are dependent on it 
for their reproduction. The term 'form' here is intended to 
stress the destruction of PCMsP as autonomous and distinct 
structures; it does not imply that their destruction is 
complete and that these productive units are already 
fully-fledged capitalist enterprises concealed behind a 
different appearance. I shall return to this point later in 
discussing class differentiation of non-capitalist 
producers.
Now that it has been established that non-capitalist 
structures should be placed within capitalist production 
relations as forms of production, I should elaborate this 
argument by examining the mechanisms of their subsumption 
and the methods of appropriation of their surplus labour by 
capital.
The relationship between capital and non-capitalist 
structures should be formulated at the level of production, 
for the characterization of this relationship at the level 
of exchange poses problems for a Marxist conceptualization 
of the notions of exploitation and surplus-value. In a 
vigorous Marxist sense, exploitation means appropriation of
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surplus value from a value-producing class by a non-value 
producing class at the level of production. This is the only 
way in which capital exploits labour.
It has been argued above that merchant capital, as the 
'agent' of industrial capital in the centre, is 
characterized by the fact that it operates solely in the 
sphere of exchange; that it exploits through robbery; that 
it does not create value because it cannot transform the 
value of labour power, and is thus incapable of transforming 
the mode of production itself. In the present era, capital 
which is acting upon simple commodity producers cannot be 
viewed as the archaic form of merchant capital. Productive 
capital penetrates the level of production and therefore the 
mechanisms of appropriation of direct producers' surplus 
labour have to be located in the sphere of production.
However, locating the mechanisms of appropriation of surplus 
labour of simple commodity producers in the sphere of 
production presents some theoretical problems. The law of 
value operates only under the conditions of full 
expropriation of direct producers from the means of 
production. Simple commodity producers are still in partial 
possession and control of the means of production and the 
reproduction of the unit of production is partially realized 
through production of use-values; this hinders the full 
operation of the law of value. Under the conditions of 
partial possession of the means of production and combined 
use-value/exchange-value production, Marx (Capital. Vol.III) 
has analyzed the exploitation of simple commodity producers 
in terms of 'devalorization of labour time'.
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In a situation in which the household, determined by the 
needs of simple reproduction, 'meets' capital, determined by 
the logic of accumulation, a devalorization of the terms of 
exchange of commodities is experienced by subsistence 
producers. The devalorization of the terms of exchange is 
the result of subsistence producers' competition with 
commodities produced by capitalist enterprises with a higher 
organic composition of capital and higher productivity of 
labour. This competition increases the costs of the means of 
production and the costs of the reproduction of producers, 
thus raising the costs of production to subsistence 
producers. To sustain this competition, simple commodity 
producers have both to intensify production of commodities 
through working longer hours and using unpaid family labour, 
and to reduce the level of consumption. Production of 
use-values by members of household for personal consumption 
ensures part of their costs of reproduction and presents a 
potential source of subsidy to capital, as it lowers the 
exchange-value of household's marketed commodities. Capital, 
in this way, intensifies the labour of household members 
without undertaking any cost of management and supervision 
of the production process. Since the socially necessary 
labour time is not introduced and the value of commodity 
produced by the household can be measured only in terms of 
the labour time, the unpaid family labour is not regarded by 
the members of the household as a 'cost', and is therefore a 
loss of surplus labour to the household.
This pattern of penetration of commodity production explains 
both the 'self-exploitation' of the direct producers and the 
cheapness of their commodities vis-a-vis commodities
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produced by capitalist enterprises (Bernstein, 1977).
Overwork and underconsumption constitute devalorization of
labour time insofar as commodities are sold as a function of
subsistence and are dissociated from any mechanisms of
'rational' cost-calculation. Marx fCapital. Vol.III) is
describing the same situation in relation to peasants owning
small plots of land when he argues:
For the peasant owning a parcel, the limits of 
exploitation is not set by the average profit of 
capital ... the absolute limit for him ... is no 
more than the wages he pays to himself, after 
deducting his actual costs. So long as the price 
of the product covers these wages, he will 
cultivate his land, and often at wages down to a 
physical minimum (Marx, Capital, Vol.Ill:805-6).
And in relation to the absence of cost-calculations and thus
lower exchange-value of commodities, he argues:
It is not necessary, therefore, that the market 
price rise, either up to value or the price of 
production of his product. This is one of the 
reasons why grain prices are lower in countries 
with predominant small peasant land proprietorship 
than in countries with a capitalist mode of 
production. One portion of surplus of the peasants 
... is bestowed gratis upon society and does not 
at all enter into the regulation of price of 
production or into the creation of value in 
general. This lower price is consequently a result 
of the producers' poverty and by no means of their 
labour productivity (ibid:806).
Competition with capitalist producers, therefore, results in 
the intensification of labour and reduction of consumption 
levels of the household, leading to devalorization of 
subsistence producers' labour time. Indebtedness, greater 
reliance on cash income, and presale of product are all the 
result of a 'simple reproduction squeeze'. Subsistence 
producers continue to cover the costs of their reproduction, 
both individual and reproductive, through production of 
use-values. This is an intensification of
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'self-exploitation'. From the point of view of capital, 
production of use-values is a source of 'subsidy'; from the 
point of view of direct producers, no surplus-value is 
produced at all (Bernstein, 1977). Placed in the context of 
the CMP, all types of unpaid domestic labour necessarily 
involve devalorization of labour time.
Only the specific conditions of household simple 
reproduction allows for this particular mechanism of surplus 
appropriation and exploitation. Devalorization of labour 
time occurs only because the objective of production is 
simple reproduction of the household (and not accumulation) 
and because the rationale and economic calculation of simple 
reproduction and capitalist production are significantly 
different.23
Production and appropriation of surplus-value by subsistence 
producers thus takes place under much less determinate and 
efficient conditions than those of capitalist production, 
for partial possession of the means of production is a 
barrier to the full operation of the law of value. 
Devalorization of labour time, therefore, entails production 
of absolute surplus value by direct producers (Bernstein, 
1977). This also implies that, at this stage, subsistence 
producers are formally subsumed by capital.
This distinction between the formal and real subsumption of 
labour by capital and absolute and relative appropriation of 
surplus-value, is central to this approach. By formal 
subsumption of labour by capital, Marx meant a situation in 
which capital takes over labour processes without
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transforming production relations and the internal 
organization of labour. The existing mode of production is 
not altered. This situation is synonymous with the period of 
manufacturing in Europe:
At first, capital subordinates labour on the basis of the technical conditions in which it historically finds it. It does not, therefore, change immediately the mode of production (Marx, Capital. Vol.1:293).
Formal subsumption of labour by capital is also synonymous 
with absolute surplus-value extraction, which entails 
extraction of surplus-value by lengthening of the working 
day, intensification of labour and increase in the number of 
worker units. No transformation of the mode of production 
occurs at this stage:
The production of surplus-value ... by means of simple extension of the working day, proved, therefore, to be independent of any change in the mode of production itself (ibid:293).
Real subsumption of labour by capital revolutionizes
organization of labour, increases labour productivity and
transforms individualized household production into
socialized production.24 Due to improved means of
production, relative surplus value is extracted. This level
of subsumption entails a complete separation of the direct
producer from the means of production:
The production of absolute surplus-value turns exclusively upon the length of the working day; 
the production of relative surplus-value revolutionizes out and out the technical processes 
of labour, and the composition of society. It therefore presupposes a specific mode, the 
capitalist mode of production, a mode which, along with its methods, means and conditions, arises and develops itself spontaneously on the foundation afforded by the formal subjection of labour to 
capital. In the course of this development, the formal subjection is replaced by the real subjection of labour to capital (ibid:477-8).
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It must be noted that the distinction between formal and 
real subsumption of labour by capital is primarily 
analytical. It is quite possible for both forms of 
subsumption of labour to co-exist within a social formation. 
'Simple reproduction squeeze' could reach its limits when 
non-capitalist producers are able to improve their 
techniques of production, and thus move toward production of 
relative surplus-value. But the qeneralization of commodity 
relations is also quite consistent with the persistence of 
non-capitalist forms of production operating at extremely 
low levels of productivity (Goodman and Redclift, 1981). For 
analytical purposes, however, it is essential to specify the 
limits to the real subsumption of labour since they will 
affect the specific modes of appropriation of surplus 
labour.
A further specification of non-capitalist producers concerns 
the question of their class differentiation. The question is 
how to characterize direct producers when their subsumption 
to capital is incomplete and they still retain possession of 
the means of production. I have already discussed that for 
Banaji (1977) simple commodity producers are 
'pre-capitalist' only in 'appearance' and a 'form' of the 
CMP in 'essence'. He, therefore, considers the independence 
of simple commodity producers vis-a-vis capital only as a 
'formality'. Juridically speaking, subsistence producers 
appear to be free, but behind the formality of independence 
the relations of production in which they are engaged are 
already capitalist in nature. Under these conditions, simple 
commodity production is regarded as a 'quasi-enterprise' 
employing wage-labour. The conclusion to be drawn from this
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is that:
The price which the producer receives is no longer a pure category of exchange but ... concealed wage. Behind the superficial 'surface' sale of products, peasants under this form of domination sell their labour power (Banaji, 1977:34).
Banaji, therefore, attaches minimal importance to the fact 
that simple commodity producers are in partial possession 
and control of the means of production. Simple commodity 
production is only a specific form of reproduction of 
capital and simple commodity producers are already selling 
their labour power to capital. They are, therefore, 
'disguised proletarians' and the income they receive from 
the sale of their commodities is a 'concealed wage'. Banaji 
appears to have no doubt about the ultimate 
proletarianization of subsistence producers.
Bernstein (1977) disagrees with the view that production
relations within the household are already capitalist
production relations, 'concealed' by the direct producers'
formal possession of the means of production. For him, the
fact that subsistence producers are not wholly dependent on
wage-labour for their reproduction is significant. Bernstein
is sensitive to the fact that formal subsumption imposes its
own limits on both the household and capital:
Simple commodity producer is not a proletarian as 
(a) he/she retains some control over the organization of production ... (b) household production, while occupying a definite place in the social division of labour precludes any 
significant development of the division of labour internal to the production process ... and therefore cannot produce the 'collective worker' 
in Marx's sense (Bernstein, 1977:63, emphasis in original).
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Despite the apparently total control exercised by capital,
subsistence producers cannot be characterized as 'semi' or
'disguised proletarians' for
the process stops short of full proletarianization in that the separation of the producers and the means of production is not complete, and the individualized production of the household is not replaced by the socialized production process 'set in motion' by capital (ibid:69).
With the monetization and commoditization of the 
reproduction cycle, the prices received by direct producers 
are equivalent to the cost of reproduction of the labour 
power. Subsistence producers are therefore 'wage-labourer 
equivalents'. This is to emphasise the formal subjection of 
the household by capital and the continual production of 
use-values by its members.
Proletarian destiny of subsistence producers is not 
inevitable. This is to reject the assumption that the 
'classical model' of transition is a universal one, and to 
suggest that paths of transformation in the periphery could 
take a different direction due to periphery's 
historical/structural specificity. This also reminds us of 
the points raised by Bradby (1975) and Clarke (1977): it is 
not 'necessary' for capitalism either to destroy or conserve 
PCMsP in a functional or existential sense. Class 
differentiation of non-capitalist producers, their 
elimination or retention, is an open question. The direction 
it will take depends on the intensity of the commoditization 
process, that is, the extent to which homogeneity of simple 
reproduction is broken by the commoditization of the means 
of production and labour power. The intensity of the
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commoditization process is itself dependent upon class 
struggle, or "the struggle for effective possession and 
control between the producers and the capital/state" 
(Bernstein, 1977:73).
* * * * * *
The following four Chapters of this study will seek to 
examine the experience of capital accumulation in one 
peripheral social formation, Iran, in the context of the 
theoretical framework advanced here. The period of 1800-1978 
is divided into different phases on the basis of the 
internationalization of the three circuits of capital 
identified here. The empirical and historical data presented 
in the following Chapters are consistent with the dynamics 
of the internationalization of the circuits of capital 
discussed in this Chapter.
Within the framework of the approach of the 
internationalization of capital, this study has advanced a 
number of theoretical propositions. First, it has been 
argued that the historical periodization of the development 
of the world market on the basis of the distinction between 
the circuits of capital clearly shows that the prevailing 
debate about the theoretical primacy of the sphere of 
production or circulation is misleading. While the sphere of 
production always plays a determinant role in defining the 
structural properties of a mode of production, during the 
initial incorporation of peripheral formations into the
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world market exchange relations are dominant. Secondly, by 
emphasizing the persistence and intensification of 
noncapitalist forms of labour exploitation, this study 
challenges a major assumption of the approach of the 
internationalization of capital: that 'the bourgeoisie 
creates a world after its own image'. 'Development', 
perceived as the expansion of capital as a social 
relationship into the backward areas of the world economy, 
does not have uniform and functional consequences. While 
through the approach of the internationalization of capital 
the dynamics of the historic world-wide expansion of capital 
can be established, no necessary or general socio-economic 
consequences can be said to flow from the installation of 
capitalism in a given society. The case of Iran will show 
that the incorporation of a society within the global system 
of capitalist relations does not necessarily result in the 
liquidation of all noncapitalist social and economic 
arrangements.
The implication of this theoretical perspective would be a 
rejection of mechanical causal models of economic 
development. A differential approach to the development of 
capitalism is needed in order to avoid the pitfalls of 
transposing the European experience to peripheral social 
formations, taking into account the fact that capitalism has 
developed in these formations not endogenously but as a 
result of contradictions external to them. This perspective 
also entails a critique of those forms of Marxism which 
conceive of history as a universal and inevitable march 
towards progress and advanced forms of material production. 
The history of the past two centuries of structural
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transformation in Iran, as outlined in the following 
Chapters, shows not only the uneven and combined effects of 
development of capitalism, but also indicates that we can 
have no general theory either about the genesis of 
capitalism or the necessary conseguences of its development.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1. The tendency for the rate of profit to fall is directlyrelated to the capitalists' need for exporting their products and obtaining a higher rate of profit, through producing more commodities at lower prices. The need to maximize profits and minimize costs of production results in an increase in the organic composition of capital ( ),increasing the ratio of dead labour to living labour. Conseguently, each commodity produced will have a smaller 
relative proportion of surplus value. Given the fact that only living labour produces value, and that the struggle between labour and capital tends to keep the rate of surplus value ( ) constant, what follows is a tendency for the
rate of profit to fall (  §—  ) .cw
2. Accumulation without wage necessarily involves exploitation of price differences, either in space (merchant capital) or in time (usury capital). In reality, however, merchant's and usurer's capital are often represented by the same person.
3. The concept of simple commodity production as a 'form' of production will be discussed fully in the last Section of this Chapter.
4. The distinction between formal and real subsumption of labour by capital will be discussed in the last Section of this Chapter.
5. See Chapter One, note No.12, for a brief discussion of the unequal exchange theory.
6. Many Marxists have emphasized the size or the organizational form of the firm as the main structural feature of capitalism at its monopoly stage. Sweezy (1942), for one, has attached a great deal of importance to the expansion in the scale of production, the separation between ownership and control and the replacement of individual private property owners by a group of shareholders as the main structural features of monopoly capitalism. These changes within the firm are not unimportant in their own terms, but they merely amount to formal and descriptive observations of changes in the nature of capitalism and do not constitute theoretical criteria for explaining transition from competitive to the monopoly stage.
7. For a similar concept of finance capital, dissociated 
from the banks and their role, see Brewer (1980) and Krest (1973).
8. Underconsumption theory generally concerns the inability of a closed capitalist system to absorb surplus 
value produced, either because production of consumer goods exceeds demand ('realization crisis') or because the small size of the market prevents capitalists from expanding production of consumer goods and sustaining the average rate 
of profit. In both cases, stagnation follows, unless
124
capitalism resorts to external markets as a counteracting tendency. For detailed discussions and critique of various theories of underconsumption, see Bleaney (1976), Brewer (1980) and Lustig (1980).
9. See, for a similar point, the concept of the 'imperialism of free trade' in Gallagher and Robinson (1953). For a classical view of 'anti-imperialist' free trade era, see Platt (1968).
10. This is also Palloix's (1977) interpretation of the development of the world market. All stages of capitalist development are also stages of imperialism for him (he even refers to primitive accumulation as 'proto-imperialism').
11. Lenin (1978) has been criticised for having failed to establish a theoretical link between five major tendencies he ascribes to the 'imperialist' stage of capitalist development, for having identified monopoly capitalism with abated competition and inevitable decay and stagnation, and 
for an underconsumptionist 'surplus capital' thesis which does not establish why the export of capital becomes a necessity of the system at the monopoly stage. For a critique of Lenin's Imperialism see: Arrighi (1978), Brewer (1980), Kitching (1981) and Lindsey (1980).
12. The question of the role of the state and its relationship with MNCs has been subject of a rather large debate. Due to the lack of space this question has not been addressed here. See, for this debate, Barratt-Brown (1974), Hymer (1972), O'Connor (1970b), Magdoff (1969), Murray (1975), Mandel (1975), Poulantzas (1974), Rowthorn (1975) and Warren (1975). For more recent discussions of the role of the state, which emphasize the significance of the state in the process of internationalization of production, see Jenkins (1987) and Richards (1987).
13. The following discussion of Fordism is based on the theoretical framework of the 'regulation school', particularly associated with the works of Aglietta (1982) and Lipietz (1982a-1984-1985-1986-1987-1988).
14. By the mid-1960s, exports of manufactured goods to the periphery had fallen to 2% of GDP in the EEC, 0.8% in the USA, and 2.3% in Japan. Imports constituted only 0.2% of GDP in all three cases during this period (Lipietz, 1982a:37).
15. As the development of Fordism corresponded to the post-war US hegemony over the capitalist world market, the present crisis of Fordism also corresponds to the declining US hegemony and to the intensification of rivalries amongst imperialist metropolises. The present crisis significantly 
shows that Fordism has neither solved the inherent cyclical fluctuations of capital accumulation nor the inherent tendency towards inter-imperialist rivalries. Today Europe and Japan are competing against each other to take over the leading role of US capitalism. In strict economic terms, the intensified inter-imperialist rivalry is reflected in the relative decline in the share of American exports in the total world trade: from 20% in 1950 to 12% in 1978, compared
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with the rise of W.Germany (from 4% in 1950 to 12% in 1978); and Japan (from 1% in 1950 to 8% in 1978), (Munck, 1984:65).
16. This complex question cannot be addressed within the limits of this study. It would suffice to point out that the profit-squeeze interpretation of the theory of capitalist crisis has been found inadequate for the phase of monopoly capital (Section C, this Chapter). Crises of profitability, however, do occur, and the relocation of production to cheap labour areas has augmented the rate of surplus value for individual capitalist investors and MNCs, but for the system as a whole, exploitation of labour is only one possible response to the crisis of profitability. The rate of profit can also be restored through other measures such as the depreciation of the constant capital, e.g., opening up new sources of energy and raw materials. See Jenkins (1984-1987) for arguments against the falling rate of profit tendency as an explanation for the present crisis.
17. In the case of the four Asian countries mentioned above, their share of world manufactured exports grew by 2% per annum between 1967 and 1977, against 2.1% per annum for Japan and W.Germany, and 2.9% for the USA. Indeed, it seems that the leading imperialist centres, the USA and Japan, have gone a long way in relocating their production processes: in 1977, the NICs accounted for 15.5% of imports from the US and Japan respectively (Lipietz, 1982a:39).
18. The data in the case of Latin America clearly shows this trend: while in the 1960s foreign direct investment accounted for about 30% of foreign flows into Latin America, with bank loans and bonds accounting for 10%, in the 1970s the share of direct investment by MNCs had dropped to 21% and the share of private international financiers had risen to 59% (Frieden, 1983:6).
19. These authors do not explicitly discuss the question of the NIDL, but the position here attributed to them logically follows from their arguments. Warren (1973-1980) is particularly known for the views mentioned above, and has been criticized extensively (Ahmed, 1983; Amin, 1983; Emmanuel, 1974; Giilap, 1986; Halliday, 1983; Howe, 1983; Lipietz, 1982b; Jenkins, 1984; Petras et al., 1978; Pilkington, 1981).
20. The literature on debt and aid as new forms of dependency is extensive. See especially: B.Franklin, "Debt Peonage: The Highest Form of Imperialism?" Monthly Review. No.10, 1981. J.Aronson (ed): Debt in the Less Developed Countries. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1979. E.Verluysen, The Political Economy of International Finance. New York:St.Martin Press, 1981.
21. The number of countries affected by the internationalization of productive capital, whatever system of accumulation is involved, constitutes only a small part of the periphery. In global terms, the share of the NICs of 
consumer and producer goods remains very small. Between 1969 and 1977, the Third World as a whole increased its share in the export of world manufactured goods from 7% to 9%,
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falling back subsequently. In the late 1970s, imports of manufactured goods from the Third World accounted for less than 2% of total consumption of manufactured goods in North America, the EEC and Japan, while in the clothing industry imports from the Third World accounted for over 11% of the consumption in various blocs of the OECD (Jenkins, 1984:48, 43). Moreover, the 'free production zones' employ only 7.25 million people - a mere fraction of the 'labouring poor' in the Third World (Munck, 1984:67). These figures show the limitations of the internationalization of productive capital both in terms of the area and the type of industry involved. The thesis of the NIDL looks even more dubious if we consider the very real threat of protectionism by central states, further limiting markets for export of manufactured commodities by the NICs. See particularly Bienfeld (1988) for a critique of the thesis of NIDL.
22. The circuit of simple commodity production will be fully discussed in the following Chapter. See particularly Chapter Three, Section B.
23. Given our emphasis on the production sphere, the unequal exchange thesis (see Chapter One, note No.12) is rejected for it sees the appropriation of surplus labour through exchange. In the transaction between capitalist enterprises and noncapitalist producers, what actually occurs is not the exchange of unequal values but equal exchange for values which have been produced under unequal conditions or unequal amounts of labour (Bernstein, 1977; Mueller, 1981). That is to say, simple commodity producers produce the same amount of value within a much longer time because of the lower level of development of productive forces and thus lower labour productivity.
24. Socialized production refers to the level of capitalist development when 'collective worker' has emerged. It implies concentration and centralization of the means of production, complex division of labour and cooperation between and 
within productive units. This level of development corresponds to real subsumption of labour by capital and relative surplus-value extraction.
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CHAPTER THREE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MERCHANT CAPITAL AND 
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS OF THE EMERGENCE 
OF A NEW POWER BLOC: 1800 - 1911
In this Chapter, I shall analyze the process by which the 
Iranian social formation was incorporated into the 
capitalist world market via the circuit of merchant capital 
from approximately the 1800s until 1911. I shall argue that 
during this period the internationalization of merchant 
capital led to a generalization of commodity production on a 
precapitalist basis. An analysis of the impact of merchant 
capital on the character of the state, class structure, and 
the nature of production relations constitutes the primary 
object of this Chapter.
This Chapter is divided into three sections. In the first 
section, I shall discuss changes in the material bases of 
society, that is, in the pattern of land tenure1, production 
relations, and class structure as a result of the 
penetration of metropolitan capital in the form of, first, 
wars, military invasions and conquests, and, second, in the 
form of loans, concessions and diplomatic activities. The 
pattern of land tenure and forms of labour processes are 
only touched upon insofar as they can sufficiently establish 
the proposition that there existed a causal link between (i) 
commodity production for the world market; and (ii) 
consolidation of precapitalist private monopoly on land. In 
the second section, the nature of class struggle in the
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Constitutional Movement (1905-11) and the relationship of 
the Movement with the commoditization of the economy will be 
discussed. In the third section, I shall draw on Marx's 
distinction between the 'first' and the 'second path' of 
capitalist transformation in order to define the specificity 
of primitive accumulation of capital in Iran.
A. Incorporation of Iranian Social Formation Into the 
Capitalist World Market
The year 1800 is not the exact beginning of the 
incorporation of Iranian formation into the world market. 
Integration with the capitalist world market began around 
the 1600s and found its culminating point in the 19th 
century.2 Initially, incorporation into the world market was 
very slow due to the particular internal structures of 
Iranian formation; a social formation constituted by 
semi-isolated tribal, rural and urban units and the absence 
of a centralized state impeded commoditization and 
penetration by metropolitan capital.
By 1800, however, Iran had come into close contact with the 
metropolitan capital, and by the end of the 19th century it 
had fully been transformed into a peripheral social 
formation. Metropolitan capital penetration into Iran did 
not take the form of formal colonization but of rivalry 
between two imperialist powers of the 19th century: Britain 
and Russia. The central objective of this inter-imperialist 
rivalry was the need of imperialist centres for raw 
materials for their expanding industries, and for markets to 
export their manufactured goods (Clawson, 1979). In the
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first half of the 19th century this rivalry took the form of 
wars and military conquests, and in the second half of the 
century it was carried over to 'peaceful' means of 
diplomatic activities, provision of loans, banking 
operations, and, above all, concession-grabbing. By the 
second half of the century, the era of free trade on a 
world-scale had ended and increased concentration and 
centralization of capital in a number of capitalist centres 
had given rise to a new stage characterized by the export of 
capital and direct state intervention.3 However, given the 
slow process of capital penetration into Iran and the 
unevenness of capital accumulation on a world-scale, the 
Iranian markets were opened not for the purpose of export of 
capital, but for the imposition of 'imperialism of free 
trade'.4 The relentless inter-imperialist rivalry throughout 
the 19th century was basically motivated by the need for raw 
materials.
From about 1800, when the Qajar dynasty (1792-1925) had 
established itself, until 1917, when the Bolshevik 
Revolution removed Russian imperialism, Iran was the scene 
of continuous rivalry between British and Russian 
imperialism. This rivalry had placed Iran in a semi-colonial 
position while both powers achieved control through securing 
a series of political, military, judicial and commercial 
concessions through the existing state, and often 
conflicting, communities of interests within the indigenous 
ruling elements. Imperialist powers used the state as an 
administrative and military structure for their 
exploitation. By encouraging the mortgaging of the economy 
through concessions, loans, and the abandonment of tariffs,
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the inter-imperialist rivalry both maintained and prolonged 
the absolutist rule of the Qajars and, at the same time, 
weakened it.
Iranian markets were first opened to foreign capital through 
a number of wars and military confrontations.5 In 1813, the 
Russian invasion of western areas of the Caspian Sea ended 
in Iran's surrender of most of her territory in the Caucasus 
and an agreement on having no naval forces on the Caspian 
Sea. Subsequently, the British imposed the Anglo-Persian 
Treaty of 1814 which stated that the Iranian frontier with 
Russia had to be determined by negotiations between Iran, 
Britain and Russia, and that the British and Iranian 
governments had to provide mutual assistance in case of 
aggression against either Iran or Britain.
Being closer to Iran, Russia engaged in a series of military 
attacks on its common border with Iran. The strongest 
attacks on the Caspian Sea region occurred in 1825 and 1828. 
They each ended with great territorial losses for Iran, and 
the imposition of the two economically damaging treaties of 
Golestan and Turkamanchai. According to the Turkamanchai 
Treaty Iran surrendered all of her territory west of the 
Caspian Sea and consequently lost all revenues obtained from 
that area through taxes on land and agricultural products. 
This Treaty also lowered the rate of tariff on Russian goods 
to 5% only and removed the internal duties on such goods.
For their part, the British provoked a war between Iran and 
Afghanistan in 1856, resulting in total victory for the 
British who had entered the war against Iran. As a result of
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this defeat, Iran relinquished all her claims to Afghan 
territory in 1857, and granted capitulatory rights and 
commercial privileges of tax exemptions for domestic trade 
and low tariffs for imports of British goods.
From approximately the mid to late 19th century, 
metropolitan capital penetration into Iran took the more 
'peaceful' form of concession-grabbing. By the 1870s, the 
activities of the imperialist powers had become almost 
strictly diplomatic, through which commercial concessions, 
loans, and political and economic rights were secured. By 
the end of the century almost all areas of the economy, 
banking, transportation, communication, mining, customs and 
the nascent industries were controlled by the metropolitan 
capital. The list of the concessions is indeed endless. In 
the late 1850s, the British won a concession for the 
construction of telegraphic lines. In 1872, the Reuter 
concession granted Baron Juluis Reuter, a British citizen, 
exclusive rights over all mining (except silver and gold), 
irrigation, transportation, establishment of banks, 
factories and a lease of the country's entire customs for 25 
years upon payment to the Shah of a stipulated sum for the 
first five years and an additional 60% of the net reserve 
for the remaining 20 years (Kazemzadeh, 1968). Although this 
concession was not put into operation, later, the first bank 
in Iran, the Imperial Bank of Persia, with exclusive rights 
to issue banknotes was built in 1889 by the British.
The Russians, for their part, also secured a number of 
concessions. The first Russian concession covered the 
fisheries at the Caspian Sea with a monopoly on Iranian
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caviar production; and the second was a concession to build 
the Banque d'Escompte, which competed with the British-owned 
Imperial Bank of Persia.
The most famous concession of this period, which marked 
Iran's first anti-imperialist movement and also its first 
foreign debt, was the Tobacco Concession granted to Major 
G.F. Talbot of Britain in 1890. According to this 
concession, the right of full monopoly over the production, 
sale and export of all tobacco throughout Iran was given to 
Major Talbot for 50 years in return for an annual rent of 
£15,000 and a quarter of the annual profits after the 
payment of all expenses, and a 5% dividend on the capital. 
Together with the clergy, the Iranian merchant class, whose 
interests were seriously threatened by this concession, 
launched a massive and nation-wide protest. The clergy 
issued a total ban on the consumption of tobacco which 
brought the operation of this concession to a halt. The 
Court was forced to cancel the concession in 1892, and had 
to pay £50,000, borrowed from the British-owned Imperial 
Bank, as compensation. The cancellation of this concession, 
known as the 'Tobacco Movement'6, signalled the decline of 
British influence in Iran in the second half of the 19th 
century and the growing Russian hegemony. In addition to 
internal opposition, Russian protest also affected the 
cancellation of both Reuter and Talbot concessions. The 
British did not regain their earlier degree of influence 
after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.
There was, however, one area of the Iranian economy in which 
the interests and domination of British imperialism remained
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constant: the oil industry. In 1901, William K. D'Arcy, a 
British subject, obtained a sixty-year concession for 
exploration, exploitation and export of Iranian oil. This 
concession covered the whole country except for the five 
northern provinces, and was tax-exempt. Oil was discovered 
in 1908 and, subsequently, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AICO) was formed in 1911, with the British government 
acquiring 51% of the share (Bharier, 1971:154-5). I shall 
later return to the question of the structure and impact of 
the oil industry on the Iranian economy.
The early military interventions and wars, resulting in 
territorial losses, the loss of revenue from taxation and 
trade, the imposition of comprehensive economic concessions, 
and the formation of the two competing Russian and 
British-owned banks which monopolized Iranian money markets, 
are ample evidence of the forms of capital penetration into 
Iran and the pattern of inter-imperialist rivalry. These 
forms of capital penetration not only accentuated the fiscal 
crisis of the state throughout the 19th century but they 
also opened Iranian markets to the 'imperialism of free 
trade', which eventually transformed the economy into an 
exporter of agricultural raw materials and a consumer of 
Russian and British manufactured goods. Incorporation into 
the world market via the circuit of merchant capital 
gradually transformed the precapitalist economy of Qajar 
Iran into an economy in which the principle of market was 
dominant. In the course of nearly one and a half centuries, 
that is, the period from 1800 until the late 1950s, 
domination of merchant capital shaped and influenced almost 
all aspects of the economy and the path of its transition to
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capitalism. What is central to this study is the extent and 
nature of the expansion of commodity production in Iran and 
the way in which this development affected the character of 
production relations. More importantly, I am concerned with 
the specific path of capitalist transformation taken in Iran 
as a result of the domination of merchant capital.
Internationalization of the circuit of merchant capital gave 
rise to a number of tendencies in the Iranian economy. These 
tendencies can be identified as the consolidation of the 
institution of private property and the concomitant 
concentration of the means of production (land), 
commoditization of agricultural output which involved 
replacement of subsistence production by cash cropping, and 
the collapse of petty-commodity production. These changes 
were all responses to, or adjustments of, the Iranian 
economy to integration with the world market. Obviously, the 
course of this transformation is partly determined by the 
characteristics of the society in which they occur. An 
understanding of the nature of the precapitalist mode of 
production is, therefore, essential for a thorough analysis 
of these transformations.
The nature of the precapitalist mode of production in Iran 
is the subject of a rather large debate. I must emphasize 
that an exact characterization of precapitalist Iran is not 
the direct object of this study; and it is not possible, 
within the present limits, to enter into this debate. It is 
necessary, however, to discuss those aspects of the debate 
which are directly relevant to the purposes of this study.
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The controversy over precapitalist Iran derives from 
different and conflicting interpretations of a complex 
system of property ownership whose structural 
characteristics can be summarized as follows: (i) the 
predominance of state ownership of land; (ii) the existence 
of pastoral/nomadic societies; (iii) the absence of 
juridical serfdom and hereditary nobility; (iv) the lack or 
weakness of labour services; (v) the extraction of surplus 
in kind or in money rent; (vi) a socially 'fragmentary' and 
politically 'despotic' structure resulting in the effective 
absence of classes and class struggle.
Lack of space does not allow me to discuss each of these 
features separately. However, it will be sufficient to note 
that the main difficulty in characterizing precapitalist 
Iran is the exact status of the complex system of property 
relations in which three forms of landownership co-existed: 
tribal/communal, state and private landownership. The terms 
of the debate, therefore, come down to two main guestions. 
First, whether this complex and mixed system of 
landownership should be characterized as 'feudal', 'Asiatic' 
or some other distinct mode of production. Secondly, whether 
precapitalist Iran should be characterized in terms of one 
single mode of production or a combination of two or several 
modes of production.
Given the complex system of landownership, precapitalist 
Iran has variously been characterized as 'tribal feudalism' 
(Minorsky, 1943; Keddie, 1981); 'patrimonial absolutism' 
(Banani, 1978); 'Umag system' or 'tribal state' (Reid,
1978); 'Oriental despotism' or 'Asiatic mode of production'
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(Abrahamian, 1974-1975; Ashraf, 1970-1980; Bashiriyeh, 1984; 
Katouzian, 1981; Mehrain 1979; Shaikholeslami, 1972); an 
exact equivalent of European feudalism (Pigulevskaya et al. 
1975; Kuznestova, 1963; Ivanov, 1977; Nomani, 1976-1977); or 
a 'specific ' variant of European feudalism (Petroshevsky, 
1968; Shaugannik, 1985). Another interpretation emphasizes 
the mixed nature of the economy, and argues that 
precapitalist Iran should be seen as a combination of 
several modes of production. Turner (1984:165-8) argues that 
precapitalist Iran was characterized by the 'oscillation' of 
two modes of production: 'prebendalism' and 'feudalism';
with the movement towards the domination of the latter mode 
of production from the 10th century onwards. Foran 
(1988:351-3), within the problematic of 'articulation of 
modes of production', identifies three modes of production 
co-existing in Iran from the 16th century onwards: 
'pastoral-nomadic mode of production', 'peasant 
cash-cropping mode of production' and 'petty-commodity mode 
of production'.
While it is not possible to discuss these formulations in 
detail here,'7 I would argue that any characterization of 
precapitalist Iran in terms of the 'Asiatic mode of 
production', 'Oriental despotism', 'patrimonialism', etc., 
is misguided. My disagreement with these formulations is 
based on two premises. First, these are largely political 
descriptions which characterize the system in terms of 
categories such as centralization vs. decentralization, 
patrimonialism, military patronage, and despotism (Foran, 
1988). These formulations not only define the system in 
terms of political categories but also tend to isolate the
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latter from the productive capacity of the economy and the 
overall character of the social formation. Secondly, these 
formulations share, implicitly or explicitly, certain 
assumptions with the traditions of Orientalism and 
functional anthropology, which have been dismissed earlier 
as inadequate.8 To substantiate this argument, I would like 
to discuss briefly two structural features of precapitalist 
Iran which are central to the debate and to an exact 
characterization of the system. One is the question of the 
status of private landed property, and the other is the 
character of pastoral/nomadic societies.9
The first question to consider is the status of private 
landed property in Iran. After the Islamic conquest in the 
7th century, landed property relationship in Iran came to be 
based on the institution of iqta, which designated that, 
theoretically, land throughout the empire belonged to the 
monarch who was both a religious leader and a political head 
(caliph). The state or crown land was called khaleseh and 
was assigned to both village and tribal communities in 
return for taxes. In this system of landownership, direct 
officials of the monarch or tribal chiefs were assigned the 
right to collect land tax. The officials' function was both 
judicial and economic. They collected taxes and provided 
services. This meant that possession of land was temporary 
and did not provide a permanent profit, posts were not 
hereditary and the monarch always had absolute authority.
The officials did not necessarily reside in the villages and 
their salaries were derived from taxes. Thus, the ownership 
of land, theoretically, resided with the state.
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Crown or state land was not the only type of landholding. 
There also existed vafq land, which was land belonging to 
religious institutions, and mulk land, which was private 
land corresponding completely to European feudal 
landownership in that it was held unconditionally and 
without obligation to the state and could be sold without 
hindrance. Whether or not this pattern of landownership 
should be termed 'feudal', 'feudal-prebendal' or 'Asiatic', 
it is certain that it was gradually transformed as a result 
of the incorporation of the Iranian economy into the world 
market. The general trend was towards the decline of state 
ownership of land and the consolidation of private landed 
property. This trend had begun in the medieval period when 
there was a general transformation of non-hereditary, 
conditional iata to hereditary increasingly unconditional 
iqta. By the last decades of the 19th century, an 
unconditional private ownership in land, and a corresponding 
distinction between landlord and peasant classes, had 
developed. To understand this process, it is necessary to 
discuss the policies of competitive tax-farming and sale of 
state lands adopted by the state in the second half of the 
19th century.
Beginning with the reign of Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834) the 
state entered a fiscal crisis induced by a combination of 
internal and external factors. The predominant factor was, 
however, external to Iranian formation; it was the result of 
Iran's entry into the world market in the form of military 
defeats in lengthy wars against Russia and Afghanistan, and 
the consequent loss of territories and revenues and the 
mounting foreign debts. Contradictions internal to Iranian
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society, like the inter-tribal and tribal-agricultural wars, 
and the extravagant spending of the Qajars made their 
contribution, but these factors were only of secondary 
importance. The fiscal crisis continued throughout the reign 
of Mohammad Shah (1834-1848)10, when the court adopted a 
policy known as tuyul whereby the rights of tax-farming or 
landholding were assigned to selected individuals. Then, in 
the second half of the century, the Court resorted to 
extensive sale of the crown lands. The administrative policy 
of tuyul and the sale of state lands are central to this 
study for they had important repercussions for the pattern 
of land ownership and the social structure at large.
The institution of tuyul was complex and covered various 
forms of grants. One variant of tuyul was a grant of state 
land (khaleseh) to administrative or military staff in lieu 
of revenue or salary. Tuyul grants in the case of tribes 
usually meant obligation for the tribes to provide military 
contingents to the state. Another variety of tuyul was a 
grant of the right to collect taxes of a given area.11 The 
granting of these forms of tuyul rights greatly accelerated 
in the first half of the 19th century. As tuyul-holders were 
usually judicial and political figures within their 
districts, as well as being landlords, they gradually moved 
toward further autonomy from the state. In the case of 
tribes, tuyul rights usually transformed tribal chiefs into 
semi-feudal landlords. Both state officials and tribal 
chiefs who were tuyul-holders commonly established their own 
military forces. Through such forces, even those 
tuyul-holders who commonly were supposed to pay taxes to the 
state freguently defied the central government and formed
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semi-independent political domains. Therefore, although 
tuyul was theoretically revokable, there was a tendency for 
tuyul land to become the private property of each assignee 
and for the distinction between property rights and those of 
tax collection to disappear.
The assignment of tuyul rights resulted in political 
decentralization and financial weakening of the state. In 
the second half of the 19th century, further pressures for 
revenue, generated by this decentralization and by mounting 
foreign debt, led to new policies concerning land. One 
policy involved a different implementation of tuyul rights; 
the other involved outright sale of state lands. The former 
was the policy of auctioning of governorship and official 
posts to the highest bidders. This policy, which was 
basically an auctioning of tuyul rights, was a form of 
competitive tax farming in which the individual who offered 
the highest price tag for collecting the taxes and revenues 
from a district was assigned to the district with full 
political and economic powers. The financial needs of the 
Court determined the length of the time for which tuyul 
rights were given. The Court's hope for higher price bidders 
each year often led it to give short-term tuyul rights.
Throughout the 19th century, tax farming and sale of state 
lands brought more and more land under the ownership of 
tribal chiefs and large landlords. Tuyul rights were 
gradually transformed into de-facto private property, and a 
particular type of landholding was developed that was 
eventually transformed into private land ownership, 
inheritable and alienable by sale (Lambton, 1953; Keddie,
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1960). Although the on-going process of the establishment of 
regularized property rights to land was by no means complete 
in 1900, in certain areas distinct feudal estates had become 
established. Therefore, the reguirements of the world 
market, channelled through the Court and the landlord class, 
eventually broke down the traditional system of 
landownership. Competitive tax-farming and sale of state 
lands were also the central mechanisms of shaping the 
character of the landowning class, the movement of the 
merchant class into landowership, and the creation of a vast 
pool of indebted peasantry. I shall later return to these 
important points.
What is significant at this stage is that the policies of 
competitive tax farming and sale of state lands also led to 
the entry of tribal chiefs into the fragmented ruling class 
of Iran and to the integration of nomadic societies with the 
larger social structure. It is necessary at this point to 
consider the character of pastoral nomadic societies.
Generally speaking, pastoral nomadic societies have been 
seen as an important element in Iranian history, and a major 
obstacle to structural transformation in Iran (Lambton 1953; 
Keddie, 1981; Moghadam, 1986-1988a-1988b). There is a 
tendency in the literature to reduce the whole history of 
Iran to a constant struggle between northern nomadic Turks 
and southern sedentary Persians; and to see this struggle as 
the basic feature affecting development of Iranian society. 
Moghadam (1986-1988a-1988b), for instance, in what she calls 
the 'theory of dynastic cycles', advances the view that in 
the period from the 11th to the 19th centuries, cyclical
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nomadic invasions and rule in Iran led to the arrest in the 
development of productive forces, social classes, and 
private property rights in land, reinforcing and 
perpetuating the conditions of 'despotism'. While in Europe 
tribal invasions subsided in the 11th century, thus allowing 
for the development of feudal production relations, in Iran 
they continued until the 19th century, forming a major 
obstacle to the historic transition to capitalism.
While I have no problem with the argument that tribal 
structures played a role in inhibiting historical 
transformation in Iran, and therefore constitute a 
structural specificity which should be taken into account, 
most studies on tribes in Iran present a number of problems.
Beyond the general commonplace characterization that nomadic 
pastoral societies own animals and move about, we need to 
specify the particular character of production relations 
prevalent in these communities which, on the one hand, 
distinguishes them from sedentary societies and, on the 
other, renders them more resistant to structural change. 
Tribal structures express the conditions of natural economy, 
where production and distribution take place without the 
medium of the market, that is, production of use-values for 
direct immediate consumption. While use-value production 
dominates nomadic societies, they are also involved in the 
production of exchange-value as expressed in the trade of 
animals and animal by-products for handicraft and 
agricultural commodities produced by sedentary societies. 
Production of exchange-value, however, is marginal to 
nomadic societies as long as the larger production relations
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of the social formation remain precapitalist. In tribal 
societies, land is owned collectively, division of labour 
operates along sex, age and lineage, movement of property 
takes place through marriage, and the main items of exchange 
are women and grazing animals.
Within this general precapitalist framework, the most 
important factor which specifies tribal societies is the 
expression of production relations through the kinship 
system. In tribal societies, economic does not constitute a 
separate sphere; nor do tribes contain a concrete 
superstructural entity distinct from the economic base. 
Economic and noneconomic spheres coincide and are expressed 
through the kinship system. The kinship system is 
superstructural in that it maintains the ideological, 
judicial and political functions; it is also economic since 
it determines and regulates the conditions of production and 
consumption. In other words, kinship relations and 
production relations are intrinsically complementary; the 
superstructural dimension of kinship appears as the dominant 
characteristic of nomadic societies because the determinant 
role of the economy is expressed through it (Godelier, 1973; 
Helfgott, 1977). Central to the kinship system is the 
institution of chiefdom which is a collective recognition of 
leadership entity representing the internal interests of 
tribes and ensuring their access to collective property 
(grazing lands). In the sedentary societies, by contrast, 
kinship relations do not define production relations. 
Landlords own and control the means of production (land) and 
extract surplus through sharecropping. Land is owned 
collectively in tribal societies, and the surplus produced
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(animal by-products) enter the market through exchange with 
sedentary societies under different conditions.
In briefly characterizing pastoral nomadic societies my 
argument is that the apparently determinant role of the 
kinship system, as expressed through the institution of 
chiefdom, was the factor which tended to undermine the 
capacity of tribal societies for transformation and imposed 
a relative autonomy on them which was absent in settled 
agriculture. While the centrality of chieftainship and blood 
ties rendered these structures more resistant to change, 
this by no means implies that tribes are inherently stagnant 
socio-economic units, incapable of transformation and immune 
to external pressures. Generally speaking, there are two 
misconceptions about tribes. First, there is the Chayanovian 
view of tribes as inherently self-sufficient structures, 
perpetually reproducing themselves at the level of simple 
production. Secondly, the 'military superiority' of tribes 
is often over-emphasized, leading to their characterization 
as warlike, somewhat hostile towards civilization and 
constantly pursuing military and territorial conquests. 1 2  In 
relation to the first point, it should be stressed that the 
history of Iran, as elsewhere, shows a general dissolution 
and disintegration of tribal structures in response to the 
same forces which operated upon sedentary and urban 
communities. Although tribes, given their internal 
structures, were more resistant to these pressures, it can 
be shown that tax-farming and the tuyul system gradually 
incorporated tribal chiefs into the dominant power 
structure. This integration was uneven and protracted, but 
the appointment to a governorship or administrative position
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did extend the activities of tribal chiefs beyond the 
parochial limits of chieftainship. As mentioned above, the 
tribal chiefs received grants of land and became responsible 
for administration and collection of taxes. Although at the 
local level their power continued to be based on the kinship 
system, at the national level tribal chiefs emerged as an 
element of the fragmentary ruling class of Iran towards the 
end of the 19th century.
Secondly, the military superiority of tribes should be seen 
as an objective economic necessity of their existence, 
rather than an indication of an innate tendency towards 
warfare and plunder. Under the conditions of climatic 
aridity, the periodic paucity of goods and grazing lands, 
and competition with sedentary societies over scarce 
resources, tribes developed a strong military component, 
rendering military invasions and physical destruction a 
means of regulating their relations with both settled 
agriculture and other rival tribes. Otherwise, tribal 
societies could easily be considered as complementary to the 
sedentary way of life.13
The underlying anthropological and Orientalist assumptions 
of most studies on tribes in Iran (and elsewhere), 
therefore, tend to mystify the concept of 'tribe' and reduce 
the complex history of capitalist transition to a struggle 
between peaceful sedentary societies and warlike free 
barbarians. More fundamentally, these studies betray a 
one-sided, 'internalist' approach to the question of 
structural transformation. The analysis of structural change 
must take into account both the mutual relationship between
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the internal features and specificities of the social 
formation and the external impact of integration with the 
world market.
Two basic conclusions can be drawn from the above 
discussion. First, private landed property rights did 
develop in Iran, on terms not too different from European 
feudalism. The continual emphasis on the state ownership of 
land, or on the 'insecurity' of private landed property 
under the conditions of 'despotism', reveals a failure to 
break with the Orientalist problematic, and a preoccupation 
with legal, formal and political categories which tends to 
obscure the economic and social reality. Through competitive 
tax farming land became de facto possession of military 
leaders, state officials, tribal chiefs and governors. The 
gap between theory and practice widened as different types 
of land assignments gradually became hereditary and were 
treated as private property. Whether or not we consider the 
institutions of iqta and tuyul as equivalent to European 
fief, the overwhelming tendency, during the period under 
consideration. was towards the development and consolidation 
of mulk (an exact equivalent of European fief) and a gradual 
disappearance of all other types of distinction. Secondly, 
the arrest in the development of productive forces in Iran 
should not be exclusively attributed to tribes and tribal 
invasions; nor should tribes be seen as a distinct mode of 
production, possessing an 'essence' which sets them 
conceptually apart from the larger social structure. To the 
extent that nomadic and sedentary societies produced surplus 
under different conditions, they can be seen as constituting 
two sets of production relations. But the significance of
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tribal societies can be grasped only after the nature of the 
total system and the larger production relations within 
which tribes exist and are reproduced are identified. This 
study has adopted a broad concept of mode of production and 
therefore rejects the essentialist category of the 'nomadic 
mode of production'.14 In nomadic societies, the expression 
of production relations through the kinship system and the 
regulation of economic activities through patriarchal 
control of tribal chiefs, prolonged the separation of direct 
producers from the means of production. Due to the factors 
mentioned above, breakdown of relationship between sedentary 
and nomadic societies also resulted in periodic plunder and 
physical destruction. To this extent, pastoral nomadic 
societies constituted an internal obstacle to primitive 
accumulation of capital in Iran, but did not, in any 
significant sense, retard the development of productive 
forces.
Returning to the question of the mechanisms of 
peripheralization, it is arguable that the policies of 
competitive tax-farming and sale of state lands in the 
second half of the 19th century had a causal and direct 
relationship with the incorporation of the Iranian economy 
into the world market. These policies were, as discussed 
earlier, the central factor in the development of private 
property rights in land. The concomitant process of the 
commoditization of agricultural output also had a causal 
relationship with the development of private landed property 
and incorporation into the world market. Logically, land had 
to be commoditized, that is, its status as crown land had to 
be transformed into land alienable and inheritable by sale,
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in order for necessary changes in the quantity and quality 
of agricultural products to occur, and in order to make 
large-scale export for the world market possible. In other 
words, consolidation of private property and commoditization 
of land also necessitated the shift from subsistence to 
cash-crop production, and the expansion of monetary 
relations in the Iranian countryside.
Like competitive tax-farming and sale of crown lands, the 
conversion into cash-crop production was also a response to 
the pressures of the world market on the Iranian economy to 
produce raw materials for export to the expanding economies 
of Russia and Britain. The first response had to come from 
the Qajar dynasty and the large landlords who moved towards 
profitable production of cash-crops for external markets.
The bankrupt state, pressed by increasing need for revenues, 
began to demand cash payment instead of payment in kind. As 
landlords and taxfarmers were pressed to produce more for 
the world market, peasants had to convert into cash-cropping 
and pay their dues and feudal's share of the crop in cash.
By the 1880s both private property in land and payment in 
cash were established in the Iranian countryside, although 
other forms of land tenure and payment in kind did not 
totally disappear.
Stimulated by the economic development in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, production of cash crops increased 
considerably in the late 1880s, especially in the northern 
provinces of Iran. By the mid 1890s, cash-crops constituted 
a major proportion of Iran's foreign trade. Cash-cropping 
converted larger and larger areas of land into production of
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those items profitable on the world market, while production 
of foodstuffs for local consumption, such as wheat and 
barley, was suppressed. Production of cash-crops such as 
cotton, tobacco, and opium, which were all exported, was 
boosted. Opium, for instance, became a leading export 
commodity constituting 28% of Iran's total exports by the 
1880s, whereas it had been an import item in 1800. The 
British exported the opium to China and made exorbitant 
profits out of that trade. The famines in Isfahan and Yazd 
in 1871-72 have been attributed to the shortage of 
foodstuffs and their high prices as a result of production 
for export markets (MacLean, 1904, cited in Issawi, 1971:
136: Keddie, 1960).
Russian and Iranian merchants encouraged the cultivation of 
cotton by providing seeds and cash to farmers in the north, 
especially in Khurasan province. During the American Civil 
War the shortage of cotton made the British turn to 
countries like Iran, Egypt and India to supply this basic 
raw material. The production and export of cotton thus 
increased dramatically in Iran. The production of silk and 
tobacco in the northern province of Gilan was also 
instrumental in generating monetary transaction in the 
Iranian countryside as Iranian merchants had to purchase 
silkworm eggs from Greek and Armenian merchants of Russian 
citizenship (Issawi, 1971). Apart from the cashcrops such as 
opium, cotton, silk and tobacco, grains also entered trade 
and at the beginning of the 20th century Iran was exporting 
more grain, mainly rice, to Russia than raw cotton 
(Nowshiravani, 1981:572).
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The above evidence suggests the transformation of the 
Iranian economy from a self-sufficient agricultural economy 
to an economy of cash-crop exports by the second half of the 
19th century. Export of cash-crops further distorted Iran's 
already fragmented agricultural economy, preventing the 
development of an integrated home market. Export orientation 
firstly prevented domestic distribution and consumption of 
export products, and secondly encouraged shifts in the 
cultivation of certain products that were geared to foreign 
markets. As a result, agricultural production developed in 
an uneven, distorted and sometimes isolated pattern. While 
the northern areas that produced the major commodities for 
foreign trade developed large commercial and trade centres, 
other areas of the country stagnated or declined. This 
uneven and distorted pattern of development was the direct 
result of the peripheral position of Iran within the world 
market. The decline of nascent industry, following this 
pattern of incorporation into the world market, is indicated 
by the fact that by the second half of the 19th century 
re-export of manufactured goods declined relative to that of 
agricultural commodities. By the turn of the century, only 
less than 1% of imports into Iran could be classified as 
capital goods and small items of machinery, while mass 
consumption items such as cotton, tea and sugar constituted 
about 60% of Iran's imports (Bharier, 1971:10; Nowshiravani, 
1981:564). Bharier (1971:10) estimates that 75% of Iran's 
exports were agricultural raw materials by 1900, while 
according to Nowshiravani (1981:564) 85% of Iran's exports 
in the year 1903-4 consisted of raw materials such as 
grains, cotton, wool, opium and dried fruits.
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These figures indicate the fundamental shift in the 
commodity composition of Iran's foreign trade by 1900 as 
compared to the beginning of the 19th century. From being a 
producer and exporter of semi-manufactured goods, Iran had 
changed into a predominantly exporter of agricultural raw 
materials. This change is similar to the pattern of 
transformation occurring in many peripheral areas as they 
were being increasingly incorporated into the world market 
through the circuit of merchant capital.
The ever-increasing role of the market and the intensity of 
the generalization of commodity relations are also indicated 
by changes in the volume of Iran's foreign trade and its 
trading partners. The rise of foreign trade was relatively 
slow in the first three decades of the 19th century but from 
the 1830s it began to expand at a much faster rate. By 1864, 
the total volume of trade had risen fourfold, and there was 
nearly a twelvefold increase in the volume of Iran's trade 
in the period of 1800-1914 (Issawi, 1971:132).
An indication of the rise of foreign trade is the estimation 
that in 1800 the total value of trade was £500,000, 
representing imports, exports and re-exports. As transit 
trade represented half of the total trade, the total value 
of trade must have been about £250,000. By the 1880s, the 
total value of trade had risen to well over £7 million, and 
by 1913-14 it reached £20 million (Issawi 1983:230-1). In 
1800, Iran's major trade partners were its immediate 
neighbours, Afghanistan, the Ottoman Empire and British 
India, and half of Iran's imports were ultimately for 
re-exports to these countries (Malcom, 1930, cited in
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Issawi, 1971:264-7). By the second half of the century,
Russia and Britain had replaced Afghanistan and the Ottoman 
Empire. This shift was accompanied by a decline in transit 
trade through Iran relative to the country's foreign trade. 
Since an increasing proportion of exchange was destined for 
consumption within the country, the total volume of trade 
indicates the intensity of the spread of commodity relations 
(Nowshiravani, 1981:564).
Russia was Iran's largest trade partner during the second 
half of the 19th century and Russo-Iranian trade increased 
at a more rapid rate than that of the total volume of 
foreign trade in Iran. Russian efforts were directed at 
driving out competition, and they did succeed in reducing 
British trade with Iran. Whereas trade with Britain had 
accounted for over half of Iran's trade until 1870, Russia's 
share of total trade began to increase after that date. 
Russia received 66% of Iran's exports and supplied 53% of 
Iran's imports, while British imports had dropped to 25% and 
its exports to Iran to 12% in the post-1870 period (Entner, 
1965:42).
The developments discussed so far, commoditization of land, 
cash-crop production, relative expansion of monetary 
relations, and changes in the structure and volume of Iran's 
foreign trade, provide convincing evidence for the argument 
that the major impetus for transition to a market economy in 
Iran came from outside rather than from internal 
developments. Although factors such as opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869, the fall in ocean freight rates, and the 
gradual improvement of transportation through the
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territories of Iran's immediate neighbours in the 1870s made 
Iranian markets more accessible to the outside world, the 
major factor in the expansion of commodity relations was the 
transformation of the Iranian economy into a supplier of raw 
materials and a market for the growing industries of Russia 
and Britain. By the second half of the 19th century the 
subsistence nature of the Iranian economy had been 
transformed into a market economy. If by 'subsistence 
economy' we understand production of use-values, extraction 
of economic surplus directly either in the form of goods or 
labour services, the close correspondence between production 
and consumption, limited regional specialization and the 
restricted sphere of exchange, then all these features began 
to be undermined by the second half of the 19th century. 
Gradually, production for exchange rather than for immediate 
personal consumption, indirect surplus extraction through 
cash rents or taxes, and increasing regional specialization 
in exchange became dominant.
Demographic changes in the rural areas are also indicative 
of the incorporation of the economy into a network of 
internal and international trade. A full 50% of the entire 
Iranian population of 5 to 6 million in 1800 is estimated to 
have been nomadic. Together with the sedentary community 
they constituted about 87% of the population living in the 
rural areas. The remaining one-seventh of the population, 
comprising absentee landlords, merchants, state officials, 
and petty-commodity producers lived in the urban areas. The 
small share of agricultural products in the export trade of 
Iran in 1800, as compared to their dominant role later in 
the 19th century, suggests the degree of self-sufficiency of
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peasant and nomadic population at that time. Although by the 
1880s the population was still largely rural, the relative 
size of the nomadic population had fallen to about 25%. By 
1900, about 80% of the population lived in the rural areas, 
a percentage that was to remain almost constant until 1940 
(Bharier, 1971:25). These demographic changes, the shift of 
25% of the population from nomadism to a settled agrarian 
way of life, and the increase in the percentage of urban 
population, were also responses to the expansion of 
commodity relations and the growing internal specialization 
in exchange.
By the end of the 19th century direct monetary exchange 
relations had become prevalent, and agriculture had been 
drawn into the world economy through the international 
system of trade relations. It is, however, crucial to 
emphasize that none of these developments should be 
identified with the rise of capitalist production relations 
in the Iranian countryside, as a number of writers have 
argued (Ashraf and Hekmat, 1974). During this period no 
total separation from the means of production and no shift 
to relative surplus-value extraction - both ensuring 
expanded reproduction of capital - had yet occurred. Under 
the domination of merchant capital, production of 
commodities for the market did not result in any change in 
the character of production relations or in the development 
of productive forces.
However, there is evidence that wage-labour did appear in 
the Iranian countryside in the late 19th and 20th 
centuries. This wage-labour took the form of casual
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labourers hired by feudal landlords, usually at harvest 
time, and paid in cash or in kind. The data also suggest 
that the urban wage-earners grew in number. The urban 
population of trade centres, especially Tehran and Tabriz, 
increased by two or three times, absorbing some of these 
wage-earners. Road projects undertaken by the British and 
Russians provided employment opportunities for some of these 
wage-earners between 1890 and 1920. For instance, 30,000 
wage-labourers were employed by the British in 1920 in road 
projects (Nowshiravani, 1981:576). Another type of 
wage-labour took the form of large-scale migration of 
dispossessed peasants to Russia where they found employment 
opportunities in the factories, road construction and, 
especially, in the oil fields of Baku. In 1893, 11% of 
workers in the oil industry in Russian Azarbaijan were 
Iranians; by 1915, this number rose to 29% (Abdullaev, 1963, 
cited in Issawi, 1971:51). On the whole, it is estimated 
that between 60,000 to 100,000 Iranians entered Russia 
during the first decade of the 20th century, and about an 
equal number returned. During the years preceding the First 
World War these numbers doubled (Entner, 1965:60-1).
Wage-labour, however, is not a sufficient condition for 
capitalism. Its emergence in 19th century Iran is related to 
the processes discussed above: competitive tax-farming, 
development of private property in land, cash-crop 
production and commoditization of agriculture. Following the 
state's policy of tax-farming and sale of crown lands, more 
and more land came to be owned by landlords and tribal 
chiefs. This concentration of land occurred through a series 
of sharp and brutal inroads into peasants' plots and the
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destruction of small holdings in particular. There was a 
constant redistribution of peasant plots, the abrogation of 
the traditional rights of peasants, and the confiscation of 
their small holdings (Keddie, 1960: Lambton, 1953). If 
anything, these processes, and the arbitrary and chaotic 
system of taxation, intensified the exploitation of the 
peasantry. Short-term tax-farming rights forced tax-farmers 
to utilize all means of greater surplus extraction within 
the shortest possible time. Having little guarantee to 
access to land after their rights expired, the tax-farmers 
did not engage themselves in productive process. Their aim 
was only to extract as high taxes as possible. They did not 
reside on the land; in most cases they were absentee 
landlords with their representatives overseeing the affairs 
of their rural properties. The indebtedness of the peasantry 
to landlords and merchants was a new phenomenon. Peasants 
were forced to stay on the land not only because of their 
indebtedness but also because of the lack of opportunities 
outside agriculture. There was no industrial development in 
the cities, and the handicraft industries were in a state of 
decline. However, high taxes, land confiscations and general 
insecurity forced some of the peasants off the land. They, 
together with the simple commodity producers bankrupted as a 
result of import of Western manufactured products, formed 
the bulk of the dispossessed wage-earners of this period.
The absence of a capitalist home market meant that they had 
to sell their labour power elsewhere; hence their 
large-scale migration to Russia towards the end of the 19th 
century.
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Competitive tax-farming, together with land confiscations, 
droughts and famines can be considered as the earliest 
mechanisms of primitive accumulation in Iran. The emergence 
of wage-labour, however, was sporadic, uneven, localised and 
isolated; there existed no systematic mechanisms in the 19th 
century which could have created a class of 'free' 
wage-labourers. As I have mentioned above, the labour that 
was released was mainly from the depressed rural areas and 
declining handicraft centres concentrated in the northern 
regions. Uneven development had in fact created a group of 
dispossessed labourers who stood alone and detached from a 
vast pool of politically unconscious, disorganised and 
dispersed peasantry. This organised and conscious faction of 
the dominated class existed within a formation in which even 
its ruling class was not an industrial bourgeoisie and which 
had not even acquired bourgeois state apparatuses.1'" As I 
shall argue below, until the mid-20th century Iran remained 
a predominantly pre-capitalist country which exhibited many 
characteristics of a market economy. Sharecropping, which 
has not disappeared even today, remained the dominant form 
of labour, although fixed rent in money and in kind also 
survived.16 The outmoded and primitive methods of production 
also remained virtually the same until at least the first 
two decades of the 20th century.
To sum up, what exactly occurred in this phase was an 
intense process of commoditization on the basis of 
precapitalist production relations following the entry into 
the world market via the circuit of merchant capital. Under 
the sway of feudal landlordism and merchant capital, the 
consequences were devastating for the Iranian economy, and
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yet they were typical characteristics of this phase of 
capital accumulation in the periphery. Merchant capital, as 
an 'agent' of metropolitan industrial capital, consolidated 
precapitalist production relations and blocked an organic 
transformation of petty-commodity production into capitalist 
production.
This point brings us to the question of the decay of 
petty-commodity production and handicraft in 19th century 
Iran. As mentioned before, Iran was a producer of 
semi-manufactured goods, mainly textiles, during the Safavid 
Empire (1501-1722). Issawi (1971:12-3) shows that in the 
mid-1600s, silk exports from Iran were worth £1 to £2 
million, as compared to £5 million exports from Britain in 
1688 or £4.8 million from France in 1715. Beginning with the 
entrance into the world market, the first military defeat 
from Russia, and the imposition of the Treaty of 
Turkamanchai in 1828, a long-term process of decay of 
petty-commodity production and nascent industry started in 
Iran. It has already been mentioned that this Treaty imposed 
only 5% tariff rate on Russian goods and exempted them from 
internal duties. The low tariff was later extended to 
Britain in 1836 and 1841. Russia adopted subsidization of 
its products for the purpose of effective competition with 
the products of more advanced countries, notably Britain, 
and also in order to discourage industrial production within 
Iran. For instance, Russians temporarily exported sugar to 
Iran at artificially low prices which brought about the 
bankruptcy of the modern sugar mill established in Iran in 
1895 (Nowshiravani, 1981:565). Keddie (1981:56) mentions 
that a British firm, 'probably by design', imported diseased
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silkworm eggs to Iran in the mid-19th century. Consequently, 
the entire silk industry had disappeared by the 1870s, and 
was replaced by the carpet industry which was also promoted 
by the British. This inter-imperialist rivalry placed Iran's 
economy in the orbit of the 19th century colonial expansion 
and, as such, the growth of the Iranian economy was of a 
specific type: while certain industries prospered and 
developed, others, not linked to the requirements of the 
world market, declined and disappeared. The items whose 
production was boosted were rugs, carpets and handmade wool 
shawls. The expansion of this 'cottage industry' is perhaps 
explained by the fact that it was an area in which the 
metropolitan countries could not compete; however, it could 
hardly lay the basis for industrialization. The major items 
of import to Iran were 'colonial goods' such as tea (from 
British India), sugar and tobacco (from Russia) and textiles 
(from Britain) (Bharier, 1971:10).
Russia was the more powerful imperialist power and succeeded 
in establishing a monopolistic position within the Iranian 
markets by the late 19th century. The Treaty of 
Turkamanachai provided the basis of Russo-Iranian trade 
relations until the beginning of the 20th century. In 1903, 
a new customs duty went into effect, replacing the old 
import-export tax of 5% by a new tariff schedule that 
generally favoured Russian goods over imports from other 
countries and eliminated Iranian export tax. The removal of 
export tax on Iran's raw materials demonstrated the 
dependence of Iran's agricultural exports on the Russian 
markets (Entner, 1965:53-5).
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The impact of the 'imperialism of free trade' on the Iranian 
economy was evident as early as the 1830s when large 
quantities of European manufactured goods were poured into 
the Iranian markets, with destructive effects for the 
nascent industries. The Iranian petty-commodity producers, 
the hand-manufacturers, the artisans and craftsmen enjoyed 
no protective tariffs and, unlike foreign merchants, were 
not exempted from internal taxes. Production of items which 
were hand-made and manufactured in home and small workshops 
was severely reduced following the import of cheaper 
factory-made goods from Russia and Britain. The metropolitan 
bourgeoisie, enjoying tax immunities and low tariff duties, 
dumped their products in the Iranian markets. The industrial 
centres in Yazd, Isfahan, Kerman, Tabriz and Mashhad 
declined, and their major factories were closed down 
partially due to competition by metropolitan capital 
(Ashraf, 1970:325).
I have so far discussed the mechanisms of peripheralization 
in 19th century Iran. The consolidation of private property 
in land, its subsequent concentration, commoditization of 
the means of production, development of cash-crop production 
and monetary relations, and the general decline of 
petty-commodity production and nascent industry were all 
responses to the requirements of the world market for the 
production of agricultural raw materials. I have emphasized 
that none of these changes should be identified with the 
development of capitalism in Iran for they did not amount to 
a fundamental transformation of social relations of 
production and the mode of extraction of surplus. Rather, 
these developments consolidated the feudal relations of
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production. While the relationship between the bulk of the 
peasantry and the feudal ruling class remained basically the 
same, these developments, and the policies of competitive 
tax-farming and land sale, were mechanisms which profoundly 
affected the character of the ruling class and its later 
behaviour in the political struggles of the early 20th 
century. They brought about two interlinked processes of 
change in the nature of the ruling class: (i) the two 
distinct fractions of the landowning class, the officialdom 
and the landed aristocracy, gradually converged; and (ii) 
the merchant class developed into a major class within the 
social formation at large, and moved into landownership.
To begin with the first process, a brief discussion of the 
nature of the landowning class is necessary.17 The Iranian 
landlord class was divided into two fractions: the landed 
aristocracy (the Court notables and princes), and the 
officialdom (the political, administrative and bureaucratic 
agents of the state).18 Minorsky (1943) discusses the 
process whereby a new officialdom was created during the 
Safavid dynasty (1501-1722) which gradually transformed the 
foundations of political power. The origins of this process 
dates back to the reign of Shah Abbas I (1587-1629) whose 
policies led to the dismembering of the old nobility from 
the centres of political power, and their replacement by a 
new officialdom. During his reign, state land, crown land 
and vafq land were expanded at the expense of fiefs and 
private lands. Consequently, the state bureaucracy and the 
functional significance of its members increased rapidly. 
Sixteenth century Iran witnessed the growth of a powerful 
and centralized state bureaucracy. Shah Abbas I also
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introduced new elements into the traditional power 
structure, such as Georgian slaves and Armenians, who gained 
important positions within the army. Thus, at the expense of 
the old nobility and tribal chiefs, a new officialdom of 
non-tribal and non-noble origins, also known as 
'bureaucratic landlordism', was created.
In addition to land revenues, this officialdom also had an 
income from its effective control of state apparatuses. As 
the level of ground rent could also be determined by the 
state, the officialdom appropriated part of the social 
surplus as well as shares from the taxes in the form of 
salaries. Through their access to state apparatuses they 
imposed limitations on the revenues of the landowning 
nobility and reduced their political power by confiscating 
their lands and appropriating their surplus. This situation 
resulted in a struggle for land and revenue between the two 
class fractions, beginning in the 19th century when 
'bureaucratic landlordism' emerged as a highly developed 
element of power structure, and continuing until the early 
20th century. As Lambton (1953) convincingly argues, the 
state policy of land assignment and tax-farming during the 
19th century led to the fusion of interests between the 
landowning nobility and the officialdom, although the 
distinction between them did not totally disappear. Firstly, 
these policies led to the narrowing of the gap between 
land-ownership and state bureaucracy to the extent that 
members of the officialdom came to own several villages each 
and received feudal dues directly. Secondly, with the 
commoditization of land and sale of crown land to merchants, 
an alliance was formed between the landowning class and
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merchants. From this point onwards, the direction of 
struggle and alliances shifted from that between landowning 
nobility and state officials to the one between merchants 
and landlords. The Constitutional Movement (1905-11) was a 
turning point in Iranian history in that the landed 
nobility, subordinated by the officialdom, won a decisive 
victory over the officialdom in an uneasy alliance with the 
merchants (Lambton, 1953). This alliance removed the 
officialdom fraction of the power bloc19 from the political 
and economic scene forever. At the political level, 
therefore, the incorporation of the Iranian economy into the 
circuit of merchant capital corresponded with the fusion of 
interests and alliances between the ruling landowning class 
and the merchants. This alliance laid the basis of the 
absolutist state of the 1920s, as shall be discussed in the 
next Chapter.
At this point, it is necessary to discuss the material bases 
of the development of the merchant class. The Iranian 
merchant class was the product of the particular mode of 
socio-economic transformation of Iran following its entry 
into the world market. The processes discussed above, the 
imposition of free trade, expansion of foreign trade, sale 
of crown lands, and cash-crop production, gave rise to a 
class of merchants who, through their links with the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie, accumulated large amounts of 
capital and moved into landownership. The major economic 
activities of this class were foreign and domestic trade, 
collection and export of major cash-crops such as rugs, 
tobacco, opium and cotton, and the import and distribution 
of foreign products. Merchants were also involved in road
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construction, transportation, and communication. Some 
merchants also began to invest in industrial and mining 
projects which, as I shall argue below, characterized the 
particular mode of transformation of the Iranian economy 
under the domination of the circuit of commodity capital. 
Furthermore, in the absence of credit and banking 
institutions, merchants also played a significant role in 
the provision and circulation of funds, and they became the 
major source of loans to landlords, governors, state 
officials and the Court. Some of the merchants accumulated 
considerable wealth and established their representatives in 
Europe, China and India.
Therefore, the specificity of the Iranian merchant class was 
that it was involved in diverse economic activities. But 
what is of particular importance for this study is the 
movement of the merchant class into landownership, and the 
investment in agriculture by this class. As mentioned 
previously, state policies concerning land were amongst the 
most important mechanisms to draw the merchant class into 
landownership. The demands for immediate payment for tuvul 
right and their short-term assignment, as well as the sale 
of crown lands, meant that only individuals in possession of 
liquid funds, such as merchants and moneylenders, or those 
able to obtain cash from those with capital, could enter the 
competition for tuyul rights or purchase of land. State 
policies consequently opened the way for merchants and 
moneylenders to become landowners with investment in land. 
The movement of the merchant class into landownership, 
therefore, was not accidental. While it was logical for the 
financially bankrupt Court to adopt such policies for
165
raising revenue, for the merchant class, too, it was logical 
to seize upon these opportunities as one means of expanding 
their area of activity and capital. At that time land was 
the main area in which the wealth accumulated by the 
merchant class through trade could be invested.
Yet the acquisition of land by merchants was not always 
voluntary. As mentioned before, merchants were the major 
source of provision of loans to landlords and Court 
officials who, despite their considerable assets, were often 
in need of cash and had to turn to merchants for loans. Land 
was consequently put up as collateral for such loans, and in 
cases when landlords could not pay their debts, their land 
would pass into the hands of merchants. Thus the payment of 
loans in the form of land assignment by the bankrupt Court 
deepened the involvement of merchants in agriculture. This 
process gradually transferred the authority of the Court, 
which used to own, theoretically, all the empire's land, to 
a merchant class which became increasingly powerful within 
the social formation at large.
The movement of the merchant class into landownership 
obviously affected the character of the landlord class. 
Previously, a landlord was simply a state official or a 
Court notable. With the merchant class involved in trade, 
tax-farming, landownership and moneylending, these practices 
became interrelated to the extent that merchant, tax-farmer, 
moneylender, and landlord could be the same person. The fact 
that the Iranian landlords were also merchants and state 
officials was a new development in the social structure of 
19th century Iran; and it also explains the flexible and
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often contradictory behaviour of Iranian merchants in the 
class struggle of the early 20th century.
The increasing frustration of the merchant class, caused by 
the foregoing semi-colonial situation, set in motion an 
urban popular movement, known as the Constitutional 
Movement, under the leadership of merchants in 1905-11. In 
the following section, I do not intend to recapitulate the 
narrative of the Constitutional Movement, but to examine its 
material bases, the reasons why merchants and 
petty-commodity producers emerged as the main forces behind 
it, the reasons for its failure, and its conseguences for 
the emergence of the absolutist state of the 1920s.
B. The Constitutional Movement
The most remarkable outcome of the incorporation of the 
Iranian economy into the world market was the emergence of a 
class of merchants who, while expanding and prospering as a 
result of the export of raw materials and the import of 
manufactured goods, were also hurt and frustrated by the 
same process. As both the Russians and the British aimed at 
capturing Iranian markets, the most important element of 
foreign trade was their policies concerning tariff charges 
and transportation of goods. I have previously stressed the 
importance of the imposition of the 5% rate of tariff on 
Russian goods through the Turkamanchai Treaty. In fact 
throughout the 19th century Iranian merchants were 
increasingly affected by the tariff policies and 
transportation taxes of the Russian government, the more 
influential imperialist power. Until the 1890s, most of
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Iran's European imports were transported through Russia, and 
nearly all of Iran's imports passed through the northeastern 
region of Iran bordering Russia. Russia imposed high transit 
tariffs on goods transported through its territory into 
Iran, and forced Iranian merchants to pay high tariff 
charges and taxes on transportation of goods inside Iran 
(Issawi, 1971:92-9, 108-112). Russia's trade policy, which 
was related directly to the industrial expansion of the 
Caucasus, hurt both European and Iranian merchants badly. 
Therefore, although Iranian merchants had enriched 
themselves through export of raw materials and import of 
manufactured goods to Iran, they were also in a precarious 
position because of their lack of control over tariff 
charges. By the 1880s these policies had shattered the near 
monopoly of the market by the Iranian merchants, and had 
frustrated their attempts for further accumulation of 
wealth.
The first protests against Iran's semi-colonial position 
were launched during the last years of Nasir-al-Din Shah's 
reign (1848-1896). In 1884 the merchants, in a plea to the 
Shah, demanded an end to the import of foreign manufactured 
commodities and opposed the 5% rate of tariff on Russian 
goods (Ashraf, 1980). Policies of Nasir-al-Din Shah's Court 
had accentuated the contradictions of the system, manifested 
through closer ties with the imperialists and the increasing 
number of foreign firms and concession hunters arriving in 
Tehran and other major cities. The policies of his 
successor, Muzaffar-al-Din Shah (1896-1906), followed a 
similar pattern. In 1898 the need for liguid assets led 
Muzaffar-al-Din Shah to sell the entire Iranian customs
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(except for the southern customs which were controlled by 
the British) to three Belgian concessioneers who became 
responsible for virtually the whole customs and tariff 
system of the country. The Shah then managed to secure a 
loan of 22.5 million rubles from the Russian government in 
1900, to be paid off through the customs receipts controlled 
by the Belgians. The Belgians had, in turn, established a 
close relationship with the Russian government and expanded 
their control to include the fiscal affairs of the country. 
This brought them into direct confrontation with Iranian 
merchants and artisans, who had been complaining against the 
excessive and illicit demands of Russian traders and Belgian 
officers.
By the last decade of the 19th century the legitimacy of the 
monarchy and the Court had been eroded amongst merchants who 
had found them inaccessible to their demands. This erosion 
of legitimacy was demonstrated by strikes, protest 
demonstrations, bazaar shut-downs and sanctuaries which 
became especially widespread after 1905 when Iran faced a 
severe economic crisis partly resulting from a bad harvest 
in Russia. In 1905, Russia was crippled by revolution and 
defeat in her war with Japan. Given the dependence of the 
Iranian economy on Russian trade, the economic crisis in 
Russia severely affected Iran (Avery, 1965). In response to 
the declining trade and soaring prices, the Court, guided by 
pressing needs for revenue, raised tariffs, postponed 
payment to the local creditors and began harassing merchants 
and accusing them of hoarding.
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The initial strikes and protests developed into a movement 
with clear political and economic demands. Merchants, in 
alliance with the petty-bourgeoisie, the ulama and the 
intelligentsia, were the main force behind the 
Constitutional Movement20. This alliance had found an 
earlier expression in the Tobacco Movement (1898) and these 
classes and social categories had traditionally formed the 
main elements of the power structure in Iran (Keddie,
1971).21 Merchants, who had earlier demanded a 'house of 
justice' and had opposed the 5% rate of tariff on Russian 
goods, now demanded the establishment of a national assembly 
and a national bank which would put an end to the insecurity 
of capital, the arbitrary power of the Court, and 
imperialists' control over the financial system of the 
country. Under the pressure generated by protest 
demonstrations and bazaar shut-downs, Muzaffar-al-Din Shah 
was forced to grant a form of constitution that permitted 
the establishment of a national assembly in 1906.
In this study, the Constitutional Movement is interpreted as 
a basically bourgeois, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal 
movement whose aim was to establish a non-revolutionary, 
liberal and democratic state, that is, the establishment of 
the political superstructure necessary for the safeguarding 
of the institution of private property. The material basis 
of the Movement derived from a generalization of commodity 
relations resulting from the incorporation of the economy 
into the circuit of merchant capital. The main demands made 
by the merchants were all of a bourgeois-democratic nature: 
the abolition of the absolutist power of the Court, the end 
of feudalism, the establishment of a Constitutional
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Assembly, elections, legal codification and legislature, and 
a defence of the national market through ending foreign 
control of the economy. The Movement, however, failed to 
achieve its aim of the establishment of bourgeois liberal 
democracy. This is particularly evident in the second phase 
of the Movement when a Russian-backed coup in 1908 
suppressed the direction of the Movement. This changed the 
nature of class alliances which had marked the early phase 
of the struggle and facilitated the rising power of large 
aristocratic landlords, who had captured a significant share 
of the control of the new executive. The ultimate outcome of 
the Movement was the consolidation of the power of the 
Court, basically representing the landed aristocracy and the 
ulema.
It is necessary to examine three interlinked aspects of the 
Movement in order to substantiate the above argument. The 
first aspect is the nature of the class alliances and class 
struggle, particularly the alliance between the merchant 
class and the petty-bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the 
relationship between the merchants, the landed aristocracy 
and the foreign bourgeoisie on the other. The second is the 
reasons why the Movement failed to achieve its objectives, 
and the third, the character of the power bloc which emerged 
in the aftermath of the Movement.
I have previously mentioned that the landed aristocracy 
formed the power base of the Qajar dynasty. Large landlords, 
we may recall, consisted of individuals who had established 
hereditary feudal domains through the acquisition of early 
tuyul rights. This class was the direct extractor and
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appropriator of surplus from the land and was divided into 
the two fractions of landed aristocracy and officialdom. The 
Qajar Court, consisting of the monarch and its top staff 
(the latter often members of the monarch's family assigned 
as governors), together with large landlords and tribal 
chiefs formed the ruling class of 19th century Iran. They 
obtained their income from tribute and taxes extracted from 
the peasantry and the nomadic population, and from the 
gradual auctioning of the economy to the imperialist powers 
in the form of treaties, concessions, etc. The above 
discussion of the modes of capital penetration into Iran 
shows that the Court and the landed class were in close 
collaboration with foreign capital. Together, they 
transformed the means of production into commodity and 
pressed for higher incomes through tax-farming and 
cash-cropping. Thus the relationship of the Court and the 
landed class with the foreign bourgeoisie can be said to 
have contained no fundamental contradiction. It would, 
however, be erroneous to assume that the Court's sole 
existence depended on its relationship with the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie.
The merchants' relationship with the Court and the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie was of a different nature. This 
relationship was contradictory in that it contained both 
negative and positive aspects. Merchants had expanded and 
prospered as a result of their ties to the foreign 
bourgeoisie. In terms of trade interactions, they shared 
common interests; sale of good was beneficial to both. 
However, foreign capital's control of tariffs was 
contradictory to the merchants' further expansion, and the
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imperialists' control of financial institutions was 
particularly damaging to merchants' interests for it 
effectively prevented the merchants from expanding into an 
industrial bourgeoisie. Therefore, there existed a source of 
conflict between the two classes. It is useful to 
characterize the nature of the relationship between the 
merchants and the foreign bourgeoisie, as well as the 
merchants' relationship with the Iranian landed aristocracy, 
in terms of 'non-antagonistic contradiction'. This point 
requires further explanation.
The Constitutional Movement basically centred around 
merchants' demands for an end to the insecurity of capital 
through the regularization and registration of property 
rights. The precondition of this regularization was a 
thoroughgoing commoditization of the economy and an end to 
the absolutist power of the Court. However, because of the 
specificity of capital accumulation in Iran and the 
particular character of the merchant class, the merchants' 
conflict with the Court and the foreign bourgeoisie was 
logically limited. Commodity relations in Iran were 
introduced from outside? the merchant class was involved in 
agriculture and landownership, and its expansion depended on 
external markets and the requirements of foreign capital. 
These specificities blocked a capitalist transformation of 
the economy and prevented the development of the principal 
antagonistic contradiction of every class society, i.e., the 
contradiction between the exploiting and exploited classes. 
The merchants' contradiction with the landowning class and 
foreign capital was of a 'non-antagonistic' nature, that is, 
the reversal of the subordinate position of the merchant
173
class did not necessitate the total destruction or removal 
of the dominant classes. 2 2  The driving force behind the 
Constitutional Movement was basically this 'non-antagonistic 
contradiction'.
It is only through a precise characterization of the nature 
of the structural relation of the merchant class with other 
classes that we can understand its mode of political 
struggle. The merchant class came into conflict with the 
landed class and the foreign bourgeoisie not because of its 
'freedom-loving', 'nationalistic' and 'progressive' 
character, 2 3  but because it was not receiving a large share 
of the surplus from taxes, feudal dues and trade, and it had 
been deprived of this surplus through the close ties between 
these two classes. Otherwise, as long as the feudalists and 
foreign bourgeoisie were prepared to provide means of 
accumulation through tax-farming and trade, they were not in 
any fundamental conflict with the merchants' interests. All 
those classes had one single interest in common: the 
exploitation of the peasantry, wage-workers and the 
petty-bourgeoisie. The anti-despotic, liberal and 
constitutionalist ideology of the Movement should not 
obscure the fact that the merchants' struggle was not 
exclusively guided by these ideas. Indeed, the 
constitutional monarchy was the superstructural prereguisite 
for the preservation and institutionalization of private 
property and accumulation of wealth by merchants. The 
Iranian merchants were deeply involved in landownership and 
foreign trade; they had more than sufficient grounds to 
settle for a compromise with both the landed class and the 
foreign bourgeoisie. The merchants, therefore, rose not to
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destroy the existing structures but to reform them so that 
they could secure a place within the power bloc and to 
become, ultimately, the hegemonic fraction within it. In 
short, the interests of the merchant class were not in 
fundamental and antagonistic contradiction with either the 
landed class or the metropolitan bourgeoisie.
In most analyses of the Movement, the indigenous bourgeoisie 
is divided into the two factions of 'comprador7 and 
'national' (Ashraf, 1980; Ashraf and Hekmat, 1981;
Bashiriyeh, 1984; Jazani, 1980; Mehrain, 1979). The 
'comprador bourgeoisie' is associated with the merchant 
class whose dependent character is derived from the 
intermediary role it plays between the local market and 
foreign capital. This faction is dependent on the foreign 
bourgeoisie for the continuation of capital accumulation 
and, indeed, for its very existence. The 'national 
bourgeoisie', on the other hand, is associated with the 
direct producers and small traders functioning within the 
local market. It was this progressive faction of the 
indigenous bourgeoisie which remained loyal to the Movement 
and rose against the landed class and the foreign 
bourgeoisie. It was also the only class capable of leading 
Iran towards 'independent capitalist development'.
While the fact that the merchant class expanded through its 
ties with the foreign bourgeoisie, and had vested interests 
in the preservation of these ties, is not disputed, I would 
argue that the distinction between 'comprador' and 
'national' bourgeoisies is both theoretically and 
empirically groundless. This distinction is the outcome of a
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lack of theoretical differentiation between the merchant 
class and the petty-bourgeoisie: yet these are two distinct 
classes related to different circuits of capital.
In the Iranian case, the petty-bourgeoisie mainly comprised 
those sectors of the urban population who were in 
handicraft and cottage industries of the bazaar. They were 
petty-bourgeoisie not because they owned small amounts of 
capital but because they were directly involved in the 
production of commodities, and thus differed from the 
merchants who operated at the level of exchange only. 
Although some of simple-commodity producers did become 
involved in foreign trade, this trend was not dominant. They 
consumed what they produced and sold their surplus on the 
internal market. Some also hired wage-labour, but this was 
the case only in larger workshops where apprentices were 
necessary. The same processes of socio-economic 
transformation of the semi-colonial period, which resulted 
in the expansion of the merchant class, led to the decline 
of the petty-bourgeoisie. It was particularly this class 
which was hit hardest by the imposition of free trade. With 
the large-scale importation of manufactured goods the 
possibility for this class to be transformed into 
wage-labourers was emerging; some of the simple-commodity 
producers were actually dispossessed and formed a part of 
the large-scale migrations to Russia towards the end of the 
19th century. The petty-bourgeoisie, therefore, differed 
sharply from the merchant class in two respects: (i) the 
degree and mode of its involvemerit in th,^  production 
process; (ii) its relationship wi^h foreigp capital.
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These two basic differences explain why the relationship 
between the merchants and the petty-bourgeoisie was 
structurally contradictory and antagonistic. The merchants' 
means of capital accumulation through international trade, 
and their possible transformation into an industrial 
bourgeoisie, were detrimental to the interests of the 
petty-bourgeoisie. Yet, despite contradictory economic 
interests, the petty-bourgeoisie had allied itself with the 
merchant class and the ulama. The reason why this alliance 
collapsed towards the end of the Movement, when merchants 
moved closer to the Court and the landed class, is 
particularly understandable in the light of the activities 
of the petty-bourgeoisie outside the Parliament.
Unlike the merchants, the petty-bourgeoisie had 
traditionally been organised through the guilds, a form of 
occupational/organizational trade union where members of 
different crafts formed different groups. In the early 
stages of the Movement in 1905, aniumans. a form of local 
administrative apparatus or government, had been appearing 
throughout the country. The aniumans were mainly organized 
around the guilds and the petty bourgeoisie, and they 
rapidly expanded in the northern provinces in 1906, where 
the petty-bourgeoisie had gained strength. From the early 
stages of the Movement, control on high taxes and prices, 
and the unchecked exercise of power by the landed class and 
tax-farmers had been a major issue. The functions of the 
aniumans were control over prices of agricultural 
commodities, distribution of output, and tax assignments and 
collection. These organizations were potentially threatening 
to the local landlords and Court representatives, as well as
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to the merchants. This was particularly evident in the 
northern aniumans which were influenced by the Iranian 
Social Democratic Party, a counterpart of the Russian Social 
Democratic Party, and also where some sections of the 
peasantry and urban workers were mobilized through 
instigating attacks on local landlords and introducing new 
programmes for reform in the land tenure system.24
The petty-bourgeoisie became the most politically radical 
class in the Constitutional Movement. It was also the threat 
posed by this class which logically strengthened the 
merchants' alliance with the ulama and even the Court. The 
merchants were totally immersed in the religious 
institutions. The activities of the aniumans. a potentially 
threatening peasantry, and their fundamental economic 
interests in trade and land, both partially safeguarded by 
the Court and foreign capital, brought merchants closer to 
the ulama and the landed class in the Parliament.
The Russian-backed coup d'etat of 1908 helped much in 
further shaping this pattern of alliance and in changing the 
direction of the Movement. From the very beginning Russian 
imperialism had allied itself with the Court and had felt 
threatened by the Parliament, and especially by the northern 
aniumans collaborating with the Russian Social Democrats, in 
1908 Russian troops were sent into northern Iran and the 
Parliament was shelled. The period of 1908-09 is generally 
considered as a period of civil war in Iran which put an end 
to the activities of the Parliament and dissolved the 
aniumans. The ultimate result of the coup was to consolicate 
the pattern of alliance which had already emerged: a closer
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alliance of the merchants, the landed class and the ulama 
through the removal from the political scene of the radical 
elements of the Movement, the petty-bourgeoisie and the 
intelligentsia.
The constitution and the Parliament were the most 
rudimentary foundations of a bourgeois-democratic state. The 
1908 coup terminated the development and routinization of 
both. With the entry of the feudal and tribal chiefs into 
the Movement, and the recognition of the supremacy of the 
institution of the monarch and the Court, both constitution 
and the Parliament became redundant structures. After the 
period of the civil war the power structure had remained 
basically the same: the power of the landed class, merchants 
and the ulama increased at the expense of the dominated 
classes. After the removal of Mohamad Ali Shah in 1 9 0 8 , a 
committee was formed whose social composition showed that 
the Court and the landed class had actually been 
strengthened. The consolidation of the position of feudal 
landlordism is indicated by the fact that the First 
Parliament abolished the practice of tuyul. I have 
previously discussed the division of the Iranian landowning 
class into the two fractions of officialdom and landed 
aristocracy, and shown how the creation of the 'bureaucratic 
landlordism' had constrained and subjugated the old 
nobility. The abolishment of tuyul had a crucial impact on 
the character of the landowning class: it transferred the 
administrative nature of landlordism into the hands of the 
old nobility by firmly establishing the institution of 
private property (Keddie, 1960; Lambton, 1953).
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The failure of the Constitutional Movement to achieve its 
ends can be clearly seen in the changes which occurred in 
the composition of the subsequent Parliament. According to 
the decree of the Constitution and the First Electoral Law, 
the following six social categories/classes were to be 
represented in the Legislative Assembly: (1) princes and
members of Qajar family; (2) officialdom; (3) ulama; (4) 
merchants; (5) guilds; (6) landowners. Thus the rural and 
urban poor were excluded from the Electoral Law altogether. 
The following table shows the percentage of each of these 
social classes and categories in the First Parliament.
Table 1: Social Composition of the First Parliament
No. Percentage
Qajar Princes 8 5%
Officialdom 36 22.3%
Ulama 47 29.2%
Merchants 28 17.4%
Guilds 29 18%
Others 13 8%
TOTAL 161 100%
Source: Ashraf, 1980:119
The sixth category, forming 8% of the total number of 
deputies, was constituted by six large landlords and four 
physicians. The occupation or social class of the last three 
members is not mentioned but it can be assumed that they 
were also large landowners. Considering that the Qajar 
princes were also large landowners, the total percentage of
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the landed class, added to that of the 'officialdom', would 
constitute over 27% of the deputies. In the course of the 
next few parliaments, the guilds (petty-bourgeoisie) totally 
disappeared from the scene and the percentage of merchants 
decreased to less than 10% (Ashraf, 1980:119). These figures 
show that the Parliament came to be dominated by the 
landowning class and the ulama; landownership remained the 
material base of power, and religion its ideological 
justification. The ulama. indeed, gained enormous power; 
they were given veto power over all legislation. The 
constitution prevented the major contender for state power, 
the merchants, from rising to dominance but they did secure 
a subordinate position within the power bloc. A peculiar 
class with one foot in trade and another in land, the 
merchants had won a lukewarm victory and they settled for a 
compromise with the Court and the feudalists. In a sense, 
they had achieved their 'constitution'.26
The above discussion of the nature of class alliances of the 
Constitutional Movement also indicates the reason why the 
Movement failed to achieve its ends. The merchant class 
failed to establish a bourgeois-democratic state; and to 
become the hegemonic fraction of the power bloc, because of 
the non-antagonistic nature of its contradiction with the 
dominant classes. The Constitutional Movement occurred at a 
time when an industrial bourgeoisie was absent; and 
objective conditions were not favourable to the 
transformation of the absolutist rule of the feudal class to 
bourgeois-liberal democracy. The merchant class, as I have 
stressed repeatedly, was a specific class whose involvement 
in landownership and its dependence on colonial powers
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prevented the development of an antagonistic contradiction 
with the landowning class and the foreign bourgeoisie. Its 
alliance with the petty-bourgeoisie was also uneasy and 
structurally contradictory, which partly explains the 
absence of the dominated classes in the Movement. Although 
the Constitutional Movement was formed as a result of the 
conflict of Iranian merchants with the Court and their 
imperialist protectors, and despite the growing resentment 
of the merchants and the petty-bourgeoisie towards the 
arbitrary exercise of power by the Court, a bourgeois 
democracy failed to materialize in Iran because of the 
semi-colonial situation and the weakness and immaturity of 
merchants as a class. Such structural characteristics are 
typical of this phase of capital accumulation in the 
periphery where domination of the social formation by 
merchant capital blocked the organic transformation of 
petty-commodity producers to capitalist producers. This 
particular mode of socio-economic transformation under the 
domination of merchant capital shall be elaborated below.
C. The Two Paths of Capitalist Transformation
I have argued that among the most important consequences of 
the integration of the Iranian economy with the world market 
were the consolidation of precapitalist production 
relations, the sway of merchant capital over production 
processes, and the subsequent blockage of an organic 
transition from petty-commodity to capitalist production.
These developments are compatible with the dynamics of the 
internationalization of merchant capital, and can be
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directly related to Marx's distinction (Capital. Vol.III, 
Chapter XX) between the 'two paths' of transition to 
capitalism, discussed in detail in Chapter Two of this 
study. To recapitulate, the 'first path' is that of the 
direct-producer/capitalist, 'the truly revolutionary path', 
and the 'second path' is that of merchant/capitalist, which, 
by itself, is incapable of transforming the existing 
structures. The present discussion of 19th century Iran 
provides sufficient evidence that it was the 'second path' 
of transition to capitalism which was experienced in Iran. 
The semi-colonial situation resulted in the merchant class 
establishing 'direct sway over production process'. Indeed, 
the available evidence suggests that, while petty-commodity 
production declined and some direct producers were 
dispossessed, the merchant class actually attempted to move 
into industrial production. In the last guarter of the 19th 
century, for the first time in Iranian economic history, a 
number of merchants invested their capital in industrial and 
banking corporations. This capital investment included the 
establishment of a silk-cord factory in the northern 
province of Gilan in 1885, rope-processing plant in Tabriz 
in 1894, a tea-processing factory with the machinery 
imported from Russia, and a large-scale project for iron 
extraction and road construction in the northern province of 
Mazandaran in 1894 (Ashraf, 1980:84-5). There was also some 
capital investment by Russian and British bourgeoisie in the 
period after the Constitutional Movement. It is estimated 
that some 60 small and medium sized factories were 
established during the first two decades of the 20th century 
through capital investment by Iranian merchants and British 
and Russian bourgeoisie. The major capital investment of
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this period was in the oil industry owned by the British, 
employing 7,000 workers; the fisheries in the Caspian Sea 
owned by the Russians, employing some 4,200 workers; in the 
forestry and lumber industry, with 300 workers, and in 
railroad construction in the north with 200 workers, both 
established by the Russians (Ashraf and Hekmat, 1981:738).
This investment of capital in industry by the merchant class 
indicates the specific pattern of transition to capitalism 
in Iran. However, the merchants' attempt to transform 
themselves into an industrial bourgeoisie failed under the 
conditions of semi-colonial domination.22 Their enterprises 
could not withstand the competition of European manufactured 
goods and were eventually closed down. Evidence suggests 
that only those factories which specialized in production of 
agricultural raw materials, such as cotton processing 
plants, were successful; while those competing with foreign 
capital, such as the textile industry, went bankrupt.
In this study, I have identified the domination of the 
merchant capital, as an 'agent' of the expanding industrial 
capitalism of the centre, over production processes as the 
major obstacle to capitalist transformation of 19th century 
Iran. Under the semi-colonial situation, the movement of the 
merchant class into landownership and cash-crop production 
for external markets was a major obstacle to the 
transformation of production relations and the development 
of productive forces, and, simultaneously, it was a logical 
and inevitable outcome of the commoditization of the economy 
on a precapitalist basis. One can make the simple comparison 
that while in Europe primitive accumulation of capital was
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accomplished through internal forces of the market, greatly 
promoted by the colonization of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, in Iran this process was introduced as a process 
predominantly external to the social formation. The process 
took the form of wars, military defeats and 
inter-imperialist rivalry, which imposed commercial 
capitulations, free trade and 'open door' policies. These 
developments paved the way for the expansion of the merchant 
and landowning classes whose domination of the economy 
suppressed the organic transformation to capitalism. In 
Tudor England, land closures drove the peasants off the land 
and played a crucial part in the creation of 'free' labour. 
In Iran, incorporation into the circuit of merchant capital 
left its contradictory impact on the whole process. On the 
one hand, heavy taxes, costly dues, land confiscations, 
peasant indebtedness, cash-cropping for export, and a 
sequence of droughts and famines drove some of the peasants 
off the land, and in this sense laid the preliminary basis 
for the establishment of the CMP. On the other hand, the 
same developments suppressed the transformation of the mass 
of the peasantry into an industrial labour force; and of the 
petty-bourgeoisie into capitalist producers. The sway of 
merchant capital and fuedal landlordism was the main 
obstacle to capitalist transformation of Iran but, in 
itself, this obstacle was only an 'effect' of the 
internationalisation of merchant capital.
Internationalisation of merchant capital gave rise to a 
number of tendencies such as the consolidation of private 
property in land, the concentration of the means of 
production, the commoditization of agriculture, and, on the
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whole, the strengthening of precapitalist production 
relations. These transformations were significant for the 
nature of class alliances prior to the emergence of the 
absolutist state of the 1920s. I have interpreted the 
Constitutional Movement as the outcome of the 
commoditization of the economy and the concomitant expansion 
of a merchant class which prospered but was simultaneously 
suppressed through its ties to foreign capital. Its attempt 
to capture the apparatus of the state and to establish a 
bourgeois-liberal democracy failed due to its peculiarities 
as a class, and the non-antagonistic nature of its 
contradiction with the Iranian landed aristocracy and 
foreign bourgeoisie. The complementary and yet contradictory 
interests of Russian and British bourgeoisie and the 
indigenous ruling class were channelled through the Iranian 
state, which acted as distributor of surplus amongst these 
classes. The core of the struggle was over this surplus.
As a result of the semi-colonial domination, the 'second 
path' of capitalist transformation was experienced in Iran. 
The merchants' attempt to transform themselves into an 
industrial bourgeoisie was, however, frustrated due to the 
domination of the economy by the Iranian landowning class 
and foreign capital. In its characteristically peripheral 
context, the real pressure had to come from the state for 
the CMP to become dominant, a development which was delayed 
until the second half of the 20th century. By the beginning 
of the 20th century, however, a peripheral economy had been 
born, fully integrated with the world market via the export 
of agricultural raw materials and the import of manufactured 
goods. The peripheral position of the Iranian economy within
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the capitalist world market was strengthened by the 
absolutist state which emerged in the aftermath of the 1921 
coup d'etat. This will be examined in the next Chapter.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. My emphasis is on the pattern of historical evolution and consolidation of precapitalist private landed property rather than on the exact character of the ground rent. The latter aspect will be fully discussed in Chapter Six.
2. See Introduction for a discussion of the choice of the period under consideration.
3. See Chapter Two, Sections B and C for a theoretical discussion of this periodization.
4. See Gallagher and Robinson (1953) for the concept of the 'imperialism of free trade', and Chapter Two, Section C for a discussion of this concept.
5. The following discussion of the initial stages of metropolitan capital penetration into Iran is very brief and is drawn from Curzon (1969) and Kazemzadeh (1968) which provide details of the period.
6. See Keddie (1966) for a detailed discussion of this movement.
7. For a discussion of the various interpretations of precapitalist Iran, see: Foran (1988).
8. See Chapter One for a discussion of these traditions as colonial disciplines and the context of their formation.
9. Other structural features outlined above, that is, the questions of juridical serfdom and hereditary nobility, weakness of labour services and the consequent form of labour exploitation through appropriation of surplus in money or in kind, and the 'despotic' form of political rule, are also important for a thorough characterization of precapitalist Iran. Although lack of space does not allow me to deal with these issues, the following discussion implies a position compatible with those of Nomani (1976-1977), Petrushevsky (1968) and Shaugannik (1985). They characterize precapitalist Iran as a feudal system which, although possessing a number of specificities, did not in essence differ from European feudalism. Nomani, in particular, is an important source. Against the prevailing Orientalist interpretations of Iran, his analysis shows the existence and consolidation of private landed property, feudal servile obligations and peasants' legal attachment to the soil. See also the critique developed by Turner (1984, chapter five) against the usefulness of the concept of Oriental despotism 
in relation to Iran.
10. For details of the nature of fiscal crisis, see Lambton (1970). Avery and Simmons (1970) also discuss various attempts by the Qarjars to deal with this crisis, such as debasement of the currency in the late 19th century.
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11. For a more detailed account of different forms of tuyul. see Lambton (1953). The brief account of the tuyul system in this study is largely drawn from the above work.
12. See Moghadam (1988a) for a characterization of tribes in these terms, particularly her argument that while surplus extraction in settled agriculture took the 'peaceful' form of sharecropping, in nomadic societies surplus was extracted 
through violence and plunder. Her general conclusion is that the cyclical reproduction of nomadic dynasties caused the "persistence of despotism, the arrest in the development of private property in land, the absence of social classes, and the self-reproducing character of the Iranian socio-economic system" (ibid:409). Criticisms of Orientalism have been particularly difficult and ineffective because Marxism shares some of its central assumptions, making it possible to operate within both discourses without being necessarily contradictory or inconsistent. Moghadam's work is a good example of this possibility. For a critique of the Chayanovian view of tribes and its relationship with functional anthropology, see Asad (1978).
13. Asad, for example, has argued against the prevalent assumption that tribes in the Middle East constituted a formidable military force. See his 'The Beduin as a Military Force' in C.Nelson (ed), The Desert and the Sown. Berkeley, 1973 .
14. For an attempt to characterize the 'nomadic mode of production', see the chapter 'The Nomadic Brake' in Perry Anderson's Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London,1974. For a critique of this concept see Asad (1978) and Turner (1984).
15. See also Ashraf and Hekmat (1981) who recognize the uneven and unsystematic character of primitive accumulation in Iran by arguing that the development of an industrial bourgeoisie lagged behind the growth of wage labour.
16. The system of sharecropping will be discussed in Chapter Six on the land reform.
17. I am indebted to Ashraf (1970), Lambton (1953),Minorsky (1943) and Vali (1980) for the following discussion of the landowning class.
18. The concept of class fraction employed in this study refers to an internal structural differentiation within a social class. Class fractions are defined as those ensembles which are related to different instances of economic 
practice, involving "different forms of labour power and means of production, and different ways of combining these" 
(Post, 1978:84). According to this definition, all class fractions are located at the level of production relations, 
that is, they represent a specific type of relation to the process of production and a specific mechanism of appropriation or surplus labour. Within the capitalist class, for example, we can distinguish between industrial, mercantile, financial and agrarian class fractions.
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19. The concept of power bloc has been developed by Nicos 
Poulantzas (1973) who defines it as "the particular contradictory unity of the politically dominant classes as related to a particular form of capitalist state"(ibid:234). Post (1978:61-2) identifies three important aspects of a power bloc. First is its composition. A power bloc may be formed in essence by one ruling class, containing various fractions with interests of their own; or it may contain elements of more than one class. The second important aspect is the existence within the power bloc of a hegemonic or dominant element which could be a class or class fraction. The third aspect is the exact form of the articulation between the power bloc and state apparatuses. This articulation may take the form of a parliamentary party system, or military rule by a junta, or constitutional monarchy, or a variety of other forms. In short, the term 'power bloc' refers to a situation in which state power is held by an alliance of dominant classes and class fractions, whose interests are complementary and contradictory at the same time. This alliance could also characterize a precapitalist state as no state power is monopolized by a 
single class or class fraction.
20. It is beyond the scope and concern of this study to discuss the role of the ulama and the roots of their power in 19th century Iran. For a discussion of these issues see Algar (1969) and Keddie (1971). For a discussion of the intelligentsia in 19th century Iran, see Abrahamian (1976).
21. I have defined the ulama and the intelligentsia not as classes but as 'social categories', a concept developed by Poulantzas (1975) who defines it as those "social ensembles ... which may become social forces whose distinguishing feature is based on their specific and over-determining relation to structures other than economic one" (ibid:84). According to Poulantzas (1975) a social category is defined on the basis of its relationship to non-economic instances 
and, therefore, does not, a priori, relate to the class origins of its members. It is, however, important to determine the class origins of the members of social categories involved in the division of labour at cognitive and political levels. Theoretically, a social category could be formed by individuals from diverse class origins, although this is determined by the level of the development 
of the society in question.
22. The concepts of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradicitions are developed by Post (1978:25-30) who bases his argument on Mao Tse-Tung's essay On Contradictions. Very briefly, from a Marxist point of view, the structures of social relations are characterized by contradictions which are mutually interdependent and contain both positive and 
negative aspects. The contradictions between those structures which have the potential for self-destruction are 
termed antagonistic. These are contradictions in the social relations of production of any class society. Non-antagonistic contradictions, on the other hand, exist within cognitive, political and ideological structures which relate only indirectly to the social relations of production. Non-antagonistic contradictions do not
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necessitate the abolitition of the dominant structures, but only partial changes in the conditions of their existence. These contradictions, for instance, characterize the relationship between various fractions of a single class.The contradiction between merchant class, on the one hand, and the landlords and foreign bourgeoisie, on the other, was not limited to ideological and political level; rather, it reflected a struggle over the distribution of the surplus. I have, however, defined it as a non-antagonistic contradiction because the primary social relations of exploitation were not operating between these classes. In this sense, the reversal of the position of merchants did 
not necessitate the destruction of the existing social relations of production.
23. See, for example, Mu'mini's (1977) characterization of the merchant class in these terms.
24. For details concerning the alliance of the aniumans with the petty-bourgeoisie, and the debates within the aniumans about the possibility of a socialist revolution in Iran, see Abrahamian (1982), Mehrain (1979) and Zabih (1966) .
25. Mohamad Ali Shah, who had ascended to the throne in 1907, fled to Russia after the 1908 coup d'etat.
26. Mehrain's (1979) work represents a detailed and similar analysis of the Consitutional Movement, although its attempts at class analysis contain a certain amount of conceptual unclarity, leading to an implicit identification of merchant capital with the development of capitalism in 19th century Iran. This work also represents another example of the apparent compatibility of Marxist and Orientalist discourses, as mentioned previously in note 12.
27. This is compatible with Soudagar's (1980) argument who discusses the attempts made by merchants to invest in industrial enterprises, and the failure of this class to transform itself into an industrial bourgeoisie due to the semi-colonial condition of Iran. Soudagar argues that "although accelerating the dissolution of feudalism, accumulation and concentration of merchant capital, in the second half of the 19th century, could not bring about the dissolution of feudalism on its own" (ibid:213). This is in line with the present analysis; as I have argued repeatedly throughout this Chapter, neither landownership nor accumulation of profit at the level of exchange by merchant 
capital can provide sufficient bases for the capitalist transformation of the economy. Soudagar makes a precisely similar point. Furthermore, Soudagar argues that the transformation of merchants into capitalist producers did 
not materialize in the 19th century due to the general economic insecurity and the inability of the Court to protect capital; which further reinforced merchants' dependency on foreign capital (ibid:212-3). This is also in line with the characterization of merchants' relationship 
with both the landowning class and the foreign bourgeoisie in terms of non-antagonistic contradiction; which has been 
seen as a major factor inhibiting the transformation of
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merchants into an industrial bourgeoisie. Lambton's (1971b) discussion of the case of Haji Abd-al Karim, a powerful and wealthy merchant in mid-19th century Iran, also confirms the 
present discussion. She discusses how Haji Abd-al Karim's dispute with the Court over a loan he had provided had led him to seek British support and protection through assuming British citizenship. This case is an example of the contradictory structural position of merchants, who were dependent on the imperialist powers for the continuation of capital accumulation and were simultaneously frustrated by this dependency and the internal antagonism with the Court and the landowning class.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MERCHANT CAPITAL 
AND GENERALIZATION OF COMMODITY PRODUCTION: 1911-1941
The purpose of this Chapter is to analyze the 
internationalization of merchant capital in Iran under the 
auspices of the peripheral state which emerged after the 
1921 coup d'etat.
In order to better understand the role of the Iranian state 
in the process of the internationalization of merchant 
capital, this Chapter begins with a few remarks on the 
characteristic features of the state in the periphery and 
the factors which foster its relative autonomy. The second 
Section of this Chapter focuses on the socio-economic 
fragmentation of Iran following the First World War. This 
fragmentation is seen as the long-run consequence of the 
semi-colonial position of Iran in the capitalist world 
market during the 19th century, and the failure of the 
Constitutional Movement to establish a bourgeois-liberal 
state.
The principal argument of this Chapter is that until the 
second half of the 20th century Iran remained a basically 
precapitalist country, incorporated into the world market 
via the circuit of merchant capital. This argument is 
developed in the third Section where the role of the state 
in the generalization of commodity relations is examined.
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Reza Shah's state is seen as the first centralized state in 
Iranian history which intervened in the economy in order to 
regulate and generalize production of agricultural raw 
materials for the world market. Although fundamentally 
precapitalist, the state laid the foundation for future 
capitalization of the economy through its infrastructural 
reforms and the rudimentary separation between economic and 
political power which these reforms initiated. In discussing 
Reza Shah's state, I have attempted specifically to place it 
in the context of the characterization of peripheral states 
outlined at the beginning of this Chapter.
A. State in Peripheral Formations
In Chapter Two, a number of distinctive features of 
peripheral economies were identified. It was argued that the 
internationalization of each circuit of capital has led to 
increasing integration of peripheral economies as integral 
components of the social process of reproduction in the 
centre; that these economies are characterized by structural 
heterogeneity (persistence of noncapitalist forms of 
production); and that at each phase of the
internationalization of capital the nature of the commodity 
produced in the periphery plays a significant role in the 
mode of its integration into the world market. These 
features of peripheral capital accumulation directly affect 
the character of the state in the periphery and suggest that 
the process of the formation of the peripheral state 
fundamentally differs from that of the metropole. Peripheral 
states embody specific contradictions and reguire a 
conceptualization different from that of the state in
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advanced capitalist countries.
One of the major contradictions of the peripheral states is 
that the centre of gravity of capital accumulation is 
situated outside their national territory. This is to say, 
the peripheral states lack an economic basis congruent with 
their national territory, or there is a lack of 
correspondence between national/political and economic 
spheres. The absence or weakness of a reproductive sector in 
the peripheral economies means that the boundaries of the 
economic (world market) and the political (nation-state) 
structures do not coincide in peripheral formations. While 
in the metropolitan capitalist societies the process of 
capital accumulation is self-centred, and thus political 
conflicts tend to arise from the basic contradiction of 
capitalism (i.e. the increasing socialization of labour as 
against private appropriation of surplus-value), class 
struggle in the periphery is determined and influenced by 
contradictions originating in the specific character of 
their integration into the world market (Hein, 1980; Ziemann 
et al., 1977) .
It is these specific conditions of capital accumulation in 
the periphery which give rise to, and foster, the relative 
autonomy of the state. Alavi's (1972) analysis of the 
post-colonial state has been particularly influential in 
relation to the guestion of the relative autonomy of the 
state in the periphery. He argues that in contrast to the 
state in advanced capitalist societies, post-colonial state 
is not the instrument of one single class but represents 
multiple class interests. Drawing on the examples of
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Pakistan and Bangladesh, he shows that in the post-colonial 
period the state represented the interests of three 
propertied classes; the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the 
indigenous bourgeoisie, and the landed class. Since none of 
these classes can exclusively dominate the state 
apparatuses, or subordinate the other two, the state plays a 
conciliatory role in maintaining the balance of power, and, 
in doing so, assumes a relative autonomy from these classes. 
Moreover, at the time of independence, the post-colonial 
state 'inherits' a superstructure constituted by a 
bureaucratic-military oligarchy, which is 'overdeveloped' in 
relation to the economic base of the post-colonial society. 
This particular disjuncture in base/superstructure increases 
the relative autonomy of the post-colonial state. The 
bureaucratic-military oligarchy, then, through the direct 
appropriation and distribution of the economic surplus, 
achieves a certain 'centrality' and relative autonomy in 
relation to all other classes, and, by implication, becomes 
the central force of the post-colonial society.
Alavi's thesis of the post-colonial state has been followed 
by a debate which need not be repeated here1. While the 
theses of 'overdeveloped' and 'central' post-colonial state 
have been strongly criticised (Leys, 1976; Ziemann et al., 
1977), the questions of the multiple class character of the 
state and the heterogeneity of production relations remain 
important issues for understanding the peripheral state's 
relative autonomy. While in advanced capitalist societies 
private commodity production and the fractionalization of 
the economic interests of the ruling class form the real
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basis of state autonomy, in peripheral societies this 
tendency is reinforced by the underdeveloped class structure 
and the heterogeneous production relations. Therefore, 
structural heterogeneity, particularization of the interests 
of the ruling class and the weakness of the bourgeoisie are 
the principal causes of the relative autonomy of the state 
in the periphery (Thomas, 1984).
The characteristic features of peripheral economies also 
reinforce the need for an active state interventionist 
policy. The binding to the world market, the contradictory 
and incoherent societal reproduction, and the need to 
promote the process of capital accumulation in the absence 
of a strong bourgeoisie make it a sine qua non for the 
peripheral state to intervene and invest in the production 
processes. In other words, the need for an active and 
permanent state intervention in the periphery is 
structurally rooted in the disruption of the peripheral 
economic structure and the relatively stagnant expanded 
reproduction process. In this sense, peripheral states own 
more productive forces and are more directly involved in the 
appropriation of economic surplus than states in advanced 
capitalist societies.
Considerable attention has been focused on the state 
bureaucracy as another source of the relative autonomy of 
the state.2 The rapid growth of the bureaucracy is the 
necessary outcome of the growing complexity of the division 
of labour. The competitive nature of capital and the 
antagonism amongst fractions of the capitalist class render 
the direct operation of state apparatuses by this class
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difficult, and make it necessary to create a body of 
bureaucrats. The formation and growth of the state 
bureaucracy brings about an institutional change in the 
structure of the state by separating the state from the 
ruling class and the civil society at large; and is thus a 
factor in promoting the relative autonomy of the state. It 
must be emphasized, however, that the state bureaucracy 
neither constitutes a class on its own nor can the class 
character of the state be determined by the 'petty- 
bourgeois' origins of the functionaries of state 
apparatuses.3
To sum up, I have argued that characterization of the 
peripheral state must begin with placing the state in the 
context of the world market. The sources of the relative 
autonomy of the peripheral state lie in the absence of a 
reproductive sector, and the weakness of an indigenous 
bourgeoisie which make state intervention in the 
accumulation process necessary. The structural heterogeneity 
of peripheral economies, the particular character of the 
commodity which links these economies to the world market, 
and the rapid growth of the state bureaucracy also foster 
the relative autonomy of the peripheral state. Moreover, as 
Thomas (1984) has argued, the economic functions of the 
peripheral state (particularly in the post-colonial period) 
are necessarily contradictory in the sense that while the 
state's struggle to create a national arena in the world 
economy appears anti-imperialist, this struggle results in 
the reproduction of world market conditions within the 
national economy for the benefit of the indigenous dominant 
class. For example, foreign capital may be attacked (through
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nationalization, demands for higher prices of primary 
products, criticisms of insufficient aid and technological 
assistance) in order to strengthen indigenous capital 
(through tariff policies, foreign trade control, suppression 
of trade unions). The state therefore must win a relative 
autonomy from the interests of the dominant class in order 
to pursue its economic functions. The main economic function 
of the state, however, remains that of securing the 
conditions of capital accumulation and reproduction of the 
basic class relations of the society.
I have briefly outlined the specific factors fostering 
relative autonomy of the peripheral state - some also common 
to states in advanced capitalist societies - in order to 
better understand the reasons why the peripheral state 
assumes an apparently more 'central' role and is able to 
adopt active interventionist policies. In the case of the 
peripheral absolutist state in Iran in the 1920s and 1930s 
almost all these factors were present. They endowed the 
state with a relative autonomy from the ruling landowning 
class, enabling it to pursue reforming policies which led to 
a rudimentary separation of economic and political power.
B. Socio-Political Fragmentation: 1911-1921
The period of 1911-1921, covering the years after the 
collapse of the Constitutional Movement to the emergence of 
the Pahlavi state, is a distinct phase in Iranian political 
history. This period was marked by the absence of a power 
bloc, the collapse of the institution of the parliament, and 
the consequent fragmentation of the power structure and
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radicalization of various political forces. The main 
external events which created a new phase of political 
crisis were the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution 
in Russia. Iran, having been a semi-colony of both Britain 
and Russia, was deeply affected by these events.
During the First World War Iran was invaded by British, 
Soviet, German and Turkish troops. The Ottoman Empire, 
allied with Germany, invaded Iran in 1915 in order to push 
back the Russian troops who had been stationed in the north 
since 1911. While Russian forces were fighting Turkish 
troops in the north, the British occupied the south and 
formed an army called the South Persian Rifles, an 
eguivalent to the Russian-organized Cossack Brigade in the 
north (Keddie, 1981:79-80). With the country turning into a 
battlefield for these invading forces, the central 
government collapsed. The parliament had already been 
dissolved, following Russian military invasion, in 1911. The 
collapse of the government and the parliament removed the 
Constitutional Movement's final possibilities for the 
establishment of a state. During the next decade, both the 
Constitution and the parliament remained inactive. The only 
political institution which continued to function during 
this period was the cabinet, which existed as one of the 
many equally strong centres of power. Decline in the power 
of the executive and the Court, accompanied by the abolition 
of the parliament and the physical presence of foreign 
troops in the country, strengthened some feudal landlords 
and tribal chiefs, enabling them to establish strong and 
autonomous domains in various parts of the country. The 
decade of 1911-1921 was therefore a period of severe
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disintegration of socio-economic structures, when Iran 
appeared on the verge of collapse and annexation. The 
imperialist powers played a major role in intensifying 
fragmentation of the system by promoting ethnic, regional, 
and tribal conflicts. Each group, tribe or class fraction 
identified itself with either Russian or British forces, 
seeking to establish independent or autonomous states.
Despite their wartime alliance against Germany, Russia and 
Britain remained in constant competition in Iran. They 
continued to adopt policies which were determined by their 
own economic interests as well as designed to prevent the 
other's territorial expansion. In the previous Chapter, I 
have discussed the impact of the divided and competitive 
character of imperialist domination on the political and 
economic transformation of Iran in the 19th century. During 
the war, this competing and divided foreign capital could 
not provide a substitute for the abolished parliament and 
the weakened central government, so Iran in this period was 
a country without a central government or a single power 
bloc.
The inter-imperialist rivalry was abruptly terminated in 
1917 when the victory of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia 
and the approaching end of the First World War set off a new 
pattern of imperialist domination and a new wave of 
political crisis. In January 1918, the USSR removed all 
Tzarist privileges, concessions and treaties with Iran. The 
departure of Tzarist Russia from Iran meant that British 
imperialism could now dominate Iran single-handedly and with 
relative ease. However, Iran had proved to be rich in an 
important raw material: oil. It has been mentioned before
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that through the D'Arcy concession Britain had acquired 
total control of the southern oil fields in 1901. The 
discovery of oil in 1908 had increased Britain's interest in 
Iran, and by the second decade of the 20th century Iran 
moved into a new pattern of relationship with the capitalist 
world market. This new relationship was characterized by 
Iran's domination by a single imperialist power, and its new 
function within the international system, that is, 
production and export of oil. The significance of this 
commodity for the industrial expansion of Britain had been 
demonstrated by its importance in the First World War when 
the British navy had switched from using coal to oil.'3’
Britain's interests in Iran were not limited to the oil 
industry. After the war, British policy in Iran turned 
towards the creation of a neo-colonial peripheral state that 
would retain Britain's domination over Iran and protect its 
interests. This policy is partly evident in the Anglo- 
Persian Pact of 1919. Under the Pact, the British offered 
loans, administrative and financial assistance for a total 
reform of the entire administrative apparatus of the state 
including customs, taxation and the treasury. Other 
proposals included a low tariff for British commodities, the 
creation of a national army and programmes for building 
infrastructure such as extensive plans for road construction 
(Avery, 1965:203-5).
The Anglo-Persian Pact sparked a new wave of nation-wide 
political struggle and crisis in Iran more severe than that 
during the Constitutional Movement. From the date of the
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introduction of the Pact in 1919 until the middle of 1922, 
Iran experienced such an intense political struggle between 
various classes and political groups that the country 
appeared on the verge of annexation and division into 
separate republics. The political crisis, begun by the 
Constitutional Movement, had not only remained unresolved by 
the end of the First World War but had actually escalated 
during and after the war.
The decentralization and fragmentation of the Iranian polity 
was evidenced by the formation of five autonomous provinces 
in the south, two independent republics of Gilan and 
Mazandaran in the north, and the autonomous republic of 
Azarbaijan by 1920.5 This decentralization was the long-term 
consequence of the failure of the Constitutional Movement to 
establish a bourgeois-democratic state. The failure of the 
Movement, I have argued, was due to the nature of the 
parliament which failed to dominate the old executive, the 
monarchy, and its ideological base, the ulama. This failure, 
in turn, derived from the particular mode of socio-economic 
transformation of 19th century Iran. The class which aimed 
to establish a bourgeois-democratic state was itself the 
outcome of the semi-colonial situation: it was not an 
industrial capitalist class proper but a merchant class with 
contradictory class interests and alliances. The 
socio-political fragmentation, chaos and crisis of the war 
years were the legacy of the semi-colonial position of Iran 
in the world economy. During the last two years of the 
crisis, inter-tribal, rural-tribal and military 
confrontations became the order of the day. A form of 
political stalemate had developed since the central
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government was unable to suppress autonomy-seeking movements 
and the latter were not strong enough to capture Tehran.
Only the use of force seemed to offer an alternative to the 
existing situation. This alternative was provided by the 
British: they succeeded in staging a coup d' etat in 
February 1921. The commander of the military division that 
launched the coup was Reza Khan, a colonel of the Cossack 
Brigade. In 1925 he declared himself the first king of the 
Pahlavi dynasty.
C. Absolutist Peripheral State and Generalization of 
Commodity Relations: 1921-1941
In this Section, it will be argued that Reza Shah's state 
was the first centralized state in Iranian history which was 
committed to a systematic generalization of commodity 
relations. The state's commitment to centralization and 
political unification of the country, its anti-tribal, 
secular, and developmentalist ideology, and the reforms it 
instituted, separated political power from economic power in 
a rudimentary fashion. This separation was the necessary 
basis for the expansion of commodity production and market 
relations, but it should not be identified with the 
capitalist character of the state at this stage of Iranian 
history. Basically, the class character of a state is 
derived from the nature of dominant production relations.
The policies adopted by the state and the way in which it 
intervenes in the economy are also indicative of its class 
character. An examination of these areas, as presented 
below, suggests that Reza Shah's state was not capitalist; 
it was a predominantly precapitalist state representing the
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interests of the landowning and merchant classes. Although 
the state's intervention in the economy and its 
infrastructural reform programmes failed to generate a 
transition to capitalist production relations, it will be 
argued that they did lead to the generalization of commodity 
production, and to a deeper integration of the Iranian 
economy into the world market via the circuit of merchant 
capital. The direction of state's reforms and intervention 
was unmistakable: increasing commoditization and 
specialization in exchange laid the basis for future 
transition to the internationalization of money capital.6
While little economic changes took place in the period of 
1911-1925, except for the increase in the production of oil 
in the British-owned oil industry, the two decades of the 
1930s and 1940s are marked by the state's direct 
intervention in the economy and its emergence as the central 
instrument of capital accumulation. Obviously, the first 
goal of the state was political unification and the 
establishment of relative stability. By 1925, all forms of 
political opposition, including tribal revolts and 
autonomist movements, had been crushed (Keddie, 1981:91); 
and Reza Shah had moved to establish absolute control over 
the political system. A degree of political stability had 
been achieved which enabled the state to begin its reform 
programmes. In the period of 1925-30, the state instituted a 
series of reforms which were basically infrastructural in 
nature. They were aimed at centralization and expansion of 
the administrative, educational, judicial and transportation 
systems. From 1930 onwards, however, the state moved to
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directly influence the economy through capital investment in 
manufacturing industry and control over foreign trade.
There are no comprehensive statistical data on the structure 
of the economy for the period 1925-30. The existing data on 
state expenditure, however, suggest the centrality of 
infrastructural programmes during this period. The 
centralization of the army and the bureaucracy was 
particularly a major concern; these institutions accounted 
for the bulk of state expenditure. A conscription law, with 
universal service, was enacted in 1926, and military 
expenses were for a time the largest budget item (Keddie, 
1981:94). Roughly within the period of 1928-33, Ministries 
of War, Finance and Interior received 70% of state 
allocations, with the Ministry of War receiving 40% to 50% 
of the total budget (Katouzian, 1981:114; Keddie, 1981:98). 
The military continued to receive between 30% to 35% of the 
state budget throughout the late 1930s (Bharier, 1971:64). 
Other areas of state expenditure were post and 
telecommunication and education which, within the 1928-33 
period, received 6.2% and 6.8% of state budget respectively. 
Later, in the 1940s, on average about 4% of state 
expenditure went to education. Education expenses rose from 
£100,000 in 1925 to £3 million in 1940 (Banani, 1961:108; 
Elwell-Sutton, 1941:142; Katouzian, 1981:114).
But the major area of state expenditure was transportation. 
The construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway started in 
1927 and was completed in 1938. Linking the Caspian Sea to 
the Persian Gulf, it covered 1,394 Kilometres of railway 
(Ashraf, 1970:329; Katouzian, 1981:115). Apart from the
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railway project, the state also made considerable investment 
in extending ordinary roads. The Ministry of Roads was 
established in 1930, and road construction activities 
expanded the carriage road from 1,286 miles in 1921 to 
16,000 in 1938 (Ashraf, 1970:330). Officially, Iran's roads 
were stated to total 24,000 Kilometres by 1938 (Issawi, 
1971:375) .
State expenditure in infrastructural projects was made 
possible by customs revenues, oil royalties, sale of state 
lands, and revenues from state monopolies on foreign trade. 
But, seemingly, the most important source of state revenues 
in the 1930s was indirect taxes, particularly following the 
enactment of a regressive income tax in 1933, and taxes on 
major consumer items such as sugar and tea (Banani,
1961:133; Bharier, 1971:64; Issawi, 1971:376; Upton,
1960:98). In the period of 1921-30, the state spent $2 
billion on the military, $260 million on railway 
construction and $200 million on the construction of 
government buildings (Bharier, 1971:303-234; Halliday,
1979:66).
The most substantial impact of these infrastructural 
projects was to generalize commodity production. For 
example, the poor condition of overland transportation had 
been a major barrier to the development of trade. Trans- 
Iranian Railway established an economic link between north 
and south and facilitated export-import trade. Trade was 
also facilitated by the abolition of road taxes, enforced by 
the Qajars, which had been a barrier to internal transport 
(Issawi, 1971:376).
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The state's reforms in the judicial system also facilitated 
the expansion of trade by limiting the traditional influence 
of the ulama and the religious law (Shari 'a') , which were 
both seen as a brake on economic development. Shari'a had 
forbidden charging interest and trade by Muslims in certain 
goods. It did not recognize joint-stock companies, and had 
left certain commercial rights to the ulama. The Commercial 
Code of 1925 was designed to limit ulama's influence in 
commercial matters, and recognized joint-stock companies 
(Banani, 1961:70-84; Keddie, 1981:95). The state also took 
over a large part of the religiously-controlled land (vafq). 
Moreover, a French-style Civil Code of 1928 and an Italian- 
style Criminal Code of 1929 brought the administrative and 
judicial systems under secular law, and further reduced the 
power of the ulama, who had, until then, controlled these 
areas. Laws concerning the registration of legal documents 
and ownership were transferred from the ulama to secular 
authorities; and registration of marriages and divorces also 
came under secular law (Banani, 1961:70-84). Therefore, the 
loss of power by the ulama f who had constituted one of the 
elements of the power structure in 19th century Iran, was 
both economic, through the loss of revenue from land and 
trade, and ideological, through secularization of state 
apparatuses.v
State intervention in the areas of finance and foreign 
trade, and the first major investments in the manufacturing 
industry, mark the decade of 1931-41. Banking and finance 
came under state control with the creation of the National 
Bank of Iran in 1927, which took over the right to issue 
bank notes and other national banking privileges from the
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British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia (Keddie, 1981:102; 
Katouzian, 1981:112-3). Later the Agricultural and 
Industrial Bank and the Loan Bank were founded in 1933 and 
1939 respectively. By 1940, the National Bank had 84 
branches throughout the country. Through these banks, 
financial markets came largely, but not entirely, under 
state control. These banks financed capital investment in 
industry, trade and transport, and their capital was mainly 
drawn from regressive income taxes (Bharier, 1971:237; 
Keddie, 1981:102; Issawi, 1971:377). Formation of these 
banks created a rudimentary financial system which, together 
with the improved transport system further facilitated and 
regulated trade and commodity production. The corollary to 
state financial control was state monopoly over foreign 
trade; an area which remained the greatest realm of state 
intervention in the 1930s.
The Law of Foreign Trade Monopoly was introduced in 1930 
(Ashraf, 1970:328; Bharier, 1971:86). Through this law, the 
state took control over exports and imports, foreign 
exchange, industry and transport. Certain imports such as 
tea, cotton and sugar became the monopoly of the state, 
while others could be authorized only by proving exports of 
greater value (Keddie, 1981:106). An exchange control law 
was passed by which merchants had to obtain special 
permission to import luxury goods, and exporters were 
required to sell 90% of their foreign exchange to the state 
within one year of obtaining it (Bharier, 1971:107). Almost 
33% of all imports and 49% of all exports were controlled 
through state monopolies (Ashraf, 1971:328).
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State control over foreign trade was in line with the 
import-substitution policy, which characterized Iranian 
industry in the 1930s. The objective of this policy was to 
create light consumer industries to transform local raw 
materials into consumption goods. This policy would reduce 
dependency on foreign exchange, which, due to the depression 
of the 1930s, was not forthcoming. The depression was 
characterized by a sharper drop in agricultural rather than 
industrial prices; it resulted in the reduction in the price 
of Iran's agricultural raw materials on the world market, by 
2 to 3 times, which in turn curtailed the flow of foreign 
exchange into Iran (Keddie, 1981:98, 99-106).
Partly in order to offset the deteriorating terms of foreign 
trade, the state raised a high tariff wall against the 
import of certain consumer goods. Low interest rates were 
given to private investors through the National Bank, and 
the import of capital goods and machinery was exempted from 
customs duties and certain other taxes. However, it seems 
that tariff rises, although in line with import-substitution 
policy, were initially designed to meet the need for 
revenues and not for protecting local industry (Banani, 
1961:16; Clawson, 1979:254). Keddie (1981:96) also observes, 
correctly, that the idea of protective tariffs had not yet 
fully developed in the 1930s, and that tariffs were mainly 
based on revenue needs.
After the war, industry in Iran had been limited to a few 
power plants and match factories, although small privately- 
owned textile factories had expanded in number. But real 
growth in industrial investment occurred from 1930 onwards.
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Initially, most of the capital investment in industry was 
carried out by the state. By the late 1930s, however, 
private capital investment in manufacturing industry was 
relatively high. The initial absence of private capital 
investment in industry is comprehensible given the 
particular character of the Iranian merchant class, and the 
general structure of the economy in the 1930s. The merchant 
class had traditionally, and logically, invested in land 
rather than in industry, as the latter had proved disastrous 
for individual merchants under the conditions of semi­
colonial domination. Moreover, as I shall discuss below, the 
state did not move to induce any changes in the nature of 
agrarian production relations. Agricultural production 
continued to be organized on the basis of large feudal 
estates concentrated in the hands of large absentee 
landowners, and the landlords were under no pressure to 
improve agricultural productivity. Industrial private 
capital remained underdeveloped as cheap labour made 
exploitation of land and peasants more profitable than 
investment in industry. Given the traditional concentration 
of capital in trade and landownership, high costs of initial 
investment in industry, and slow returns in a market with a 
very low purchasing power,8 the main pressure for 
industrialization had to come from the state during the 
first half of the 20th century. The state had to perform the 
role which the Iranian merchant class had failed to play. 
Indeed, what could have been accomplished if the 
Constitutional Movement had not failed was partly 
accomplished by the state.
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Despite the lack of comprehensive data on the exact size, 
output and structure of the industry in the 1930s, the 
existing information does indicate the growth of a nascent 
home market for the production of consumer goods and the 
purchase of labour power. The number of industrial 
enterprises increased 17-fold during Reza Shah's reign. In 
1925, there had been fewer than 20 industrial plants; of 
these only 5 were large, each employing more than 50 
workers.9 They included a sugar refinery, a match factory 
and two textile mills. By 1941, however, the number of 
industrial plants had reached 346. Of these, 200 were small 
installations, but the other 146 included such major plants 
as 37 textile mills, 8 sugar refineries, 11 match-making 
factories, 8 chemical enterprises, 2 glass works, 1 tobacco 
and 5 tea processing plants (Abrahamian, 1982:146-7). Most 
of the large-scale plants were state-owned, while some were 
a combination of state and private-owned, or were wholly 
private-owned plants; often with state subsidies and 
guarantees (Ashraf, 1970:330; Bharier, 1971:172-80; Wilber, 
1948:132). By the late 1930s, however, over half of the $260 
million invested in industry came from the private sector 
(Issawi, 1978:132). Private capital continued to increase, 
and, by the mid-1940s, only sugar, cement and tobacco 
factories were entirely state-owned. In textiles, tea­
processing, flour and rice milling a mixture of private and 
public plants operated; and other manufacturing was left 
entirely to private enterprise (Bharier, 1971:180-1).
A review of annual state expenditure and allocations will 
also give some indication of the economic trends in this 
period. The budget of the Ministry of Industry and Mines,
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established in 1932, reached R315 million in 1938, and R745 
million in 1940 (Bharier, 1971:66). In 1941, state 
allocation to industry was nearly 50 times that it had been 
in 1934, with the result that the percentage share of 
industry and trade, in total budgetary allocations, rose 
from 3.5% in 1934 to over 24% in 1941 (Katouzian, 1981:131).
It is also important to note that the increased state 
expenditure in manufacturing industry was made possible 
through increases in state revenues. I have already 
discussed the main sources of state budget during this 
period: indirect taxes, oil revenues, and state control over 
financial markets and foreign trade. State budget rose from 
under R237 million in 1924 to over R3,613 million in 1941 
(Ashraf, 1971:329). According to Bharier (1971:66), the 
total state budget rose 10-fold in the 1928-40 period. Oil 
revenues, although increasing, were not yet substantial; 
they contributed between 10% to 30% of state budget during 
the same period (Bharier, 1971:65,159; Katouzian, 1981:129).
A major impact of state's infrastructural reforms and direct 
investment in industry was the growth of wage-labour. In the 
preceding Chapter, I have argued that wage-labour first 
developed in the second half of the 19th century, and have 
discussed the unsystematic nature of the processes which led 
to the dispossession of direct producers during this period: 
confiscation and concentration of land, cash-crop 
production, an arbitrary and chaotic system of taxation, 
together with famines and droughts were factors which led to 
the impoverishment of the peasantry and forced some of the 
peasants off the land. During the first half of the 20th
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century 'free' labour still came primarily from rural areas. 
However, it is important to note that the causes of rural- 
urban migrations within the period of the mid-1930s to the 
late 1950s were different from those in the late 19th 
century. In the period of 1930-1950s, the rural-urban 
migration was caused by what might be considered as the 
'pull' factors, that is, the concentration of manufacturing 
industry, the rapid expansion of construction activity and 
the prospects of higher living standards offered in the 
urban areas (Bharier, 1971:31). Although land confiscations 
and 'natural' disasters such as famines and droughts 
continued to influence the pattern of rural-urban migration, 
in contrast to the situation in the 19th century, the 
state's direct investment in infrastructure and industry in 
the 1920s and 1930s created a small home market for the 
purchase of labour power. As will be discussed later, rural- 
urban migrations in the post-1960s period assumed a 
different character when, following the land reform, the 
development of capitalist production relations in the rural 
areas marked the beginning of a large-scale and systematic 
real subsumption of labour by capital.10
The railway and road construction activities were the major 
areas in which wage-labour employment, outside the oil 
industry, was concentrated. Although there are no exact 
figures on the number of wage-labourers in these areas, it 
is estimated that they numbered in tens of thousands in road 
and railway construction projects of the late 1920s and 
1930s (Banani, 1961:133-5). Another major area of wage- 
labour employment was in state-owned factories. Ashraf 
(1970:329) estimates that by 1941 between 50,000 to 60,000
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wage-workers were employed in 200 industrial plants. About 
120 factories employed from 30 to 100 workers, about 10 
industrial plants employed 100 to 500 workers, and some 
employed between 500 to 1,000 workers. Textile factories 
were the largest industrial plants where the highest 
concentration of wage-labour employment occurred: they 
employed about half of the total industrial labour force. 
Consequently, state-owned industry employed 40% of all wage­
workers, and owned 80% of the largest industrial plants. 
Together with the number of workers in the railway system 
and non-oil mining sector, the proportion of wage-labourers 
employed by the state comprised 60% of the total labour 
force (ibid:329-330). Apart from textile factories, other 
large-scale state-owned industrial plants included a cement 
factory, essential for construction projects, sugar 
refineries, tobacco factories, a steel mill and iron factory 
by 1941 (Bharier, 1971:177-8). Later, in the late 1930s and 
1940s, private capital investment increased relatively, but 
the formation of this nascent industrial bourgeoisie, still 
tied to land, and the growth of wage-labour, should not be 
identified with transition to capitalism at this stage. This 
important point will be elaborated below.
No comprehensive data have been found on the exact size of 
the working class within this period. Ashraf (1970), 
Abrahamian (1982), and Bharier (1971) give different figures 
on the expansion of wage-labour employment. While it is 
generally agreed that the number of wage-workers was about 
1,000 in 1925, the numbers given for the period of the 1940s 
fluctuate between 50,000 to 170,000. According to Abrahamian 
(1982) during the 1930s
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the wage-earners in oil and large modern factories, together with some 10,000 in small modern factories, 2,500 in the Caspian fisheries, 9,000 in the railways, 4,000 in the coal fields, another 4,000 in the port docks, and a substantial but seasonal number in construction jointly produced a total of over 170,000 (ibid:147).
These figures do indicate the growth of wage-labour 
employment. Bharier (1971:172), for instance, emphasizes 
that between 1934 to 1938 the number of wage-earners 
increased by 250%; and according to Katouzian (1981:131) the 
industrial labour force (excluding the oil industry) in 1941 
was nearly three times what it had been in 1931. It is also 
important to note that the growth of wage-labour was not as 
significant as the general increase in the manufacturing 
industry, partly due to the capital-intensive nature of 
large-scale state-owned enterprises. The proportion of wage- 
labourers to the total labour force was still very small: 
wage-workers constituted less than 4% of the total labour 
force by the 1940s (Abrahamian, 1982:147). As mentioned 
above, the main reason for the slow growth of wage-labour 
was that the state did not carry out any land reform which 
would have separated the direct producers from the means of 
production.
The expansion and centralization of state apparatuses also 
led to the employment of a large proportion of the labour 
force in the army, the bureaucracy and the educational 
system. By the end of the 1930s, 20% of state expenditure 
went to wages and salaries (Bharier, 1971:64), indicating 
the development of working and middle classes. The expansion 
of the middle class was particularly disproportionate. 
Abrahamian (1982:145) estimates that 90,000 bureaucrats were
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employed in 10 new civilian ministries; and the 
'intelligentsia' grew to 7% of the country's labour force. 
Compared to the working class which constituted less than 4% 
of the total labour force, this figure shows another 
specificity of class formation under the auspices of the 
state. The growth of the middle class was more extensive 
than that of the industrial bourgeoisie and the working 
class, confirming the view that the nature of state 
intervention in the economy was basically infrastructural 
and in the unproductive areas of the economy.
The evidence presented so far gives some indication of the 
general economic trends of this period: development of 
infrastructure, expansion and centralization of state 
apparatuses, state control over foreign trade and a 
rudimentary financial market, increased state budget and 
expenditure, and the formation of a nascent home market. 
These developments, however, failed to generate a transition 
to the internationalization of money capital. Rather, they 
led to a deeper incorporation of the Iranian economy into 
the world market via the circuit of merchant capital.
The failure of the state to generate a transition to the 
internationalization of money capital, and therefore to 
establish capitalist production relations, was primarily due 
to the absence of foreign capital investment at the point of 
production (Clawson, 1979:254-5). The absence of foreign 
capital investment was partly caused by the depression of 
the 1930s, which curtailed the flow of foreign exchange into 
the Iranian economy. But the primary reason for the absence 
of foreign capital investment should be sought in the nature
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of the Iranian economy's relationship with the world market. 
In the first half of the 20th century, Iran's relationship 
with the world market was still based on the requirements of 
industrial capital in the centre, that is, production of 
agricultural raw materials for export to the centre and a 
market for the importation of Western manufactured goods. 
This type of relationship entailed that metropolitan capital 
could not tolerate competition from local producers, and 
that the development of capitalist production relations had 
to be severely limited. Iran was not yet a site for direct 
investment by foreign capital and the bulk of foreign 
capital remained linked to the economy through trade.
There was, however, one exception: the oil industry was the 
only area in which direct foreign capital investment did 
take place. This was a highly developed capitalist industry 
with little tendency towards penetration of capitalist 
production relations into other sectors of the economy. In 
effect, it was a capitalist 'enclave' superimposed on an 
economy with distinct precapitalist agrarian structures. The 
British government owned 51% of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (APOC), which had been established in 1909. In 1933, 
the Iranian state signed a new 60-year agreement with the 
APOC, renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The new 
agreement reduced the area of concession to 25% of the 
original concession, and the royalties were to be assessed 
on a new tonnage basis (Bharier, 1971:156; Amuzegar and 
Fekrat, 1971:14-15). The new agreement continued to provide 
a vested interest for Britain in the Iranian economy.
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The original investment by the APOC in Iran amounted to 
£21,656,252 million. Oil exports were exempted from taxes 
and customs duties, making further profits for the British 
government. At a conservative estimate, this modest 
investment of some £22 million produced for British capital 
something like £700 to £800 million in its fifty years of 
operation; that is an average of £16 million a year (Elwell- 
Sutton, 1955:84). The direct royalties the APOC paid to the 
Iranian government were very meagre indeed: oil royalties 
constituted about 10% of the state budget in the 1920s, 30% 
between 1929 and 1932, and 25% between 1934 and 1938. This 
is despite the fact that production of oil increased 
rapidly, rising from 80,000 tons in 1912 to 4.2 million tons 
in 1925 to 5 million tons in 1930 (Bharier, 1971:159).
Therefore, the Iranian economy assumed another important 
role for British imperialism: production of oil. The British 
had created a small colony around the southwestern oil 
fields with almost no contact with the rest of the economy. 
They imported all the technology and personnel reguired, 
including manual labour force from India. During the period 
of 1910-50, the APOC made no impact on the production 
processes, or on the banking and financial system. The only 
significant impact of the industry on the economy was the 
oil royalties to the Iranian government. The impact of the 
employment of the local labour force was almost negligible, 
due to the capital-intensive nature of the oil industry and 
the APOC's policies of importing its labour force. Despite 
the APOC's policies, however, the number of Iranian 
employees in the oil industry did increase from 20,000 in 
1920 to about 30,000 in the 1930s and to 50,000 in 1948
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(Bharier, 1971:162), but this was less than 1% of the total 
labour force of Iran (Amuzegar et al., 1971:26). Indeed, the 
stakes for the British government in the southern oilfields 
were high; Britain's capital investment in the oil industry 
overshadowed the total local investment in trade and 
industry during the 1930s (Keddie, 1981:109). However, due 
to the APOC's policies and the particular nature of the oil 
industry,11 the impact of this direct capital investment on 
the local economy closely resembled the mercantile form of 
capital penetration: except for the provision of very small 
amounts of royalties and wage-labour employment, the larger 
social relations of production remained unaffected by it.
An examination of two areas of the Iranian economy, foreign 
trade and agriculture, further supports the argument that 
while there was a substantial degree of commoditization in 
the 1930s, the dominant form of capital remained mercantile 
and production relations precapitalist.
There are no comprehensive data for the Iranian foreign 
trade during this period. However, the existing information 
suggests that world market demand, and the structure of the 
Iranian economy, limited Iran's non-oil exports to 
agricultural raw materials and carpets. Indeed, from the 
beginning of the 19th century until the early 1950s, 
carpets, raw cotton and dried fruits constituted over half 
of the value of Iran's non-oil exports (Bharier, 1971:110). 
In the 1920s, agricultural production was divided between 
cash-crops (cotton, opium, dried fruits, tobacco), which 
were mainly exported, and food crops produced for domestic 
market. Despite the lack of data for agricultural output, it
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seems that Iran was generally self-sufficient in food 
production, and its non-oil exports began to recover and 
were generally maintained in the 1920s. It is also certain 
that carpets made up the bulk of Iranian exports, which 
remained a village-based and cottage industry (Katouzian, 
1981:95, 116-7).
The data on foreign trade for the period of the 1930s are 
also scanty and incomprehensive, but they do confirm the 
view that commercialization became significant in the 1930s, 
and that there was a substantial increase in the export of 
agricultural raw materials. Undoubtedly, the new state 
industries encouraged the production of cash-crops for 
export, which was highly profitable to large landlords. For 
example, the value of non-oil exports (mainly cash-crops) 
rose from R179 million in 1921 to R459 million in 1930; 
while the total value of exports rose from R502 million to 
R1,575 million for the same period (Bharier, 1971:107). 
Concomitant with state policy of protection of local 
consumer goods and promotion of exports, imports of producer 
goods also rose rapidly, helped by the drastic decrease in 
their price following the depression. While the value of the 
imported durable producer goods totalled R442 million for 
the entire period 1900-1927, it reached R427 million for 
1937 alone. In 1927, capital goods comprised about 3% of all 
imports; their share rose to 25% in 1930 and 30% in the 
period of 1937-43 (Bharier, 1971:197).
In terms of trade partners, trade with Britain generally 
prospered in the 1920s, while trade with Russia fell 
substantially, partly due to British tariff policies which
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allowed British goods to be imported at very low rates and 
were unfavourable to Russian-Iranian trade. Despite the 
annulation of the Anglo-Persian Pact in 1920, and the 
conclusion of a Russian-Iranian Treaty in 1921, Russian 
trade with Iran reached only three-fourths of its prewar 
level by 1928 (Bharier, 1971:102-16; Keddie, 1981:83-7). 
However, by 1940, the Soviet Union had overtaken Britain in 
trade, the U.S., for the first time, had gained an important 
trade position, and Germany had emerged as the leading trade 
partner (Wilber, 1948:136). Germany's rise to a prominent 
trade position can partly be explained by the general 
opposition and hostility towards Britain in Iran, but, more 
importantly, by Germany's own position in the world market: 
an aspiring imperialist power seeking markets and zones of 
influence. Earlier in the 1920s German firms had played a 
prominent role in the construction of the Trans-Iranian 
Railway. In the 1930s, Germany provided most of the 
machinery and contractors in Iran's industrial, mining and 
construction projects. Germany emerged as the leading trade 
partner in Iran's foreign trade: between 1939 to 1941, it 
controlled about half of the total value of foreign trade 
with Iran (Keddie, 1981:110).12
In agriculture, production relations remained on a 
precapitalist basis and no agrarian reforms were carried out 
in the 1920s and 1930s. The general direction of state 
policies was towards consolidation of private property in 
land and further commercialization of agricultural output; 
both highly profitable to the landowning class. A Civil Code 
of 1928 made registration of landed property compulsory-and 
recognized de facto ownership as legal ownership of land
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(Lambton, 1953:189-97). Registration of landholdings was a 
necessary precondition for land transfers and thus 
consolidation of private property rights. Sale of state 
lands, which had begun in the mid-19th century, continued in 
the second half of the 1930s. In 1934, state lands were put 
on the market, but on prices which only large landlords and 
merchants could afford. Some landlords and state officials 
used their power to take over the land, and through 
pressures such as withholding much needed water from the 
land, many peasants were expropriated (ibid:246-9). But, on 
the whole, state policies placed land expropriations on a 
more regular basis. Through the Department of Land 
Registration, regional magnates were encouraged to place 
communal property under their names. Complete villages were 
sold to private tenants, and state land in remote areas, 
which had in effect been controlled by tribal chiefs and 
large owner-tenants, were turned over to them legally. The 
landlord-dominated parliament also passed a law that any 
village in the possession of one person for 30 years becomes 
his private property (Keddie, 1981:96). In 1939 the state 
also brought land belonging to religious institutions (vafq) 
under its control (Abrahamian, 1982:141). These measures 
legalized land expropriations, which had been an ongoing 
process since the 19th century, and strengthened private 
property rights to land. An indication of the extent to 
which private landholding was consolidated is that about 70% 
of the cultivated land came to be owned by private 
landlords; the remaining 20% belonged to the state, and the 
rest 10% was controlled by religious institutions.13 This is 
a far cry from the early 19th century when all land 
theoretically belonged to the state.
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Sale of state lands and land registrations, although 
resulting in the concentration and consolidation of private 
land ownership, did not entail a change in the nature of 
production relations. These measures did, however, 
facilitate production of cash-crops for export markets. 
Despite the lack of data on agricultural output, the 
existing evidence suggests that state's promotion of 
commercialization of agriculture facilitated production of 
cash-crops; examples are exemption of cash-crop exports from 
taxes and the exemption of agricultural machinery imports 
from tariffs (Keddie, 1981:96). Taxes were also placed on a 
more regular basis and labour service (bigari) diminished to 
some extent (Lambton, 1953:179-81; Clawson, 1979:258). 
Peasants, however, were given no protection and production 
relations remained organized around sharecropping, a 
transitional form of production which has not disappeared 
even today.14 Under the sharecropping system direct 
producers were not fully divorced from the means of 
production, although it can be stated that expansion of 
commodity relations did encourage differentiation of the 
peasantry. Neither did the methods of production undergo any 
substantial changes. Landlords were encouraged in the 
scientific and hygienic use of canals, the construction of 
roads, the establishment of health services, rural housing, 
etc. The landlord-dominated parliament, however, blocked any 
radical changes and few progressive measures were carried 
out in practice. Given the legalization of land 
confiscations, large landlords came to own about 70% of the 
cultivated land, while 40% to 50% of the rural population 
remained both landless and without any cultivation rights.15
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In relation to tribal population, the state adopted the 
policy of forced settlement. However, animal husbandry 
continued to provide the only source of economic subsistence 
for tribes as they had no alternative way of making a 
living. As a result of forced settlement and inadequate 
grazing lands, many tribes lost their animals, leading to 
decreasing livestock production and general impoverishment 
of nomadic population (Keddie, 1981:96-7).
Although production relations remained precapitalist, 
consolidation of private landed property and the expansion 
of commodity production did affect the character of the 
landowning class. The developments discussed above 
accelerated the 19th century trend of transforming 
'bureaucratic landlordism' into private landholding (Ashraf, 
1970:330; Lambton, 1953:179-81; Clawson, 1979:258). To be 
more precise, state policies led to an increasing 
convergence of the two fractions of the landed class: the 
aristocracy and the officialdom. This convergence entailed a 
significant change in the legal status of large landlords 
from that of a 'petty-territorial prince' (Lambton,
1953:260) into an individual commodity owner. This trend was 
piecemeal in the late 1930s, but significant in the context 
of the subsequent capitalist transformation of the 
economy.16
These state policies also consolidated both the movement of 
the merchant class into land ownership and its sway over 
production processes. Although the merchant class did become 
involved in agricultural production, this involvement was 
restrained by the state's monopoly control of private trade.
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On the other hand, exclusive state control of foreign trade 
meant greater protection for large merchants and landlords, 
which intensified commodity production on a pre-capitalist 
basis and limited capital investment in manufacturing. By 
1940, investment by merchants in commercial enterprises was 
greater than total investment in industry. There were twice 
as many commercial as industrial corporations in 1940, and 
their total capital was twice as high (Keddie, 1981:107). 
Private capital continued to be directed to usury, 
moneylending, landownership and production of raw materials 
for export. Merchant capital, with strong metropolitan ties, 
remained the dominant form of capital.
It probably goes without saying that the large landholding 
class was the principal base for the Pahlavi regime, and 
land ownership remained the basis of political power. An 
examination of the social composition of the 4th and 5th 
National Assemblies, whose support was instrumental in Reza 
Shah's succession to power, shows that the majority of 
Assembly members originated from the landed and merchant 
classes. The two political parties which dominated these 
assemblies, the Reformers' Party and the Revival Party, were 
largely composed of landed aristocrats, wealthy merchants 
and clerics. Subseguently the position of large landlords 
was further strengthened as they increasingly gained high 
positions in the parliament, the cabinet, the diplomatic 
corps and state enterprises (Lambton, 1953:181-93). Large 
landlords, who had constituted 8% of the First Parliament 
and 12% of the 4th, made up 26% of the 12th Parliament, 
together with high state bureaucrats and the nascent 
industrial bourgeoisie. Landlords also formed 84% of Reza
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Shah's deputies. Of the 50 ministers who filled 98 cabinet 
posts between 1925 to 1941, 37 had been born into titled 
families. Other measures taken by the state, such as the new 
law passed by the Third National Assembly introducing adult 
male suffrage and extending the vote to the rural 
population, also ironically served to strengthen the 
position of landlords within the parliament (Abrahamian, 
1982:120-126, 149-150, 121).
However, the preservation of the interests of the landowning 
class was not straightforward and the Pahlavi state should 
not be considered as a mere instrument of this class. Large 
landlords and merchants gradually lost their independence. 
Tribal chiefs were incorporated into the landowning class 
and this class in turn, through integration into the state 
executive and its bureaucracy, grew increasingly dependent 
on the state. This implies an important transformation in 
the character of the state. Through the centralization and 
expansion of state apparatuses and the introduction of a 
secular, uniform legal system, the state acguired a relative 
autonomy from various factional interests and indigenous 
dominant classes. It was on this basis that the state was 
able to curb and limit the power of feudal lords, tribal 
chiefs and the clergy, and legitimately restrain individual 
or class interests. The internal structure of the state was 
such that, while it preserved and represented the interests 
of the landed and merchant classes, it also controlled and 
restrained these classes and the political factions they 
represented. This development is evident in the 
dispossession, imprisonment and even execution of a number 
of large landlords and tribal chiefs.17 Through land
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confiscations, Reza Shah himself became the largest landlord 
in the country.18
Factors mentioned earlier in the discussion of the 
peripheral state, such as the expansion of the state 
executive and its bureaucracy, the underdeveloped class 
structure, the underdeveloped and heterogeneous production 
relations, and the fractionalized economic interests of the 
dominant classes, were the principal sources of the relative 
autonomy of the Pahlavi state. Neither the landowning class 
nor the merchant class and the nascent industrial 
bourgeoisie were able to become the economically dominant 
class. Indeed, the industrial bourgeoisie was only a class- 
in-formation, and the state was the instrument of its 
formation and expansion. Moreover, in a situation where 
bourgeois norms of constitutionality were neither 
well-developed nor deeply well-entrenched, and where there 
was little or no separation of powers among the judicial, 
executive and parliamentary organs of the state, the 
relative autonomy of the state could only be fostered.
The economic function of the state was also necessarily 
contradictory. The Pahlavi state's 'nationalist' struggle to 
create a national arena in the world economy (e.g., the 
annulment of the colonialist 1919 Anglo-Persian Pact, the 
dissolution of the British-owned Imperial Bank of Persia) 
only served to reproduce world market conditions within the 
national economy, that is, regularization of the export of 
raw materials to external markets and thus further 
commoditization of the economy. Without a relative autonomy, 
the state would not have been able to pursue its
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contradictory economic function, to intervene in the 
domestic economic system, or to intervene against foreign 
capital. Given the extent to which the Iranian economy was 
subject to state intervention, and the degree to which the 
state owned the means of production and was directly 
involved in the extraction and distribution of surplus, I 
would agree with Ziemann and Lanzendörfer (1977) and Leys 
(1976) that the peripheral state is more 'embracing' and 
'extensive' than the state in advanced capitalist societies. 
In short, representation of class interests by the state 
came to acguire a new character, different from that of the 
Qajar Court, indicating the most rudimentary moves towards 
separation of the 'economic' from the 'political'; a 
distinction wholly absent in precapitalist Qajar Iran.
In further relating this analysis to the earlier discussion 
of the peripheral state, it can be argued that the Pahlavi 
state was not a post-colonial state in the sense used by 
Alavi (1972). Unlike post-colonial states, the Iranian state 
did not 'inherit' 'overdeveloped' apparatuses. Indeed, one 
might argue that 19th century semi-colonial domination was 
even more exploitative than formal colonial rule. While the 
colonial state did establish a legal-ideological framework 
for subseguent bourgeois rule, the peripheral state in Iran 
had to start from scratch to build this infrastructure. 
During the semi-colonial rule, the sole sources of 
infrastructural development were imperialist concessionary 
enterprises, operating according to the logic of maximum 
profitability. Iran was left with retarded communications 
and anachronistic legal, educational and finance systems, by 
comparison with many formal colonies where such developments
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were systematic and comprehensive. The peripheral state in 
Iran tried to accomplish what the bourgeois Constitutional 
Movement had failed to achieve at the turn of the century.
Through its ownership of most of the means of production, 
the state appropriated a large part of the economic surplus 
and deployed it in bureaucratically-directed economic 
activity. Most of the surplus was distributed amongst the 
military and the bureaucracy. With regard to the guestion of 
the class characterization of the state-bureaucracy and its 
relationship to the means of production in Iran, the 
critigue developed above against the concept of 
'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'19 renders it untenable to argue 
that the bureaucracy constituted a class in its own right 
and that the state represented bureaucratic class interests. 
In Iran, the leading members of the state executive and its 
bureaucracy, the diplomatic corps, Parliamentary deputies, 
and high army officers were also the owners of the means of 
production, which remained primarily in the form of landed 
property, and were therefore the appropriators of economic 
surplus. They formed the dominant class in Iran, not because 
they were in control of state apparatuses but because they 
owned the means of production. The bulk of the bureaucracy 
had no particular interest in the expansion of commodity 
production for external markets or in the preservation of 
the system in general, no matter how much individual members 
were committed to the ideology of 'developmentalism': they 
were not the owners of the means of production.
In conclusion, the state which was born of the coup of 1921 
was not a capitalist state. It did not intervene at the
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point of production to transform the nature of production 
relations; its intervention in the economy served only to 
generalize commodity production. Measures taken by the 
state, such as the introduction of a commercial code, the 
establishment of a national bank, and the construction of 
roads and railways, all served to accelerate generalization 
of exchange relations. As for agriculture, sale of state 
lands and compulsory land registrations gave a firm legal 
basis to private landownership.20 The state, therefore, laid 
the foundation for future capitalist transformation of the 
economy. In Europe, the transformation of the state from 
feudal to a bourgeois institution was the historical product 
of an organic transition from feudalism to capitalism. There 
the emergence of a nascent bourgeoisie ensured a historic 
struggle against the feudal landowning classes. In Iran, in 
its particularly peripheral context, the state was the 
central vehicle of initiating this transition.
The role of the state as the motor force of transition and 
capital accumulation was particularly evident in the phase 
of the internationalization of the circuit of money capital. 
It is to this phase that I shall turn in the next Chapter.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
1. See, for this debate, Leys (1976), Saul (1976), von Freyhold (1977) and Ziemann et al. (1977). Alavi's thesis 
has also been discussed by First (1980), Marcussen and Torp (1982) and Thomas (1984).
2. See, for example, Draper (1978) and Thomas (1984), who discuss the state bureaucracy in detail. References cited in note number 1 also deal with the question of the role and function of the state bureaucracy.
3. I am referring to the argument that the state bureaucracy is of petty-bourgeois origins; and that through control of state apparatuses it forms a class on its own. Berberoglu (1983), Clawson (1979), Saul (1976) and Von 
Freyhold (1977) have developed this argument in detail. This argument was originally presented by Issa Shivji in his 
influential Class Struggle in Tanzania (1976). Shivji argued that the class which moved to occupy state apparatuses after independence in Tanzania was the petty-bourgeoisie, comprising all salaried workers from the higher civil servants and intellectuals to managers, farmers, traders, tailors. The stratum of this class which achieved control of the state is a class of a new type in the process of formation. The notion of petty-bourgeois state has been ingeniously criticized by First (1980) and Leys (1976). They argue that this notion is based on an erroneous understanding of the concept of petty-bourgeoisie and its identification with state bureaucracy. Firstly, the petty- bourgeoisie is an historically accurate notion, referring to those who are directly involved in the production of commodities mainly for the purpose of personal consumption and reproduction of the household. The fact that they own the means of production means that the categories of surplus-value and wage-labour are absent in the circuit of 
simple reproduction, and so they are fundamentally different from capitalist producers. They are also different from the so-called 'white-collar' employees, managers, clerks, state functionaries, etc., who do not possess capital and the means of production. Secondly, as First (1980) has strongly argued, the class character of the state cannot be 
discovered by inspecting the interests of the state bureaucracy. The state bureaucracy does not form a class in itself and we have to move beyond the state apparatuses in order to characterize the social bases of the state. Once it is established that the social origins of the occupants of government posts have little or no explanatory power in determining in whose class interests the state operates, and that the state bureaucracy itself does not constitute a social class (whether of petty-bourgeois origins or not), any discussion of the predetermined politics of the 'petty- 
bourgeois state', and its 'anti-imperialist', 'nationalist' or 'reactionary' ideology become futile. The critique of the notion of 'petty-bourgeois politics' is developed by Williams (1976).
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4. According to Amuzegar and Fekrat (1971:16), the 
discount sale of Iranian oil by the APOC to the British 
Admiralty had saved the British government some =f]7.5 million 
during the First World War.
5. For details on the formation of these republics and 
other autonomy-seeking movements during and after the war, 
see Abrahamian (1982), Avery (1965), Cottom (1979) and 
Lenczowski (1949).
6. The formation of Reza Shah's state has generally been 
seen as a turning point in Iranian economic and political 
history. Interpretations of this turning point, however, are 
often characterized by lack of conceptual clarity, and 
almost always dominated by the Orientalist problematic. 
Bashiriyeh (1984:11) sees the 1930s as the point of 
transition to capitalism, and adds that Reza Shah's state 
transformed the Iranian society from 'Oriental despotism' 
into a 'capitalist social formation'. Ashraf (1970), 
Katouzian (1981) and Moghadam (1988b) also uneasily combine 
an Orientalist interpretation of the state with a discussion 
of capitalist transformation. Ashraf (1970:328) argues that 
in the period of 1925-30, Reza Shah 'revitalized the Asiatic 
system of power', while in the period of 1931-41, he 
established 'state-capitalism'. It is very difficult to see 
the relationship between 'Asiatic patrimonialism' and 'state 
capitalism', but Ashraf seems to mean that the state 
policies led to an assimilation of 'Western legal-rational 
authority' with 'arbitrary and non-rational Persian 
patrimonialism' (ibid:328). In this sense, Reza Shah's state 
is seen as a continuation of 'thirty centuries of tradition 
of patrimonial intervention in economic enterprises'
(ibid:320). Katouzian (1981) seems to be expressing the same 
view when he describes Reza Shah's reign as a period of 
'pseudo-modernist despotism'. Moghadam (1988b), too, briefly 
describes Reza Shah's state in terms of 'persistence of 
despotism' (ibid:413-4).
7. Expansion and modernization of the educational, 
bureaucratic and judicial systems are discussed in the 
literature in detail. Banani (1961), discusses anti-clerical 
reforms (Chapter 3) and educational reforms (Chapter 6). See 
also Abrahamian (1982), Chapter 3, Katouzian (1981), Chapter 
3, and Keddie (1981), Chapter 5, for discussions of these 
reforms. Transport and communications are discussed by 
Elwell-Sutton (1941), Lenczowski (1949) and Wilber (1948). 
The last three authors, as well as Banani, paint a positive 
and progressive picture of Iran in the 1930s and are 
generally sympathetic to Reza Shah.
8. Bharier (1971:66) notes that real income remained 
stationary during the 1928-40 period.
9. Large-scale manufacturing is usually defined as 
enterprises employing 10 or more workers.
10. for a discussion of the distinction between formal and 
real subsumption of labour by capital see Chapter Two, 
Section E.
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11. The specificities of the conditions of production and extraction of oil will be fully discussed in Chapter Five. This discussion has been avoided here as it was only from 
the late 1950s onwards that the oil industry directly affected the pattern of capital accumulation and the character of the state.
12. Iran's relation with Germany in the 1930s, and Reza Shah's pro-Nazi sympathies, are discussed by Baldwin (1967) and Issawi (1971).
13. These are approximate estimations. See Chapter Six, Section A for the exact figures and their sources.
14. In Chapter Six, Section B, the exact nature of sharecropping as a transitional form of labour will be discussed.
15. See Chapter Six, Section A, for the sources of these figures and a discussion of the category of landless peasants who had no cultivation rights f khushneshins1.
16. Lambton (1953), Chapter 8, discusses in detail the process by which the legal status of landlords was transformed, leading to a consolidation of private landownership.
17. These issues are discussed in detail by Abrahamian (1982), Chapter 3, who also describes Reza Shah's state as the'guardian of the landowning class'(ibid:149).
18. The fact that Reza Shah confiscated many villages from large landlords and tribal chiefs and registered them under his name is often stressed in the literature cited here.See, for instance, Keddie (1981) and Ashraf (1970). Clawson (1979:258) states that at the time of his abdication in 1941, Reza Shah owned up to 6,000 villages.
19. See note number 3, this Chapter.
20. For evidence on the consolidation of private landed property during Reza Shah's reign, see Lambton (1953), Chapter 8, who discusses this point in detail. Keddie (1981), Chapter 3, also stresses the strengthening of the 
institution of private landed property in the 1930s. Ashraf (1970) is an interesting case because despite his attempt in 
applying Witfogel's concept of 'Oriental despotism' and Weber's 'Oriental patrimonialism', concedes that during Reza 
Shah's reign "the institution of private landed property was well established and received a solid legal basis"(ibid:330). Reza Shah's confiscation of entire villages has led some writers to argue that the institution of private property remained 'insecure' (Katouzian, 1981; Moghadam, 1988b). These interpretations have been found inadequate because of their 'politicist' character and the assumptions they share with the Orientalist problematic (see Chapter One, Section E for this point).
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CHAPTER FIVE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MONEY CAPITAL AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION RELATIONS: 1941-1978
Iran was incorporated into the circuit of money capital from 
the mid-1950s onwards. This Chapter examines the structural 
changes induced in the Iranian social formation by the 
internationalization of this circuit. It is argued that the 
most important consequence of the export of capital from the 
metropolitan economies to Iran was the development of 
capitalist production relations and the formation of a 
capitalist home market.
The internationalization of the circuit of money capital in 
Iran coincided with the emergence of the US economy as the 
centre of the Fordist system of accumulation and the 
hegemonic imperialist centre. This phase of capital 
accumulation also coincided with the nationalization of the 
oil industry and its development as a state monopoly. 
Dependence on oil as the main source of financing the 
capital accumulation process imposed certain structural 
features on the pattern of capitalist development and the 
character of the state in Iran which are fairly common in 
all oil-based economies. The first Section of this Chapter 
examines the specificities of oil-based states and 
economies.
The following three Sections of this Chapter examine, 
empirically, the process of the internationalization of the
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circuit of money capital in the context of the emergence of 
the US economy as the leading imperialist power, the export 
of capital from the centre and its investment at the point 
of production, and an oil-based capital accumulation and an 
oil-mediated link with the world market.
Section Five of this Chapter analyzes the beginning of the 
internationalization of productive capital from the 
mid-1970s onwards, marked by a movement from the 
'sub-Fordist' system of accumulation to that of 'peripheral 
Fordism'. In relation to the critigue of the thesis of the 
NIDL developed above (Chapter Two, Section D), an empirical 
examination of the Iranian case confirms the view that the 
internationalization of the circuits of money and productive 
capital has not led to the complete dissolution of 
precapitalist structures in the periphery; rather, 
precapitalist forms of production have been restructured as 
integral parts of the expanded reproduction of capital. In 
the last Section of this Chapter these non-capitalist forms 
of production in Iran are identified and their relationship 
with the dominant CMP is examined.
A. Contradictions of the 'Rentier' Peripheral States
The empirical focus of the present Section is on 
oil-exporting countries in the periphery. Since oil is the 
commodity which primarily links these societies to the world 
market, the purpose of this Section is to examine, 
theoretically, the particular characteristics and 
contradictions engendered by an oil-mediated link with the 
world market, and the consequences it holds for the
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structure of the state and the socio-economic development of 
major oil-exporting countries.1
There are a number of attributes of oil, as a commodity, 
which have fundamental effects on the socio-economic 
structures of all societies in which production and export 
of oil has become the dominant economic activity. First, the 
conditions inherent in the production of oil give rise to 
large financial surpluses which are in excess of 'average 
profit' produced in capitalist manufacturing industry. 
Messarrat (1980) has analyzed the origins of this 
'superprofit' in the oil industry by relating the conditions 
of extraction and production of oil to Marx's theory of 
ground rent (Capital. Vol.III).
In capitalist industry, the conditions of competition ensure 
that the most productive processes in a given industry are 
generalized and determine the average price of production 
(production costs plus average rate of profit). In other 
words, the law of value ensures that the level of 
productivity is generalized, i.e., transferred to other 
industries and sets the average price of production. In 
capitalist industry, therefore, the final price of 
commodities is not determined by those capitals which 
produce in the worst conditions, but by those which operate 
in the average conditions of production. This law of 
capitalist production, the generalization of labour 
productivity or the equalization of the average rate of 
profit, does not operate in those spheres which are 
immediately dependent on nature, that is, in agricultural
and extractive industries. Here the level of labour
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productivity cannot be generalized because the highest 
productivity levels do not arise from capital but are 
dependent on nature. As a result, the market price is not 
determined by those commodities produced in average 
conditions of production, but by those produced under 
marginal conditions. In this sphere, therefore, capitals 
producing under the worst or marginal conditions obtain an 
average profit, while those producing under the most 
favourable conditions obtain a superprofit compared to the 
natural guality and location of the raw material. Under 
private landed property, this 'surplus profit' is 
transformed into absolute ground rent and appropriated by 
the landowning class. The institution of private monopoly in 
land acts as another barrier to the operation of the law of 
value; it prevents capital's access to land unless a tax or 
toll is paid. By raising the level of tax or toll, the 
precapitalist landowning class appropriates a superprofit 
and sets limits to capitalist competition and the free flow 
of capital in and out of agriculture. Private monopoly in 
land does not allow capital to transcend the first barrier, 
that is, the limitation on the generalization of labour 
productivity.
Like agricultural production under private landed property, 
the law of value is modified (or faces obstacles) in the 
conditions of production of oil. Oil is a raw material, or a 
use-value, extracted from land. Productive oil wells are 
fixed in supply and their location and number are determined 
by nature. Thus, unlike the manufacturing industry, the 
market price of oil is not determined by the socially 
necessary labour time required for its production under
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average conditions, but by the amount of labour time 
necessary to extract it under marginal conditions. Secondly, 
oil is only one type of energy, and the total world demand 
for energy cannot be met by oil or other cheaper sources of 
energy. Thus the value of energy is much above the average 
extraction costs of oil. In other words, the final price of 
oil is much above its production costs, for the price of oil 
is determined by the price of production of the marginal 
energy producer on the world-scale.
These conditions explain why extraction of oil takes the 
form of extraction of absolute ground rent, or a 
'superprofit', which the landowner (oil exporting state) 
manages to extract from capital (oil wells). This analysis 
also explains the existence of differential rent in the oil 
sector. Differential rent exists whenever surperprofit 
arises from the difference between the individual price of 
production of a single capital and the general price of 
production in the same sphere. This is to say, oil is of 
different qualities and is found under widely different 
conditions; and that there is an enormous difference between 
the costs of the production of the most expensive source of 
energy for which there is still a social demand, and the 
average costs of the extraction of oil. This difference is 
transferred into differential rent by the sale of oil 
(Messarrat, 1980).
Oil revenues are therefore superprofits realized by the oil 
companies, transformed into differential rent and 
appropriated by the state. For this reason, the type of 
state of major oil-producing countries has been termed
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'rentier state'. This term has been popularized by Hussain 
Mahdavy (1970) in his discussion of Iran. 'Rentier states' 
are defined as "...those countries that receive on a regular 
basis substantial amounts of external rent. External rents 
are in turn defined as rental paid by foreign individuals, 
concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or
governments of a given country.....Oil revenues received
by the government of the oil-exporting countries can also be 
external rents". (Mahdavy, 1970:428)
The second structural feature of the oil industry is its 
extreme 'enclave' character. Oil is a commodity whose 
extraction, compared to other primary commodities, is 
extremely capital-intensive. Production of oil is largely 
independent of the level of the development of the 
productive forces or the nature of production relations of 
the local economy. The tendency in the oil industry is 
towards a greater degree of capital intensiveness, greater 
automation and a smaller labour component per unit of 
output. When a broad and diversified industrial base is 
largely absent, as is the case in most major oil-exporting 
countries, the impact of oil operations on the local economy 
is negligible. The oil sector establishes neither a strong 
'backward linkage' (the flow of resources from the local 
economy into the oil industry) nor 'forward linkages' (the 
local economy's use of oil industry's output and products). 
The only linkage of the oil sector with the local economy is 
through provision of revenues and foreign exchange. I have 
discussed above the origins of the abundant revenues created 
by the oil sector. The apparent prosperity these revenues 
create in a number of urban centres has very little to do
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with the structure of the economy in the oil-based 
countries. It is for this reason that Mahdavy (1970) refers 
to the oil revenues as a "free gift of nature, or a grant 
from foreign sources" (ibid:429).
These two structural characteristics of oil, that is, a 
commodity whose production realizes a superprofit, derived 
from the existence of absolute and differential ground rent 
in the oil sector, and its extreme 'enclave' character, are 
coupled with the fact that oil is one of the few primary 
commodities for which there has been a continuous increase 
in world demand over the past 50 years. Production and 
export of oil are vital for the reproduction of the 
capitalist world market, perhaps as vital as the 
reproduction of labour power. Given these characteristics, I 
shall now consider the important structural consequences of 
the oil sector for the nature of the state and class 
formation in major oil-based economies.
The first structural consequence of an oil-mediated link 
with the world market is the development of a particular 
type of statism. I have previously discussed, in Chapter 
Four, those particular features of peripheral capital 
accumulation which foster relative autonomy of the state: 
the heterogeneous social and economic structure, the 
multiple class basis of the state, the weakness of a 
bourgeois class, the absence of a reproductive sector, a 
stronger need for an active state interventionist policy, 
and the rapid growth of the state bureaucracy. In peripheral 
rentier economies, the peculiarities of the oil sector is an 
additional factor which enhances the relative autonomy of
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the state. This is to say, the fact that the oil sector is a 
state monopoly and that oil is a source of superprofit endow 
the rentier state with a relative autonomy almost specific 
to it. For example, the abundance of oil revenues means that 
the state does not need to develop a tax base, nor does it 
need to secure the conditions for the intensified 
exploitation of labour power to increase productivity 
levels. In other words, state monopoly of a source of 
superprofit tends to increase the objective disjuncture 
between the state and the civil society. Rentier states are 
generally absolutist structures maintained by oil revenues; 
they can continue for years without any need for structural 
reform or creation of a strong social base.
The rentier state regulates the whole process of capital 
accumulation by distributing the oil rent through 
'development projects'; it sets the pattern of investment 
and consumption, the method of industry, the level and 
composition of employment, the distribution of income, and 
the pattern of demographic changes. The repercussions on 
class formation and class conflict are fundamental: the 
rentier state is able to expand, reward and even create 
certain classes, and to guarantee the repression of other 
classes. Oil-engendered statism and relative autonomy of the 
state are two sides of the same coin. 2
What is at issue here is the pattern and composition of 
state expenditure of the surplus and the response it 
generates in the economy. There is a tendency for the 
rentier state to relate to the economy not through 
production but through distribution, circulation and
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consumption. One consequence of this is that the industrial 
bourgeoisie comprises a small fraction of the bourgeois 
class, whereas traders, construction contractors, and 
financiers constitute major fractions of this class. The 
latter fractions of the bourgeoisie do not reinvest the 
appropriated profit in the productive processes but direct 
it towards land speculation, luxury trade and other 
non-productive spheres. These economic activities do not 
directly increase the total social capital but merely meet 
the demands of a society with an over-expanded middle class 
and 'services sector'.
The disproportionate growth of the middle class and state 
bureaucracy is another impact of the rentier state's 
distribution of rent on the pattern of class formation. This 
over-expansion of the public sector and services is a 
characteristic feature of all peripheral economies, but it 
is more pronounced in rentier economies since the oil 
revenues grow at a much faster rate than the GNP. The share 
of services in the national output expands because of the 
rapid expansion of the public sector and as a result of high 
demands for private services. In the rentier economies, 
therefore, the progression from agriculture to industry and 
services is distorted in the form of the growth of services 
sector (First, 1980). All non-productive economic 
activities, import-export trade, urban real estate, etc. 
become the hallmark of development.
A state relating to the economy through distribution and 
consumption also promotes consumerism by the bourgeoisie and 
the upper strata of the middle class, while the productive
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sectors of the economy stagnate or decline. As a result, a 
kind of home market is created in which demands for the 
means of consumption far exceed the demands for the means of 
production. This demand can be met only through imports for 
consumption by these classes, at the expense of the 
exclusion of the rest of the population from the market.
Thus, within the context of the capitalist world market, oil 
revenues would be spent on financing imports for 
non-productive consumption rather than for financing a 
process of industrialization. Although the rising price and 
production of oil seem to be desirable for promoting 
industrialization, the oil sector is actually transformed 
into an element which delays industrialization. The paradox 
of the rentier economies lies exactly here: increasing oil 
production inserts these economies deeper into the world 
market through dependency on imports and high consumption.
In short, the above analysis of the relationship between the 
oil sector, state, and capital accumulation emphasizes the 
contradictions engendered in the structure of oil-based 
economies at both national and international levels. At the 
national level, the oil sector, as a source of superprofit 
directly accruing to the state, intensifies the tendency 
towards state interventionism and fosters the relative 
autonomy of the state. It also encourages the state to 
relate to civil society through distribution and consumption 
rather than production. At the international level, the oil 
sector results in deeper insertion of peripheral economies 
into the capitalist world market.
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However, the notion of rentier state, although it correctly 
describes the contradictions engendered by the planning 
strategies adopted by the state of an oil-based economy, 
does not go far enough in analyzing the class character of 
the state. While issues of state planning strategies are not 
unimportant guestions, they have to be posed in such a way 
as to clarify the class basis of the state (First 1980).
None of the tendencies of the rentier economies discussed 
above are inevitable, or even inherent, in the conditions of 
production of oil. The realization of these tendencies 
depends on the economic and political priorities of the 
state, themselves determined by its class character and by 
its position in the world market. It is important to 
emphasize this point because, both in Marxist and 
non-Marxist thought, there is a strong tendency to 
characterize oil-based states as precapitalist institutions, 
and to examine their politics in an unspecific and populist 
fashion. Two examples of this type of approach (within the 
Marxist tradition), which in different ways attribute the 
pre-capitalist character of the state to the particular 
nature of the oil sector, are studies by Delacroix (1980) 
and Messarrat (1980).3
Delacroix (1980) characterizes oil-based or 'distributive 
states' as archaic, precapitalist institutions linked to the 
world market through trade. This characterization derives 
from Delacroix's conception of the oil sector itself. He 
argues that production of oil is not based on the extraction 
of surplus-value and thus exploitation of those involved in 
the production process. Since the entire economy is 
dependent on the production of oil, the central task of the
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state is simply distribution of a commodity whose production 
does not involve exploitation of labour power. 'Distributive 
states', therefore, cannot be analyzed in terms of class 
relations and class politics; they express the conditions of 
the primacy of consensus over coercion and of political over 
economic.
On a totally different plane, Messarrat (1980) also 
characterizes oil-exporting states as predominantly 
precapitalist landowning institutions. Messarrat's point is 
to demonstrate how the oil-exporting states, as 
representatives of the international landowning class, have 
constituted a barrier to further accumulation of capital on 
a world level. To demonstrate this point, he extends Marx's 
analysis of the development of capitalism within a single 
nation-state (Britain) to the international level of 
analysis. Historically, on a national level, capital had to 
face forces related to rent; now the very same forces 
express themselves internationally, in the guise of the 
nation-state, thus reproducing the original relationship 
between capital and landed property. At the world level, 
forces related to rent are posed as the major oil-exporting 
countries (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 
OPEC), while forces related to capital are represented by 
the major oil-consuming countries of the centre 
(International Energy Agency, IET). This seems too simple a 
classification, but Messarrat does not mean that the world 
market is divided between two types of nation-states.
Rather, each nation-state is subjected to a 'dual 
characterization' in that it represents the interests of 
both the landowning and capitalist classes. Oil-based states
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are not feudal states pure and simple but, given the low 
level of development of capitalism in these countries, the 
interests of capital in them are only marginal, and they 
predominantly represent the interests of rent. In IEA 
countries, on the other hand, capital represents the 
decisive interests. Oil-rich countries are, therefore, like 
the feudal landowning classes within the centre countries in 
the earlier phase of capital accumulation. OPEC, by the same 
token, is the institution of the landed property on the 
world market, and, as such, is a barrier to further 
accumulation of capital.
The characterization of oil-based states as pre-capitalist, 
landowning institutions is fundamentally erroneous. I have 
argued above that oil as a commodity does have important 
effects on the structure of the state and the pattern of 
capital accumulation, but the larger production relations of 
oil-exporting countries are not derived from the conditions 
of extraction of oil, but from dynamics produced by capital 
accumulation on the world level. One major argument of this 
study is that the internationalization of money capital has 
necessitated capitalist transformation of peripheral 
countries; the latter are no longer enmeshed in the world 
market through trade only. However, the characterization of 
oil revenues as absolute and differential rent explains the 
origins of superprofit in the oil industry, and thus its 
place as provider of enormous amounts of revenues, but this 
does not mean that no exploitation of workers occurs in the 
process of production of oil. The character of the oil 
sector as being dependent on nature only modifies the 
operation of the law of value in comparison with the
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manufacturing industry; it does not eliminate exploitation.
In determining the class character of oil-based states the 
guestion of the pattern of the distribution of the rent is 
of prime importance since it indicates the nature of the 
ruling class and the particular pattern of development of 
class forces. Although at the present stage of capital 
accumulation OPEC countries are predominantly capitalist, an 
examination of the distribution of oil-rent shows that the 
level of the development of capitalism varies from one 
country to another. There is no homogeneous monolithic bloc 
of oil-exporting countries, although the oil-mediated link 
with the world market does produce certain common effects in 
these countries. In Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, oil-rent is 
mostly used for luxury imports or investment in real estate 
property and treasury bonds in other countries, indicating 
the strong precapitalist character of the ruling class. In 
Iran, Irag, Algeria and Venezuela, oil-rent has been 
utilized to transform precapitalist production relations, no 
matter how partial this process has been.
The capitalist nature of the major oil-exporting countries 
can be shown not only by the direct role of the state in the 
transformation of relations of production, but also by the 
existence of state oil corporations which make the state the 
biggest capitalist in the country (Nore, 1980). Given the 
'strategic' and economic importance of oil for the 
reproduction of the capitalist system, the state in 
oil-exporting countries plays a central role in maintaining 
the interests of capital. This is not to say that the 
precapitalist structures have been dissolved completely, nor
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that, with the development of capitalism, these countries 
have already become entirely independent politically and 
economically. OPEC is not an institution of the 
'anti-imperialist' 'national bourgeoisie' of the Third 
World. Its contradiction with the IEA on the world market is 
not antagonistic. Oil-exporting and oil-consuming countries 
are organic components of the world market and their 
relationship is marked by mutual interests and structural 
interdependence. Messarrat recognizes this fact, but insists 
that the development of capitalism in OPEC countries has 
only transformed the old relationship between capital and 
precapitalist landed property into a new relationship 
between capital and modern landed property.
In this section, I have discussed the common effects of an 
oil-mediated integration with the world market on the 
structure of the state and class formation in major 
oil-exporting peripheral formations. I have emphasized that 
the specific conditions of the extraction and production of 
oil foster the relative autonomy of 'rentier states' and 
intensifies the tendency towards state interventionism. In 
discussing the nature of the oil sector, I have accepted 
much of Messarrat's theoretical perspective on the 
characterization of oil revenues as superprofits derived 
from the absolute and differential ground rent, but have 
argued that the class character of the state in major 
oil-exporting countries is not derived from the 
specificities of production of oil as a commodity, but from 
necessities of the present phase of capital accumulation on 
the world level.
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Insofar as the principal function of the state is 
maximization of surplus appropriation for accumulation and 
extended reproduction of capital, the state is capitalist. 
Rentier states are distinguished by the fact that the 
direction of surplus in the production process is only 
partial; and a large part of surplus is unproductively 
consumed by the state apparatuses. This, however, does not 
imply a precapitalist character for the rentier state. 
Indeed, in the majority of oil-based countries the oil-rent 
has been used to transform precapitalist production 
relations, as the case of Iran will show, but the failure of 
the state to develop fully productive forces and homogenize 
production relations emanates from the larger context of the 
world market and from a host of other factors, such as the 
particular political structure, and the level of political 
and military dependency on the imperialist centre.
B. Anglo-American Imperialist Rivalry and Nationalization 
of Oil: 1941-1953
In August 1941, Iran was invaded by British and Russian 
troops. Reza Shah's pro-German sympathies and the German 
invasion of the USSR in June 1941, provided the Allies with 
an excuse to invade Iran. The main reason for the invasion, 
however, was to use the Trans-Iranian Railway to send 
supplies to the troops in the USSR. The British forced Reza 
Shah to abdicate in September 1941 and he was subseguently 
sent into exile and died in Johannesburg in July 1944. Upon 
his abdication, his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, ascended the
throne.
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During the war, Iran was once again divided by imperialist 
powers into three zones: British in the south, Soviet troops 
in the north, while Tehran and the central province 
remaining unoccupied. In January 1942, the Allied leaders 
met in Tehran and agreed to a pact that guaranteed the 
departure of Allied troops from Iran within six months after 
the end of the war.
The Allies' occupation had severe economic and political 
impacts on the country. It led to the devaluation of the 
currency by 100%, and the subsequent inflation, combined 
with a decline of the marketable agricultural surplus, 
resulted in a great scarcity of goods and famine in towns 
(Katouzian, 1981:142-4). During the war and in the immediate 
post-war years, the state monopoly on foreign trade became 
inoperative, as Britain and the US opposed any limits on 
their national exports. The few industries which were 
established by Reza Shah declined and, by 1950, only 53,000 
were employed in industrial enterprises, that is, less than 
one-half percent of the population (Keddie, 1981:127). 
Likewise, private capital investment was negligible during 
the period as it appeared risky and insecure. There was a 
great deal of hoarding, and investment in urban real estate 
was the major form of capital investment.
Politically, Reza Shah's abdication and departure from Iran 
ended 16 years of dictatorship and unleashed a new wave of 
political activity. During the war years Iran witnessed the 
formation of numerous political parties, societies, and 
associations by both radical and conservative forces. Free 
press, trade unions and a relatively free parliamentary
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system re-emerged, and the Iranian Communist Party (Tudeh 
Party) grew and expanded enormously. The Tudeh Party, whose 
members had been jailed by Reza Shah in the 1920s and were 
released after his departure, grew into the most 
influential, best organized, and the largest communist party 
in the Middle East. It became a major political force in 
Iran during this period and was particularly influential in 
the more prosperous regions of the north, which have 
traditionally been a stronghold of radical and leftist 
politics. It also grew southward, and gained considerable 
influence amongst the oil workers of the southwestern oil 
fields, which were controlled and owned by the British.
By 1944-45 the Tudeh Party controlled the streets of almost 
all major towns. In 1944, its membership reached 25,000. The 
Federated Trade Unions of Iranian Workers and Toilers 
(CCFTU) was formed also around the same time, consisting of 
400,000 members and 186 trade unions (Iran and Permanent 
Revolution:1983:5) . By August 1946, three cabinet ministers 
were members of the Tudeh Party (Keddie, 1981:121).
According to the British ambassador in Tehran, 8 out of 11 
cabinet ministers in 1946 were either communists or 
communist sympathizers (Abrahamian, 1982:234).
Iran during the occupation was divided not only by class 
antagonism but also by ethnic and regional struggles. In the 
north, the presence of the Red Army and the tremendous 
influence of the Tudeh Party encouraged demands for autonomy 
in the two provinces of Azarbaijan and Kurdestan. In 
November 1945, the Democratic Party of Azarbaijan, formed in 
September 1944, took over the region and established a
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National Assembly. The provincial government of Azarbaijan 
called for autonomy from the central government. Similar 
events occurred in Kurdestan where the Kurdish Democratic 
Party, formed in 1945, proclaimed the formation of the 
Kurdish Republic in January 1946. Both autonomous 
governments were strongly supported by the Red Army which 
prevented the central government troops from entering these 
provinces.4
The British, who owned the entire oil industry in the south, 
saw their vital economic interests at stake and watched 
these developments anxiously. From their point of view, the 
presence of the Red Army in the north, the formation of the 
autonomous governments, and the tremendous influence of the 
Tudeh Party, were signs of the central government falling 
into the hands of the Bolsheviks. By then, the classic 
British imperialist policy was, whenever its interests were 
endangered, to provoke ethnic and tribal rebellions against 
the central government. Thus, when the Tudeh Party organized 
a general strike in the oil fields in 1946 involving some 
100,000 workers, the British provoked the minority Arab 
workers against the majority Persian workers to divide and 
break the strike. They also mobilized the reactionary forces 
of the region - religious leaders, tribal chiefs and large 
landlords - to pressure the central government to expel the 
three communist ministers from the cabinet.
After the end of the war, when British and American troops 
left Iran, the USSR refused to evacuate its forces from the 
northern provinces according to the treaty it had signed and 
made it conditional upon receiving a northern oil concession
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from the central government. During the war years, oil 
appeared to be the centre of inter-imperialist rivalry in 
Iran. The Iranian parliament had passed a law in September 
1944 making it a crime to enter into negotiations with 
foreign powers for oil concessions while Allied troops were 
in Iran. The Soviet Union's insistence on the northern oil 
concession, which it had been demanding since October 1944, 
was basically a reaction to Anglo-American rivalry. The 
British wished to preserve their concession in the AIOC 
intact and to keep out competition in the face of growing 
Iranian nationalism and the interests of other powers. 
Moreover, since 1943 two American companies, Standard Vacuum 
and Sinclair, had been investigating the possibilities for 
obtaining the northern oil concession. However, following 
negotiations between the USSR and the Iranian government, 
resulting in the promise of a 50-year joint Soviet-Iranian 
oil concession in the north, the USSR agreed to withdraw its 
troops in March 1946. The consequences of the Soviet 
withdrawal proved disastrous for the northern autonomous 
governments. In November 1946, the central government's 
troops, backed by the British, invaded the provinces and 
both autonomous governments collapsed. While some of their 
leaders fled, others were jailed and executed. Subsequently, 
the joint-concession with the USSR was rejected by the 
Iranian government.
The issues of the northern oil concession and the autonomous 
governments of Azarbaijan and Kurdestan marked the first 
major US involvement in Iran. Without US support, it would 
have been almost impossible for the Iranian government to 
crush the autonomous governments and to refuse,
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subsequently, the northern oil concession to the USSR. These 
developments also involved Iran in the cold war which was to 
polarize international politics in the post-war period.
Iran, as a country of economic and strategic significance, 
that is, an oil-rich country with a large market for 
manufactured goods and capital investment, and as a 
defensive base against the USSR, was gradually coming into 
the focus of emerging US imperialism.5
It is important to note that the gradual emergence of the US 
as the hegemonic imperialist power in the post-war years was 
fundamentally related to changes in the structure of US 
capital and in the pattern of inter-imperialist rivalry. The 
uneven character of capital accumulation on the world level 
led to a shift in the centre of concentration and 
centralization of capital from Britain to the USA. The US 
capital, having been fundamentally influenced by the 
recession of the 1930s, appeared as the centre of Fordist 
accumulation in the post-war period and sought to 
reconstruct the world economy on a basis which could secure 
its access to markets and raw materials. More precisely, 
British hegemony over the region was challenged by the US 
from 1941, when the latter entered the war, until 1957, when 
the Eisenhower doctrine was proclaimed. This transitional 
period was marked by Anglo-American rivalry and conflict in 
the Middle East (Halliday, 1974:505). Apart from the 
conflict over the Suez Canal in 1957, the oil
nationalization crisis of 1951-53 in Iran was clear evidence 
of this inter-imperialist rivalry and of the declining 
British hegemony in the region. The oil nationalization 
crisis was a turning point in Iranian history, in that it
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put an end to the Anglo-American rivalry over markets, raw 
materials, resources and concessions in Iran. Over the next 
two decades, the US emerged as the single dominant 
imperialist power in the region.
The fall of Reza Shah, and the Allies' rivalry over the 
northern oil concession during the occupation, raised the 
question of the 1933 oil agreement, and indeed the whole 
question of Iranian oil resources and oil revenues. 
Throughout the 1940s, nationalist feeling in Iran was 
directed against the continued ownership of Iran's oil by 
the AIOC. In the immediate post-war years the AIOC was 
paying out an ever smaller percentage of its growing income 
and royalties to the Iranian government. The revenues paid 
to Iran amounted to only 11.9% of the total net income of 
the company; this was less than the 19.5% in taxes which the 
company was paying to the British government. Iran's share 
in the company's profit was only 14.6%, even less than the 
16% of profits which Iran had received under the D'Arcy 
concession of 1903 (Katouzian, 1981:183). Therefore, the 
1933 agreement, which had extended the period of concession 
for another 60 years, was generally considered as a colonial 
imposition. Between 1933 to 1951 the Iranian government had 
received a total of £105 million from the AIOC, while the 
AIOC had paid £715 million in taxes to the British 
government and £115 million worth of profits to its 
shareholders. The AIOC had also invested £500 million in 
other branches which it had established outside Iran in 
order to avoid payment of taxes to the Iranian government 
(Nirumand, 1969:102). Table No.2 shows that even the taxes 
collected by the British government from the company were
256
greater than the amounts the Iranian government received 
under the contract:
Table 2: Iranian Profits and British Tax Collections From the AIOC. 1948-1950
Year Iranian Profits British Tax Collections(million pounds) (million pounds)
1948 9 28
1949 13.5 23
1950 16 50.5
Source: Nirumand, 1969:45
Oil was thus the central issue of the elections in 1950; and 
oil-workers' demonstrations in the AIOC fields in 1951 
forced members of the parliament to approve the Oil 
Nationalization Act of parliamentary deputy Mohammad 
Mossadeg, who headed a loose bourgeois-national organization 
called the National Front. Mossadeg was elected as prime 
minister in 1951. In June 1951 the oil industry was 
nationalized and the state-owned National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC) took over the fixed assets of the AIOC. An 
offer was made to the AIOC to resume activities as an 
operating company on a 50-50% profit sharing basis, and the 
Iranian government would compensate the AIOC for its 
unilateral abrogation of the 1933 agreement.
The AIOC refused the 50-50% profit sharing offer. The 
reaction of British imperialism was to send battleships to 
the Persian Gulf, to freeze Iranian assets, and to file 
complaints against Iran in both the World Court and the 
United Nations Security Council. The British government also 
imposed a boycott on the direct purchase of Iranian oil by
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any oil company or individual country. As a result, the 
seven international oil companies (the so-called 'seven 
sisters') which controlled the transaction and shipment of 
oil throughout the world, boycotted the purchase of Iranian 
oil. The British-imposed boycott resulted in a severe loss 
of oil revenues and a decline in oil-related employment in 
Iran. From the Oil Nationalization Act in 1951 to 1953, Iran 
exported only 103,000 tons of oil, or less than the amount 
of its exports in a single day prior to nationalization 
(Nirumand, 1969:105).
During the oil nationalization dispute, the US played a 
conciliatory role, as both Iran and Britain turned to the US 
as a mediator. From the point of view of the 
nationalist-bourgeois government of Mossadeq, the US was a 
counter-balance to the old British colonialism in the 
region. From the US point of view, Mossadeq's government was 
the best alternative to the rise of communism in Iran, 
especially given that the Tudeh Party, after a major 
crackdown in 1949, had gained enormous power through the 
nationalization crisis and was again operating openly.6
As the Tudeh Party grew stronger and pro-Tudeh 
demonstrations continued, it seemed that political struggles 
in Iran had reached new proportions. The prime objective of 
the US was to put an end to British hegemony in the Middle 
East, so that it could secure Iranian markets and oil 
revenues for itself and perpetuate Iran's incorporation into 
its 'zone of influence'. But Mossadeq did not seem a strong 
enough barrier against 'communism'. In January 1953, when 
the Eisenhower Republican administration took office in the
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US, British and US views on how to resolve the issue 
gradually coincided. The US, now backing the boycott, was 
becoming convinced that Mossadeg could not cope with 
'communism', and that he was not going to sign an oil 
agreement favourable to American interests. In August 1953, 
a coup d'etat, organized by the CIA and British Intelligence 
Office, overthrew the nationalist-bourgeois government of 
Mossadeg, and the Shah, who had fled to Italy, was returned 
to the throne.7 The CIA spent about $19 million to carry out 
the coup (Ahmed, 1973:10; Nirumand, 1969:87).
The 1953 coup culminated a year later in a 25-year agreement 
which left effective control of oil production and 
marketing, and 50% of the profits, in the hands of the 
so-called 'seven sisters' (Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Gulf and 
Standard Oil of N.J. from the US, British Petroleum and 
Anglo-Dutch Shell) and the French oil cartel Compagnie 
Francaise des Petroles. Although the Iranian state now 
received 50% of the oil profits in place of the 11.9% 
pre-nationalization profit sharing arrangement, the eight 
world oil companies forming the Consortium were the real 
controllers of oil production, pricing and distribution. As 
can be seen in the following table, the British share 
dropped from 100% to 40% in the post-nationalization period, 
egual to that of the US companies which previously held no 
share in the oil industry.
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Table 3: Participation of Oil Companies in Iranian Oil
Name of Company ParticipatingPercentage
British Petroleum Oil Co. 
(formerly the AI0C)
40%
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey 8%
Standard Oil Co. of California 8% US
Texas Oil Co. (Texaco) 8% Firms
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. 
(Socony-Mobil Oil)
8%
US Firms
Gulf Oil Corporation 8% 40%
Royal Dutch Shell
(60% Dutch, 40% British)
14%
Compagnie Francaise des 
Petroles
6%
Total 100%
Source: Nirumand, 1969:100
C. Foreign Capital Investment and the Rise of Capitalist 
Industry
It was argued in Chapter Two that in the post-war period the 
new requirements of imperialism were no longer those of raw 
materials and markets, but the demands of finance capital 
for higher rates of profit through export of capital 
(Clawson, 1979). This is the phase of the
internationalization of the circuit of money capital when 
capital export becomes the central mechanism through which 
peripheral economies are integrated with the world market. 
This phase also corresponds to the development of a 
capitalist home market in the periphery which, in the case 
of Iran, was based on a 'sub-Fordist' mode of accumulation.
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The post-war 'Point Four Programme', launched by the US in 
the Middle East, had exactly the function of establishing 
the context for the export of capital to Iran. The Programme 
sought to establish the prerequisite of a capitalist home 
market by providing technical, financial, commercial and 
administrative 'assistance' to the countries of the Middle 
East. In Iran, the Programme began in October 1950 and 
continued until 1965. Its objective was to implement 
structural and administrative reforms in all areas of the 
economy. The Shah was pressured to sell his Crown Lands to 
the peasants; factories were reorganized for sale to private 
industrialists; and attempts were made to attract private 
foreign capital investment by re-organizing the 
newly-established Industrial Development Centre and Plan 
Organization in 1954 (Amuzegar, 1966:18-9). The first 
seven-year development plan of 1949 was partly financed by 
this Programme through a $25 million grant in 1950 
(Nirumand, 1969:41).8
The Point Four Programme, however, covered only a small part 
of the total US aid and loans which were poured into Iran as 
'emergency grants' and 'special assistance' following the 
1953 coup. Most of the grants and loans, which totalled 
$127.3 million in 1954 alone, came from the Foreign 
Operation Administration and Export-Import Bank (Alexander 
et al., 1980:270). Between 1955 and 1960 Iran received $500 
million in military assistance, almost 50% of the total US 
aid, which amounted to $900 million (Ahmed, 1973:13). The 
drastic rise in both military and economic aid to Iran after 
the coup can be shown by the comparison that while before 
the coup military and financial aid to Iran amounted to less
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than $30 million, in the period of 1953-70 it reached $2,300 
billion. This exceeded any amount the US offered to a 
non-NATO country during this period (Ramazani, 1982:28,327).
These loans and grants can be considered as 'port-folio' 
investment, or the early forms of capital export from the 
centre. They diminished as a proportion of capital 
investment during the 1960s and, by 1967, US financial 
assistance to Iran was formally terminated. From the 
mid-1960s onwards, capital export from the centre began to 
take a distinctly different form: direct investment in the 
manufacturing industry, spurred by the spread of tariff 
barriers to encompass products previously exported to Iran. 
In the 1970s, investment by private foreign capital 
generally took the form of 'joint-ventures' between MNCs and 
the state and local private capital, or the form of 
technology with imported machinery and capital goods. These 
different forms of capital export, and their investment at 
the point of production, signalled the internationalization 
of the circuits of money and productive capital, the rise of 
capitalist production relations and the development of a 
capitalist class in Iran. The Iranian state played a central 
role in this process; it directly intervened in the capital 
accumulation process and became a major capital investor.
As mentioned before, until the 1950s the oil industry was 
the only area in which major capital investment took place. 
In the late 1950s and 1960s the state initiated an 
aggressive campaign to attract foreign capital investment in 
other areas of the economy. For this purpose, the Centre for 
the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment (CAPFI)
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was established in 1955. Under CAPFI's supervision, foreign 
investors who entered into joint-ventures with Iranian 
industrialists were guaranteed all rights, exemptions, and 
facilities accorded to domestic capital. They were 
guaranteed 5-year tax exemptions, exemption from duty on all 
imports, as well as the right to repatriate profits in the 
currency in which they first invested and guarantees of 
compensation in case of nationalization or war.
Following the formation of CAPFI, private foreign capital 
inflow increased rapidly. In the eight years after the 
establishment of the Centre the total foreign capital 
investment increased by about 800%. In the decade of 
1963-73, the inflow of foreign capital was valued at some 
$130 million (McLachlan, 1977:151). By 1970, 90 foreign 
firms were established in Iran; by the mid-1970s, their 
number reached 200 (Bharier, 1971:192, Halliday, 1979:153). 
During the 1970s, and especially after the oil boom in 1973, 
the state promoted the establishment of joint-ventures with 
private or state capital. By 1975 some 193 joint-ventures 
had been set up with foreign capital of 18 different 
countries (Issawi, 1978:145). The following table shows the 
amount of foreign capital investment in the manufacturing 
industry in the period 1956-68.
263
Table 4: Foreign Private Investment in Iranian Manufacturing 
Industry, 1956-68 (ml. rials)
Year
Total
approved Inflow Outflow
investments of funds of funds
1956 122 31 0
1957 101 63 0
1958 294 25 1
1959 24 135 0
1960 170 139 0
1961 365 198 5
1962 595 396 15
1963 1,350 193 144
1964 483 253 90
1965 4,319 808 451
1966 n . a . 958 265
1967 n . a . 668 153
1968 n . a . 1,583 586
Source: Bharier, 1971:191
The US was the major foreign capital investor in Iran and, 
by the late 1960s, its private capital investment was 
estimated in excess of $200 million, or half of Iran's total 
private investment. By 1975 US private capital investment in 
Iran reached $1 billion, and there were some 400 US firms 
with stakes in Iranian industry. It was, however, only after 
the oil boom in 1973-74 when Japanese capital took over US 
capital, amounting to 43% of all foreign capital investment 
(Halliday, 1979:154). The following table shows the major 
foreign capital investors in Iran during the period of
1968-76.
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In the 1970s foreign capital investment in Iran was 
concentrated in the most technologically advanced industries 
such as capital-intensive petrochemical and electronics. 
These industries were designed to lead Iran toward 
export-substitution industrialization based on the 
'peripheral Fordist' mode of accumulation. The statistics on 
foreign capital investment in Iran, as shown in the previous 
table, might suggest that the presence of foreign money 
capital has not been very significant. These figures, 
however, are not very accurate. From the mid-1960s onwards, 
a large part of foreign capital inflow consisted of 
technology and machinery imported on a large-scale for 
capital-intensive industry. It is also safe to assume that 
foreign capital entering the country through channels other 
than direct investment was much higher. For example, foreign 
capital inflow in the form of loans and credits formed about 
20% to 30% of Iran's total capital formation in the early 
1960s. In 1961 alone, loans to Iranian industrialists from 
foreign suppliers of capital goods and raw materials reached 
an estimated $400 million (Benedick, 1964:61-2). Although 
tariff and tax policies of the state provided an incentive 
for private foreign capital investment in the manufacturing 
industry, the principal factor for foreign capital inflow 
was not tariff barriers and cost differentials between the 
local production and the world market, but the dynamics of 
capital accumulation in the centre, that is, concentration 
and centralization of capital at the monopoly stage of 
capitalist development.
The rapid increase in foreign capital investment was 
obviously accompanied with the growth of private capital
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accumulation and the rise of a local capitalist class. The 
four main fractions of the capitalist class, the industrial, 
financial, agrarian and mercantile bourgeoisies, grew 
rapidly during this period.9 Likewise, the state played a 
central role in the formation of this class and in the 
encouragement of private capital investment through its 
fiscal and monetary policies, and through the formation of a 
number of financial institutions.
The first incentive for the growth of private capital 
investment was provided by the state through the devaluation 
of currency in 1957. The devaluation of currency and an 
increasing money supply led to a boom in the 1955-59 period, 
marked by increasing state expenditure and private sector 
credit. This period, for the first time, witnessed the 
growth of private capital investment on a large scale, 
private investors responding to cheap credit and low rate of 
inflation. The devaluation of currency made $95 million 
available to the state, and $48 million of this was 
allocated as credit to private investors (Benedick, 
1964:102). Loans extended to the private sector increased by 
46.1% in 1957, 60.3% in 1958, and 32.4% in 1959 (Walton, 
1980:246). In the period between 1950 and 1960 private 
capital investment in industry climbed from $60 million per 
year to an estimated $120 million (Baldwin,1967:103).
Mahdavy (1970:441) estimates that between 1955 and 1959 the 
total private capital investment increased five-fold. 
Although an overwhelmingly large proportion of private 
capital investment continued to be concentrated in urban 
real estate construction, the boom in construction swamping
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all other types of investment, about 20,000 factories of all 
sizes were established in the course of four years between 
1952 and 1956 (Bharier, 1971:184).
One of the main incentives for private capital investment 
was the establishment of a number of banks and financial 
institutions by the state in the 1960s. These institutions 
were the Industrial Credit Bank (ICB), established in 1957, 
the Industrial Guarantee Fund, founded in 1959, the 
Development and Investment Bank of Iran (IMDBI), established 
in 1973, the Bank Melli Iran and the Agricultural 
Development Bank.10 These banks, strongly supported by the 
state were instrumental in encouraging private capital 
investment in industry through easy credits and loans. Their 
formation led to the mobilization of large amounts of 
capital and the expansion of credit. The IMBDI was founded 
with 60% Iranian capital (both state and private) and 40% 
foreign capital (Benedick, 1964:124). It was therefore the 
first major area of foreign capital investment in the 
Iranian economy outside the oil industry. The IMDBI became 
the most effective institution in the country in supporting 
private capital investment, and the major source of 
provision of large-scale, long-term credit to private 
industry. It sought foreign partners for Iranian capitalists 
in joint-venture projects; provided foreign exchange for the 
import of capital goods; and protected domestic production 
of goods against foreign competition. In the period of 
1954-7, the IMDBI provided loans totalling $873 million to 
private enterprises and directly invested $116 million in 
industry. In 1974 alone it made loans of $291 million, and 
direct investment of $49 million (Issawi, 1978:154-5).
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Parallel to the formation of state banks was the growth of 
private banks and financial institutions. There were no 
private banks in Iran until the early 1940s. The first 
indigenous private bank in Iran, the Bank Bazargani Iran 
(Commercial Bank of Iran) was founded in 1949 but had very 
little impact on the economy. Beginning in 1953, 5 new 
private banks were established, and by 1960 there were 17 
private banks in Iran. The number of branches of private 
commercial banks increased from 1,000 in 1960 to 4,500 in 
1968 (Bharier, 1971:224-5, Issawi, 1978:160). The 
development of private commercial banks and financial 
institutions also suggest the growth of a sizeable financial 
bourgeoisie. Foreign capital substantially participated in 
the formation of these banks, and jointly-owned banks with 
US, West European and Japanese capital flourished.
Banks and financial institutions were not the only means by 
which the state promoted private capital accumulation.
Fiscal and monetary policies of tax-holidays, licensing, 
easy credit and customs rebates also played an important 
role in this process. The policy of licensing was used to 
control and guide both foreign and private local capital, by 
directing investment into selected industries and using it 
to encourage decentralization of industry. A license would 
enable the holder to receive governmental or bank credits, 
tariff exemption on imported goods, eligibility to buy 
governmental land, water and power at nominal prices, and 
tax exemptions for five years. Industrial enterprises were 
also offered exemptions from taxes on export profits, 
low-rate export credits, and rebates on duties paid on 
materials used in exported products. A further incentive was
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given to joint-venture companies by exempting 10% of their 
profits from taxation. If losses occurred to private 
industry, they could be carried out over a number of years, 
and profits re-invested in industry or derived from export 
earnings were exempted from taxation. The direct income tax 
law of 1966-67 made industrial enterprises tax-exempt for 
ten years. Furthermore, through its trade policies, the 
state committed itself to support enterprises by limiting 
competition within the home market, creating additional 
tariff barriers to protect them, and, in some cases, by 
banning importation of foreign goods.11
To further encourage private capital accumulation, in the 
late 1960s, the state began the sale of its holdings in the 
consumer goods industries to the private sector and limited 
its direct investment to large-scale, capital-intensive 
units such as steel mill, tractor assembly, petrochemicals, 
machine building, heavy engineering and electronics. Light 
industries, generally producing durable and non-durable 
consumer goods such as radios, television sets, footwear, 
oil heaters, and food products were left to the private 
sector. The Tehran Stock Exchange was established in 1967, 
with the IMDBI as the prime force behind its formation. Both 
the IMDBI and the Tehran Stock Exchange offered shares to 
private investors.
The state also assisted private capital accumulation through 
the development of a public infrastructure. Most of the five 
development plans were infrastructural;12 they expanded 
means of communication, electric power capacity, areas under 
irrigation, water supplies, and other general facilities. In
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this way, they provided low cost services to capitalists and 
lowered the initial costs of production. Transport and 
communications was, consistently, the largest category of 
expenditure in these development plans.
On the whole, these policies initiated a process of rapid 
capital accumulation by foreign and local private capital. 
Between 1957 and 1960 the number of factories increased from 
45,000 to 70,000. An annual average of 400 commencement 
permits for the manufacturing industry were issued by the 
Ministry of Economy in the 10-year period of 1958-68. Within 
the same period, sales of industrial fuel oil almost 
doubled. Iran's manufacturing sector grew about twice as 
fast as the average growth of this sector in other 
peripheral economies (Bharier, 1971:183-9).
It can readily be seen that the phase of the 
internationalization of money capital also led to the 
formation of a capitalist class and altered the composition 
of the power bloc. We have seen that in the phase of the 
merchant capital the power bloc was formed by the 
feudal/merchant classes, producing for the external market 
but operating with precapitalist production relations: the 
'agro-export oligarchy'. With the internationalization of 
money capital this model of domination entered into crisis. 
Beginning in the early 1960s, a relatively sizable 
bourgeoisie came into existence whose social origins was 
constituted by three major classes: (i) the landowning
class; (ii) the merchant class; and (iii) the petty 
bourgeoisie.
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The land reform, which will be discussed in the next 
Chapter, played an important role in the formation of the 
bourgeoisie. The land reform law provided landowners with 
compensation for the land they had to sell to the state.
This compensation took the form of shares in state-owned 
factories. In this way, the state aimed to create a class of 
industrial bourgeoisie out of the landowning class and to 
transform at least part of its wealth into capital invested 
in industry. In practice this transformation was very 
limited because the majority of ex-landlords did not invest 
in industrial production, and directed their capital in the 
areas of construction, urban land speculation, banking and 
insurance.
The merchant class constituted the second social origin of 
the Iranian bourgeoisie. As has been shown in the previous 
Chapters, the socio-economic ties between the merchant and 
landlord classes in Iran have generally been strong, as a 
result of the movement of merchant class into landownership 
in the 19th century. Until the early 1960s, merchants 
continued to buy land and invest in agriculture. The land 
reform and the various incentives for private capital 
investment must also have driven some merchants into 
capitalist production; a process of transformation of this 
class, which as we have seen, was both promoted and hindered 
as a result of the incorporation of Iranian formation into 
the circuit of commodity capital.13
The transformation of simple commodity producers into 
capitalist producers ran on similar lines. The majority of 
small-scale capitalists came from a petty-bourgeois
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background. But, in addition to small factory owners, some 
of those who built industrial empires in the 1960s and 1970s 
also came from bazaar simple-commodity production.I *14 Thus, 
the 'first path' of transition to capitalism, direct- 
producer/capitalist, which was blocked in Iran in the 
earlier stage of the internationalization of merchant 
capital, became possible under the auspices of the state, 
albeit in a belated and distorted way. However, only a small 
proportion of simple-commodity producers managed to 
transform into capitalist production. Within these 'first 
path' capitalists, the majority either stagnated at the 
level of small-scale production or fell into the ranks of 
the proletariat. The transformation of simple-commodity 
producers into capitalist producers further shows the 
important role which the state played in the formation of 
the bourgeoisie.
I have previously mentioned that the capitalist class was
divided into the four fractions of industrial, financial,
mercantile and agrarian bourgeoisie. However, the
differentiation of this class into these fractions does not
imply that they were exclusive. Many individuals were
involved in more than one area of economic practice: there
were capitalist farmers involved in trade, merchants
involved in finance, and bankers involved in construction
and real estate. It is therefore difficult to determine the
size of the various fractions of the capitalist class,
although it is certain that the bourgeoisie as a whole
formed a very small proportion of the population. Bashiriyeh
(1984:15) maintains that in the 1970s the bourgeoisie was
composed of 150 families, who owned 67% of all industries
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and financial institutions; while Halliday (1979:151) 
estimates that in 1974, 45 families controlled 85% of firms.
The internationalization of money capital also led to the 
expansion of capitalist wage-labour. The real turning point 
in the formation of a sizeable working class in Iran was the 
land reform of 1962 which unleashed a large-scale process of 
dispossession of direct producers. The overwhelming majority 
of the Iranian working class came from peasant and 
petty-bourgeois backgrounds. The massive rural to urban 
migrations, from the 1960s onwards, formed one of the main 
features of this class. Parallel with the processes of 
migrations and dispossession, the proportion of agricultural 
workers in the total labour force dropped from 75% in 1946 
to 46% in 1966, then to 33% in the late 1970s (Bharier, 
1971:34-5). The industrial labour force grew from 23% of the 
total labour force in the 1960s to 34% in 1978 (Bashiriyeh, 
1984:51).
Methods of documenting changes in the class structure by 
reference to demographic changes or to shifts in the 
distribution of the 'economically active population' among 
various 'sectors' of the economy are notoriously unreliable. 
The categories employed in this type of statistics do not 
directly reflect changes in the nature of production 
relations; nor do they allow us to identify the prevailing 
mode of production in agriculture and industry. Despite this 
inadequacy, the above figures certainly indicate the 
tendency towards dispossession of direct producers and the 
rapid growth of capitalist wage-labour. From 1965 to 1968, 
employment in industry expanded at a rate of 5.8% annually,
274
and in the 1969-75 period it rose to 7% a year 
(Johnson,1980:15) . On the whole, out of an economically 
active population of totalling 10.4 million in 1977, an 
estimated 2.5 million were employed in approximately 250,000 
manufacturing firms (Looney, 1982:3). Between 60% to 70% of 
wage-earners were employed in small-scale enterprises, but 
the number of large-scale enterprises also increased form
198.000 in 1966 to 700,000 by the mid-1970s (Halliday, 
1979:182). About 78,000 of these wage-earners were employed 
in the oil industry, including the vast army of day 
labourers who were organized by labour contracts (Turner, 
1980:275). The oil-industry remained the largest employer of 
wage-labour, despite its capital-intensive nature and the 
tendency towards the decline of wage-labour employment. In 
addition to 2.5 million wage-labourers in oil and 
manufacturing industries, there were also about 1 million 
unskilled workers employed in construction (Hooglund, 
1982:119). The figure of 3.5 million wage-labourers in 
1977-8 is a substantial increase over the 1956 figure of
800.000 wage-earners (Kazerai, 1980:42), and suggests that 
the working class accounted for between 30% to 35% of the 
total economically active population by the late 1970s.
The underlying strategy of the state-sponsored process of 
industrialization in the 1960s was the import-substitution 
policy. This policy led to the development of a sub-Fordist 
mode of accumulation in Iran. Import-substitution policy, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, represents an attempt by 
peripheral states to develop a Fordist model of accumulation 
based on the importation of producer goods financed out of 
the agricultural surplus or the mineral and oil rent.
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Massive customs barriers would then nurture a sector 
producing consumer goods for the narrow middle class market 
within the country. However, in most peripheral economies, 
as in Iran, the adoption of such a policy does not lead to a 
genuinely Fordist system, but a 'sub-Fordist' mode of 
accumulation (Lipietz,1984). Sub-Fordism in the periphery is 
based on capital-intensive methods resulting in 
unemployment, acute unequal income distribution, a 
distortion of the price system (due to the uncompetitiveness 
of commodities on the world market) and an almost total 
dependence of the industrial sector on the internal 
market.15 It is, however, erroneous to suggest that the 
failure to develop a genuinely Fordist system of 
accumulation in the periphery is due to the wishes of 
metropolitan capital to 'block' the process of 
industrialization at this phase of world capital 
accumulation. Rather, this failure is partly due to the 
absence of the social conditions for the development of a 
system of intensive accumulation, that is, the insufficient 
transformation of the internal social relations, the 
immaturity of the bourgeoisie as a class, the limited 
development of wage-relations and the narrow internal 
markets.
It is a truism that the development of sub-Fordism in the 
periphery actually increases the differences in productivity 
levels between the centre and the periphery, and intensifies 
periphery's dependence on the metropolitan economies. As we 
shall see in the following Section, dependency on the oil 
rent as the principal source of financing the accumulation 
process intensified these tendencies in Iran. However, the
276
development of sub-Fordism in Iran is reflected by all the 
old indicators of 'economic growth': the share of consumer 
goods imports in the total imports declined from 30% in 1959 
to 11% in 1969 (Looney,1982:39); and manufactured products 
diversified from 300 different types in 1958 to 450 in 1960 
(Bharier, 1971:188). Both the industrial sector and the 
industrial output expanded and diversified.
The evidence marshalled above suggests that: (i) foreign 
capital investment began in earnest in the post-war period. 
The Iranian economy was incorporated into the circuit of 
money capital, first, via 'portfolio' investments, and then 
increasingly through direct capital investment. Although 
tariff barriers and tax policies of the sub-Fordist strategy 
were beneficial to foreign capital, I have argued that the 
causes of capital export should be sought in the dynamics of 
metropolitan monopoly capitalism rather than in the cost 
differentials between local production and the world market; 
(ii) by sponsoring banks and financial institutions, and by 
favourable taxation, licensing and trade policies, the state 
played a central role in encouraging private capital 
accumulation; (iii) capital export from the centre and the 
promotion of private capital accumulation by the state also 
led to the formation of a capitalist class and the growth of 
capitalist wage-labour. The composition of the power bloc 
was altered and the bourgeoisie developed into the dominant 
class of the Iranian formation.
I have so far discussed the process of industrialization in 
Iran without any direct reference to the role of the oil 
sector. A distinct feature of industrialization from the
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mid-1960s onwards was the rapid increase in the share of 
public investment and public consumption as compared to that 
of private sector. This shift in the pattern of 
industrialization can be understood only in relation to the 
development of the oil sector as the principal source of 
financing capital accumulation.
D. Oil and Capital Accumulation
With the discovery of oil in 1908, the oil industry became a 
major basis for the production of surplus to the 
metropolitan centre and, after its nationalization, the 
fundamental factor underlying the emergence of a 'rentier' 
state. I have previously shown that in the period of 
1908-51, the AIOC paid only a meagre proportion of the net 
profit derived from oil to the Iranian state. During Reza 
Shah's reign, the total oil income accounted to only £35 
million, and oil revenues financed between 10% to 30% of the 
state development budget. For the whole period between the 
discovery of oil and its nationalization (1908-51), the oil 
revenues accruing to the state amounted to £120 million 
(Bartsch, 1971a:246-9).
The period of 1950-56 represents a landmark in Iranian 
economic history in that the structure and sources of 
capital accumulation, and the role of the state in this 
process, were fundamentally altered. In the previous Section 
it has been shown that Iran had undergone a substantial 
process of capitalist industrialization from the mid-1950s 
onwards. Transition to capitalist production relations 
forces social actors to maximize their profits. The
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capitalist rentier state, as a commodity owner on the 
market, is subject to the same driving force of capitalist 
accumulation, that is, maximization of revenues and profits. 
Under this pressure, the Iranian state intensified the 
exploitation of oil revenues. Economically, this meant that 
the superprofits were, to a degree, transformed into a 
differential rent and were appropriated by the state. The 
appropriation and maximization of this differential rent was 
especially pronounced from the mid-1960s onwards, when the 
oil sector became the principal link of the Iranian economy 
with the world market. The oil revenues formed the 
cornerstone of the relative autonomy of the state, and the 
pattern of their distribution affected the whole structure 
of the economy and the relationship of the state with the 
bourgeoisie.
Although nationalization of the oil industry meant in 
practice that only 50% of the share of the industry was held 
by the state, it enabled the state to appropriate a larger 
share of the rents that had previously accrued to the 
foreign oil companies as profits. While in 1950 oil revenues 
amounted to only £16 million, they reached over £100 million 
in 1960 and £183 million in 1965 (Mahdavy, 1970:438). The 
increase in the oil revenues was particularly pronounced 
from 1965 onwards: oil revenues amounted to $437 million in 
1962-3 and $712 million in 1967, and they totalled $6.3 
billion for the period of 1954-69 (Amuzegar et al., 1971:36; 
Bartsch, 1971a:246; Fesharaki, 1976a:133). The following 
table shows that in the post-nationalization period oil 
revenues have been substantially larger than other sources
of state revenues.
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In the early 1970s, two major developments accentuated the 
centrality of the oil sector to the Iranian economy. One was 
the total nationalization of the oil industry in 1971-2, and 
the other was OPEC's decision in 1973 to increase the price 
of oil. Peripheral integration with the world market makes a 
country vulnerable to sudden changes which are unrelated to 
its internal developments. The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and 
the subsequent Arab oil boycott, as well as short-term oil 
shortages in the US, were in no way directly related to 
internal developments in Iran in the early 1970s. However, 
following OPEC's decision, the price of Iranian oil per 
barrel rose from $1.50 in 1972 to $10 in 1974; and oil 
revenues increased from $2.2 billion in 1972 to $5 billion 
in 1973 and $20 billion in 1974 (Housego, 1976:21; Looney, 
1982:121).
The increasing oil revenues throughout the 1960s, and the 
fourfold increase of oil prices in 1973, made large amounts 
of oil-rent available to the state, and affected the pattern 
of capital investment, state consumption and expenditure, 
foreign trade, and, indeed, the whole structure of the 
economy. From the mid-1960s onwards, the major trend of the 
economy can be identified as an increased share of state 
consumption, expenditure and investment compared to that of 
the private sector.
I have indicated above that after 1955 there was a period of 
rapid increase in private capital investment stimulated by 
the state's credit and foreign exchange policies. It is 
important to note, however, that in the decade of 1955-65 
the share of private investment was higher than state
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investment. In 1962-3, for example, the level of private 
investment was almost twice that of state investment 
(Katouzian, 1981:229; Mahdavy, 1970:439). Most of the state 
investment in this period was limited to construction and 
infrastructure, and was complementary to private sector 
investment; state investment directed, rather than replaced, 
private capital activities. However, from the mid-1960s 
onwards the state moved to the centre stage and capital 
investment and expenditure by the state came to dominate 
private capital activities. This central economic role of 
the state was obviously possible only because of the 
increasing oil revenues and the state's monopoly of the oil 
sector. Throughout the 1960s the average annual growth of 
the oil revenues was 18%, that is, higher than the average 
annual growth of non-oil income which was about 15%. Oil 
revenues financed about 55% of the second development plan 
(1950-62), 66% of the third development plan (1963-76), and 
80% of the fourth development plan (1968-72) (Amuzegar et 
al., 1971:43-53). The extent to which oil revenues financed 
capital accumulation was also indicated by their proportion 
in total government revenues and foreign exchange earnings. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, oil revenues provided between 
50% to 80% of the total government revenues and between 80% 
to 90% of total foreign exchange receipts. The following 
table shows these oil revenue percentages in the period of
1963-77:
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Table 7: Share of Oil and Gas Sector in Government Revenues, 
Foreign Exchange Receipts and Gross Domestic Product During 
Five-Year Plans (Percentage)
Third Plan 
(1963-67)
In
Government
Revenues
48.1
Fourth Plan 
(1968-72) 55.2
Fifth Plan 
(1973-77) 77.7
Source: Walton , 1980:279
In
Current Foreign 
Exchange Receipts
In
GDP
75.8 18.7
76.2 24.0
84.7 37.4
Oil revenues transformed the state into the chief spender 
and investor: in 1963-7 state investment increased at an 
annual average of 26%, against 11% for the private sector.
In 1968, the public sector accounted for 49% of all 
investments in contrast to 34% in 1963. Between 1968 and 
1973 the public sector was responsible for 58% of all 
investments, and invested about $5 billion in industry. The 
share of the state investment in the economy reached 60% in 
1975 and 65% in 1976. The ratio of private investment to 
public investment declined substantially: from 1.53% in 1963 
to 1% in 1972 to 0.74% in 1977. The main institution through 
which the state invested in industry was the Industrial 
Development and Renovation Organization (IDRO); by the early 
1970s, the IDRO had a major stake in or owned 90 major 
large-scale firms (Halliday, 1979:149; Housego, 1976:35; 
Looney, 1982:64-5; McLachlan, 1977:141).
These figures show the specificity of Iran's oil-based 
economy: the bulk of investment in Iran since the mid-1960s 
was being undertaken by the state, the sole recipient of oil
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revenues. But the state dominated the economy not only in 
the area of capital investment but also in consumption 
expenditure. The rates of state consumption expenditure were 
particularly high after the oil boom in 1973, making $98.2 
billion of oil-rent available to the state, instead of an 
anticipated $24.6 billion, to finance the fifth development 
plan of 1973-78 (Housego, 1976:21). The immediate reaction 
to the quadrupling of oil prices was the doubling of the 
budget of the fifth development plan from $24.6 billion to 
$69 billion, and the immediate expenditure of the revenues 
as they accrued. In 1973, state consumption expenditure 
jumped by more than 220% over the previous year. During the 
first quarter of 1975, state spending increased by 280%, 
compared with the same period in the previous year. In 
1974-5 alone, the state spent $22 billion. Money supply 
increased by 60% per year, and imports were running at $1.2 
billion a month. Private consumption also increased very 
rapidly but at a much lower rate: in 1977-8, private 
consumption was 7 times and state consumption was 26 times 
what they had been in 1962-63 (Bashiriyeh, 1984:86; Graham, 
1978:19-87; Katouzian, 1981:86).16
What is significant in this connection is not only the 
domination of the economy by the state through high 
investment and consumption expenditure, but also the way in 
which the oil rent was distributed amongst various classes.
I have argued above that the pattern of the distribution of 
the oil rent is one of the clearest indications of the class 
character of the state and of the level of the development 
of productive forces. The distributive policies of the state 
also play a central role in the formation of the bourgeoisie
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and in limiting the latter's economic and political 
existence.
A large part of the superprofits earned by the oil sector 
was distributed in the form of easy and liberal credit 
policies amongst certain fractions of the indigenous and 
foreign bourgeoisies. Generous fiscal incentives, exclusive 
industrial licensing, and low or non-existent taxes lowered 
the price of capital goods and over-valued exchange rates, 
leading to a rapid accumulation of capital by Iranian 
capitalists and their foreign counterparts. But these low 
credit rates were almost exclusively available to large 
capitalist enterprises. Small shopowners and petty-commodity 
producers had no access even to unsubsidized bank credit, 
since their enterprises did not provide sufficient capital 
for loans. They therefore had to borrow in the bazaar, where 
interest rates were about 25% to 100% as compared to about 
12% normal bank interest rates (Keddie, 1981:171).
Despite the above figures indicating large-scale state 
investment in the economy, capital investment in productive 
processes by the state was at best partial, compared to 
investment in the unproductive areas of the economy; arms 
purchases and defence budgets, housing, commerce, imports of 
luxury goods and purchase of bonds abroad consumed a much 
larger share of the surplus. After the oil boom of 1973, the 
state launched several programmes, including nuclear energy 
development, foreign aid to several Middle Eastern and 
African countries, and eguity investment in major industrial 
countries. In total, $2.38 billion was disbursed in 1974-5 
on foreign loans, grants, and investments abroad, more than
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twice the amount that Iran spent in the first two 
development plans from 1949 to 1962 (Graham, 1978:112-3).
Few of these areas directly increased the total social 
capital. Another example of the pattern of the distribution 
of the surplus by the state was the removal of all trade 
restrictions imposed earlier by import-substitution policy. 
The liberalization of trade policy was pursued from 1973 to 
1977. Within this period, loans to private sector increased 
by 289%, but more than half of these credits went into trade 
and imports. Within the same period, the number of private 
commercial banks increased from 24 to 36, and the volume of 
banking transactions increased sixfold (Bashiriyeh,
1984:87). Thus the distribution of surplus more through 
consumption and expenditure than production further enriched 
certain fractions of the bourgeoisie: the major 
export-importers, bankers, financiers and urban land 
speculators were those who benefited from the over-expansion 
of the monetary system.
In Iran, the bourgeoisie which grew under the shadow of the 
state was dependent on it in a way distinct from, for 
example, the peripheral bourgeoisie in India or the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie in Japan. The relative autonomy of 
the state was not only derived from the state's monopoly 
ownership of the oil sector but also from the historical 
weakness of the bourgeoisie. When necessary, the state was 
able to sacrifice the interests of one fraction of the 
bourgeoisie at the expense of another. The state could 
suspend its support for locally-produced consumer goods and 
allow the mercantile bourgeoisie to import similar or luxury 
goods, thus curbing the interests of the industrial
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bourgeoisie. The liberalization of trade policy, as 
mentioned above, led to massive concentration of capital by 
banks and large traders at the expense of the producers of 
consumer goods. It is not a contradiction to say that the 
same factors which enhanced the relative autonomy of the 
state also inserted it deeper into the class struggle. This 
point can best be exemplified by the period of fiscal crisis 
and recession in the 1975-8 period.
The recession of 1975-8 was caused by a fall in oil prices 
and a reduction of demand for oil on the world market.17 The 
1976-7 budget deficit was $2.4 billion, the government owed 
a further $3 billion to the contractors, and the rate of 
inflation was about 200% annually (Bashiriyeh, 1984:89-90; 
Graham, 1978:98-100). The state responded to the fiscal 
crisis through measures such as instituting shareholding by 
workers, 'anti-corruption' and 'anti-profiteering' 
campaigns, wage-rises, tight credit control, and control 
over prices and profit margins. These measures, despite the 
fear, panic and flight of capital they caused,18 were by no 
means anti-capital moves. A very small proportion of the 
working class was affected by share participation scheme as 
small-scale industry and banks were excluded and the law was 
never fully enforced. These measures, however, provide 
significant examples of the relationship between the state 
and the bourgeoisie and the direct role of the former in the 
class struggle. They show the extent to which the state was 
prepared (and able) to intervene in both circulation and 
production spheres in order to secure the conditions of its 
own existence. Obviously, the ultimate function of the 
rentier state is the maintenance of social relations of
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production for the requirements of the oil economy. This is 
also partly the condition of the reproduction of the 
bourgeoisie as a class, although as this particular 
conjuncture shows, state intervention is not always tied to, 
or compatible with, the interests of the bourgeoisie. 
Consider, for example, the wage rises. The oil revenues 
enabled the state to pay certain sections of the working 
class above the value of commodity labour power. This was 
apparently not compatible with the interests of capital, but 
necessary, or it seemed so, for the maintenance of the 
system as a whole. Both wage increases and the share 
participation scheme were designed to create an illusion 
amongst wage-earners that they, too, were benefiting from 
the oil income. Through these measures the state tried to 
buy the consent of some sections of the working class by 
penalizing some fractions of the bourgeoisie.
Despite its dependency, and despite these apparently 
anti-capital moves, the bourgeoisie remained the main 
beneficiary of the oil surplus. It is almost impossible to 
establish, quantitatively, the accurate proportions of the 
surplus distributed amongst various fractions of the 
bourgeoisie, or consumed in those areas of the economy 
described here as unproductive. The available statistics 
cannot be readily translated into the theoretical categories 
employed in this study. It is, however, possible to 
determine approximately the pattern of distribution of 
surplus on the basis of the data on the sectoral growth of 
the economy. For our purposes, it is particularly the 
so-called 'services sector' which is important. This sector 
covers a heterogeneous group of activities such as housing,
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insurance, trade, road construction, communications, 
banking, and education. Diverse economic activities, from 
those of the big banker to those of the car washer and 
street vendor, are lumped together in the 'services sector'. 
In most peripheral economies the share of services in the 
GNP (which indicates the level of total national income) is 
generally high; but in oil-based economies, where the 
provision and use of different kinds of services are 
encouraged by the availability of the oil revenues, the 
services sector constitutes a much larger share of GNP. In 
Iran, the contribution of services to GNP rose from about 
10-20% in 1900 to 45% in 1976 and to 55.6% in 1977-8 
(Bharier, 1971:61; Katouzian, 1981:260). In terms of 
employment, the share of services also rose rapidly. The 
following table shows the share of each sector in employment 
in the period of 1962-78:
Table 8: Sectoral Distribution of the Total Labour Force 
1963-78 (Percentage)
1962-3 1967-8 1972-3 1977-8
Agriculture 55.1 49.0 40.9 32.2
Industry 20.6 24.7 29.0 33.2
Services 23.8 25.7 29.5 34.0
Oil 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:Katouzian, 1981:259 
As can be seen from the above table, the share of services
in employment increased from 23.8% in 1962 to 34% in 1978;
higher than the share of employment in any other sector of 
the economy. The disproportionate growth of this sector,
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both in terms of its contribution to GNP and to labour force 
employment, is the result of the much higher income per 
worker in this sector (Katouzian, 1981:260-1). Distribution 
of large amounts of surplus by the state, in the form of 
high salaries and easy credit policies, led to the 
disproportionate growth of this sector. Bureaucrats, 
bankers, insurance brokers, hoteliers, restauranteurs, real 
estate speculators and financiers were the recipients of 
this high income.
The disproportionate growth of the services sector is also 
indicative of the growth of the middle class. It has also 
been argued earlier that the dynamics of oil-based capital 
accumulation particularly lead to the over-expansion of the 
middle class. In the case of Iran, it is impossible to 
present any accurate statistical analysis of the growth of 
the middle class as the existing data are vague, scanty and 
conflicting.19 However, it is certain that in the 1960s and 
1970s the development of the middle class was substantial, 
to a large part due to the over-expansion of state services 
and apparatuses. According to Bayat (1987:25, 61) the number 
of those employed in services, that is, in commercial, 
insurance and banking services, as well as the state 
bureaucracy, reached 1.65 million in 1978. About 68% of 
these 'services workers' were in the state sector, as 
teachers and clerical workers, and 213,000 were employed in 
the private sector (Ibid.:61).
It is also significant that within the services sector 
itself the share of 'state services' was dominant: it grew 
from one-fifth of the total service expenditure in 1963 to
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one-third in 1978 (Katouzian, 1981:258). It is safe to 
assume that a large proportion of 'state services' covered 
bureaucratic expenditures and military defense purchases.
For example, the expenditure of the surplus on the state 
bureaucracy rose from R99 billion to R730 billion between 
1971 to 1975 (Bashiriyeh, 1984:86). But it was particularly 
in the area of defense and military purchases where the 
expenditure of the surplus was substantial. While during the 
entire period of 1950-72 Iran's arms purchases amounted to 
$1.5 million, between 1973 and 1979 they reached $19 
billion. The share of defense expenditure in GNP was also 
massive: between 1968 and 1971 the percentage of GNP that 
went to military expenditure rose form 5.6% to 18.5%. By the 
late 1970s, Iran was the largest buyer of American arms in 
the world; its defense expenditure accounted for 27% to 29% 
of the total government budget (Falk, 1979:43; Halliday, 
1979:95; Race and Class. 1979:93; Ramazani, 1982:47;
Sampson, 1978:252; Theberge, 1973 : 19). 20
In the 1960s and 1970s Iran experienced high rates of 
growth; between 1962 and 1978 GNP increased 10-fold, from 
$4,323 million to $43,365 million (Katouzian, 1981:256). But 
it was particularly in the period of 1973-8 that the rates 
of growth of the economy were extraordinarily high: GNP grew 
by 34% in 1973-4 and by 42% in 1974-5 (Housego, 1976:27). 
However, as has often been pointed out, national income 
statistics are misleading in that they tell us nothing about 
the regional and class division or which classes benefit 
from the expansion of the economy and which classes provide 
the surplus-value. They also tell little about the internal 
structure of the economy and its relationship with the world
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market. Moreover, GNP rises generally do not deal with 
non-monetary sources of value, such as subsistence 
production or domestic labour, and they could simply reflect 
the expansion of the monetary system and not a genuine 
development of productive forces. These statistics are 
particularly misleading (and high) in the oil-based 
economies where the oil sector occupies a predominant 
position in Gross Domestic Product (GDP, which simply 
measures the total wealth generated within a country) and is
the major factor in determining its size . In Iran , as the
following table shows, oil revenues formed 12% of GNP in
1962 and 50% of GNP in 1973, due to the fourfold increase in
oil prices (Katouzian, 1981:257) •
Table 9: Sectoral Distribution of Gross 
1963-78 (Percentage)
National Product
1962-3 1967-8 1972-3 1977 -8
Agriculture 27.4 21.6 10.3 9. 2
Industry 17.8 20.7 12.6 18 .5
Services 40.0 36.4 23.9 34 .6
(state services) 7.6 9.4 7.9 10 .9
Oil 12.3 18.0 50.6 34 .7
Source: Katouzian, 1981:257
As the above table shows, the second largest contributor to 
GNP was the services sector, indicating that this sector was 
the main beneficiary of the over-expansion of the monetary 
system, while the lowest share belonged to agriculture, 
which declined from 27.4% to 9.2% in the 1962-78 period. 
Corresponding to the extra-ordinarily large share of the oil 
sector in GNP was the continual decline of the share of
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non-oil GDP in the GNP: it fell from about 90% in 1959-63, 
to 81% in 1972, to 70% in 1973 and to 66% in 1977 (Looney, 
1982:60). The growth rates in GNP, therefore, are basically 
indicative of the increase in oil revenues, and do not 
reveal the many signs of backwardness in the Iranian 
economy. National income statistics, however, do show a 
salient feature of the Iranian economy: Iran in the 1970s 
was a fully oil-based economy in that a single export, oil, 
accounted for over one-third of its GNP and 80% to 90% of 
its total foreign exchange earnings.
The centrality of the oil sector in the economy, and the 
failure of the state to achieve its industrialization 
objectives, become even more clear if we examine the 
input-output structure of the home market and the way in 
which the sub-Fordist system of accumulation developed. 
Instead of relying on the export of primary products and 
foreign loans to develop its manufacturing sector, as is the 
pattern in most peripheral countries, Iran relied heavily 
and almost exclusively on the export of oil. A clear 
indication of this reliance on oil is the economy's 
export-import structure: in the decade of 1965-75, the value 
of oil-export income, the value of all other exports, and 
the value of imports stood in relation to each other in the 
approximate ratio of 7:1:6, meaning that without oil 
revenues Iran could finance only about one-sixth of its 
total imports (Hameed et al., 1975:919). Moreover, the oil 
revenues enabled the state to increase imports without any 
necessity to promote internal production. Imports increased 
extremely rapidly: their value soared fivefold to $15 
billion between 1972 and 1976 (Housego, 1976:21). Oil
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revenues allowed imports to be continually higher than 
non-oil exports, as the following table shows:
Table 10: Excess of Imports Over Non-Oil Exports
Period Percent
1900-5 821910-14 611925-29 631935-39 161946-48 971955-60 2631957-60 363
Source: Baldwin, 1967:59
The import-substitution policy did increase industries' 
production of consumer goods: by 1970 consumer goods output 
had increased to 68% of manufacturing goods over the 1962 
figure of 62%. But the expansion of consumer goods industry 
did not result in increasing export of manufactured 
commodities: exports accounted for only 4.7% of the 
manufacturing sector's output in 1962, falling to 2.3% in 
1970. Moreover, the manufacturing sector's linkage with 
other sectors of the economy remained very weak: in 1962 it 
sold 31% of its output to other sectors and this fell to 19% 
in 1970, an extremely low percentage (Looney, 1982:30-1). 
These figures reveal a number of salient structural features 
of the home market: expansion of industry was based on the 
development of the means of consumption, while declining 
export capacity, increasing dependence on imports and the 
weak sectoral linkages of the economy indicate the 
underdevelopment of the the means of production.21 As the 
following table shows, agricultural commodities (mostly 
dried fruits, cotton, and raw materials) continued to 
constitute the bulk of Iran's non-oil exports, that is,
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between 80% to 90% of the total non-oil exports.22
Table 11: Exports From Iran Excluding Oil, Gas and Minerals. 
Value in $ Millions.
1968-9 1971-2
Value % Value %
Growth
Rate
Agricultural
Produce
125.3 59.8 80.9 55.1 18.1
Carpets 59.6 29.4 75.4 23.0 40.1
Other
Manuf actures
24.6 11.8 71.6 21.8 40.1
Total 209.5 100.0 328.0 100.0 27.1
Source: Hameed and Bennet, 1975:427
Therefore, although an oil-financed import-substitution 
policy diversified the production of consumer goods for the 
internal market, the 'virtuous circles' of intensive 
accumulation could not be established in Iran, and the 
dependency of the economy on the world market was 
intensified by the import of productive goods and export of 
oil. The sub-Fordist system of accumulation does not lead to 
'self-sufficiency', especially when it is based on 
production and export of oil.23
Class and regional inequalities, which exist in all 
societies undergoing capitalist industrialization, were 
further accentuated in Iran by the state's policies of the 
expenditure of the surplus in unproductive areas of the 
economy, and by reliance on monetary rather than fiscal 
policies. The statistics on income inequality do not readily 
show the existing class inequalities because they are based 
on income and occupation, which refer to technical rather
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than social relations of production. They are, however, 
indicative of class inequalities and of the way these 
inequalities are exaggerated in oil-based economies.
According to an ILO study of 1973, 10% of the population 
accounted for 45% of total private consumption, while 30% at 
the bottom of the income scale accounted for only 8% of 
private consumption. The income inequality between the urban 
and rural areas was even sharper. According to the same ILO 
study, urban incomes, compared with rural incomes, increased 
from 4.6:1 in 1956 to 5.7:1 in 1969. The distribution of the 
oil rent in the urban areas, where higher income groups were 
concentrated, and the emphasis on urban-based 
industrialization, were the main causes of income inequality 
between the two sectors.24
These figures show the concentration of industry and 
economic surplus in the urban areas, where the bourgeoisie 
lived. This class also enjoyed a high level of consumption. 
In a rentier economy where rent tends to be invested in 
unproductive areas such as construction, import of luxury 
items, and urban real estate development, where the 
bourgeoisie has no real economic and political existence 
independent of the state, and where it is the state which 
shapes the pattern of capital accumulation, high rates of 
income and profits earned by a minority tend to be directed 
more towards consumption than production.
In this Section I have discussed the structure of 
industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s in order to confirm 
the characterization of the rentier state and the economy as
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discussed above, and to establish the proposition that, 
although the superprofits earned by the oil sector provide 
the best opportunity for industrialization, in effect they 
promote the dependency of oil-based economies on the 
external markets.
E. Towards the Internationalization of Productive Capital
None of the characteristics discussed above, investment of 
oil rent in unproductive areas, failure to develop the 
productive forces, low level of labour productivity, high 
degree of dependency on the world market, and extreme 
regional and class inequalities, imply that no transition to 
the CMP occurred in Iran. The question of the development of 
capitalism is primarily a question of the transformation of 
production relations, rather than the levels of labour 
productivity. No matter what specificities an oil-mediated 
link with the world market imposed upon the development of 
the state and the economy, and despite the substantial 
amounts of surplus squandered on palaces, bureaucratic 
consumption, outright corruption, nuclear installations, and 
ultrasophisticated weapons, Iran in the 1960s and 1970s did 
experience substantial capitalist transformation. Waste, 
corruption and arms purchases did act as barriers to capital 
accumulation,25 but economic surplus was also invested in 
the productive sectors of the economy, although to a 
relatively small extent. The capitalist nature of fiscal and 
monetary policies of the state was unmistakable, and by the 
1970s a fairly diversified manufacturing sector had been 
established.
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The state's economic activity has been shown to have 
concentrated on three areas: (1) building up a modern 
infrastructure; (2) promoting a sub-Fordist system of 
accumulation involving the substitution of manufactured 
products via local production; (3) direct investment in 
heavy industries such as petrochemicals, oil refineries and 
steel mills. As has been indicated above, the state priority 
in the 1970s was given to investment in heavy industry 
designed to produce for external markets. Parallel to this 
support for export industries, credits were re-allocated to 
the restructuring and merger of industrial enterprises. In
1973 a State Fund to guarantee exports was created which 
would cover defaulting foreign debtors. The move from 
import-substitution of consumer goods (sub-Fordism) to 
production of manufactured commodities for external markets 
(peripheral Fordism) was greatly assisted by the quadrupling 
of oil prices in 1973, but would have been unthinkable 
without the existence of a capitalist ruling class and a 
state ready to play the export-substitution card. Promotion 
of export-substitution industrialization signalled the 
beginning of the internationalization of the circuit of 
productive capital and a more direct role of the MNCs in the 
economy.
An indication of this new phase was a number of commercial 
contracts signed between the Iranian state and MNCs between
1974 to 1976 in which Iran committed itself to provide a 
base for the production and export of manufactured 
commodities by MNCs (Bani-Sadr and Vieille, 1978). The 
promotion of joint-ventures with foreign capital by the 
Iranian state, either through state-to-state barter
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agreements or direct investment by MNCs, should also be seen 
in the context of the internationalization of productive 
capital. To induce MNCs to locate themselves in the Iranian 
economy, the state assured financial, infrastructural, and 
capital participation, and a guarantee of external markets.
Indeed, after the oil boom of 1973 Iran became an instant 
paradise for multinationals. It presented indisputable 
advantages for these firms: investment facilities such as 
private and especially public participation in industry, 
industrial credits, profit repatriation, cheap labour power, 
abundant energy, an expanding market, and political 
'stability'. Earlier, in the 1960s, assembly plants had 
flourished through a sub-Fordist system of accumulation. 
These plants included automobile assembly plants, and plants 
producing television sets, refrigerators, buses, and radios. 
In the 1970s capital investment by the MNCs was especially 
directed towards oil refineries, gas, petrochemicals, steel, 
iron, copper, and other industries designed to lead Iran 
towards export-substitution industrialization.
The development of the petrochemical industry is a good case 
in point. Petrochemicals were the major projects of the 
1970s, and multinationals played an important role in their 
development because they involve large amounts of capital 
investment and technological expertise. In 1965 the state 
had established the National Petrochemical Company (NPC), 
whose aim was to attract foreign capital and technical 
assistance for the implementation of petrochemical projects. 
The state entered into three joint-ventures with three 
multinationals for petrochemical projects. Two were American
299
firms, Allied Chemical Corporation and AMOCO International, 
each holding 50% of the share, with 50% held by the state.
The third joint-venture was with B.F.Goodrich on the basis 
of a 74-26% shareholding, with the larger share belonging to 
the state. Total combined state and foreign capital 
investment in petrochemical projects was $675 million in the 
1968-71 period (Bartsch, 1971a:260). By far the largest 
industrial venture was the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company, 
concluded in 1976 between the NPC and a Japanese industrial 
consortium in which Mitsui was the major shareholder with 
45% of equity (McLachlan, 1977:162).
Apart from these projects, a number of bilateral economic 
agreements were also concluded between Iran and West 
European countries. These contracts were either based on 
oil-for-goods exchange, which ensured portions of the 
Iranian market for individual industrial states and 
multinational firms, or provided for direct capital 
investment by these firms. These trade agreements included 
projects for industrial housing, participation in the 
automobile components industry, construction of nuclear 
power stations, steel mill industries, oil refineries and 
arms purchases. Metropolitan countries were thus able to 
're-cycle' the oil money through these contracts, and, so to 
speak, 'captivate' potentially profitable markets in Iran.
The statistics for this period give an idea of the extent of 
the involvement of the multinationals in the Iranian 
economy. Between 1965 and 1970, US-based MNCs invested $150 
million in Iranian industries other than oil and gas, 
bringing total US investment to $700 million and total
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foreign investment to $1.3 billion. After the 1973 oil price 
rise, foreign capital investment increased rapidly; 
investment in industry by US firms, combined with capital 
invested by the Iranian state reached nearly $20 billion by 
the end of 1978. In 1976, Iran purchased another $6 billion 
worth of commodities from the US, and an additional $5 
billion in services from various multinational firms (Petras 
and Morley, 1981:9).
Due to the abundance of foreign exchange provided by the oil 
sector, the Iranian state almost always held the upper hand 
in its joint-ventures with foreign capital, apparently 
controlling and restricting the latter. Especially after the 
oil boom, the largest amount of capital investment was 
always provided by the state. In the period of 1973-8, 
direct investment by the state in the economy as a whole, 
amounted to $46.2 billion, compared to $2.8 billion invested 
by foreign capital and $23.4 billion invested by the private 
sector. Within the same period, $2.7 billion was loaned to 
the private sector by the state (Halliday, 1979:155).
Foreign capital was allowed to invest in Iran only through 
joint-ventures, and in 1975 the state limited the maximum 
percentage of shareholding by foreign firms to 25%. But the 
subordinate position of foreign capital, in terms of its 
smaller percentage of shareholding, is only superficial. In 
contrast to other peripheral economies, foreign exchange was 
not a serious handicap to industrialization in Iran. The 
dependence of the Iranian economy on metropolitan capital 
was not so much derived from capital and foreign exchange 
shortage as from shortages of technical, technological and 
managerial skills, especially given the low levels of skill
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in rentier economies and the monopolistic control of MNCs 
over advanced technology. As I have discussed in Chapter 
Two, for the critics of the thesis of the NIDL the 
internationalization of production is marked by this 
technological dependency.
Through the development of export industries Iran had hoped 
to penetrate the markets of neighbouring countries in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, as well as those of India, 
and Egypt. In 1974, Iran provided loans worth $300 million 
to India and $1 billion to Egypt, and signed joint-venture 
contracts with India, Egypt and Pakistan in order to secure 
imports of raw materials to Iran and markets for export of 
Iranian manufactured goods (Burell et al., 1974:12-5). The 
prospects for the export of Iranian manufactured goods to 
Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf states seemed brighter. 
Iran exported its manufactured goods to Eastern Europe on 
the basis of state-to-state barter agreements. It seemed 
that it was only on this basis, when the possibility of 
competition was removed, that these 'markets' could absorb 
low guality goods. Iran exported 34% of its industrial 
output to Eastern Europe in 1972, and 24% in 1974 (Bani-Sadr 
et al., 1978:33). The lack of infrastructure and the 
fragmentation of the Persian Gulf states made them ideal 
markets for commodities produced by the MNCs in Iran, which 
could be exported to these states at lower costs and higher 
profits.
A number of writers, (Albrecht, 1979; Ahmed, 1973; Frank, 
1981a; Petras et al., 1981) have described Iran in the 1970s 
as a 'semi-peripheral' economy and a 'sub-imperialist'
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regime comparable to the South African and Brazilian 
states.26 The term 'sub-imperialism' is usually used to 
indicate the necessity of political repression as a 
prerequisite for the development of an intermediary 
economy.27 Sub-imperialist states are characterized by 
militarization, over-expansion of the repressive apparatuses 
of the state, and expansionist foreign policies. They are 
large, populous, and semi-industrialized countries which 
possess raw materials of great value to metropolitan centres 
and provide large markets for Western capital goods and 
capital investment.
In the 1970s Iran was in the process of being transformed 
into a 'Brazilian model of development' following the 
adoption of an export-promotion policy. Indeed, similarities 
of the pattern of the development of the home market in 
Brazil and in Iran were striking. The growth of monopoly and 
finance capital in Brazil had been accompanied by an 
increasing concentration of income, a greater flow of 
capital from the metropolitan centres through MNCs, and a 
stronger alliance between metropolitan and indigenous 
bourgeoisie. As in Brazil, the development of the peripheral 
Fordist system of accumulation in Iran excluded the working 
class and the bulk of the rural population from the benefits 
of industrialization; the main beneficiaries of the surplus 
were the Iranian bourgeoisie in partnership with MNCs. The 
emergence of Iran as the 'regional super-power' and the 
'ideal of the Nixon doctrine' was also a parallel 
development.28
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However, despite the important political and strategic role 
of the Iranian state for US imperialism in the region, it is 
important to stress that Iran was still far from being a 
'semi-peripheral' and 'intermediate' economy in the 1970s, 
even though it was certainly moving in this direction. The 
economic strength and expansionism of the Iranian state 
should not be exaggerated. Iran's search for agricultural 
raw materials in the 1970s reflected the declining state of 
its agriculture rather than the strength of its economy. The 
trade agreements concluded with, and loans provided to, 
other Third World countries (and a number of advanced 
capitalist countries) were only possible because of the oil 
boom which endowed the state with temporary financial power. 
The repressive apparatuses of the state, the army, the 
military and the secret police, over-expanded, but Iran 
basically remained a single-commodity export economy. This 
is reflected by the fact that, as an 'intermediate' economy, 
an overwhelming proportion of Iran's non-oil export remained 
in the category of agricultural raw materials and 
'traditional' handicrafts such as carpets. While Brazil, the 
arch-model of peripheral Fordism, provided 24% of 
manufactured exports in the Third World between 1966 and 
1975, Iran's share for the same period was only 2% to 3% 
(Frank, 1981a:98).
Despite all the peculiarities of an oil-mediated link with 
the world market, Iran was certainly moving towards the 
internationalization of the circuit of productive capital in 
the 1970s. We may draw the general conclusion that the two 
decades of capitalist industrialization in the 1960s and 
1970s resulted in the expansion of the internal circuit of
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capital accumulation and a local realization of a 
significant proportion of the surplus-value generated. The 
unprecedented revenues provided by the oil sector led to a 
deeper incorporation of Fordist sectors of the economy into 
the circuit of productive capital. The Iranian economy in 
the late 1970s began to take on functions of intermediation 
within the international economic system, such as those 
performed by Brazil and South Africa, but was at too early a 
stage of such development to be described as 
'semi-peripheral'. The whole process of the transformation 
of the economy along these lines came to a halt following 
the 1979 Revolution.
The character of peripheral capitalist development in Iran 
was further complicated by the fact that in the phase of the 
internationalization of the circuit of productive capital, 
leading to a fairly rapid real subsumption of labour 
processes by capital, capitalism remained a non-exclusive 
mode of production. The non-capitalist relations of 
production persisted, or were restructured, while they were 
progressively subordinated to the dictates of capitalism. In 
the following Section I shall identify these non-capitalist 
structures and specify the nature of their relationship with 
the dominant capitalist mode of production.
F. Capitalism and Non-Capitalist Forms of Production
A closer examination of the structure of the industry 
reveals the specific pattern of the development of 
capitalism in Iran. The manufacturing industry consisted of 
two sectors; large-scale, capital-intensive industry
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employing wage-labour, and small-scale 'traditional' units. 
The large-scale sector included the oil sector, state-owned 
enterprises, multinational firms, joint-ventures and other 
large-scale units of production which, under state 
protectionism and the import-substitution policy, produced 
durable and non-durable consumer goods and some capital 
goods. As mentioned above, it was this Fordist sector of the 
manufacturing industry which was the main recipient of the 
oil-rent in the form of easy credits and the tax exemption 
policies of the state. According to Bayat (1987:27) there 
were 923 of these units in Iran in 1973, including 162 
multinational firms. Small-scale industry, on the other 
hand, was divided into those units employing 10 or fewer 
workers, and those which operated on the basis of simple 
reproduction and family labour, that is, production 
processes which do not involve employment of wage-labour and 
extraction of surplus-value. The statistics indicate that 
small-scale industry constituted the predominant form of 
manufacturing in Iran. In 1960, 80% of factories employed 10 
or fewer workers, while only 1% of all industrial 
enterprises employed more than 200 workers (Benedick,
1964:26) .
This small-scale industry not only existed side-by-side with 
modern, capital-intensive industry, but also proliferated 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, in 1967, over 97% of 
the total number of industrial units employed 10 or fewer 
workers, while only 0.3% employed more than 50 workers 
(Looney, 1977a:ll). Moreover, although the small-scale 
industry employed the larger proportion of the labour force, 
it was responsible for the production of only a small share
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of industrial output. In 1967 small-scale industry employed 
about 68% of the total industrial labour force and produced 
32% of the industrial output (Looney, 1973:124). Large-scale 
industry, on the other hand, employed a small proportion of 
the labour force but produced most of the industrial output: 
in 1967, 0.7% of the industrial units, employing only 17% of 
the industrial workforce, accounted for 65% of the total 
industrial output (Bartsch, 1971b:16). The following table 
shows that, in the period of 1964-7, employment in 
small-scale industry grew at a faster rate than in 
large-scale manufacturing, 11.8% compared with 9.2% 
respectively, indicating the greater capital-intensiveness 
of the large-scale industry and the proliferation of the 
small-scale. Table 12 also shows that the annual rate of 
growth of small-scale industry (12.8%) has been higher than 
large-scale industry (7.9%), although the latter was 
responsible for a much higher proportion of the total 
industrial output.
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Table 12: Employment and Output of Large and Small Firms in 
the Urban Areas: 1964-67
Average
Annual
Growth
1964-7
1964 1965 1966 1967 (%)
Number of
Establishment
Small
Large
Total
108,920 
3,219 
112,139
108,920 
3,436 
112,356
108,920
3,552
112,472
156,233 
4,042 
160,265
12.8 
7.9 
12.7
Employment
Small
Large
Total
328,220 
164,879 
493,099
326,220 
198,722 
524,992
335,410
207,193
542,603
458,891 
214,377 
673,268
11.8 
9.2 
10.9
Value of
output
(million
rials)
Small
Large
Total
45,912
63,613
109,525
41,798 
86,024 
127,822
44,250 
96,779 
141,029
60,445 
119,396 
179,841
9.6
23.0
18.0
Note: Large Firms - engaging 10 or more persons.
Small firms - engaging fewer than 10 persons.
Source: Looney, 1973:116
These figures show a salient feature of the process of 
industrialization in Iran. Industry was composed, on the one 
hand, of a Fordist sector, that is, a highly developed 
sector based on capital-intensive methods, responsible for 
the employment of a small proportion of the labour force, 
and accounting for a much larger share of the total 
industrial output. The huge revenues generated in the oil 
sector had deeply incorporated these modern sectors of the 
economy into the international circuit of expanded 
reproduction, generally via the MNCs. On the other hand, 
there also existed 'traditional7 small-scale enterprises 
with much lower levels of labour productivity, outmoded 
methods of production, minimum capital provision, primitive
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division of labour and higher rates of employment.
For Barratt-Brown (1974), this pattern of industrial 
expansion is indeed the very essence of 'neo-colonialism' as 
experienced in the phase of the internationalization of 
production in the periphery. Endorsing the fact that most 
peripheral countries have undergone capitalist 
industrialization in the present phase of world capital 
accumulation, Barratt-Brown (1974) argues that this 
development has taken a 'dualist' form under the domination 
of multinationals:
What is emerging in the underdeveloped countries 
is a form of dualism, not between a subsistence 
sector of agriculture within a feudal framework 
and a market industrial capitalist sector, but 
between a high profit/high wage international oligopolistic capitalist sector and a low 
profit/low wage competitive local capitalist 
sector. (Barratt-Brown, 1974: 276)
Barratt-Brown (1983) has also described this pattern of 
development under the domination of multinational firms as 
'enclave development':
What is developed today by transnational companies 
in each of the developing countries is one mineral 
or primary product or one or two types of 
manufactured goods to fit into their synergy, as 
they call their mix of input and outputs. They 
look for oil or some other mineral in one area, 
forest and plantation crops in another, cheap 
labour for manufacturing in a third, and 
everywhere the world over they look for markets. 
But this leads to a peculiar kind of development 
in developing countries - the oil wells, the ore 
mines, the plantations or the free trade ports. We 
need to describe this as 'enclave' development 
because outside of the enclave little or no 
development takes place. (Barratt-Brown,
1983:155-6)
The structure of industrialization in Iran, as has been 
shown, is very similar to Barratt-Brown's 'dualistic' or
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'enclave' peripheral economies created by the 
internationalization of production. In Iran, large-scale, 
capital-intensive high-profit Fordist industry, representing 
wage-labour employment (on the basis of relative 
surplus-value extraction), a monopolistic position within 
the market, and high income per head, existed alongside the 
low profit/low wage competitive enterprises based on artisan 
or family labour and low income per head. What is 
significant is that, despite the hot-house capital 
accumulation in the 1970s, this 'traditional' sector did not 
disintegrate but actually proliferated and experienced a 
high rate of growth.
In addition to the notions of 'dualistic' and 'enclave' 
development, some writers have employed the distinctions 
between 'formal' and 'informal' sectors, and 'primary' and 
'secondary' markets to characterize this pattern of 
industrial expansion.29 I would argue that although these 
notions are not incorrect in themselves, they are merely 
descriptive in that they do not go far enough in analysing 
the particular character of the 'traditional' sector and its 
relationship with capital. A closer examination of these 
units of production reveals that the majority of them were 
based on non-capitalist production relations; and through 
their formal subordination by capital they were reproduced 
as integral parts of the reproduction cycle of the dominant 
CMP. This characterization can more clearly show the 
particular structure of the home market and the multiple 
class structure, as well as the failure of the Iranian state 
to generate the expanded reproduction of capital.
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To identify these non-capitalist structures, we should 
concentrate on the bazaar economy, an apparently coherent 
and independent economic sector but one deeply integrated 
into the CMP at both production and circulation levels.
Other more 'invisible' areas of the economy, such as the 
role of unpaid 'family labour' in the reproduction of labour 
power, usually linked but not confined to the bazaar 
economy, are also significant in this connection.
The bazaar is a concentrated complex of craftsmen, 
retailers, wholesalers, merchants, moneylenders, and simple 
commodity producers. Merchants and moneylenders form the 
highest strata of the bazaar; then there are shopkeepers and 
petty-commodity producers, such as cloth sellers, candy 
makers, carpet weavers, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, carpenters, 
cobblers, dyers, tailors, and quiltmakers. Each occupation 
is organized through guilds, and each guild has a leader who 
is usually a wealthy merchant or shopkeeper. Some prosperous 
craftsmen and artisans, such as goldsmiths and 
carpet-weavers, employ wage-labour but in the majority of 
cases the means of production are owned and controlled by 
the direct producers who sell their final product on the 
market.
Despite the substantial capitalist development in Iran in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the bazaar as a centre of commerce, 
credit and simple-commodity production did not disappear, 
although it did lose some of its prominence, and 
independence, by being subsumed by capital. Rather than 
abandoning the bazaar for capitalist production, the 
shopkeepers and small-commodity producers remained a viable
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centre of crafts production, commerce and retail sale; and 
some areas of the bazaar economy actually expanded with the 
development of capitalism.
The bazaar economy functioned both at the levels of 
circulation and of production. At the level of circulation, 
the bazaar remained a tightly-controlled and organized 
distribution network. Merchants and shopkeepers drew their 
sources of funds from trading, real estate transactions, 
moneylending profits and credits obtained from commercial 
banks. The large merchants were not only retailers and 
wholesalers, but also moneylenders; the borderline between 
trade and usury was indistinguishable. The bazaar formed the 
third important financial market in Iran, in addition to 
private commercial banks and state banks (Benedick, 1964). 
Therefore, despite the spread of a sophisticated banking 
system, the operations of bazaar moneylenders did not die 
out; the primitive forms of credit and merchant capital 
co-existed with finance and productive capitals. For 
instance, at the beginning of the 1960s there were up to 
half a dozen moneylenders (sarrafs) in Tehran making private 
loans of over R5 million, 50-60 lending R2 to R5 million and 
up to 600 to 700 making smaller loans (Benedick, 1964:65-6). 
Many of these moneylenders were large merchants who borrowed 
from commercial and state banks and then re-lent this money 
at higher interest.
Most of the loans were for consumer finance, construction 
and real estate, but some were also given to industrialists 
as sources of their capital investment. Dependence on the 
bazaar as a source of credit was particularly acute for
312
small factory owners - the characteristic Iranian 
manufacturing unit - because commercial and state banks, as 
mentioned before, were not concerned with loans to 
small-scale enterprises. Small factory owners were also 
dependent on the bazaar for supplies of raw materials where 
large merchants had access to the sources of raw materials 
as landowners sold part of their agricultural surplus 
through the bazaar system. Likewise, those small 
peasant-proprietors who managed to accumulate a marketable 
surplus usually took their surplus to the nearby towns and 
sold it to the bazaar merchants. Some bazaar merchants and 
moneylenders were also involved in the practice of advanced 
purchase of the products of sharecroppers who were usually 
in debt and in need of cash.30 Although dependency on the 
bazaar was greatly reduced for larger manufacturers, due to 
the substantial increase in private banking capital, in the 
1960s and 1970s the bazaar still remained an invaluable 
outlet for smaller factory owners.
The bazaar economy was, therefore, not only an important 
precapitalist structure of simple commodity production but 
also a centre of commerce and credit. Usury and primitive 
forms of credit remained an intrinsic part of capitalism in 
Iran. In cases of shortages of capital investment in small 
enterprises, which was quite commonplace, the bazaar more 
commonly provided loans to such investors than did the 
commercial and private banks. Therefore, the state control 
and regulation of financial markets did not eradicate or 
replace primitive forms of financial and credit markets.
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The bazaar was also a centre of subsistence production, that 
is, petty-commodity production of handicrafts and other 
'traditional' commodities. For this reason the estimation 
that 60% to 70% of the total industrial labour force was 
employed in small-scale industry during the 1970s is 
misleading, for it virtually excludes hundreds of thousands 
of those who worked in the bazaar workshops producing rugs, 
carpets, textiles, and metalwork (coppersmiths, goldsmiths, 
and blacksmiths). For example, in the case of textile 
industry we know that while 40,000 workers were employed in 
factories, 55,000 were engaged in handloom operations in the 
bazaar (Benedick, 1964:21). By 1970, there were about 45,000 
home workshops spread throughout the country (Bartsch,
1971a:261). There are no accurate statistics to 
differentiate between the two main labour processes within 
this category: that based on wage-labour and involving a 
total separation of direct producers from the means of 
production, which thus cannot be characterized as 
precapitalist; and those simple-commodity producers and 
'family workers' who owned their means of production either 
in the bazaar or physically outside the arena of the bazaar 
economy but usually connected with it. The following table, 
however, gives an indication of the size, and significance, 
of non-capitalist labour organizations within what is 
generally described as the 'informal' or 'secondary' labour
market.
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Table 13: The Position of Workforce of Secondary Sector in Total Employment, 1976-7
No. %
1. Small-scale industry 602,000 6.8
(Urban) (333,000) (3.7)
(Rural) (269,000) (3.0)
2. Petty-entrepreneurial 
sector
1,104,455 12.0
Petty-self-employed* 433,783 4.9
3. Domestic Servants 165,000 1.8
Total Wage-labourers 4,745,000 53.9
Total economically 
active population
8,799,420 100.0
* In all sectors except agriculture and hunting
Source: Bayat, 1987:31
The above table shows that while over 1.5 million persons 
were involved in petty-commodity production or were 
'self-employed' (in most cases the term 'self-employed' 
refers to the same thing: the simple reproduction of capital 
or petty trade), about 600,000 persons were employed as 
wage-labourers in small manufacturing enterprises. In other 
words, 17% of the total labour force within this sector can 
be characterized as direct producers, as compared with 6.8% 
who were wage-earners. This estimation, however, is not 
accurate because not only is the rural areas not included,31 
but also the category of unpaid family workers is not taken 
into account. This category mostly consists of women and 
children who are involved in production of rugs and carpets 
at home. In the absence of statistics, there is no way of 
determining its size and its significance in the 
reproduction of labour power or of the household as a whole.
315
However, scattered evidence suggests that, as a particularly 
non-capitalist activity, it proliferated in the 1970s.
Carpets have always been a major export item in Iran and
carpet weaving has always employed more people than any
other sector of the economy. In the 1960s export of carpets
regularly earned between $15 and $20 million of foreign
exchange annually. With the increase in production and
export of carpets in the 1970s, hundreds of thousands of
women and children were drawn into this area; and carpets
became the next major source of foreign exchange earnings
after oil. It is estimated that in 1964 about 125,000 people
were employed in carpet-weaving workshops (Baldwin,
1967:135-6) but even an approximate estimation of the number
of those involved in carpet-weaving is hard to come by.
According to the semi-official Keyhan newspaper in 1968:
In Mashhad and the region around it, there are about 300 carpet workshops that have altogether 10,000 carpet looms. There are over 30,000 carpet weavers employed in these workshops, and two-thirds of them are children aged between 6 and 10. (quoted by Jalil, 1976:15)
And again:
In Kashan and villages surrounding it there were about 30,000 carpet looms and 45,000 weavers. Only 10% of workers are men and the rest are women and children. The minimum age for a carpet weaver is 
7. The seven-year old girls instead of going to primary school sit behind carpet looms and work 
for 5 rials a day (2 \ pence at the 1968 exchange rate). (ibid:150)
These estimates, however, are inaccurate for they take into 
account only the number of those who worked for a wage in 
the carpet-weaving workshops but not the number of household
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producers. The characterization of wage-earners in carpet 
weaving workshops is, of course, straightforward. They are 
engaged in capitalist production of commodities and produce 
surplus-value for the owners of the workshops, usually on 
the basis of absolute surplus-value appropriation.
What is of particular interest to us is the production of 
commodities such as carpets, rugs and textiles not on the 
basis of wage-labour in the workshops, but at home by the 
members of the household. Traditionally, carpet weaving has 
been an urban phenomenon but in the 1970s the production of 
carpets shifted from urban to rural areas, and hundreds of 
looms were established in villages. One explanation of this 
shift could be that both large-scale proletarianization and 
underemployment in the rural areas, following the land 
reform and the mechanization of agriculture, created 
abundant 'free' labour for this enterprise. Many households, 
both rural and urban, bought their own looms and were 
engaged in this trade. Bonine (1981) demonstrates how, in 
the case of the city of Yazd, which is famous for its- silk 
and weaving industry, both workshop and home production of 
textiles and carpets began to mushroom in the 1970s. There 
were thousands of wooden handlooms for clothweaving in homes 
and many more in small workshops. In the case of 
clothweaving he shows that, although the number of 
traditional wooden handlooms had declined drastically, 
hundreds of looms still existed at homes. Moreover, with the 
decline of wooden handlooms, many households acguired 
electric looms and weaving continued to provide a 
'supplemental income' to the family. The labour was 
generally performed by women and children at home and the
317
final product was sold to the bazaar merchants by the male
members of the household. In addition to the ownership of
the loom by the household and the direct sale of the product
on the market, there was also a situation in which a mill
was owned by a local middleman, who then sold the final
product to the bazaar merchant; or else the mill was owned
by the merchant directly. In both cases the family received
a wage and had no control on the final product. Although
there were about 25 factories in Yazd (the majority employed
5 to 10 persons, and a few employed 20 to 30 persons), the
system of household production, either for a wage or as a
'supplemental income' (simple-commodity production) did not
die out. We do not know the number of these cases of simple
reproduction but the phenomenon seems to have been very
widespread. In one case Bonine (1981) observes:
villages soon realized how profitable carpet weaving could be as a supplemental income, and so, by the mid-1970s, thousands of looms were owned by villages themselves. In 1977, the carpet merchants estimated that at least 50,000 looms were operating in the Yazd region. (Bonine, 1981:209)
The data on the growth of the 'services sector' in Iran are 
also significant for the present argument. We have seen that 
the contribution of this sector to GNP rose from about 
10-20% in 1900 to over 55% in 1978. The structure of the 
services sector has already been discussed. It has been 
argued that this sector is a heterogeneous category 
consisting of both the big banker and the car washer. 
Therefore, its spectacular growth in the 1970s shows not 
only the expansion of certain fractions of the bourgeoisie 
(those involved in banking, finance, insurance, trade, 
etc.), but also the large size of the 'self-employed',
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unemployed, casual wage-earners and outworkers. In this
connection, Petras (1985) maintains:
The growth of both the industrial and 'services sector' continues roughly at the same proportion for all capitalist Third World countries. Within the 'services sector' there are essentially two groups, the new bureaucratic and commercial classes that form a distinct minority, and the huge army of unemployed and underemployed 
('self-employed'), street vendors, day labourers, domestic workers, and other low paid workers in low-productivity activity. Thus the service sector is made up in large part of the reserve army of 
unemployed .... As capitalism grows, so does the services sector. (Petras, 1985:85)
The rapid growth of the services sector in Iran further 
confirms our view that it is too simplistic to assume that 
the development of capitalism in the periphery necessarily 
leads to the generalization of capitalist wage-labour, and 
the polarization of society between labour and capital. A 
great majority of the 'freed' labour force is not subsumed 
by capital in real terms, and ekes out a living by being 
pushed into labour processes which are not, strictly 
speaking, organized along capitalist lines. Bharier 
(1971:35) estimates that in 1966, 40% of the total employed 
population "worked on their own" while another 10% were 
"unpaid family workers". No information has been given on 
the exact nature of such economic activities, but we can 
safely state that the majority must have been involved in 
the most marginal petty-bourgeois activities such as 
carpentry, shoemaking, blacksmithing, tailoring, small-scale 
weaving and spinning and the like. It has also been noted 
that in 1976-7 the number of those who were involved in 
non-wage occupations was greater than the number of 
wage-labourers within the small-scale industry (table 13). 
The following table shows that between 1956 and 1966,
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non-wage employment (in sales, services and simple-commodity 
production) expanded faster than wage employment in the 
urban areas: 58% and 36% respectively.
Table 14: Distribution of Non-Agricultural Manual Worker 
Employment by Occupational Group and Broad Worker Status, 
1956-66
Occupational Worker Nov. 1956 Nov.1966 Change
Group Status Thousands Thousands Percent
Sales Wage 63 104 + 41 +65.1
Nonwage 281 400 + 119 +42.3
Service Wage 401 413 + 12 + 3.0
Nonwage 52 97 + 45 + 86.5
Crafts and Wage 977 1,433 + 466 + 47.7
Production Nonwage 351 585 + 234 + 66.7
Total for
manual Wage 1,441 1,960 + 519 + 36.0
occupations Nonwage 684 1,082 + 398 + 58.2
Source: Looney, 1973:118
To my knowledge, no study on capitalist development in Iran 
has accounted for this type of 'unpaid family labour', has 
considered these direct producers as part of the 
'economically active population', and, more importantly, has 
addressed the question as to why, despite the movement 
towards the internationalization of productive capital in 
the 1970s, household subsistence production actually became 
much more widespread than before. Bearing in mind the 
approximate number of 1.5 million petty-commodity producers 
(in the urban areas only), it would be safe to say that in 
the 1970s together with household producers, the number of 
non-capitalist producers was only second, if not almost 
equal, to the number of 'visible' wage-earners.
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The mass of 'family workers', 'self-employed', casual 
wage-labourers and outworkers created a disparate social 
phenomenon in the urban areas which can be termed the 
'labouring poor'. While dependency writers depicted this 
mass, together with 'lumpen' elements, as 'marginals', 
others considered them as constituting a separate mode of 
production - 'petty-commodity mode of production' - 
articulated with capitalism.32
In Chapter Two of this study, I have discussed the 
non-capitalist character of these producers and their 
structural articulation with capitalism. I have argued that 
these units of production cannot be conceptualized in their 
own terms but only in terms of their subsumption by capital. 
Only an approach based on social relations of production, 
providing categories which are both theoretical and 
historical can specify the complex forms of dependency and 
subordination outside capitalist wage labour. I have argued 
that subsistence or petty-commodity production 
('self-employment') consists of ownership of the means of 
production by the direct producers, of low division of 
labour, and of little specialization in the production 
process. Furthermore, the breakdown of the reproduction 
cycles of petty-commodity producers under capitalism means 
that they cannot reproduce themselves independently of the 
larger production relations; they combine production of 
use-value with that of exchange-value. Petty-commodity 
production exists as a form of production and does not 
constitute an independent theoretical state. It would 
therefore be false to consider petty-commodity producers as 
'outside' or 'apart' from capitalism, or their products as
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belonging to another mode of production articulated with 
capitalism. It is equally misguided to consider various 
elements of the 'labouring poor' as 'marginal' to the needs 
of peripheral capitalism. These elements are all integrated 
into the dominant CMP and the overall economic system. The 
reproduction of the labour power of unpaid family workers, 
outworkers, street vendors, shoeshiners, peddlers and even 
the lowest, rock-bottom 'lumpenproletariat' does not incur 
any cost on capital; their 'economic activity' is 
'invisible' insofar as capitalism imposes the distinction 
'waged/unwaged' on the sellers of labour power.33 These 
largely non-capitalist producers are formally subsumed by 
capital, that is, capital dominates these units of 
production without transforming their immediate labour 
processes. In this way, their labour power, reproduced 
outside generalized commodity production, is nonetheless 
introduced into it. Given that the full operation of the law 
of value is hindered by total or partial possession/control 
of the means of production by these direct producers, it has 
been shown that their exploitation occurs in the form of 
devalorization of their labour time, involving 
'self-exploitation' and production of absolute 
surplus-value.
It follows that, for instance, handicraft and household 
production of commodities within the sphere of subsistence 
production is more exploitative than wage-labour. In the 
case of one village, Afshar (1981) observes that the 
introduction of carpet-weaving did not bring more 
prosperity; rather, it intensified the exploitation of 
direct producers, of whom the majority were women and
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children. She observes that in most of the households which 
acquired their own looms, women and children were not 
working for a wage and received no payment for spinning and 
weaving. She argues that the contribution of this type of 
unpaid household labour to the reproduction of labour power 
could be considerable:
... unlike cultivation, carpet-weaving is a year round employment which has resulted in women earning nearly as much, sometimes more, than men in the household. It takes thirty to sixty days to weave a carpet which is sold by men at 20,000 to 30,000 rials. Thus each woman earns from 6,750 to 17,000 a month or the equivalent of ten to twenty-eight days wages for a man. (Afshar, 1981:83)
One of the consequences of the partial reproduction of 
labour power by non-capitalist labour processes is the low 
level of wages in the periphery and the enhanced role of 
merchant capital. The re-structuration and persistence of 
formal subsumption of labour by capital means that both 
merchant's and usurer's capital continue to operate under 
the dictate of the dominant productive capital. Indeed, the 
bazaar merchants continued to exert a great deal of control 
in this area. In the 1970s only 5% of the production of 
carpets for external markets was controlled by the state, 
and the extent of state control on the domestic trade and 
production of carpets was even smaller (Baldwin,
1967:135-6). The number of bazaar merchants involved in this 
trade increased from about 45 to 240 in 1977 (Bonine, 
1981:209). Some of these merchants owned about a hundred 
looms each and established workshops in several villages.
In this Chapter it has been shown that the
internationalization of the circuits of money and productive
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capital led to a rapid process of capital accumulation in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The role of the state and the 
specificities of the oil sector have been particularly 
emphasized in examining this process. It has been argued 
that the internationalization of the circuits of money and 
productive capital did not lead to a generalization of 
capitalist wage-labour, and non-capitalist labour processes 
were preserved and integrated with the circuit of the 
expanded reproduction of capital. In the following Chapter 
we shall see that the state-induced agrarian transition to 
capitalism also occurred in the context of the expansion and 
persistence of noncapitalist structures.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
1. In discussing the general characteristics of the rentier states in the periphery, I have benefited from the following works: First (1980), Petras and Morely (1983),Hein (1980), and Katouzian (1979-1981).
2. I should stress again that the emphasis on the relative autonomy of the state should not be taken to mean that the state is a disembodied force standing above civil society.In all class societies, the state acts to resolve contradictions engendered by class divisions, and in doing so it ultimately reproduces the conditions of the dominance of a power bloc constituted by different classes and class fractions. Relative autonomy of the state does not imply that the variety of forms of state intervention adopt a neutral character, but that the dominant power bloc does not directly organize and regulate the conditions of its dominance in the economic and ideological spheres. In this sense, one may say that the state is autonomous in all class societiesI have argued, however, that certain features of transitional. peripheral and oil-based societies tend to enhance the relative autonomy of the state.
3. For non-Marxist approaches to oil-based states see:H .E.Hazelton, 'Gold-Rush Economics: The Development Planning in the Persian/Arabian Gulf', Studies in Comparative International Development. Vol.13, No.2, 1978, and M.Chatelus and Y.Schemeil, 'Towards a New Political Economy of State Industrialization in the Arab Middle East', International Journal of Middle East Studies. No.16, 1984. For a characterization of the rentier state in Iran within the Orientalist problematic see Katouzian (1981), who considers the distribution of tuyul rights and of oil revenues by the state of basically the same nature, therefore emphasizing the element of 'continuity' in Iranian history.
4. My brief discussion of the growth of the Tudeh Party and the formation of the autonomous governments is based on 
the following works which provide detailed analysis of these issues: Abrahamian (1968-1970-1981-1982), Halliday (1978) and Zabih (1966) .
5. For an early history of US-Iranian relationship, see Alexander et al. (1980) and Rubin (1980).
6. An assassination attempt against the Shah by a religious fundamentalist in February 1949 had led to the banning of the Tudeh Party and the CCFTU .
7. For the oil nationalization crisis and the overthrow of Mossadeg's government, see Abrahamian (1982), Cottom (1979), Nirumand (1969), Paine (1975) and Zabih (1966-1982).
8. In 1949 the first seven-year development plan, providing for a total expenditure of $656 million, was approved by the state. The plan was to be financed by the
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oil revenues, by loans from the IBRD and by internal loans 
from the National Bank of Iran. However, oil revenues disappeared because of the oil nationalization, and the IBRD 
did not make any loans to Iran. The plan was suspended in 1951.
9. For the concept of class fraction see Chapter Three, note number 18.
10. For details of the development of financial institutions and banks, and their role in stimulating private capital investment, see: Benedick (1964).
11. For details on taxation and licensing policies, see: Najmabadi (1976).
12. There were altogether five development plans in Iran between 1949 and 1977. In discussing the basic features of industrialization in Iran, I have not dealt in a chronological fashion with details of the development plans but have drawn general conclusions. For details of these development plans, see Baldwin (1967) and Razavi et al.(1984) .
13. See Chapter Three, Section C, for this point.
14. In this connection, Graham (1978) remarks: "For the most part, the entrepreneurs graduated from trading operations in the Bazaar, frequently transferring from traditional commerce via a dealership or agency for one of the international companies" (Graham, 1978:47). Amongst these 'first path' capitalists who established industrial empires, Graham (1978:47-8) mentions Ahmed Khayami who established Irannational in 1962, which became the biggest company in the automotive sector with one of the largest workforce in the country; and Habib Sabet, whose joint-venture enterprises covered almost 50 companies and employed 10,000 people.
15. For a critique of import-substitution policy, see Griffin and Enos (1973).
16. I have avoided a detailed discussion of the impact of the 1973 oil boom and the expansion of the monetary system on the economy. For details concerning labour shortages, inflation, infrastructural problems, etc., see: Graham 
(1978), Looney (1982) and Jabbari (1981).
17. For reasons for fluctuations of oil prices and of demand for oil on the world market in this period, see: Graham (1978) and Looney (1982).
18. Fearing increased state intervention in prices, wages and other factors of production and exchange, about $2 billion of private capital was transferred abroad by the bourgeoisie. The rate of private capital investment in industry and construction also fell during this period. Foreign capital reacted in the same way to these state measures. See for details Graham (1978) and Walton (1980).
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19. For studies on the development of the middle class in Iran, see: Bill (1972a), Binder (1962), Liaghat (1976-1980) and Young (1952). These studies are basically conducted 
within the problematic of modernization theory and the serious conceptual problems they represent make even a reinterpretation of the data almost impossible.
20. For details on arms purchases and military build-up see Falk (1979), Paine (1975), Sampson (1978), Race and Class (1979), and The Arms Trade with the Third World (1971), Chapter XIV.
21. In Marx's analysis, expanded reproduction of capital takes place in an abstract form, in two departments of commodity production: Department I, where the reproduction of the means of production takes place; and Department II, where the reproduction of the means of consumption occurs. Both forms of reproduction depend on the redistribution of the means of production in each Department, which conseguently depends on the proportion of commodities produced and the surplus-value invested by capitalists. This abstraction enabled Marx to deal with the question of production and realization of surplus-value.
22. The handmade production of carpets in the workshops and on the basis of a primitive division of labour is not considered here as 'manufacturing industry' but as 'traditional handicrafts'.
23. Hein's (1980) discussion of the extreme world market dependency of the Venezuelan economy through the export of oil is also relevant to the Iranian economy. He argues that the enormous extent to which the Venezuelan state subsidized 
the economy through the oil sector, and protected the internal market through a tariff system, resulted in a high degree of distortion of the law of value:
Extra economic power determines the development of a particular firm more than competitiveness, i.e., conditions prevail under which capitalist 
competition cannot stimulate the development of the forces of production nor promote a nationally integrated division of labour. (Hein, 1980:236)
This is to say, the development of a restricted home market based on large-scale capital-intensive industry and leading to the decline of petty-commodity production was not so much the result of free competition on the market but of the imposition of certain policies by the state.
24. For details on income inequality in Iran, see Jabbari (1981) and Pesaran (1976-1982).
25. For corruption, particularly in relation to the Pahlavi Foundation and arms purchases, see Graham (1978) and Sampson (1978) .
26. The term 'sub-imperialism' was first used by the Brazilian sociologist Marini (1972) in analyzing the political and economic transformations of Brazilian society
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after the military coup d'etat in 1964. See particularly 
discussions of this concept in relation to Iran in Frank 
(1981a) and Halliday (1979).
27. For example, see Lipietz (1984) who argues that in 
order for peripheral Fordism to develop these countries have 
to have authoritarian regimes. For a critique of this view, 
see Jenkins (1984).
28. For a discussion of this point, see Paine (1975) and 
Theberge (1973).
29. For these distinctions, see Looney (1973) and Bayat 
(1987) .
30. Pre-harvest sale of crops, or the practice of 
salaf-khari. will be discussed fully in the next Chapter.
31. The question of rural subsistence production will be 
dealt with separately in the next Chapter.
32. See, for a classical discussion of marginalization 
within dependency theory, G.Germani, Marginality, New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 1980. For a characterization of 
'marginals' as a distinct mode of production see, Quijano 
Obregon, 'The Marginal Pole of the Economy and the 
Marginalized Labour Force', in Wolpe (1980).
33. Various contributors to the two volumes Casual Work and 
Poverty in Third World Cities (edited by Bromley and Gerry, 
1979), and Peasants and Proletarians: The Struggle of Third 
World Workers, (edited by Cohen, Gutkind and Brazier, 1979) 
also develop these points extensively and show the 
structural relationship between the massive and disparate 
category of the 'labouring poor' and capital.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE LAND REFORM
In this Chapter I shall discuss the particular pattern of 
the development of capitalism in Iranian agriculture as a 
result of the state-induced agrarian transition. The land 
reform is of tremendous importance for this study not only 
because it transformed the nature of production relations in 
agriculture but also because it demonstrates direct state 
involvement in the process of capital accumulation.
Generally speaking, the 'agrarian guestion' is solved when a 
predominantly pre-capitalist agriculture is transformed into 
a capitalist one. This means that a home market for the 
production of the means of production and the means of 
consumption is created, labour is entirely separated from 
the means of production (land), and land and labour are both 
commoditized. Agricultural product, similarly, is no longer 
produced for the reproduction of the unit of production, but 
for sale on the market. Commoditization of land, labour and 
product implies a total separation of agriculture from 
industry, and the generalization of an economic surplus by 
the former for the expansion of the latter. The consequence 
of this process is a structural change in agricultural 
production relations, the creation of classes of rural 
bourgeoisie and rural proletariat, and the ultimate 
domination of the CMP.
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The process briefly described above is the 'classical model' 
of primitive accumulation, that is, a process stimulated by 
the private appropriation and market forces alone, unfolded 
over a period of three centuries in Western Europe. The 
underlying theme of this Chapter is the historical and 
structural distinctiveness of this process in the periphery. 
My argument is that while primitive accumulation of capital 
occurred organically and out of the contradictions of PCMsP 
in the centre, in the periphery (i) it occurred in the 
context of integration with the world market and in response 
to the requirements of metropolitan economies; and (ii) it 
was promoted by the peripheral state which had a direct 
interest in accumulation through the spread of capitalist 
production relations.
In the first two Sections of this Chapter the nature of 
pre-reform production relations and the class structure in 
the rural areas are discussed. Section Three examines 
various stages of the land reform and identifies its main 
objectives as the creation of a capitalist home market as a 
prerequisite for the export of capital from the centre.
While state intervention into Iranian agriculture 
transformed the nature of production relations and the mode 
of surplus extraction, it also led to the re-structuration 
and perpetuation of non-capitalist forms of production. 
Placed in the context of the dominant CMP, the survival of 
these noncapitalist structures partly explains the character 
of peripheral capitalism in Iran. This argument is 
elaborated in the last Section of this Chapter.
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A. Pre-Reform Rural Class Structure
As has been pointed out in Chapter Three, there existed 
three types of landownership in pre-capitalist Iran. These 
were, first, land owned privately by individual landlords 
(mulk); second, state land (khaleseh); and third, land 
controlled by religious institutions (vafq). There are 
various estimations of the extent of the distribution of 
land amongst these categories, but they all confirm that a 
vast majority of land was owned by private landlords.
We may recall that the method of land assignment by which 
the state assigned areas of land and its government to the 
highest bidder or for services rendered (tuyul) was 
abolished by the First Parliament in 1906. The abolition of 
tuyul institutionalized private landownership, and the 
concentration of land in the hands of private landowners was 
an on-going process throughout the first half of the 20th 
century. Thus by the late 1950s about 70% of the total crop 
land was owned by a small number of landlords (McLachlan, 
1968:687). Landowning in Iran was not measured in terms of 
area but, traditionally, on the basis of the number of 
villages owned by each individual. Each village was divided 
into six parts (dangs), and large landlords were those who 
owned at least one village or six parts eguivalent to one 
village. There are no statistics on the number of large 
landlords before the land reform, but at most they did not 
number more than several hundreds. These large landlords, 
some of whom owned 20 to 40 villages each, were usually 
members of the royal family, high state officials, high 
ranking military officials, tribal chiefs, prominent
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members of the clergy or wealthy merchants (Hooglund,
1982:12, 154). The extent of concentration of land was 
indeed extreme; about 37 families owned 19,000 villages, 
while medium landlords, i.e., those who owned between 1 to 5 
villages each, owned 7,000 villages (Halliday, 1979:107). 
Large landowners accounted for 2% of all landowners and 
owned 55% of all cultivated land (Hooglund, 1982:12).
Between 18% and 20% of the arable land was owned by the 
state and religious institutions. The latter category was 
the second largest landowner, owning up to 6,000 villages or 
12% of the total cultivated land. Vafq lands were widely 
dispersed throughout the country and they were managed by an 
administrator who was entitled to keep 10% of all annual 
revenue as personal remuneration. The state was the third 
largest landowner; it owned over 5,000 villages, or 6% of 
the total crop land. The remaining 10% of the cultivated 
land was owned by a large number of small private 
landowners, whose property equalled less than one village, 
and probably numbered between 500,000 to 1 million 
individuals; and a tiny minority of small 
peasant-proprietors (Hooglund, 1982:155; Lambton, 
1953:230-305; 1969:23-30; McLachlan, 1968:687).1 The 
following table, which shows the percentage of the 
distribution of landholding, roughly follows the above 
estimates. It shows that the predominant trend was towards 
the concentration of land in the hands of private 
landowners, particularly if we classify the category of 
'tribal holding' as private feudal landownership.
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Table 15: Land Distribution Before the Reform
% of land Number of % ofType of Ownership owned villages villages
Large Proprietors 56.0 13,569 34.43
(of whom those owning 
over 100 hectares) 33.8 — —
Small Proprietors 10-12 16,522 41.93
Royal Domain 10-13 812 2.06
Religious Endowment 1-2 713 1.81
Tribal Holdings 13.0 — —
Public Domain 3-4 1,444 3.67
Other Holdings — 6,346 16.10
Source: McLachlan, 1968 : 687
A common characteristic of the Iranian landowning class was
that they were usually absentee. They resided in urban areas
and only visited their estates at. harvest time to collect
their dues. They entrusted their economic affairs to a
bailiff who received a salary in cash and/or in kind.
Sometimes the bailiffs also functioned as village headmen.
Village headman, if a person different from bailiff, was
chosen by the landlord and was responsible for maintaining 
internal security. They usually received part of the harvest 
as their salary.
With regard to the pattern of land tenure in pre-capitalist 
Iranian agriculture, it should be noted that the rent 
extracted by the landowning class came in various forms; it 
either took the form of a portion of the product on the 
basis of sharecropping contracts, or the payment of a fixed 
rent in cash or in kind, and sometimes a combination of the 
two. Demesne and labour service were insignificant forms of
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land tenure in the Iranian countryside. In the case of the 
payment of a fixed rent, landlords rented several villages 
to an individual renter on a seasonal basis in return for a 
fixed rent and specified payment. While the rentees did not 
have legal rights to land, in practice they were the 
landlord of the villages during the period of their lease. 
Payment of fixed rent was the logical outcome of the 
development of private monopoly on land and the 
concentration of holdings for which landlords could not be 
directly responsible. It hurt agricultural production since 
it encouraged high profits on a short-term basis and 
discouraged investment in land. Almost all of the state 
land, most of vafg land and some private land were rented in 
this fashion. In the case of private holdings, payment of 
fixed rent was limited to the more prosperous northern 
provinces. On the whole, less than half of the total 
cultivated land was rented in this way (Hooglund, 1982; 
Keddie, 1960; Lambton, 1953). The most prevalent form of 
land tenure was sharecropping. According to official 
figures, 54% of all arable land in 1960 was based on 
sharecropping (Demin, 1967, cited in Issawi, 1971:222). 
Sharecropping arrangements, inherited from the Safavid 
empire in the 16th century, varied from one region to 
another but their basic principles had remained unchanged. 
The crop was divided between peasant and landlord according 
to the ownership by each of its main productive factors, 
namely, land, water, seeds, draught animals and labour. Each 
productive factor was assigned equal value, and the 
contributor of each received one-fifth of the crop. Thus the 
landowner automatically received 20% of the harvest in 
return for the use of his land. In practice, the most common
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situation was that the landlord possessed three factors of 
production (land, water and seeds), so that the peasant's 
share of the crop was determined by the input of oxen and 
draught animals. It was not uncommon for landlords to claim 
80% of the final product (Lambton, 1953:306-29).
To understand the exact pattern of sharecropping contracts, 
it is necessary to examine the rural class structure. An 
exact characterization of precapitalist rural class 
structure is difficult to render as the term 'peasant' in 
the context of Iranian agriculture, as elsewhere, does not 
delineate a homogeneous class defined on the basis of a 
distinct and specific set of production relations. Here I 
make a distinction between the absentee landowning class, 
and the rest of the rural population.2 Within the latter 
category, a rather complex differentiation existed. The 
largest group within this category was the nasaq-holders. 
those sharecroppers who did not own land but possessed the 
right to cultivate (nasaq) a portion of the landlord's land 
in return for a specific share of the crop or a fixed rent 
in kind or in money. In the context of Iranian agriculture, 
the term 'peasant' is usually used to denote the 
nasaq-holding sharecroppers, an imprecise usage as we shall 
see. Most of these sharecroppers provided only labour, while 
some also contributed other productive factors such as seeds 
and draught animals. The nasaq right was not hereditary or 
secure; the landlord could easily purchase a sharecropper's 
right and thus 'dispossess' him. Sharecropping contracts on 
the whole were insecure, nearly always verbal and designed 
to keep the sharecropper from accumulating any surplus. 
Landlords also used to redistribute the plots amongst
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peasants annually, so as to prevent them from acquiring any 
claims on the land. No exact data exist on the size of 
nasaq-holding sharecroppers, but it is generally agreed that 
they constituted between 40% to 50% of pre-reform rural 
population.
The remainder of the rural population were non-cultivating 
peasants. Although they were internally divided into various 
groups, they had two characteristics in common: a landless 
status and the lack of any right to cultivate the land. The 
largest category within this heterogeneous group were 
landless agricultural labourers, generally known as 
khushneshins. They comprised about 40% of the rural 
population and about 80% of all non-cultivating peasants.3 
The only means of subsistence of this group of landless 
peasants was casual wage-labour, which was basically 
seasonal. They were seasonally hired for various tasks such 
as weeding, tending sheep, threshing crops, picking cotton, 
etc. They had to move from village to village in search of 
wage-labour, which was always scarce because nasaq-holding 
peasants preferred to do most of the work themselves.
Although the only means of subsistence for these landless 
labourers was the sale of labour power to landlords or 
peasant-proprietors, they cannot be considered as rural 
proletariat in the pre-reform period. The position of 
landless labourer in a predominantly agrarian economy 
depends strictly on the character of the dominant relations 
of production in the countryside as a whole. Given the 
non-existence, or very limited development, of capitalist 
production relations in pre-reform Iranian countryside, the
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landless labourers should not be regarded as 
proto-proletarian or proletarian as his landless position 
was not the direct result of the social differentiation of 
the peasantry. Throughout the 20th century the percentage of 
landless labourers has been increasing; in most villages 
before the land reform they constituted 25% to 40% of all 
residents (Hooglund, 1982:32). This increase was both the 
result of strict demographic factors, that is, an increase 
in the rural population and, more significantly, of the 
socio-economic mode of the transformation of the Iranian 
countryside, involving as it did an extreme concentration of 
private holdings, land confiscations, and peasant 
pauperization. None of these factors was directly related 
to the development of capitalism in agriculture.
Other groups of landless, non-cultivating peasants consisted 
of petty-bourgeoisie, that is, non-agricultural workers who 
owned their means of production and provided services and 
manufactured products for the villages. They comprised 10% 
of all the non-cultivating peasants and included 
blacksmiths, carpenters, coppersmiths, shoemakers, barbers, 
bathhouse attendants and religious functionaries (Hooglund, 
1982:28-18).
The sharecropping contracts were organized on the basis of 
bunehs, or the basic unit of production and distribution. 
Only those peasants with a customary right to cultivate the 
land could work in the bunehs. Each buneh team had 4 to 7 
members, and was under the charge of one person known as 
sar-buneh. The sar-bunehs were usually chosen by the 
landlords and their function was basically supervisory; they
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rarely participated in agricultural tasks such as sowing 
seeds or ploughing. The division of labour within the 
bunehs. as well as the division of the final product, was 
almost always unegual. Nasaq-holding peasants performed 
almost all of the labour. Yet at harvest time, after the 
deduction of the share of the landlord, certain other dues 
and levies had to be paid, such as payment to village 
headman and religious officials. Moreover, the sar-bunehs 
usually received a higher percentage than sharecropping 
peasants. After the deduction of the landlord's share, the 
share of sharecropping peasants amounted to only a fraction 
of the harvest, usually not sufficient to maintain even bare 
subsistence. Sharecroppers, therefore, had to resort to 
loans for both consumption and productive purposes to 
subsist during the year. These loans were provided by local 
moneylenders, small merchants, wholesale dealers, and 
village shopkeepers, as well as by the landlords themselves. 
The loan was usually in the form of advance given to the 
peasant in kind in winter or before the harvest, when peak 
prices prevailed. It had to be repaid in summer, or 
immediately after the harvest, in cash or in kind, when 
prices were lowest. Thus, in effect, the sharecropper had to 
pay an exorbitant rate of interest (Lambton, 1953). This 
practice, known as salaf-khari. or the presale of products, 
was a persistent feature of the Iranian countryside. Once a 
consumption loan was taken, it meant perpetual indebtedness 
for the peasant for he would only be able to repay a 
fraction of it at each harvest. Apart from consumption loans 
needed for the reproduction of the household, the 
sharecropper was also in need of money for the reproduction 
of the means of production. This money was provided by
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usurers and merchants, as well as by other peasants such as 
owners of rural grist mills and owners of draught animals, 
village headmen, bailiffs and sar-bunehs. On the whole, 
usurers and merchants played a significant economic role in 
the villages and they comprised 6% of the population of 
non-cultivating landless peasants in the villages (Hooglund, 
1982:18). This situation meant that not only there was an 
almost total absence of marketable surplus on the part of 
sharecropping peasants, but it also meant practical serfdom 
for sharecroppers. Compared to the landless agricultural 
labourers, the nasaq-holders enjoyed a higher status and 
security, but in reality they each owned only their labour 
power.
Sharecropper peasants also had to perform compulsory unpaid 
labour (bigari) for the landlord for a certain number of 
days each year. This free labour service included 
agricultural and non-agricultural work, such as the 
construction and repair of irrigation canals, and care of 
landlord's gardens (Demin, 1967:222; Lambton, 1953:338-341).
I have so far described the general pattern of rural 
stratification in pre-reform Iranian agriculture. However, a 
more accurate picture emerges if the Iranian peasantry is 
divided into the three categories of 'rich', 'middle' and 
'poor' peasants on the basis of their structural position in 
production relations (Kazemi and Abrahamian 1978; Vali 
1980). Rich peasants were those who were able to meet the 
conditions of the reproduction of the household and to 
accumulate a marketable surplus. They consisted of bailiffs 
(mubasher) appointed by the landlord; the oxen-owners
339
(gavband) who obtained from the landlord the right to lease 
plough animals; and the village headmen (kadkhjada) who were 
nominated by the landlord to oversee the process of 
production. This group of peasants usually accumulated their 
surplus by means of rent and interest extraction (renting 
oxen, providing consumption loans, etc.). Some of them also 
accumulated surplus through service functions. Rich 
peasants, when they owned land, often hired landless 
labourers to work on their land.
Middle peasants included those peasants who were able to 
meet the conditions of the reproduction of the household 
without resorting to consumption loans, but were often 
unable to accumulate a marketable surplus. They owned a very 
small parcel of land, or sufficient capital to cultivate 
landlords' allotment. Small peasant-proprietors did not hire 
landless labourers and used family labour to cultivate the 
land.
The category of poor peasants consisted of those peasants 
who owned no land at all but enjoyed the right to cultivate 
the land ( nasaq-holders), and those who had neither land nor 
cultivating rights (khushneshins 'l . It has already been 
mentioned that the former group of poor peasants rarely 
owned any means of production and was, theoretically, 
entitled to one-fifth of the final product. This group of 
peasants, as we have seen, was perennially in debt and 
unable to subsist without consumption loans.
Although the distinction between the three categories of the 
peasantry in terms of their position in production relations
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is basically clear, their precise size is extremely 
difficult to determine due to the absence of reliable and 
meaningful data. It is certain, however, that the vast 
majority of pre-reform Iranian peasantry fell into the 
category of poor peasants. We may recall that nasaq-holders 
and khushneshins together formed about 80% to 90% of the 
total rural population. All specialists on Iranian 
agriculture agree that small peasant-proprietors, or middle 
peasantry, played an insignificant part in Iranian villages; 
at most they did not constitute more than 5% of the total 
peasant population (Araghi, 1987; Hooglund, 1982; Kazemi et 
al., 1978; Keddie, 1968; Vali, 1980).
Generally speaking, the absence of a middle peasantry can be 
attributed to a variety of economic, social and geographical 
factors.4 As discussed in Chapter Two, the particular mode 
of socio-economic transformation of Iran in the 19th century 
led to the entry of urban classes and groups, such as 
merchants and bureaucrats, into landownership. Peasant 
proprietors, unable to compete with urban investors, were 
squeezed out of the land market. Inadequate rainfall and the 
consequent reliance on the expensive irrigation systems 
(qanats), and the constant subdivision of the land resulting 
from the Ishamic law of inheritance also hampered the 
development of free peasant proprietorship (Kazemi et al., 
1978; Lambton, 1953). On the whole, the middle peasantry 
owned remote and arid types of land and their holdings 
barely provided more than a mere subsistence level. I shall 
later discuss the impact of the land reform on these 
categories of peasants.
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B. The Nature of Agricultural Production Relations
The single criterion adopted in Marxist analysis to 
characterize agrarian relations of production is the type of 
ground rent extracted by the landowning class. In Capital 
(Vol.III) Marx distinguishes between three types of rent in 
agriculture: precapitalist ground rent, differential rent, 
and absolute ground rent. In the precapitalist (feudal) mode 
of production, ground rent constitutes the relations of 
production and defines the essential mode of surplus 
extraction. The crucial characteristic of this form of rent 
is that the direct producer is not separated from the means 
of production and that it is fixed; it is not affected or 
determined by any direct economic mechanisms. This applies 
to both rent in kind and rent in money, and also to labour 
service. Peasants' production is divided between necessary 
product and surplus product (ground rent), which is paid to 
the landlord independent of economic mechanisms such as 
market fluctuations and producer's income.
Differential ground rent, which designates the CMP, does not 
constitute the relations of production but depends on, a 
priori, development of capitalist production relations. It 
arises either as a result of a difference in natural 
fertility or geographical situation, or as a result of 
investment of different amounts of capital in land. 
Capitalist ground rent presupposes that (i) the land and 
agricultural product are commoditized; (ii) direct producers 
are separated from the means of production; and (iii) the 
owner of land and the owner of capital are not the same 
person. Differential rent does imply the participation of
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the agricultural product in the social equalization of the 
average rate of profit, and is thus fundamentally different 
from precapitalist ground rent in that it is a form of 
surplus-value extraction rather than the production 
relations themselves.
What directly concerns us here is a category Marx (Capital. 
Vol.III) terms absolute ground rent, as distinct from the 
other two types of rent. Marx emphasizes that the source of 
absolute ground rent is private monopoly in landownership 
under precapitalist production relations. In order to 
specify the conditions of extraction of this type of rent, 
it is necessary to discuss briefly the conditions of 
capitalist development in agriculture.
The basic tendency in both agriculture and industry is 
concentration and centralization of the means of production. 
In agriculture, however, realization of this tendency 
differs from that of industry because production relations 
and property relations do not necessarily co-incide (Mandel, 
1977:278-81). This distinction is essential for 
understanding the character of absolute ground rent. In 
contrast to industry, capital faces a twofold monopoly in 
agriculture: a natural monopoly, i.e., the limited quantity 
of land and its indivisibility, and a property monopoly, 
that is, private concentration of land in the hands of a 
class of landowners who prevent access to land unless a rent 
is paid. The latter type of monopoly, private monopoly of 
land ownership, is the source of absolute ground rent. In 
countries where this monopoly has not existed, such as the 
USA, Canada and Australia, absolute ground rent has not
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developed either. In agriculture, the distinction between 
production relations and property relations means that 
private concentration of land is a legal form of ownership 
and can occur without the existence of capitalist production 
relations. This is to say, in contrast to industry, the 
concentration of the means of production is not a 
precondition of the development of capitalism; capitalism 
can develop only after the barrier of private monopoly in 
land is removed, and agricultural production is 
revolutionalized, i.e., when socially necessary labour time 
and large-scale machine production are introduced.
Private monopoly of land ownership thus acts as a brake upon 
the penetration of capitalist production relations; it 
prevents the free flow of capital in and out of agriculture 
and, therefore, does not allow the participation of 
agricultural products in the egualization of the average 
rate of profit. These are precisely the conditions of 
absolute ground rent extraction. For Marx, the origin of 
this type of rent is the lower organic composition of 
capital in agriculture as compared to other capitalist 
sectors of the economy. This means that the value of 
agricultural commodities exceeds their price of production. 
The low organic composition of capital in agriculture thus 
generates a 'super-profit' which would not be produced if 
agricultural commodities could participate in the 
generalization of the average rate of profit under the 
conditions of capitalist competition. Monopoly in 
landownership prevents this process, and the landowning 
class appropriates this 'super-profit', that is, the 
difference between the value and the price of production in
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the form of absolute ground rent.
While absolute ground rent presupposes a partial separation
of the direct producer from the means of production, it also
prevents development of capitalist production relations
because of monopoly rights in land. This is to say, absolute
ground rent entails a situation in which feudalism is
essentially eradicated but capitalist production relations
have not become dominant. It involves neither a capitalist
nor a precapitalist pattern of land tenure. These are
exactly the conditions of sharecropping. In relation to the
characterization of sharecropping, Cutler (1975) argues:
... we cannot be said to be dealing with feudal 
rent, for the conditions of tenure in general 
preclude a right to surplus product of a legal kind other than that defined by capitalist 
contractual relations. On the other hand, it is 
clear that peasant production is distinct from 
capitalist conditions of production both in terms 
of the labour-process and the conditions of 
calculation. It is this distinction which forms 
the basis for an equivalent to Marx's ground rent 
... (Cutler, 1975:86)
The pattern of land tenure in sharecropping, as Cutler 
suggests in the above passage, seems to correspond with the 
conditions of absolute ground rent extraction. The unit of 
production in sharecropping is neither fully capitalist nor 
precapitalist. On the one hand, the direct producer is only 
partially separated from the means of production, and sells 
not only his labour time but also an element of production 
on a contractual basis. The income of the sharecropper, in 
the case of the Iranian countryside, originates from the 
ownership of the means of production such as seeds, draught 
animals and sometimes working capital. The partial 
possession of the means of production by the sharecropper
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enables landlords to intervene in the process of production. 
The landlord's share of surplus is not only derived from his 
monopoly ownership of land, but also from the interest on 
capital advanced in the form of the means of production.
Marx (Capital. Vol.III) characterizes sharecropping as 
transitional, that is, the rent extracted under these 
conditions is a precapitalist form of rent in a state of 
transition to capitalist ground rent. This is implied in the 
following passage:
As a transitory form from original form of rent to capitalist rent, we may consider the metayer system or share-cropping, under which the manager (farmer) furnishes labour (his or another's), and also a portion of the working capital, and the landlord furnishes, aside from land, another portion of working capital (e.g., cattle), and the product is divided between tenant and landlord in definite proportions which vary from country to country. On the one hand, the farmer here lacks sufficient capital required for complete capitalist management. On the other hand, the share here appropriated by the landlord does not bear the pure form of rent. It may actually include interest on the capital advanced by him and an excess rent. It may also absorb practically 
the entire surplus-labour of the farmer, or leave him a greater or smaller portion of this surplus labour. But, essentially, rent no longer appears as the normal form of surplus-value in general. On the one hand, the sharecropper, whether he employs his own or another's labour, is to lay claim to a portion of the product not in his capacity as labourer, but as possessor of part of the instrument of labour, as his own capitalist. On the other hand, the landlord claims his share not exclusively on the basis of his landownership, but also as lender of capital. (Marx, Capital.Vol.111:803)
However, sharecropping in the periphery does not have to be 
a transitional situation in the sense specified by Marx. 
Capitalist differentiation of the peasantry could take forms 
different from the 'classical model' of English experience 
which Marx had in mind in the above passage. In the Iranian
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case a number of factors imposed serious limitations on the 
social differentiation of the peasantry and their ultimate 
separation from the means of production. In both 
sharecropping arrangements and payment of fixed rent, the 
landlord's economic control over production process was 
extreme. The periodic or annual redistribution of land by 
the landlord, the rarity of the payment of fixed rent (or 
privately owned land) and free peasant proprietorship, the 
type and extent of sharecropper's involvement in market 
relations, the distribution of land and products within a 
communal framework (buneh), the predominance and independent 
development of primitive forms of credit such as usurer's 
and merchant's capital, the feudal forms of division of land 
allotment such as land rented from the state or religious 
institutions, all inhibited capitalist differentiation of 
the peasantry and imposed limitations on the evolution of 
absolute ground rent into more superior types of rent. These 
factors almost always left the peasant-tenant and the 
sharecropper without a marketable surplus and thus limited 
development of commodity relations amongst them.
In the previous Chapters I have placed major emphasis on 
factors 'external' to the Iranian formation in explaining 
the absence of an organic transition to capitalist commodity 
production: the peripheral position of the Iranian economy 
within the capitalist world market under semi-colonial 
domination. I have argued that factors 'internal' to Iranian 
social formation, such as the existence of tribal-nomadic 
structures and Islamic laws leading to constant redivision 
of land, were of secondary importance. The same argument is 
relevant for an understanding of the persistence of
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precapitalist production relations in the first half of the 
20th century. The incorporation of the Iranian economy into 
the circuit of merchant capital consolidated and expanded 
monopoly ownership in land, which in turn acted as a brake 
upon the penetration of capitalist production relations. 
Absolute ground rent was not reinvested in agricultural 
production, and agricultural products did not participate in 
the equalization of the average rate of profit. Peasants' 
production, in both sharecropping and payment of fixed rent, 
was of a subsistence nature, despite the conversion from 
subsistence to cash-crop production from at least the 
mid-19th century onwards. This is to say that commodity 
production (for external markets) developed without 
affecting the internal labour process in agriculture, thus 
ensuring the increasingly high rates of rent and the 
conditions of maximum exploitation. The objective of 
production was reproduction of the household, rather than 
accumulation of surplus and expansion of production. Peasant 
proprietors and those paying a fixed rent were probably more 
affected by entrance into the world market, but these 
categories constituted an insignificant proportion of the 
peasant population and their living conditions were hardly 
above the bare subsistence level.
The conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis are 
twofold. First, the ground rent extracted by the Iranian 
landlord class was absolute ground rent. This was 
particularly the case in the post-constitutionalist era when 
monopoly ownership in land became more effective owing to 
the laws of competition in market for land. Therefore, not 
only political but also economic conditions acquired an
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importance in conferring monopoly rights to land (Vali, 
1980). Absolute ground rent was extracted in both 
sharecropping and fixed-rent-payment, in which the direct 
producer was not entirely separated from the means of 
production. This type of rent, as discussed above, is a 
direct conseguence of the existence of private monopoly in 
land under the dominance of pre-capitalist production 
relations. In other words, while the integration of the 
Iranian economy with the capitalist world market created 
economic effects which seemed capitalist in character, 
precapitalist private monopoly in land was consolidated in 
conjunction with the formation of a competitive market for 
land and the commoditization of agricultural product. 
Secondly, although the sharecropping pattern of land tenure 
is considered as transitional, it has been argued that the 
particular mode of transformation in the periphery does not 
necessarily lead to a capitalist differentiation of the 
peasantry, as specified by Marx. I have already discussed 
the factors which blocked the social differentiation of the 
peasantry in the Iranian countryside.
The above analysis reinforces the conclusions drawn in the 
previous Chapters. Commodity production, monetization and 
wage-labour, although signs of a gradual dissolution of the 
existing structures, do not amount to the development of 
capitalist production relations. The Iranian agriculture 
remained predominantly precapitalist while undergoing a 
cycle of commoditization under the domination of merchant 
capital. This analysis also demonstrates the uneven 
character of capital accumulation on the world level. 
Integration with the world market reinforced rather than
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disintegrated the existing pre-capitalist production 
relations, a requirement of capital accumulation at this 
stage. The logic of the global expansion of the CMP 
necessitated growth at certain sectors and underdevelopment 
at others.
C. The Land Reform
By the 1950s, when incorporation of the Iranian economy into 
the circuit of money capital had began in earnest, the old 
pattern of land tenure had become a fetter upon the 
development of capitalism in agriculture. The precapitalist 
structures had left vast areas of land untouched, and the 
labour was still tied to land. As late as 1960, 66% of the 
total population remained in the countryside, involved in 
subsistence production in a rural economy with a very 
limited degree of monetization and contact with the market. 
The methods of production were likewise outmoded: 75% of 
arable land was cultivated with animal power and 5% with 
human power. Only 4% of the total landholding was fully 
mechanized (Bharier, 1971:141). Feudalism was a barrier to 
the investment of capital at the point of production and to 
the creation of a capitalist home market; its logic was 
incompatible with the dynamics of the internationalization 
of money capital. The objective of the Iranian land reform 
was precisely to remove this barrier.5
The land reform, which began in 1962 and ended in 1971, was 
carried out in three phases. The basic objective of the 
first phase of the reform was to break up large-scale 
landownership by reducing it to the equivalent of one
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village. Individual landownership was therefore limited to 
one village, or to six danqs in separate villages. Landlords 
were free to choose the village, or the danqs in each of six 
different villages which they wanted to retain. They were 
required to sell their excess holdings to the state, which 
would reimburse them over a period of 15 years. The state 
would then sell this land to the peasants, who had to repay 
the value plus 10% administrative costs over a period of 15 
years.
However, this phase of the land reform resulted in 
inevitable inegualities not only because small landowners, 
those owning one or less than one village, were not affected 
but also because a number of loopholes allowed large 
landowners to retain their property. Certain categories of 
land were exempted from redistribution altogether, including 
orchards, woodlands, mechanized land worked by wage 
labourers and religiously endowed property (vaft[) • This 
allowed large landlords to select their most fertile land 
and declare it as 'orchard', or else obtain a tractor and 
employ wage-labourers and declare their land as 
'mechanized'. Moreover, the law also stated that wives and 
dependent children of landowners were entitled to the upper 
limit of land. Thus a large number of landlords transferred 
their excess holdings to their wives and children (Lambton, 
1969:101). These various clauses helped large landowners to 
retain vast areas of their land, and so remain largely 
unaffected by the reforms.
More importantly, the law stated that land could be sold 
only to those peasants who had a customary right to
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cultivate the land (nasaq-holders). or to those who owned 
one of the factors of production such as draught animals, 
grist mills or tools. The landless wage labourers 
fkhushneshins). with nothing to sell but their labour power, 
were totally excluded from the land reform. Thus, by 
excluding 40% of the rural population, legalizing their 
landless position, and giving priority to those who were 
either sharecroppers or owners of agricultural means of 
production, the land reform accentuated the existing 
differentiation within the peasantry. Permanent 
proletarianization of landless agricultural labourers was 
also a necessary prerequisite if capitalist production 
relations were to develop in the countryside.
The law made membership of rural co-operatives mandatory for 
peasants receiving land. The rural co-operatives were 
created to assist peasants in obtaining credit, marketing 
surplus, and purchasing agricultural supplies. As will be 
discussed later, cooperatives failed to perform this role 
and became agencies of state control.
The exact number of villages in Iran is a matter of 
controversy. According to 1966 census data, which defined a 
village as a permanent settlement inhabited by at least 
5,000 people, there were 67,000 villages in Iran (Hooglund, 
1982:4-5).6 Estimations of the number of villages and 
peasants affected by the first phase of the land reform are 
equally conflicting. However, given the unequal distribution 
of land amongst the peasantry and the various escape clauses 
allowing landlords to retain their holdings, the impact of 
this phase of the land reform was limited. The approximate
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estimation would be that about 30% of all villages were 
affected by the first phase of the land reform. Only a third 
of these villages were wholly distributed, while the 
remaining two thirds were partially affected by land 
redistribution. On the whole, between 25% to 33% of all 
peasant families received land under this phase of the 
reform.7 It should be noted that this estimation includes 
only the sharecropping nasag-holders and owners of 
agricultural means of production. Given that 40% of the 
rural population were excluded from land redistribution, the 
percentage of the total rural population affected by this 
phase would be much lower.
The second stage of the land reform, which began in February 
1965, was designed to regularize the existing land tenure 
system rather than to further redistribute land. It 
basically amounted to an institutionalization and increase 
of the existing tenancies. This phase dealt with those 
villages which had been exempted from redistribution under 
the first phase. The law provided for all land cultivated by 
sharecroppers to be settled according to one of the 
following 5 options:
1 - Rent the land to peasants on the basis of 30-year 
leases. The landowner would receive an annual cash rent 
determined by the net income of the past three years and 
subject to 5-year revisions.
2 - Sell the land to peasants at a mutually agreed upon 
price.
3 - Divide the land with peasants according to the 
prevailing sharecropping arrangements.
4 - By mutual agreement, establish an owner-cultivator
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joint-stock company. Each member would receive shares 
according to the number of the means of production 
contributed (land, tools, etc.). Profits from the sale of 
the crop would be distributed according to the ownership of 
shares.
5 - Purchase the peasants' cultivation rights.
Religiously endowed properties (vafq), which had been 
exempted in the first phase of the land reform, were also 
subject to tenancies lasting for 99 years. As in the first 
phase, landless agricultural labourers were excluded in this 
phase of the reform and only share-cropping nasaq-holders 
were allowed to purchase or lease lands (Lambton, 1969: 
200-2). Large landlords could exempt 500 hectares of their 
property from these methods of settlement by declaring them 
as 'mechanized', that is, by acquiring a tractor and 
employing wage-labour.
The second stage was completed in January 1967. Overall, 
54,032 villages (including some of those partially affected 
by the first phase) and 21,919 farms were affected by it 
(Hooglund, 1982:64). From a total of 1.7 million 
sharecroppers, only 57,164 (3.64%) peasants bought 
landlords' land; another 156,279 (10.04%) peasants became 
landowners through division of land according to 
sharecropping arrangements; another 83,267 received shares 
in agricultural corporations, while only 17,157 (0.87%) 
peasants agreed to sell their cultivation rights. Therefore, 
the most popular method of settlement was the conclusion of 
30-year tenancies between peasant sharecroppers and 
landlords. By the end of 1971, over 80% of all peasants
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transferred their sharecropping arrangements to tenancies 
(Halliday, 1979:111-2; Hooglund, 1982:64-7; Richards, 
1975:8). Although a large number of peasants were affected 
by this phase of the reform, a smaller number actually 
acquired land; 200,000 peasants received land under the 
second phase compared to 750,000 under the first phase (see 
Table 16). The predominant result of this phase was the 
transformation of previously insecure and verbal 
sharecropping arrangements into written and legally binding 
tenancies, which also prevented further division of 
landholdings. Tenancy arrangements were welcomed by 
landowners, for they essentially preserved their property 
rights. This protection of landlords' property rights 
prevented the replacement of the power base of landlords by 
a strong, independent peasantry, while the independence of 
landlords as a class was significantly eroded by the state.
The predominance of tenancies under the second phase only 
gave legal sanction to the previous sharecropping 
arrangements. In 1968 the government decreed a new set of 
regulations, known as the third phase of the land reform. 
These regulations provided for the sale of all land held on 
30-year leases to peasant-tenants. This phase was thus 
designed to convert the tenancy arrangements, brought into 
being by phase two, into ownership by selling the land to 
tenant-farmers. The sale of land did not apply to 
religiously endowed property, leased for a period of 99 
years, nor did it affect 'mechanized' land, exempted under 
the previous two phases. However, landlords still had the 
choice of dividing their lands with peasant-tenants 
according to sharecropping arrangements, or buying their
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cultivation rights. This phase ended in September 1971 when 
the land reform programme was officially terminated.
There are no accurate statistics on the number of 
tenant-farmers affected by the third phase. As can be seen 
in the following table, about 800,000 peasants acquired land 
by purchase or transfer, that is, about two-thirds the 
number of those receiving tenancies under the second phase. 
Therefore, roughly, 450,000 to 50,000 peasants lost the 
right they had acquired previously under phase two and 
became landless labourers or migratory workers. Taken 
together, 92% of all 2.1 million pre-reform sharecroppers 
were transformed into peasant-proprietors within the period 
of 1962-71. Over one-third of the total, or about 750,000, 
of sharecroppers received land under the first phase of the 
land reform. Under the second phase, approximately another 
200,000 peasants became landowners, and in the third phase 
about 800,000 tenants were able to obtain land. The 
following table summarizes the results of the land reform in 
the period of 1962-71.
Table 16: Land Redistribution 1962-1971
Total Nasaq-holders. 1962Peasants Acquiring LandUnder Phase 1
Under Phase 2Owner Sale to PeasantsOwner Division With PeasantsUnder Phase 3Purchase of 30-Year Tenancies Owner Division With Peasants 
TotalPeasants Holding 99-year Vafq 
LeasesTotal Beneficiaries of Land Redistribution Peasants Not Obtaining Land Percentage of Nasaq-holders 
Obtaining Land
2,100,028
753,258
57,164 156,279
738,119 61.805 
1,766,625 172.103
1,938,728
161,300 92%
Source: Hooglund, 1982: 72
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I shall later discuss the implications of the transformation 
of 92% of sharecroppers into a class of peasant small-owners 
for the development of capitalism in Iranian agriculture.8 
At this point it is necessary to emphasize that one reason 
for the inability of this class of peasant-proprietors to 
sustain their holdings was the failure of rural cooperatives 
to perform their role as credit organizations. Although 
membership of cooperatives was made mandatory for peasants 
receiving land, by 1972, 8,450 societies had been created, 
registering only 54% of those eligible for membership 
(Katouzian, 1974:234). It is important to note that the main 
reason for the slow growth of cooperatives, especially 
during the first phase of the reform, is that they were seen 
as developing into autonomous peasant bases, and 
particularly into a stronghold of support for the 
Agricultural Minister Arsanjani. Appointed as Minister of 
Agriculture in 1961, Arsanjani was considered as a radical 
reformer, and his National Congress of Rural Cooperatives 
was seen as underplaying the role of the monarch. In 1963 he 
'resigned' over the question of cooperatives. The Ministry 
of Land Reform and Rural Cooperatives was established in 
1965, and in 1967 the Central Organization of Rural 
Cooperatives (CORC) was incorporated into this Ministry. The 
function of CORC was to borrow from government banks and the 
Plan Organization and to provide credit to small 
peasant-proprietors through cooperatives. The incorporation 
of CORC into the newly-instituted Ministry, and later in 
1969, the takeover of its financial functions by the 
Agricultural Cooperative Bank, were aimed at preventing the 
development of cooperative societies into autonomous peasant 
bases and increasing state control of rural areas. Even
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after the removal of Arsanjani and the establishment of a 
firm control of cooperative movement, the Shah was wary of 
substantially increasing the flow of funds into 
cooperatives, compared with the real credit needs of the 
peasantry, the total amount of sums going into coops 
remained insignificant. Therefore, from semi-autonomous 
institutions cooperatives were transformed into agencies of 
the state, which utilized them to provide credits to mainly 
'rich peasants'.9 For the majority of small peasant-owners, 
traditional dependency on moneylenders and usurers, and the 
practice of salaf-khari. continued as before.
I have so far discussed the land reform without any direct 
reference to its impact on nomadic societies. As I have 
argued in Chapter Three, tribal structures represent a set 
of production relations different from that of sedentary 
societies due to the communal nature of land ownership, the 
centrality of the kinship system and the mode of surplus 
extraction. At a more general level, however, they express 
the conditions of natural economy in that they are involved 
in simple reproduction. As has been previously argued, 
commoditization of the economy and the development of 
private property rights in land also affected tribal 
societies by introducing production of exchange-values and 
gradually dissolving their internal structures, although to 
a much smaller extent. There are no meaningful data on the 
size of nomadic population and the extent of the 
commoditization of their economies. Issawi (1971:20) 
estimates that nomadic tribes made up about half the Iranian 
population in the early 19th century, and a quarter at the 
end of the century. In the period before the land reform, it
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is estimated that 2 million out of 18 million of rural 
population was constituted by tribes; they formed between 
11% to 12% of the non-urban population of Iran (Hooglund, 
1982:5; Brun et al., 1978:18).
In relation to tribal societies, the land reform had a 
similar objective as it did in relation to sedentary 
societies: undermining the subsistence nature of their 
economy, thus allowing for capitalist production relations 
to develop. The land reform broke up the communal pattern of 
land ownership in tribal units by allocating land to 
individual tribal households and undermining the economic 
and social role of tribal chiefs. The accompanying law of 
the nationalization of pastures10 aimed at preventing the 
communal use of grazing land. Their settlement was not 
beneficial to non-urban economy; meat production, for 
example, declined substantially (Brun et al., 1978:19). 
Tribes were assigned the worst land, and received no support 
or loans. Inexperienced as farmers, lacking capital, skills 
or a trade, the land reform and the nationalization of 
pastures were steps towards their proletarianization (Brun 
et al., 1978; Keddie, 1981; Fazel, 1985).11 Although no data 
on the extent of the transformation of tribal societies are 
available, it is safe to assume that land reform policies 
led to the penetration of exchange-value production of 
tribal units more systematically than before. I shall later 
deal with the question of the incomplete dissolution of 
tribal economies in the post-land reform period.
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In the sedentary agriculture, two new phenomena of farm 
corporation and agribusiness reinforced the dispossession of 
the peasantry and consolidated state control in the late 
1960s and 1970s. The legislation for the establishment of 
farm corporations was passed in 1967. These corporations 
were collectively-owned agricultural units which 
incorporated up to 10 villages into a single unit. All 
capital investment was provided by the state and no private 
capital was involved. Peasant-proprietors, tenants and 
owners of agricultural means of production were reguired to 
turn over their land and property in return for land shares 
in farms eguivalent in value to the property contributed. 
Peasants would obtain a portion of the annual profit on the 
basis of the number of shares they held. They could also 
supplement their income by working for the corporation for a 
daily wage. In this sense, peasant-proprietors were not 
exactly dispossessed, and their ownership of land was 
converted into ownership of shares. In reality, their 
position changed from peasant-proprietors and tenants into 
proto-proletarians. Membership of farm corporations was 
confined to peasants who had acquired land through purchase 
or division of land under any of the three phases of the 
land reform, to cultivators of plantations and orchards 
which had been exempted from distribution, to small 
landowners living in the villages, and to those landowners 
and sharecroppers who had not been affected by the land 
reform. According to the 1967 Act, farm corporations could 
be established only if 51% of those deemed 'eligible' by the 
state gave their consent (Richards, 1975:10). The landless 
labourers, constituting 40% of the rural population, were 
neither entitled to vote for the formation of farm
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corporations nor to become members.
The main objective of farm corporations was to accelerate 
capitalization of agriculture through specialization and 
mechanized production of cash crops, high rates of capital 
investment, and by concentrating fragmented individual 
holdings into vast corporate tracts. Farm corporations also 
increased the state's economic and social control in the 
rural areas. The state invested large amounts of capital in 
these agricultural units in the form of low interest rates 
and long-term loans. By 1978, a total of 94 farm 
corporations, encompassing 850 separate villages with a 
population of over 300,000, had been established. The 
typical farm corporation embraced 8 to 10 villages 
(Hooglund, 1982:86). Despite heavy state investment, farm 
corporations did not lead to increased agricultural 
productivity. By the mid-1970s, they accounted for only 
about 5% of the total agricultural output (Richards,
1975 :12 ) .
As a result of the establishment of farm corporations, 
peasant-proprietors increasingly lost their control over the 
land. Those sharecroppers who had received land in the first 
phase of the land reform, and those who had become tenants 
in the second phase, found these arrangements void of any 
meaning. They were hostile to farm corporations and 
considered working on these farms as wage-labourers and 
share-holders as next to virtual proletarianization. The 
sense of insecurity, resentment and resistance on the part 
of peasants was so strong that a bill, enacted in 1975, 
authorized the forced expropriation of the land belonging to
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those peasants who refused to join the farm corporations 
(Halliday, 1979:113). These corporations, by promoting 
differential shareholding and excluding the landless 
labourers from membership and shareholding altogether, 
perpetuated class divisions in the rural areas. Some of the 
rich peasants did prosper as a result of receiving dividends 
from their shares, but such peasants formed an extremely 
small minority. The pattern of shareholding widened the gap 
between them and the majority of peasant-proprietors on the 
one hand, and between these two groups and landless 
labourers on the other hand. The landless labourers found 
themselves permanently driven out of the rural areas as farm 
corporations reduced demand for casual wage-labour.
The introduction of agricultural joint-venture investment, 
known as agribusiness, completed this phase. The origin of 
agribusiness dates back to the mid-1950s when an American 
firm began the construction of Dez Dam, which irrigated 
20,000 acres of land, in the southwest province of Khuzestan 
(Theberge, 1973). In 1968, agribusiness projects began in 
earnest when the state bought large tracts of land from 
peasant small-owners at nominal prices to promote 
agribusiness complexes over 5,000 hectares. The objective of 
agribusiness policy was similarly the creation of 
large-scale, mechanized capitalist farms. The investors in 
these projects were the state and foreign and domestic 
private capital, although in practice the Iranian state 
owned more than 60% of the shares of all agribusiness firms 
altogether (Katouzian, 1983:318). In addition to large-scale 
direct capital investment, the state made every effort to 
attract foreign capital investment, including tax relief,
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low interest long-term loans, cost-sharing of major 
construction projects, and guarantees for repatriation of 
profits to foreign countries. In the case of Dez Dam in 
Khuzestan province, the state compelled all of the 
peasant-proprietors in 58 villages to sell their land, 
amounting to a total of 67,000 hectares. Subsequently,
55,000 persons were evicted and the villages were bulldozed 
away. The state then leased the land for 30 years to 11 
domestic and foreign companies, including MNCs such as 
Mitsui of Japan and Shell International, and international 
banks such as Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank and City 
Bank of New York. By 1978 a total of 36 agribusiness firms 
controlled an aggregate of 200,000 hectares of irrigated 
land. The total number of displaced persons is unknown, but 
as many as 75,000 people are estimated to have been evicted 
as a result of the formation of these firms. By the late 
1970s only 10,000 to 20,000 of these dispossessed villagers 
were 're-settled' in the government-built shanty towns on 
the fringes of the cities (Hooglund, 1982:85; Richards, 
1975:14).12
Although the three phases of the land reform, and the 
subsequent farm corporations and agribusiness projects, 
achieved their principal objectives of reducing the size of 
private feudal holdings, creating a class of capitalist 
farmers and 'freeing' labour, they failed both to expand a 
home market which could absorb the dispossessed labour and 
to raise agricultural productivity; both necessary 
prerequisites if a successful capitalization of agriculture 
was to be accomplished. Essentially, land reform policies 
created two types of landholding: large-scale capitalist
363
holdings of agribusiness firms, farm corporations and 
private firms, and the small holdings belonging to 
peasant-proprietors. Apart from differences in the quality 
of land, scale of production, choice of technique, and 
managerial organization, they also entailed significantly 
different types of landownership and production relations, 
which will be analyzed below. Farm corporations and 
agribusinesses together accounted for only 2.8% of the crop 
land; the remaining 97.2% of landholding was owned by 
private capitalist farms and peasant small-owners. Within 
the latter category, 15.2% of the total landholding was 
owned by private capitalist farms, and thus peasant-holdings 
accounted for 82% of the crop land (Katouzian, 1983:331).
The following table shows the distribution of land amongst 
these categories.
Table 17: Distribution of Land Amongst the Main Categories of Landholding
Million (%) ShareHectares in Total
Traditional 17.2 97.2
(non-corporate)
(i) Peasant (14.5) (82.0)
(ii) Independent Capitalist (2.7) (15.2)
Modern (corporate) 0.5 2.8
(i) Farm Corporations (0.3) (1.7)
(ii) Agribusinesses (0.2) (1.1)
Total 17.7 100.0
Source: Katouzian, 1983:332
The failure of both corporate land and peasant 
small-holdings in raising the productivity of labour is 
directly related to the state's credit policies. In general, 
state policy favoured extensive, large-scale private
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mechanized farming against small and medium 
peasant-proprietors. Most state economic and technical aid 
from the late 1960s onwards went into a small number of 
large-scale capitalist agricultural units. On average, only 
10% of the state plan funds were allocated to agriculture in 
1963-76. More than 50% of these funds was spent on farm 
corporations and agribusinesses covering only 2.8% of the 
total crop land and producing crops such as sugar cane, 
cotton and opium for export markets. A conseguence of the 
lack of access to long-term credit was the low capital 
investment by small peasant proprietors. In 1978, one-third 
of total capital was owned by just over 1% of the landowning 
peasants (Katouzian, 1978:333-4, 359). This figure shows the 
gross inequality in the distribution of both state credit 
and land. Moreover, the provision that only landowning 
peasants could be members of cooperatives and receive loans 
accentuated the class divisions in the rural areas. The 
inequality increased between nasaq-holders who had received 
land, and those landless wage-labourers who had not, as did 
the inequality among the peasant-proprietors themselves.
The concentration of ownership of land and the mechanization 
of agriculture, as well as the state's credit policies, led 
to tremendous unemployment in the rural areas and to 
rural-urban migrations. Between 1966 and 1976 at least 2 
million villagers migrated to the cities (Carey, 1976:360). 
In contrast to the 1930s and 1940s, rural-urban migration 
in the 1960s and 1970s was related to 'push' factors, i.e., 
to landlessness and limited employment opportunities in the 
rural areas (Bharier, 1971:31). Rural-urban migrations due 
to 'push' factors signalled the beginning of a large-scale
365
and systematic process of real subsumption of labour by 
capital. Between 1955 and 1966, 80% of the decline in the 
agricultural labour force was attributable to the departure 
of dispossessed peasants. Between 1969 and 1976 the 
percentage of the total labour force employed in agriculture 
fell from nearly 46% to 33% (Amuzegar et al.# 1971:97; 
Bharier, 1971:140-1).
Another consequence of these agricultural policies was that 
peasant-proprietors consumed most of their production and 
could not produce a marketable surplus. The little credit 
which small producers could obtain was spent mainly on their 
immediate consumption needs or was used to repay old debts. 
Peasant-proprietors had to resort to traditional sources of 
credit, obtaining loans at high interest rates from 
moneylenders, merchants and usurers in the villages; 
foreselling their harvest at low prices, cutting back on 
household consumption, and leaving a large part of their 
land fallow.13 This point brings us to the important 
question of the nature of production relations in small 
peasant holdings and their relationship with other types of 
landownership.
D. Post-Reform Class Structure: Development of Capitalism 
and Non-capitalist Forms of Production
In Chapter Two of this study, I have argued that 
precapitalist production relations are transformed by 
capital exercising different degrees of control over 
production and exchange. This has been shown through the 
distinction between direct or real subsumption of labour
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through the process of production, and indirect control or 
formal subsumption of production relations through markets.
It has been argued that different types of subsumption, and 
different forms of capital, can co-exist in a single area 
and can be mutually dependent. In the following analysis I 
argue that state-induced agrarian transition in Iran has 
resulted in different forms of control and penetration by 
capital, and then consider the implications of this 
particular type of capitalist development for the agrarian 
class structure.
At a very general level, the result of nearly one decade 
(1962-71) of agrarian structural changes was the removal of 
the barrier of precapitalist private monopoly on land, which 
allowed the introduction of capitalist production relations. 
The first important impact to consider is the structural 
change in the nature of private land ownership. We may 
recall that before the land reform about 70% of the 
country's total of 17.7 million hectares of crop land 
belonged to absentee landlords. After the reform, it has 
been argued that three types of land ownership came into 
existence: privately-owned capitalist farms, covering 15.2% 
of the crop land; corporate land (farm corporations and 
agribusinesses) covering 2.8% of the crop land; and peasant 
small-holdings covering 82% of the crop land.14 Therefore, 
the size of the privately-owned crop land was reduced 
substantially by land redistribution: from 70% to less than 
18% of the crop land.15 The number of large absentee 
landowners was similarly reduced. During the 1970s, there 
were some 200,000 absentee owners, that is, approximately 
half of the number of non-cultivating owners before the land
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reform (Hooglund, 1982:78-9). In other words, 52% of 
privately-owned crop land (excluding orchards and pastures) 
was sold or leased to share-croppers and owners of 
agricultural means of production; while 50% of prereform 
absentee landlords continued to own nearly 18% of the crop 
land ( or 50% of the total land, if orchards and pastures 
are taken into account - see note No.15). Moreover, the 
extent of concentration of land amongst the large landowners 
decreased. The holdings of at least 90% of private 
landowners were between 20 to 100 hectares, while truly 
large land ownership, that is, ownership of land from 100 to 
500 hectares, was limited to approximately 7,000 individuals 
(Hooglund, 1982:81-2).
The land reform, therefore, not only reduced the number of 
absentee landlords to one-half but it also decreased the 
extent of concentration of land within the remaining members 
of this class. Large private estates, embracing several 
villages each, were eliminated. But what is particularly 
significant is that, after 1971, the nature of landownership 
in these large private estates was fundamentally 
transformed: precapitalist landowners were transformed into 
capitalist farmers. Within these large estates, 
sharecroppers lost their traditional right to cultivate the 
land. The landowners exploited the land on the basis of two 
methods: they either leased out their land seasonally and in 
return for a fixed rent in cash, payable either in advance 
or after the harvest, or they employed wage-labour. As 
wage-labour employment proved more profitable than leasing 
the land, it became the predominant method of cultivating
the land.
368
Corporate lands (farm corporations and agribusinesses) were 
also based on capitalist land ownership, with the difference 
that instead of individual capitalist farmers, these farms 
were controlled, managed and largely owned by the state. The 
wage-labour employed on both private and state-owned farms 
was provided by landless agricultural labourers. The effect 
of excluding this group of the rural population from land 
redistribution was to create a class of rural proletariat 
whose only means of subsistence was the sale of its labour 
power. In 1971 there were about 1 million agricultural 
labourers who depended almost entirely on wage-labour 
(Hooglund, 1981:115-9).
So far, we can conclude that the land reform substantially 
altered the feudal nature of landownership by transforming 
feudal estates into capitalist farms predominantly based on 
wage-labour employment and production of cash-crops for the 
market. The capitalist farms were owned by private 
individuals, foreign capital or the Iranian state. Some of 
the privately-owned capitalist farms were over 50 hectares, 
while others were between 50 to 10 hectares. The ultimate 
objective of production in these farms was to maximize 
profitability by reinvestment of the surplus in production 
processes, such as in advanced agricultural machinery and 
fertilizers, and by reducing the cost of production through 
exploitation of cheap labour power. With the removal of the 
precapitalist private monopoly on land, products of these 
farms began to participate in the equalization of the 
average rate of profit, and a capitalist type of calculation 
came to dominate these enterprises. New classes of agrarian 
bourgeoisie and proletariat emerged.
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The land reform also transformed approximately 98% of 
pre-reform sharecroppers into a class of
peasant-proprietors, numbering about 2 million peasants. As 
mentioned above, the pattern of land redistribution amongst 
this class of peasant small-holders was extremely unegual. 
The land reform law gave priority to 'rich peasants'. On the 
whole, out of the 2 million peasant-proprietors, about 75% 
acguired land of less than 7 hectares; and about 35% within 
this category obtained land of less than 1 hectare 
(Hooglund, 1982:90-1). Given that the minimum of subsistence 
level in Iranian agriculture is ownership of 8 hectares of 
land, the fact that 75% of peasant-proprietors owned land 
below subsistence level had significant implications for the 
development of capitalism in agriculture and rural class 
formation. The nature of production relations within these 
households and their relations to capital (i.e., private 
capitalist farms, farm corporations and agribusinesses) 
indicate the particular character of agrarian transition to 
capitalism.
In Development of Capitalism in Russia. Lenin (1956) 
distinguished between two paths of transition to capitalism. 
The first path, called the 'Prussian path', consisted of the 
transformation of the landlord class into capitalist farmers 
by means of internal evolution of the estate. This form of 
transition has also been called one of 'internal 
proletarianization' as it is marked by the transformation of 
tenants into wage-labourers within the boundaries of the 
estate. The second form of transition is that of the 
'American path', or 'external proletarianization', based on 
the capitalist differentiation of the peasantry or direct
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producers. This differentiation arises when tenants obtain 
the title to their land and begin to work it independently 
of the landlord. The capitalist differentiation divides 
peasants into the three groups of 'rich' ('kulaks'), 'poor' 
and 'middle' peasants.
In the Iranian case, we can observe that the state's 
intervention in agriculture has resulted in a combination of 
both 'internal' and 'external proletarianization'. The 
transformation of large feudal landlords into capitalist 
farmers employing wage-labour provided by previous tenants 
and sharecroppers of the estate is analogous with the 
'internal proletarianization' path. The feudal estates 
transformed along this line, we may recall, covered only a 
small proportion of the crop land if we disregard orchards 
and pastures, but about 50% of the total land if we take 
them into account. The transformation of 
sharecroppers-tenants into peasant-proprietors can be 
interpreted as a movement towards 'external 
proletarianization'. A minority of these employed 
wage-labour; about 8.6% of peasant-proprietors owned between 
10 to 50 hectares of land, and we can assume that employment 
of wage-labour occurred amongst this small group of 
'kulaks'. But this is not an accurate picture. It would be 
erroneous to assume that a general theory of agrarian 
transition can be drawn from Lenin's analysis of one 
conjuncture, and that the changes which took place in 20th 
century Iran were exact historical parallels of those which 
Marx or Lenin described. I argue that the capitalist 
differentiation of the peasantry ('external 
proletarianization') took a specific form in the Iranian
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agriculture. A closer examination of the class of 
peasant-proprietors, and their relationship to capital, 
clarifies this point.
As mentioned above, an overwhelming majority of 
peasant-proprietors, that is, 75%, acquired land which was 
below the subsistence level. Thus, compared to a small 
minority of private capitalist farmers, the reform created a 
rather large class of owner-cultivators who were unable to 
subsist through their holdings. In order to specify the 
nature of production relations and the relationship of 
peasant-proprietors to capital, I have to refer to another 
distinction made by Lenin in the Development of Capitalism 
in Russia. Lenin argues that the movement of capital to 
determine the conditions of precapitalist production and 
exchange can be described broadly in terms of 'horizontal' 
and 'vertical' concentrations of direct producers.
Horizontal concentration occurs with direct expropriation 
and proletarianization of the peasantry and the formation of 
enterprises which are capitalist in their organization of 
production and mode of economic calculation. This is the 
'classic model' of transition, in which agriculture is 
characterized by large-scale capitalist farms and 
wage-labour. This model also implies the real subsumption of 
labour by capital. Vertical concentration, on the other 
hand, occurs when capital comes to dominate the production 
of numerous small producers without transforming their 
internal structures. Labour processes are formally subsumed 
by capital in this mode of capital penetration.
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In the periphery, as Goodman and Redclift (1981) observe, 
the state's intervention in agriculture has usually resulted 
in the 'vertical concentration' of the peasantry. To be more 
precise, state intervention in the Iranian agriculture 
resulted in the 'vertical concentration' of an overwhelming 
majority of sharecroppers. The nature of production 
relations within these households was subsistence 
production. that is, production of use-values through family 
labour for immediate personal consumption and reproduction 
of the household. But since the size of their allotments was 
much below the subsistence level, peasant-proprietors had to 
resort to other sources of income to meet the conditions of 
reproduction of the household. One such supplementary means 
of support was casual wage-labour on private capitalist 
farms or state-owned/controlled corporate lands. But 
wage-labour within villages did not amount to more than 
several days' wages per year. After 1971, the majority of 
these small-holders had to find wage-labour outside 
villages, that is, they had to travel to urban centres on a 
daily or seasonal basis. This situation clearly shows that 
the majority of small-holders were not fully dependent on 
wage-labour, nor could they meet the conditions of the 
reproduction of the household without it. It has been argued 
in Chapter Two that under the conditions of combined 
production of use-value and exchange-value, and partial 
possession and control of the means of production by direct 
producers, capital dominates these direct producers without 
altering their internal labour process. These direct 
producers are thus formally subsumed by capital. More 
precisely, the relations of production in which these direct 
producers are engaged represent particular and determinate
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combinations of precapitalist and capitalist relations of 
production. The reproduction cycle of these direct producers 
has been broken and so production of exchange-value has 
become an economic necessity. In this sense, they do not 
constitute a distinct, separate mode of production.16 The 
form of capital dominating these households is no longer 
merchant's capital operating in the sphere of exchange only, 
but money capital intervening at the point of production. In 
this sense, these subsistence producers are fundamentally 
different from pre-reform subsistence producers. Placed in 
the context of capitalist production relations, it is not 
possible to suppose that these subsistence producers exist 
in a state of 'natural economy', operating independently of 
the larger relations of production which engulf them.
Indeed, the term 'peasant-proprietor' is descriptive rather 
than analytical in that it does not specify the internal 
organization, the mechanisms of surplus appropriation and 
the mode of subsumption of these production units by 
capital.
In their competition with the farm corporations, 
agribusinesses and private farms, which represented the 
interests of capital, small peasant-proprietors had to cover 
costs of their reproduction, both individual and productive, 
characteristically through 'self-exploitation', resulting in 
the devalorization of their labour time and production of 
absolute surplus-value. One form of this 'self-exploitation' 
was domestic production of carpets and textiles. As I have 
discussed in the previous Chapter, carpet weaving spread in 
both rural and urban areas in the 1970s. It has been argued 
that domestic production of carpets and textiles, especially
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by female members of the household, contributed to the
reproduction of labour power and was therefore a source of
subsidy for capital.17 According to Bharier (1971):
Throughout the twentieth century many farmers and their families supplemented their incomes not only by production of livestock products but also by small-scale manufacturing or processing activities. For the most part, such activities were for self-consumption but some products, particularly carpets, were marketed. (Bharier, 1971:141)
As mentioned earlier, greater reliance on cash-income and 
pre-sale of products are characteristic features of 
devalorization of labour time. This is particularly evident 
in the continued dependence of peasant-proprietors on credit 
advanced by village shopkeepers, moneylenders and middlemen; 
and the persistence of the practice of salaf-khari (pre-sale 
of products) in the post-reform period in the rural areas. 
The subsistence nature of these production units, in 
competition with capital, forced peasant-proprietors to 
remain dependent upon consumption loans as well as on loans 
for the reproduction of the means of production from village 
shopkeepers and moneylenders. Through various policies such 
as high interest loans, food credits and pre-harvest 
purchase of products, shopkeepers and moneylenders kept the 
majority of small producers perennially in debt. Indeed, 
with the abolition of sharecropping, shopkeepers and 
moneylenders became the indirect beneficiaries of the share 
of the harvest which formerly belonged to the landlord. 
Although their monopoly over credit and finance had 
apparently been eroded by the formation of the Agricultural 
Bank and cooperative societies, these state institutions did 
not represent a serious threat to small traders and
375
moneylenders because state policy channelled state-loans to 
large-scale capitalist farms. Therefore, shopkeepers and 
moneylenders continued to be the main source of 
high-interest short-term consumption loans. By the 1970s, 
they had increased their business with peasants by 25% by 
comparison with the previous decade (Hooglund, 1982:95).
This is an illustration of the point made earlier that 
different forms of capital can co-exist and be mutually 
dependent within a social formation. Rather than eradicating 
merchant's and usurer's capital, the introduction of 
capitalist production relations consolidated them, albeit in 
a subordinate position.
With regard to class characterization, I have argued in 
Chapter Two that these direct producers are neither 
'semi-proletarians', nor 'disguised proletariat'. They are, 
rather, 'wage-labourer equivalents', implying that their 
full proletarianization is an open question rather than an 
inevitable destiny. In their relationship with capital, 
these direct producers may continue to be reproduced for a 
long time, or they may eventually be proletarianized; the 
final outcome would depend on the particular local 
conditions of class struggle. In the Iranian case, the 
conversion of sharecroppers into a class of 
peasant-proprietors meant that the same individual came to 
play a new role (wage-labour) in the labour market without 
implying the necessary disappearance of subsistence 
production. Owning 2 or 4 hectares of land could be a 
prelude to eventual landlessness, or it could result in the 
same individual playing multiple social roles created by the
labour market.
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With regard to nomadic societies, it has been argued earlier 
that the land reform, and particularly the law of the 
nationalization of pastures, broke up the communal use of 
grazing land and undermined the subsistence nature of their 
economy. The distinction made here between pastoral and 
sedentary societies is based on two different sets of 
production relations rather than two essentially distinct 
'peasant' and 'nomadic' modes of production. In the 
post-reform period capitalism was developing in Iranian 
agriculture but less rapidly and systematically so in tribal 
structures as their integration with the larger economy was 
slower. Capital penetration of tribal societies was not 
thorough as it did not lead to a complete separation of 
direct producers from the means of production. Brun et al. 
(1978:18), for example, show that in the post-reform period 
tribes came to be increasingly dominated by merchants and 
usurers from the urban areas, who bought their lambs very 
cheaply and sold them items such as sugar, tea and cloth at 
exorbitant rates. In competition with capital, therefore, 
the labour of nomadic producers was similarly devalorized, 
leading to their self-exploitation and
semi-proletarianization. To the extent that the dissolution 
of the subsistence economy of nomadic tribes was incomplete 
and they combined production of use-value with that of 
exchange-value, nomadic societies can also be characterized 
as non-capitalist structures formally subsumed by capital.18
The above analysis of the impact of penetration of capital 
on the rural class structure can be summarized in the 
following terms:
1 - The land reform not only abolished the ownership of
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large feudal estates by their redistribution and by reducing 
the number of absentee landlords to nearly one-half, but it 
also structurally transformed the nature of landownership. 
Large feudal landlords were transformed into capitalist 
farmers, employing the previous sharecropper-tenants on the 
estate as wage-labourers ('external proletarianization').
2 - The reform transformed the majority of sharecroppers 
into a large class of peasant-proprietors. While this 
transformation could potentially lead to capitalist 
differentiation of the peasantry ('internal 
proletarianization'), the ownership of land below the 
subsistence level by a large proportion of this class, as 
well as the state's credit and price policies, hindered this 
differentiation. I have interpreted small peasant 
proprietors, together with nomadic tribes, as non-capitalist 
producers, formally subsumed by money and productive 
capitals and exploited through the devalorization of their 
labour time. I have emphasized that the subsistence nature 
of these units is fundamentally different from pre-reform 
subsistence production for, with the penetration of money 
capital into agriculture, they no longer are isolated 
self-sufficient economies.
3 - The impact of the land reform on the khushneshin 
population was uneven. The landless agricultural labourers, 
comprising about 40% of the rural population, were 
permanently and legally proletarianized. While the position 
of the rural petty-bourgeoisie was undermined, the land 
reform consolidated the position of the wealthiest group of 
khushneshins: shopkeepers, middlemen and moneylenders. 
Therefore, merchant's and usurer's capital continued to 
operate, although they were subordinated to money capital.
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The general conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis 
is that state-induced agrarian transition eradicated the 
dominance of the feudal mode of production over agrarian 
life. But did this lead to its total replacement by 
capitalism? I have argued that the state created a class of 
peasant small-owners who were not, strictly speaking, 
involved in capitalist production. The state's credit and 
price policies, as well as ownership of land below 
subsistence level by peasant-proprietors, erected barriers 
to viable operation of these units and so made accumulation 
of capital almost impossible for these direct producers. In 
1973, only 22.3% of the total agricultural units marketed 
over half of their agricultural products; 26.7% marketed 
less than half of what they produced; and 51% marketed a 
very small or no agricultural surplus. We can assume that 
those units which produced a marketable surplus were farm 
corporations and private capitalist farms whose size was 
over 10 hectares of land. Over half of the agricultural 
units unable to produce a marketable surplus would be 
composed of the small and fragmented holdings of 
owner-cultivators. According to input-output statistics for 
1965, 15% of the total inputs for production in agriculture, 
consisting mainly of consumption goods, machinery, and 
fertilizers, were purchased from industry, while industry 
purchased 30% of its total input from agriculture. In 1972, 
industry's purchases from agriculture had fallen to 1.2%, 
while agriculture purchased 46.4% of its total input from 
industry. In 1977, industry's inputs to agriculture were 
reduced to 40%, while agriculture continued to supply only 
1.2% of industry's purchases (Ghorayshi, 1981:29). These 
figures indicate the creation of a capitalist home market,
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restricted and distorted by increasingly low levels of rural 
income and agricultural productivity. It has been shown in 
the previous Chapter that the home market developed on the 
basis of the production of the means of consumption 
(Department II). The absence of the production of the means 
of production (Department I) linked the home market with the 
metropolitan economy.19 The import, rather than production, 
of capital goods and machinery meant that the 'freed' 
superfluous labour could not be absorbed and transformed 
into a proletarian position per se.
It is essential, however, to distinguish between the 
guestion of the nature of production relations and that of 
the level of capital accumulation. It is erroneous to argue 
that capitalism failed to develop in Iranian agriculture 
because of factors such as the restricted home market, lack 
of integration between Departments I and II, unequal income 
distribution, the limited demand for wage-labour, shortage 
or lack of capital, or credit. These factors are related to 
the level of capital accumulation and labour productivity 
rather than to the nature of production relations. It is 
possible to have a capitalist sector which is marked by low 
level of labour productivity or stagnation. My point is 
that, in analyzing the character of non-capitalist units of 
production, I have not based my argument on the quantitive 
or technical aspects of the capital accumulation process but 
on the nature of production relations. While the 'point of 
domination' of capital is an issue of controversy, I have 
argued in Chapter Two that capitalism becomes the dominant 
mode of production only when the following conditions are 
met: (1) labour is entirely separated from the means of
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production; (2) commodity production is generalized; and (3) 
the expanded reproduction of capital dominates the whole 
social formation. The last point implies that the ultimate 
end of capital accumulation is production and furthering of 
surplus-value by reinvesting it in the process of 
production. It also implies real subsumption of labour by 
capital and the appropriation of relative surplus-value. In 
the light of the above analysis it seems plausible to argue 
that the state's intervention in Iranian agriculture led to 
both formal and real subsumption of labour by capital. I 
have argued that these forms of subsumption are not mutually 
exclusive and that they can co-exist within a social 
formation. This analysis also shows that the principal 
function of state intervention is to re-define the relations 
under which labour is subsumed by capital, and to secure the 
conditions of reproduction of these relations. While in the 
'classical model' the conversion from formal to real 
subsumption of labour occurred through 'natural' forces of 
the market and private appropriations, this conversion in 
the periphery has been effected through the state. Farm 
corporations and agribusinesses in Iran were significant 
steps towards this conversion.
There is no doubt that the primary objective of the land 
reform was the eradication of precapitalist production 
relations and the capitalization of agriculture. Agrarian 
transition to capitalism in Iran took a specific form: while 
it dissolved the feudal mode of production and fundamentally 
transformed the mode of surplus appropriation from 
non-monetary precapitalist ground rent to one based on 
wage-labour, it also perpetuated the conditions of formal
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subsumption of labour by capital. The final conclusion to be 
drawn is that Iranian agriculture in the 1970s was 
predominantly capitalist, but a type of capitalism which 
perpetuated non-capitalist forms of production and 
restructured them as integral parts of the expanded 
reproduction of capital. The decline of Iranian agriculture 
in the 1970s was partly the outcome of the formal 
subsumption and absolute surplus-value production by these 
agricultural units.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX
1. All of these estimations are approximate as the statistics on the distribution of various categories of landholdings in Iran are frequently contradictory. Hooglund (1982:12-3), for example, estimates that in 1960 villages 
owned by the state numbered at least 1,500 in whole or in part, while vafq land amounted to 40,000 properties 
distributed as fractional parts of villages.These estimates do, however, show the general trend of the sale of state lands and the concentration of private landed property. For details on state and vafq lands, see Lambton (1953-1969) and Akhavi (1980) .
2. By 'rural population' I am referring, strictly speaking, to those involved in sedentary agriculture. A discussion of nomadic tribes in the present context presents theoretical problems as the pattern of landholding, the mode of surplus appropriation and the nature of production relations tribal societies are engaged in differ from those of sedentary societies (see for a discussion of these points, Chapter Three, Section A). The impact of the land reform on tribal units, however, will be discussed later in this Chapter.
3. There are various estimations of the size of both nasag-holders and khushneshins. The figures given in this and the preceding paragraph are based on the following sources: Hooglund (1982:28); Katouzian (1974:227); Keddie (1973:162); and Richards (1975:8). Generally speaking, estimations given in the literature on the percentage of the nasag-holders and khushneshins of the total rural population vary between 40% to 50% and 30% to 50% respectively.
4. The insignificant role of the middle peasantry in Iranian agriculture is fully discussed by Kazemi and Abrahamian (1978).
5. For a different, and 'politicist', interpretation of the land reform, see Bill (1972a) and Hooglund (1982). 
According to this interpretation, which dominates the study of the land reform in Iran, the land reform was initiated 
primarily for political rather than economic reasons. The political objectives of the land reform are cited as the elimination of the political power of large absentee landlords, its replacement with state control in the rural areas, and a broadening of the social base of the state by creating a class of peasant-proprietors. While these 
political objectives, as well as international factors such as the Chinese and Cuban Revolutions, were important in promoting the land reform, this study sees them of secondary importance and is basically concerned with an identification and analysis of major economic trends. Theinternationalization of money capital is seen as the central factor necessitating the removal of precapitalist monopoly ownership in land. For a critique of politicist interpretations of the land reform, see Tabari (1983).
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6. Keddie (1973:165) estimates the total number of villages in Iran as 49,000, while according to Katouzian (1974:229) there were over 71,000 villages in Iran before the reform.
7. As I have said above, this is an approximate estimation. It is not possible to give an accurate figure because there are conflicting estimations of both the number of villages and the number of peasant households. I have arrived at the above average estimations on the basis of the following sources: Hooglund (1982:72) estimates that one- third of all sharecroppers received land under the first phase; the number given by Katouzian (1983:341) is 23% of all peasant households receiving land; Bharier (1971:138) gives 25% to 30% as the percentage of those receiving land; Halliday (1979:111) estimates that one-fifth of the rural population acguired land and Keddie (1981:162) estimates that something like 9% of the total peasant population received land. Keddie's much lower estimation seems to be the result of taking into account the khushneshins. The percentage of villages affected given above is based on Keddie (1973:166), Bharier (1971:138) and Halliday (1979:110) .
8. According to a study undertaken in 1970 by the Institute of Social Studies and Research (Tehran University), only 56.2% of peasant households had been affected by land redistribution by 1970 (guoted by Momeni, 1980:305). This figure, however, does not contradict the estimation of 92% for the same category because of the following reasons: (1) it seems that the figure of 56.2% of peasants affected by the reform is based not on the size of the entire population of the sharecroppers, but, as the study states "...154 villages and 8,021 households from 7 different parts of the country which have all been affected by the various phases of the land reform..." (ibid, p.304). This is to say that the study arrives at this estimation on the basis of land distribution amongst 8,021 peasant households only; (2) the estimation of 92% of sharecroppers affected by the land reform is based on the size of the 
entire population of sharecroppers affected by the three phases of the land reform, that is, 1,750,000 individuals 
receiving land out of the total population of 2,100,000 sharecroppers; (3) the large discrepancy between 56% and 92% is obviously the result of the different estimations initially employed, i.e., 8,021 households and 2,100,000 
sharecroppers respectively. Egually important is the bases of these estimations. The unit of analysis in the former 
study is peasant household. while in the latter study it is individual sharecropper. This difference renders any attempt 
to compare the two figures misguided and problematic; (4) the conclusion to be drawn is that while the figure of 56% could be a valid estimation for the 8,021 households studied, it by no means contradicts, or is even relevant to, 
the estimation of 92% arrived on the basis of the total population of sharecroppers. As I have repeatedly mentioned throughout this Chapter, studies undertaken on the land reform are marked by conflicting and vague statistics.Almost every study gives a different set of figures for not only the size of post-reform peasant-proprietors but also
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for the size of the redistributed land, the percentage of sharecroppers affected by each phase, etc. The conflicting figures are the result of difficulties in obtaining reliable 
and precise data, as well as various theoretical categories and units of analysis adopted by individual researchers. For example, the above-mentioned study estimates that 7.9% of all peasant households received land under the first phase of the land reform (ibid,p.305), while in this study 25% to 30% of all peasant families are seen to have been affected by land distribution during the same period. For the basis of the latter estimate and conflicting interpretations of this point, see note No.7, this Chapter.
9. For a full discussion of cooperative societies, see Lambton (1971a). Richards (1975) discusses in detail the relationship between the Shah and Arsanjani, and the perception of the cooperative movement by the former as potentially threatening to the stability of the monarchy.
10. The law of the nationalization of pastures and forests was part of the six-point (later increased to twelve points) 
reform programme of 'White Revolution' introduced by the Shah in 1963. The land reform, of course, was the core of 
the programme.
11. Brun and Dumont (1978) discuss the economic effects of state's tribal policies in more detail. For other studies on nomadic tribes in Iran, see Beck (1984); Helfgott (1977); Garthwaite (1978); Fazel (1985); Loeffler (1978); and Smith(1978) .
12. The reasons for the failure of these projects have been extensively discussed in the literature. See, in particular, Halliday (1979), Hooglund (1982), and Richards (1975).
13. In this connection it is noteworthy that a study by Van Ginneken (1980) argues that, except for certain regions, 'poverty' as a whole and in the rural areas diminished between 1971 and 1976 in Iran. Based on statistics provided by the Statistical Centre of Iran, Van Ginneken shows that the percentage of poor peasant households decreased from 68% in 1971 to 41% in 1976. Within the same period, the percentage of middle and rich peasants increased from 30% and 2% to 35% and 6% respectively. It is extremely problematic to relate these data to the present discussion because of the theoretical approach adopted here. In this 
study, rural class structure is discussed on the basis of the structural position of producers and non-producers in the overall production relations. Van Ginneken's distinction between 'poor', 'middle' and 'rich' peasants is based on 
annual household expenditures. 'Poor peasants' are defined as those with annual expenditures of under $800 (1971-2) and 
$1200 (1975-6), and 'rich peasants' are those with annual expenditure of over $3150 (1971-2) and $4725 (1975-6) (ibid, 
P.645). Obviously, the categories of household income and expenditure are fundamentally different from Marxian concepts of ownership and property relations. These data do 
not lend themselves to any direct class analysis; those peasants defined as 'poor' on the basis of household expenditure would not necessarily fall into the same
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category once placed in the context of production relations. 
Van Ginneken's study does indicate that sections of the rural population prospered as a result of land reform policies, but a more accurate interpretation of the data presented by Van Ginnekin would be possible only if the central categories of his study are deconstructed: large sections of 'middle' or even 'poor' peasants are probably 'rich' peasants of this study who benefited from the differential pattern of shareholding promoted by the farm corporations. They had access to credits and loans, borrowed from the corporations and relent them at high interest rates to those who were only one step away from virtual proletarianization. Van Ginneken's hypothesis cannot be established with any degree of certainty unless additional information is available on the three categories of the peasantry. His conclusion that 'poverty' as a whole diminished in Iran between 1971 and 1976 needs to be considered in light of the fact that in 1972 alone, at least 8% of the total rural population migrated to cities as a result of ownership of land below subsistence level (Carey, 1976:360). The only general conclusion which can be drawn from Van Ginneken's study is that certain sections of the rural population benefited from agricultural policies in the 1970s. In broad terms, this could mean a decline in poverty for certain sections, but also an accentuation of class divisions - a point made in this study.
14. See Table 17, this Chapter.
15. In estimating that 18% of land was held by private landowners after the land reform, Katouzian (1983:332) has not taken the ownership of pastures and orchards by absentee landlords into account as these categories of land have been exempted from land redistribution. Hooglund's (1982:78-9,81) estimation of 50% of land owned by post-reform absentee landlords, on the other hand, includes the size of pastures and orchards. Generally speaking, studies on the land reform do not consider pastures and orchards in estimating the size of private holdings after redistribution. Hooglund arrives at the figure of 50% only by assuming that, after the land reform, the size of these categories of land was larger than crop land held by the landlords (because they were exempted from the reform). All figures on the size of land used throughout this study refer to crop land only. The size of pastures and orchards have not been taken into account; not only have they been excluded from redistribution but also no statistics have been found on their size before or after the land reform. The estimate of 70% of land owned by private landlords before the land reform, for example, refers to crop land only. Therefore, although in absolute terms the land held by private landlords must have been larger than 18% of the total land, 18% is a correct figure when referring to redistributed crop lands. In other words, both figures are acceptable, depending on whether only crop lands or crop lands and pastures and orchards are taken into 
account. The figure of 18%, however, is a more relevant estimation to employ here because this study has dealt with redistributed crop land only. I should also point out that it is neither significant nor does it affect the present 
argument whether the figure of 18% or 50% is used. The
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argument here is that the nature of production relations within privately-held land was transformed following the land reform and that the size of the crop land held by absentee landlords was considerably reduced, whether or not we take into account the size of the category constituted by pastures and orchards.
16. See, for example, Ghorayshi (1981) and Nima (1983) who analyze this class of peasant-proprietors in isolation from the dominant capitalist production relations. In this mode of analysis, these direct producers are characterized as somehow self-sufficient, reproducing themselves independently of capital. Nima (1983:40) argues that had sufficient credit and capital been channelled to this 'peasant class', agriculture would have been transformed not into capitalism but into a 'petty-commodity mode of production'.
17. See for indications of domestic production of commodities by peasant households: Afshar (1981), Bonine (1981) and Lambton (1984).
18. This theoretical point has also been developed by Asad (1978) in relation to the Bakhtiyari tribe in Iran.
19. For a brief discussion of the two Departments of production, see Chapter Five, note no.21.
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CONCLUSION
A principal claim of this study has been that there is a 
fundamental difference between the dynamics of transition to 
capitalism in the peripheral areas and the dynamics of 
transition in the core areas of the world market. In the 
'classical' model, transition to capitalism and development 
of capitalist production relations occurred endogenously, 
out of the internal contradictions of feudalism, and without 
competition from other industrial powers. The endogenous 
model of transition, however, cannot be transposed to 
peripheral formations where capitalism was introduced by 
external imposition and colonial domination, and where 
competition from advanced capitalist countries played a 
major role. A given level and mode of integration with the 
world capitalist system has resulted in the periphery's 
subordinate position in that system, has imposed certain 
structural limitations on the periphery, and has influenced 
its pattern of transition to capitalism. The objective of 
this study has been to substantiate this proposition through 
an historical examination of the process of 
peripheralization in Iran.
In order to specify the different trajectory capitalism has 
taken in the periphery, this study has adopted a 
periodization approach to the development of capitalism as a 
world system. Distinguishing between the three circuits of 
merchant capital, money capital, and productive capital, and 
the dynamics of their successive internationalization, it 
has been argued that the worldwide expansion of capitalism
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has proceeded unevenly in time and space, and through 
various stages, with each stage having a corresponding 
impact on the periphery. The systemic position of the 
periphery, therefore, is not fixed; it is subject to changes 
depending on the historical stage of world capital 
accumulation and on the dynamics of the internationalization 
of the dominant circuit of capital. Despite the complexities 
of capitalist development in different peripheral 
formations, this approach has identified certain modes of 
integration with the world market and certain economic 
trends which have been taken to constitute the history of 
peripheralization and the pattern of transition to 
peripheral capitalism.
In the phase of the internationalization of merchant 
capital, the development of the world capitalist system 
blocked the 'first path' of capitalist transition in the 
periphery, the direct producer/capitalist path which is the 
organic transition from the pre-capitalist to the capitalist 
mode of production experienced in Europe, and it imposed the 
'second path' of transition, the merchant/capitalist path. 
Internationalization of the circuits of money and productive 
capital has led to the capitalist transformation of the 
periphery and the formation of new centres of capital 
accumulation. However, the assumption that, with the 
expanded reproduction of capital, subsistence producers in 
the periphery will inevitably disappear, in a manner similar 
to that of 'classical' model of transition, has been 
questioned. The capitalist mode of production has become 
dominant in the periphery without the full expropriation and 
real subsumption by capital of large sectors of the
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workforce in the periphery. Peripheral capitalism has not 
led to 'internal proletarianization' but to the maintenance 
and reproduction of non-capitalist forms of production 
incorporated into the circuit of the expanded reproduction 
of capital.
These specificities of peripheral capital accumulation - the 
'second path' of transition to capitalism and the 
present-day survival and reproduction of non-capitalist 
producers - have led us to question formulations of 
capitalist transition in terms of general and universally 
necessary processes.
This approach also claims to provide a synthesis for 
conflicting neo-Marxist interpretations of the history of 
the world capitalist market: 'circulationism' and
'productionism'. The spheres of production, circulation and 
distribution are shown to form an 'organic whole' rather 
than distinct areas. However, by specifying the dynamics of 
the internationalization of each circuit of capital, it is 
possible to determine at what phase the sphere of 
circulation and at what stage the sphere of production each 
play a determining role in the structure of the periphery 
and the mode of its integration with the world market. It 
has been argued that, during the initial incorporation of 
the periphery into the world market, exchange relations were 
the mechanisms through which the precapitalist modes of 
production in the periphery were restructured and 
consolidated. In this phase the sphere of exchange played a 
dominant role while production relations were determinant. 
Internationalization of the circuits of money and productive
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capital subordinated the sphere of exchange and led to the 
dissolution of precapitalist inodes of production. At this 
stage, the sphere of production has become both dominant and 
determinant in incorporating the periphery into the world 
market.
The case-study undertaken here has provided an example of 
the process of peripheralization within this theoretical 
framework. A study of peripheral structuration in Iran has 
reguired an investigation of three areas: (i) the nature of
the mode of production and of the social structure 
prevailing in Iran before its integration with the 
capitalist world market; (ii) the modes and character of 
capitalist penetration at each stage of world capital 
accumulation; and (iii) the nature of the social structure 
after its incorporation into each circuit of capital.
This study has covered the period of 1800-1978 in Iran, 
identifying two approximate phases of capital accumulation: 
the period of 1800-1950, or the phase of the 
internationalization of merchant capital, and the period of 
1950-78, corresponding to the internationalization of the 
circuits of money capital and productive capital. However, 
it has not been possible to investigate fully all aspects of 
this complex, protracted and uneven process of 
peripheralization. For example, the exact character of the 
precapitalist mode of production in Iran before contact with 
the world market, and the precise nature of the social 
structure have not been fully discussed. The non-economic 
moments of society such as the structure of the state and 
the nature of class struggles during the major political
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events have been dealt with only insofar as they have 
influenced the major trends and changes in the structure of 
the economy identified here. It is, however, argued that the 
period under consideration, and the trends identified, do 
constitute major and basic turning points in the 
peripheralization of the Iranian economy.
In all historical case-studies there are specificities which 
have to be identified and isolated if certain trends are to 
be discovered. In discussing the initial incorporation of 
the Iranian social formation into the circuit of merchant 
capital, I have emphasized the specific mode and character 
of this integration. The foreign capital which initially 
incorporated Iran into the world market was not only 
mercantile in form but also divided and competing. As an 
area of rivalry throughout the 19th century between the two 
major imperialist powers of Russia and Britain, Iran was 
never formally colonized but assumed a semi-colonial 
position. During the first few decades of the 19th century a 
number of wars and military confrontations established this 
semi-colonial position, which was then consolidated through 
economic concessions. From the 1850s onwards economic 
concessions became the major mechanism through which 
commoditization of the economy on a precapitalist basis was 
accelerated. Iran was drawn into deeper and more extensive 
contacts with industrial capitalism of the centre which was 
expanding in search of raw materials and markets. It has 
been argued that this particular mode of mercantile capital 
penetration had significant long-term repercussions on the 
nature of the state and the pattern of class configuration, 
class struggles and class alliances.
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Incorporation into the circuit of merchant capital 
restructured and reoriented the existing precapitalist mode 
of production in Iran to the requirements of metropolitan 
capitalism, and blocked an organic transformation of 
petty-commodity to capitalist production. The major 
political events of the 19th and early 20th century have 
been analyzed in relation to the specific mode and character 
of mercantile capital penetration. Merchant capital not only 
consolidated the precapitalist mode of production in Iran, 
but, by its divided and competing nature, it is also seen to 
have created fractions within the dominant landowning class. 
The Constitutional Movement of 1905-11 has been analyzed in 
the context of these socio-economic transformations of Iran. 
Incorporation into the world market led to the formation of 
a merchant class that grew and declined as alterations were 
made in the form and degree of mercantile capital 
penetration. The failure of the Movement to accomplish its 
goal of establishing a bourgeois-democratic state has been 
seen as the result of the particular character of this 
merchant class, its non-antagonistic contradiction with the 
landowning class and metropolitan bourgeoisie, and, in 
general, of the semi-colonial position of Iran within the 
world market. These same features brought about nearly two 
decades of political crisis, continuing from the 
Constitutional Movement until the early 1920s and 
culminating in the emergence of the peripheral absolutist 
state. Reza Shah's state is seen as the first centralized 
state in Iran to regulate and generalize the (largely) 
precapitalist commoditization of the economy. Iran, by the 
early 20th century, had been transformed into a peripheral 
formation with specific social structural features unique to
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its particular experiences in the 19th century.
By the 1950s not only had the inter-imperialist rivalry long 
been ended and the USA emerged as the hegemonic imperialist 
power, but the mode of integration of the Iranian economy 
with the world market had also changed. Following the export 
of capital from the centre, and under the auspices of a 
directly interventionist state, the internationalization of 
money capital led to the development of capitalist 
production relations and the formation of a capitalist home 
market, albeit 'disarticulated' and 'extroverted' in many 
ways. Iran in the 1970s was dominated by a single capitalist 
mode of production; its peripheral character is seen not 
only in the distortions fomented by the initial 
incorporation into the circuit of merchant capital but also 
in the persistence and maintenance of non-capitalist labour 
processes. An investigation of various sectors of the 
economy, in both rural and urban areas, has shown that the 
internationalization of the circuits of money and productive 
capital led not to disintegration but to reproduction of 
non-capitalist labour processes incorporated into the 
capitalist mode of production.
I have considered the 'second path' of transition to 
capitalism imposed by merchant capital under the 
semi-colonial condition of the Iranian formation, and the 
'inability' or 'unwillingness' of money/productive capitals 
to wipe out and replace all other modes of exploitation by 
capitalist wage-labour, and thus generalize the extraction 
of relative surplus-value, as the defining features of 
peripheral capitalism in Iran. These two features also
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indicate the different trajectory which capitalist 
transition has taken in Iran.
In this study I have attempted to show how a given level and 
mode of integration with the world market has resulted in 
the peripheralization of a specific social formation, and 
how this hierarchical ordering has conditioned the 
subsequent development of that formation. The process of 
capitalist transition in Iran, of course, had its own 
specificities, not only due to the particular precapitalist 
social structure of Iran but also because of the particular 
mode of mercantile capital penetration. The experience of 
capitalist transition in Iran was not only unlike the 
experience of the centre countries transforming from one 
mode of production to another, but also unlike the 
experience of peripheral formations that underwent direct 
colonization.
To conclude, the Iranian case shows that: (i) the dynamics
of transition to capitalism in the periphery are 
fundamentally different from those of the centre, and there 
is no justification in extending the 'classical' model of 
transition into a general theory of capitalist development; 
and (ii) the centre/periphery relationship cannot be 
characterized either in terms of perpetual stagnation and 
underdevelopment, as the 'circulationist' variant of neo- 
Marxism has defined it, or in terms of the development and 
eventual homogenization of relations of production, as the 
'classical' Marxist view holds. An examination of nearly two 
centuries of capital accumulation in Iran shows that both 
'underdevelopment' and 'growth' have been experienced, and
395
that there is no linear homogeneous process of imperialist 
domination in which peripheral formations are either 
progressively transformed or perpetually underdeveloped. A 
diversified treatment of both capital and pre-capitalist 
modes of production, and of the historical periodization of 
world capital accumulation, has provided a synthesis which 
cuts across these overly simple classifications.
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